PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRY APOLINARIO Y BANDILLON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
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People versus Apolinario
The Case
This is the People of the Philippines against Jerry Apolinario y Bandillon, a criminal appeal from a conviction for homicide. The accused, a barangay kagawad, was charged with stabbing Marlon Pascua to death on a Manila street during a chase that followed a quarrel. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must hold: it is a clean teaching vehicle on the requisites of res gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule, and it sharply separates that doctrine from the dying declaration rule, which the prosecution never invoked. It also reminds us how the Court treats credibility findings of the trial court and how actual damages must be proved.
Procedural History
An Information for homicide was filed against Apolinario before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. At pretrial, the parties stipulated on the jurisdiction of the court and the identity of the accused. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment convicting Apolinario as principal in the crime of homicide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity, 50,000 pesos as moral damages, and 43,678 pesos as actual damages, plus costs.
Invoking his innocence, Apolinario appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the trial court's treatment of the victim's statements as part of the res gestae, its consideration of the testimony of prosecution witness Alky Infante, and its failure to credit the testimony of defense witnesses Flores and Fuentes.
Facts
On the evening of 28 November 2010, Alky Infante and his friends were drinking in front of Infante's house on Narciso Street in Pandacan, Manila. Hero Osongco and his girlfriend passed by, and Osongco, thinking the group was watching the couple argue, confronted them, uttered invectives, and threatened to get back at them. He left, returned, and cursed them again. Infante and his friends chased him; he hid in a canteen, was coaxed out by barangay kagawads, but again threw invectives and threats. The group chased him once more, and Marlon Pascua, Infante's cousin, joined the chase.
As the group ran, the appellant Apolinario, a barangay kagawad, blocked their way and introduced himself as such. He then drew a fan knife and tried to stab Infante but missed. Infante fell, and Pascua helped him up, and the two started to run. Pascua was left behind. A child shouted that Pascua was being stabbed, and Infante turned and saw Apolinario on top of Pascua, stabbing him.
Pascua walked to Domingo Gadon, who was standing near his tricycle, and Gadon at once noticed the wound. Pascua asked Gadon to bring him to the hospital, and on the way he told Gadon that it was Apolinario who stabbed him. At the hospital, when his mother Dolores arrived and asked who stabbed him, Pascua replied that it was Jerry. Pascua was brought to the operating room and died. The autopsy showed that he died from a stab wound at his right lumbar area. The defense offered a different version, pointing to Osongco as the assailant, but the trial court gave full faith and credit to the prosecution's evidence.
Issues
- Whether or not the statements of the victim Marlon Pascua identifying Apolinario as his assailant are admissible as part of the res gestae.
- Whether or not the trial court erred in giving weight to the testimony of prosecution witness Alky Infante despite the alleged inconsistencies raised by the defense.
- Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering the testimony of defense witnesses Flores and Fuentes.
- Whether or not the award of actual damages was properly proved.
Applicable Provisions
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 42. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
This is the provision under which the victim's spontaneous identification of his assailant was admitted, and its text supplies the requisites the Court applied.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that all three requisites of res gestae are present. First, the principal act, the stabbing, was a startling occurrence. Second, the victim's statement was made immediately thereafter, while on the way to the hospital, before he had any opportunity to contrive a story. Third, the utterance concerned the occurrence itself and its immediate attending circumstances, and it identified the perpetrator. The Court defined res gestae as those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act, admissible when illustrative of such act, and stressed that the test is whether the declaration is so intimately interwoven with the principal fact as to be part of the transaction itself and to negative any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
The Court rejected the argument that the victim was not conscious of impending death. It found it immaterial whether or not the victim was at the point of death, because the prosecution was not claiming a dying declaration. The two doctrines are both exceptions to the hearsay rule but rest on different propositions, and the defense had confused them.
On the second and third issues, the Court restated the settled rule that the trial court's factual findings, including the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect. No evil motive was established against the prosecution witnesses, and the presumption is that they were not actuated by improper motive. The Court noted that Apolinario was then a barangay kagawad, a government functionary generally treated by residents with respect, if not fear. Absent any showing that the trial court overlooked material facts or gravely abused its discretion, the Court found no reason to disturb its assessment.
On the fourth issue, the Court disagreed with the trial court on actual damages. To recover actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable. Only the cemetery lot of 6,000 pesos, the funeral service contract of 20,000 pesos, and the payment for the place of the wake of 12,500 pesos were supported by official receipts and a service contract, for a total of 38,500 pesos. The Court sustained the 50,000 pesos civil indemnity, which is automatically imposed without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of the crime, and the 50,000 pesos moral damages. It also found the indeterminate sentence correctly applied, and imposed interest at the legal rate of six percent per annum on all monetary awards from finality of the decision until full payment.
Doctrine
A statement is admissible as part of the res gestae when three requisites concur: the principal act is a startling occurrence; the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. The test is whether the declaration is so intimately connected with the principal fact that it is part of the transaction itself and negatives any premeditation to fabricate testimony.
Res gestae and dying declaration are distinct exceptions to the hearsay rule. A statement need not be made under a consciousness of impending death to be admissible as res gestae, and a party who invokes res gestae need not satisfy the requisites of a dying declaration.
Trial court findings on credibility are binding absent a showing of overlooked material facts or grave abuse of discretion, and prosecution witnesses are presumed to have no improper motive when none is shown.
Actual damages must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty through competent proof and the best evidence obtainable, while civil indemnity and moral damages may be awarded in the amounts settled by jurisprudence.
Disposition
The appeal was dismissed and the decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification, reducing the actual damages to 38,500 pesos and imposing interest at six percent per annum on all awards from finality of the decision until full payment.
Remember This
Memorize the three requisites of res gestae and the line that res gestae and dying declaration are both exceptions to the hearsay rule but are grounded on different propositions. Examiners use this case to test whether a candidate can distinguish res gestae from a dying declaration and can apply the rule that actual damages require competent proof.