MAGDALENA SIBULO VDA. DE MESA, WIDOW OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE MESA, JUAN GILBUENA, DR. PEDRO MOLERA, EMETRIO. PRESNEDI AND LUCIO VICTA, AS OFFICERS AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE …

In this petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction, the petitioners ask this Court to review a three-to-two
decision rendered by a special division of the Court of Appeals on March 26,
1965 in C.A. 35019-R, sustaining the validity of the proceedings had and taken
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in election
case 7924 before it (Maximino A. Argana, protestant vs. Francisco De Mesa, protestee). The issue of nullity of the judgment promulgated
in the said election case was elevated to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, upon the contention that the said court of first
instance illegally and incorrectly did not allow the substitution of the present
petitioners as parties for De Mesa, after the latter’s death, and thereafter
denied due course to their appeal from the said judgment.

The antecedent facts are not
complicated.

Opponents for the mayoralty of
Muntinlupa, Rizal in the
1963 elections were Francisco De Mesa and Maximino A.
Argana. The electorate’s choice, as tallied by the
local board of canvassers, was De Mesa. Elected vice-mayor with him was Demetrio R. Loresca. Duly
proclaimed elected, these two qualified and assumed their respective positions
upon the commencement of their term of office.

Meanwhile and in due season,
defeated candidate Argana, charging the perpetration
of frauds, terrorism and other irregularities in certain precincts, protested
the election of De Mesa, which protest was docketed as election case
7924, supra, in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, the Honorable Eulogio Mencias presiding. In his return to the protest, De
Mesa traversed the charges, and, in a counter-protest incorporated therein,
sought to shift responsibility for irregularities to the protestant and his
followers, impugning in view thereof the results in some thirteen
precincts.

On March
18, 1964,
however, an assassin’s bullet felled De Mesa, and, forthwith, vice-mayor Loresca was, by operation of law, duly installed as his
successor. Notice of De Mesa’s demise was given on April
22, 1964
to the court a quo thru a
“Constancia” filed by the decedent’s counsel of
record, in which they also indicated their belief that, by reason of said death,
their authority as such counsel was terminated.

In the election case, meanwhile,
the protest ant Argana moved for the constitution of
committees on revision of ballots. Expressly to hear protestee’s view thereon and to afford him a chance to
propose his commissioners, this motion was set for hearing but, quite
understandably, no appearance was entered for the deceased protestee. Accordingly, on May 6, 1964, the court a quo
required the protestee’s widow and children to appear
within fifteen days from notice in order to be substituted for said protestee, if they so desired. They did not, however,
comply. Taking no further action in the premises, the trial court left the
matter at that.

Then proceeding ex-parte, on
June 11,
1964, the
protestant Argana reiterated his move for the
appointment of commissioners on revision of ballots, but this time without
proposing any provision for representation for the protestee whose widow and children he sought to be declared
“non-suited”. On June 23,
1964,
without notice to the protestee and/or his legal
representative – as indeed none had thus far been named – the trial court
granted the motion aforesaid.

With the constitution of the
committee on revision of ballots in which, incidentally, Ramon Antilon, Jr. was motu proprio named and then served as commissioner for the
deceased protestee, the completion of the proceedings
on revision, and the submission of the report thereon, the trial court, in its
decision of August 10, 1964, adjudged the protestant Maximino A. Argana as the duly
elected mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections, and taxed the costs and
expenses of the protest against the estate of the deceased protestee Francisco De Mesa.

On August
17, 1964,
within the reglementary period for the finality of the
decision aforesaid, a three-pronged move was taken by De Mesa’s widow, Magdalena
Sibulo Vda. de De Mesa, and the local chapter
of the Liberal Party of which the deceased protestee
was a member, thru its president and secretary. First, they sought leave to
represent the deceased protestee, invoking
specifically said protestee’s interest to keep his
political opponent out of the contested office in order to maintain his
successor therein, which interest was not abated by his death; second, they
moved for the reconsideration of the August 10, 1964 decision and/or for new
trial based, inter alia, upon the ground that,
for failure to order the protestant to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased protestee after his
widow and children had failed to appear, pursuant to the applicable provisions
of the Rules of Court, it was legally improper for the trial court to have
proceeded ex parte with the election case; and third,
they filed a “Cautionary Notice of Appeal” in anticipation of the possible
denial of their said motion for reconsideration and new
trial.

Pleading lack of personality both
of De Mesa’s widow and the local Liberal Party Chapter to intervene in the case,
as well as the absence of any ground for a new trial, the protestant opposed the
foregoing moves. To the opposition, the movants below
filed their reply. On September 25,
1964 the court a quo, subscribing to
the position taken by the protestant, denied the movants’ petition for leave to represent the deceased protestee and ordered stricken from the record their motion
for reconsideration and new trial and their cautionary notice of
appeal.

On October
6, 1964
Argana qualified as mayor and assumed
office.

Forthwith, on October 7,
1964 the
movants aforesaid gave notice of their intention to
take the matter on appeal to the Court of Appeals. This was met with the
protestant’s motion to strike out their notice of appeal, grounded on the trial
court’s finding of movants’ want of personality to
appear in the case, and consequently to appeal the decision a
quo.

In the meantime, Demetrio R. Loresca made common
cause with Be Mesa’s widow and the local Liberal Party Chapter, and moved for
leave to be added to and/or substituted as party-protestee, claiming a legal and continuing interest in the
outcome of the election protest as successor to De Mesa.

On November 10,
1964 the
trial court dictated twin orders: (1) granting the protestant’s motion to strike
out the notice of appeal heretofore adverted to; and
(2) denying Loresca’s motion to be substituted as
party-protestee.

This development sent the herein
petitioners to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and mandamus,
with preliminary injunction (CA 35019-R), to nullify for lack of jurisdiction
the proceedings taken by the trial court in the election case aforesaid without
allowing the intervention and/or the inclusion of a legal representative of the
deceased protestee; or, in the alternative, to compel
the trial court to give due course to the petitioners’ appeal from the decision
in said case. Upon bond duly filed and approved, the Court of Appeals issued the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. However, upon respondents’ motion and
over the opposition of the petitioners, the effect of said writ was temporarily
suspended until the case was finally decided by the Court of
Appeals.

Appropriate proceedings having
been had in the case, the latter court, besides finding the inapplicability to
election cases of the provisions of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on
substitution of parties in case of death, opined that the petitioners likewise
lacked the legal standing and/or capacity to appear in election case 7924
aforesaid and/or to appeal from the decision rendered therein, and that
furthermore while the petitioner Loresca may have had
such personality he nevertheless failed to timely invoke the same to protect his
interests. Accordingly, it denied the petition for certiorari and mandamus
and consequently permanently dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction
theretofore issued.

Hence, the
present recourse.

The vital issue, to which all
other issues appear to be subsidiary, is the determination of the legal effect
of the proceedings taken by the trial court in the election contest before it
subsequent to the demise of the protestee De
Mesa.

As we approach this question,
certain postulates project themselves to the fore. It is axiomatic that an
election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement
of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of
dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the
electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices
within their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it
onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad
perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to
ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected in
as expeditious a manner as possible, out being fettered by technicalities and
procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated
(Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al.,
G.R.L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna,
G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably intertwined are the interests of
the contestants and those of the public that there can be no gainsaying the
logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office of the
protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him of the character
of an adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep
his political opponent out of the office and maintain therein his successor, but
also does not in any manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the court
to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,
46 Phil., 595, 597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil.
584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).

Upon the same principle, the
death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the
proceedings in the election protest filed against him, and it may be stated as a
rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment
despite the death of the protestee.

With the death of De Mesa,
however, a contingency not expressly provided for by the Revised Election Code
was ushered in. Nevertheless, the hiatus in the special law posed no impediment
to the course of the proceedings because, precisely by express mandate of Rule
134 of the Rules of Court, said rules, though not generally applicable to
election cases, may however be applied “by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient”. For the eventuality here involved, the Rules specifically plot the
course of action to be taken, in the following language:

“Sec.
17. Death
of party.– After a party dies and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court
may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of
the deceased, x x x“. (Rule 3).

That the applicability of the
foregoing precept to the election contest below was initially conceded is borne
out by the proceedings on record. The trial court, it will be recalled, in its
order of May 6,
1964,
required the widow and children of the deceased protestee to appear and be substituted for and on his behalf
and to protect his interest in the case. But when they failed to comply – mainly
because of the shock and agony that followed in the wake of the violent death of
the protestee the trial court took no further steps in
the premises and, instead, at the instance of the protestant, declared said
widow and children non-suited, proceeded with the case ex parte and effectively blocked all attempts at intervention
and/or substitution in behalf of the deceased protestee. In these moves, the trial court did not only
merit the unqualified sanction of the Court of Appeals but the latter, taking an
even more radical view of the matter, actually held that the rule relied upon
has no application to election cases.

We cannot give our imprimatur to
the foregoing view. All reasonable intendments deducible from the law and the
essential nature of the case involved, to our mind, unerringly tend to the
contrary. At the very least, nothing extant in the Revised Election Code either
expressly or by implication renders inappropriate the application of said
principle of substitution in case of death to proceedings thereunder. On the contrary, because of its clear failure to
meet the contingency in question, the need to supplement the deficiency becomes
imperative. Then, the exertion of judicial power to hear and determine a cause
implicitly presupposes in the trial court, amongst other essentials,
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. That jurisdiction was inevitably
impaired upon the death of the protestee pending the
proceedings below such that unless and until a legal representative is for him
duly named and within the jurisdiction of the trial court, no adjudication in
the cause could have been accorded any validity or binding effect upon any
party, in representation of the deceased, without trenching upon the fundamental
right to a day in court which is the very essence of the constitutionally
enshrined guarantee of due process. As cogently synthesized in Cupples vs. Castro, 137 P. 2d., 755
–

“Where contestant was declared
elected and contestee appealed after which contestant
died, rights of parties could not be determined in absence of contestant and his
legal representative and submission would be set aside and cause taken from
calendar to b e heard only after representative of contestant should have been
substituted.” (Francisco, The Revised Election Code, 1957 ed.,
p. 583).

If this be the case with the
contestant, a fortiori no
less can be said of the contestee whose rights as well
as those of his successor by operation of law would be at hazard in an ex parte
proceeding. Further still, the fundamental purpose of the Revised Election Code,
it has been recognized, is to protect the integrity of elections and suppress
all evils that may vitiate their purity and defeat the popular will. Judicial
experience teaches that more often than not frauds and irregularities committed
during the voting come to light only when the ballot boxes are opened and their
contents examined. At no time then in the course of an election contest is the
need for vigilance more to be insisted upon than during that critical stage when
the ballot boxes are opened and the ballots themselves are revised. To deny a
party to the contest the representation that the law allows him at this juncture
is virtually to take away one of the most effective measures designed for the
approximation of the primordial objective election laws are intended to
achieve.

In the light of the foregoing, it
is our considered view that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court applies to
election contests to the same extent and with the same force and effect as it
does in ordinary civil actions. And we declare that unless and until the
procedure therein detailed is strictly adhered to, proceedings taken by a court
in the absence of a duly appointed legal representative of the deceased protestee must be stricken down as null and void.
Considering that, in the case at bar, the trial court failed to order the
protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
protestee after the latter’s widow and children had
failed to comply with the court order requiring their appearance to be
substituted in lieu of their predecessor, but instead – in derogation of the
precepts of the Rule in question and in the total absence of a legal
representative of the deceased protestee – proceeded
ex parte with the election case, said court not only
acted with grave abuse of discretion but actually committed a clear
extra-limitation of its lawful jurisdiction which, perforce, tainted all its
proceedings with the indelible stigma of nullity (Barrameda, et al. vs. Barbara, 90 Phil.,718, 722, 723; Ferreria vs. Ibarra Vda. de
Gonzales, et al, 55 O.G., No. 8, 1358, 1362-63; Sarmiento, etc., et al. vs. Ortiz, et al., G.R. No. L-18583, January 31,
1964; Caisip vs. Cabangon, G.R.
Nos.
L-14684-14686, August 26,
1960).

It is no argument against this
conclusion to contend that the requirement for the procurement of a legal
representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term “may”
instead of the mandatory word “shall”. While the ordinary acceptations of these
terms may indeed be resorted to as guides in the ascertainment of the mandatory
or directory character of statutory provisions, they are in no wise absolute and
inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a
consideration of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the
consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the
convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard
recourse in statutory construction. Thus, Black is authority for the rule that
“Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by
justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or
public officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the
public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be
construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a
duty” (Black, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 540-543). The matter here involved not
only concerns public interest but also goes into the jurisdiction of the trial
court and is of the essence of the proceedings taken thereon. On this point,
there is authority to the effect that in statutes relating to procedure, as is
the one now under consideration, every act which is jurisdictional, or of the
essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of
the party affected, is mandatory (Gonzaga, Statutes
and their Construction, p. 98, citing; Estate of Naval, G. R. No. L-6736,
May 4,
1954).
The present case is well within the purview of this
doctrine.

Nor may the motu proprio appointment by the trial court of Ramon
AntiIon, Jr. as commissioner for the deceased protestee in the revision proceedings be deemed a
substantial compliance with the legal requirement. As aptly observed in the
dissent to the decision under review, said commissioner was not the legal
representative contemplated by the Rules to be substituted for the deceased
protestee. Said commissioner was not supposed to
represent the protestee as a party litigant. His
appointment as such was made exclusively upon the initiative of the trial court
and is authorized by the law, Section 175, Revised Election Code, merely as a
time-saving device for the convenience of the court and the parties in the
purely mechanical operation of opening the ballots and tabulating the count and
in the interest of a speedy and expeditious revision and recount of the
contested ballots (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil., 632, 649-650; Raymundo vs. Gonzales, 80 Phil., 719, 721). For all legal
intents and purposes, while said commissioner’s appointment may be proposed by
the contestants themselves, he is nevertheless exclusively an officer or an
agent of the court under its direct control and
supervision.

Equally unacceptable is the
proposition that, because time is of the essence in an election contest,
recourse to the appointment of a legal representative of a deceased protestee which can only protract and delay the progress of
the case is but a finical matter of procedure which can justifiably be dispensed
with. The validity of the injunction for the prompt disposal of election
controversies as repeatedly postulated in a consistent array of jurisprudence is
not open to debate. The terms of office of elective officials are relatively
brief. To dissipate within the shortest time possible any aura of doubt upon the
true result of elections is a much sought-after desideratum. But, salutary
though the precept may be, it is no justification for cutting procedural corners
or taking legal short-cut not warranted in a system of procedure where the rule
of law is still held paramount over and above all considerations of mere
convenience and expediency. We would be the last to advocate a departure from
the policy of early settlement of electoral disputes, but we are not prepared to
lend our approval to a course of action which would tend to achieve one object
of desire at the expense of the orderly administration of justice and with the
sacrifice of the fundamental right of litigants to due process of law.
Otherwise, the speedy trial required by the law would be converted into a denial
of justice (Querubin vs. Court of Appeals, 82 Phil.,
226, 230). In law – as in any other sphere of human / relations – the end very
seldom, if at all, justifies the means. And, in the case at bar, the admittedly
imperative demand for a speedy disposition of the controversy cannot deter our
hand from striking down illegality in the proceedings therein and remanding the
case for new trial, despite the concomitant delay that may be occasioned
thereby, since that is the only course open if the ends of justice are to be
subserved (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 62 Phil., 584, 587).

Consequent to the conclusion we
have just reached, we confront the issue of who is the legal representative of
the deceased protestee entitled to be substituted in
his stead.

As the record of the case
reveals, three different aspirants vied for that legal representation: Demetrio R. Loresca, the
vice-mayor who succeeded to the position of mayor upon the protestee’s demise; Magdalena Sibulo Vda. de De Mesa, the protestee’s widow: and the local chapter of the Liberal
Party at Muntinlupa, Rizal,
to which the deceased protestee belonged, as
represented by its officers who are co-petitioners herein. An examination of the
countervailing interests of these parties seems in order.

By virtue of Section 7 of the
Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act 2264, the vice-mayor stands next in line of
succession to the mayor in case of a permanent vacancy in the latter’s position.
Upon the death of the protestee mayor in the case at
bar, Loresca as then incumbent vice-mayor succeeded by
operation of law to the vacated office and, as a matter of right, is entitled to
occupy the same for the unexpired term thereof or until the protest against his
predecessor is decided adversely against the latter. The outcome of that contest
thus bears directly upon his right to his present position and, amongst all, he
is the person most keenly concerned and interested in the fair and regular
conduct thereof in order that the true will of the electorate will be upheld.
His status as a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings –
a fact conceded by the decision under review itself – cannot thus be
disputed.

It is not correct to subject
Loresca, as the Court of Appeals did, respecting his
interest in the controversy, to the operation of the equitable principle of
laches. The initiative to cause his substitution in
lieu of the deceased protestee was not Loresca’s. It was the trial court’s as well as the
protestant’s duty, upon being apprised of the protestee’s death, to cause the appointment of his legal
representative according to the procedure delineated in the Rules, Failing in
this duty, it never became the obligation of Loresca
to take it upon himself to be appointed as such legal representative, as in
fact, he was not even duly and seasonably notified, much less ordered, to appear
and be so substituted. In this posture, and particularly because, as above held,
the trial court did not even acquire jurisdiction over him, no room exists for
the operation of the rule on laches against him. His
intervention should not have been denied.

The same cannot, however, be said
of the protestee’s widow or of the local Liberal Party
chapter of Muntinlupa. The protestee’s claim to the contested office is not in any
sense a right transmissible to his widow or heirs. Said widow’s only remaining interest in the outcome of the case is
limited to no more than the possible award of costs against the deceased protestee. Besides not being such an interest as would
justify her substitution for her deceased husband as an indispensable legal
representative, the right to such an award if eventually made has already been
waived by the protestant Argana. This effectively
withdraws the widow from the picture altogether. Much less has the local Liberal
Party Chapter any claim to substitution. Not being duly incorporated as a
juridical person, it can have no personality to sue or be sued as such. And
while it conceivably may derive some indirect benefit consequent to the
resolution of the contest in favor of the deceased protestee, neither the chapter itself nor the officers
thereof would become entitled thereby to any right to the contested office in
case of a favorable judgment, nor, for that matter, do they stand to sustain any
direct prejudice in case of an adverse one. No basis therefore exists upon which
to predicate their claim to substitution.

The foregoing views render
academic the alternative issue raised by the petitioners regarding the propriety
of their appeal from the trial court’s decision in the main
case.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment under
review is reversed and, in lieu thereof, another is rendered ‘

(1) Declaring null and void the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
election case 7924 thereof, dated August 10, 1964, which proclaimed the
protestant Maximino A. Argana the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963
elections, for having been rendered without jurisdiction over the person of the
legal representative of the deceased protestee
Francisco De Mesa, and all other proceedings taken by said court in said
election case subsequent to the death of the said protestee;

(2) Ordering the protestant Maximino A. Argana, without delay,
to vacate the office of mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal and to relinquish the same in favor of Demetrio R, Loresca;
and

(3) Ordering the Court of First
Instance of Rizal to forthwith appoint the petitioner
Demetrio R. Loresca as the
legal representative of the deceased protestee
Francisco De Mesa and allow his appearance as such in substitution of the said
deceased for purposes of said election case 7924 of said court, to conduct a new
trial in said election case, and thereafter to render judgment therein as the
evidence may warrant.

No pronouncement as to
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J. B. L.,  Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

 Barrera, J., on leave.