VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL; RELATIONS AND FREE VISAYAN WORKERS (NEGROS BRANCH), RESPONDENTS.

Herein petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines; operates a sugar central or a processing
mill at Victorias, Negros Occidental, and is the owner of sugar cane
plantations, known as Haciendas “Bacayan, Pacita, Florencia and VICMICO Nursery” all located at Victorias, and “Begonia and
Natividad”, located at Mahalapa, same province. Respondent Free Visayan
Workers (Union for short), is a legitimate labor organization, some
members of which are employed by petitioner in the above-named
haciendas and the VICMICO Nursery. On May 9, 1958, the Free Visayan
Workers sent to herein petitioner a set of proposals’ for a
collective bargaining contract in behalf of the laborers working in the
sugarcane haciendas of the Victorias Milling Company. In reply to the
said communication, herein petitioner, on July 29, 1958, informed the
“Union that it could not possibly enter, into a collective bargaining
contract or negotiate for the same, alleging that the provisions of the
Industrial Peace Act (No: 875) are not applicable to agricultural
workers. A charge of Unfair Labor Practice under Sec. 4(a), subpar. 6,
in relation to Sees. 13 and 17 of said Act, was presented by the Union
with the respondent CIR. After an investigation, the prosecutor of the
respondent CIR filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice with said
Court, against the milling company, docketed as Case No. 50 ULP-IIoilo.
A motion to Dismiss was interposed by herein petitioner, putting in
issue the applicability of the provisions of Act No. 875 to herein
petitioner, ,on its refusal to bargain collectively with – respondent
Union. On February 11, 1959, over the opposition of the Union,
respondent CIR denied the motion to dismiss and ordered herein
petitioner to Answer the complaint. After the motion for
reconsideration presented by Victorias Milling Co., Inc., was denied,
the present action for prohibition was instituted and given due course.

The only issue we are called upon to determine in the instant
proceedings is “whether or not the Industrial Peace Act applies to
agricultural workers”, since there is no dispute that the members of
.respondent Union are. merely laborers in the different sugarcane
plantations of the petitioner.

In the case of “Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Juliana Araos”, 102 Phil.,, 1080, Jan. 28, 1958, We stated—

“* * * For instance, ° there’can be no question that
under our Industrial Peace Act, the Republic of any political division
or subdivision, like, a province or municipality, must and should also
be excluded from the definition of employer. Similarly, under the term
’employee’ of our law, agricultural laborers or individuals employed in
the domestic service, like private or domestic drivers, housemaids,
kitchen helper, etc., should be exempted.”

It is claimed, however, that the above is an obiter dictum. In a
case, involving workers in a sugar central, We made a distinction
between those performing exclusively agricultural chores from: those
who are not. Thus, We said—

“Where petitioner is a highly mechanized industrial
concern v.ith the work of planting and harvesting clearly distinguished
from that of transporting, the cane from, the fields, first to a switch
and later to the mill, all its workers are to be considered industrial
woikers, except .those devoted to purely agricultural work.” (Pampanga
Sugar Mills vs. PASUMIL Workers Union, 98 Phil., 5BS; Feb. 29, 1966).

It is, therefore, the nature of the work which classifies a worker
as” one falling under the exemption as “agricultural laborers”. The
members of respondent Union are merely agricultural laborers in
petitioners haciendas, the principal work of which is planting and
harvesting sugar canes and other chores incidental to ordinary farming
operations. They are agricultural laborers. Being agricultural
workers,,and in the supposition that the milling company had committed
unfair labor .practice upon them, the Court of Agrarian Relations
has jurisdiction over the case.

“The landholder shall hot discourage, directly or
indirectly, the f6rmation, maintenance or growth of a union or
organization of tenants in his landholding, but he shall not initiate,
dominate, assist or interfere’ in the formation or administration of
any such union or organization.” ‘ (Section 27, par. 5, of RA 1199, as
amended by EA 2263, Approved June 19, 1959).

“We are
Inclined, to uphold the negative view not only because an agricultural
laborer does not come within the purview of the word employee defined
in Section 2(d) of Republic: Act No. 87b, bat also because any matter
that may pertain to the relation of tenant and landlord comes under the
Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 2263), and any controversy that may arise, between them as an
incident of their relationship comes under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Relations created by Republic Act No. 1267. *
* *

*
* * * * * *

“With regard to our conclusion that the present
controversy comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, suffice it to state that the latter court wag
created for the ‘enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the
relation of capital and labor on all agricultural lands under any
system of cultivation’ (Section 1, Republic Act 1267, as amended by
Republic Act 1409) and was given exclusive jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions,
matters, controversies, or disputes involving all those relationships
established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the
cultivation and, use of agricultural land where one of the parties
works the land’ (Section 7, Ibid,). Complainants, therefore, should
have lodged their complaint with the agrarian court for the redress of
their grievance considering this broad power given to it By law even if
nothing is said therein relative to unfair labor practice. The
subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 2263 which grants to.
agricultural workers the right to file an action of this, nature merely
serves to confirm this jurisdiction of the agrarian court. The
conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the industrial court has
improperly assumed jurisdiction over the present case’ for it comes
under. the exclusive jurisdiction of the agrarian court.” (Santos vs.
CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-17196, Dec. 28, 1961).

“An unfair
labor practice cases involving agricultural laborers engaged in
agricultural pursuits are within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations. (Hacienda Esperanza, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R.
No. L-18708, Nov. 28, 1962).

Conformably with the foregoing, the writ ia granted, the order
denying the motion to dismiss is set aside and respondent Court is
hereby ordered to desist from taking any action in Case No. 50
ULP-Iloilo. Costs taxed against respondent Visayan Free Workers, which
is hereby reserved the right to file their complaint in the proper
court.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,. Barrera, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.