THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES, (FORMERLY PACITA M. WARNS), ET AL., ACCUSED AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal interposed
by the State against the decision of Branch XVIII of the CFI of Manila,
dismissing Criminal Cases. Nos. 36894, 36899 & 36904, all entitled
“The People of the Philippines vs.
Pacita Madrigal Gonzales, et als”, for falsification of official and
public documents. When the appeal was in the stage of preparation and
submission of briefs, the Solicitor General presented with this Court a
pleading captioned “MANIFESTATION AND PETITION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW
APPEAL”, instead of an appeal brief for the State, as appellant. The
above manifestation was opposed by the City Fiscal of Manila,
Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., who appeared in this Court, as amicus
curiae.

The pertinent antecedents of the instant proceedings are contained in
the “Statement of the Case” in the Manifestation and Petition to
Withdraw presented by the Solicitor General, to which both the Amicus
curiae and the appellees concur, and which we reproduce hereunder:

“That on or about August 23, 1956, the herein
accused-appellee Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was charged with malversation
of public funds, in the amount of P104,000.00 before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, said case having been docketed as Criminal Case No.
36877 of said Court, under an information alleging that said accused,
while administrator of the Social Welfare Administration (SWA),
appropriated, took and misappropriated the said amount on five
different occasions comprised within the period from February, 1954 to
September, 1955, in the City of Manila;

“That simultaneously on the same date, the same accused-appellee Pacita
Madrigal-Gonzales was charged together with Angellta Centeno, Anita
Paggabao, Lourdea Alburo, Remedios Serrano, Julia Carpio, CaLixto
Herinosa and Crispula R. Pagaran alias ‘Pula’, with the crime of
falsification of public documents under 27 separate informations filed
before the same Court of First Instance of Manila. In said 27 separate
informations, the eight accused were alleged to have conspired in the
commission of said offense in or about and during the period comprised
between December, 1954 and September, 1955, by having allegedly caused
it to appear: That cash aids were given when no such aids were indeed
distributed to the persons named and at the time and place and in such
amounts specified, or by making and/or causing it to appear that
certain relief supplies or merchandise were purchased by the accused
Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales when in truth and in fact no such relief
supplies were purchased, thereby making untruthful statements in a
narration of fact in said public and official documents (Annexes A-1 to
A-27, pp. 4-161, rec. of L-16688-90). The aforesaid separate
informations for falsification were couched in the same form and
language, alleged the same period of time of tho commission of the
felonious acts, i.e., between December, 1954, and September, 1955, and
invariably described only the different modes of commission of the
alleged falsifications, to wit;

“* * * by taking advantage of their official positions
falsified and/or caused to be falsified the following described public
documents by making and/or causing it to appear that certain cash aids
were distributed and given personally by said PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES
(formerly Pacita M. Warns) to the persons named, and at the time and
place and in such amounts specified, in said public documents, when in
truth and in fact no such cash aids were ever distributed or even
personally by said accused PACITA MADEIGAL-GONZALES (formerly Pacifca
M. Warns) to said persons named, fit the time and place and in such
amounts specified, in the following described public documents and
otherwise making untruthful statements or narration of fact in, the
said public and official documents to the effect that social cases
studies had been made when in truth and in fact no such social’ case
studies were ever made, * * *.”

“*
* *y taking advantage of their official positions falsified and/or
caused to be falsified the following described public documents by
making and/or causing it to appear that, certain relief supplies or
merchandise were purchased by said accused PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES
(formerly Pacita M. Warns) “in such quantities and at such prices, from
such business establishments or persons as appear to be specified in
the following described public, documents, when in truth and in fact no
such relief supplies or merchandise was purchased by the accused
PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES (formerly Pacita M. Warns) in such quantities
and at such prices,” at such times and places and from such business
establishments or persons as are mentioned and specified in the said
public documents, and otherwise making untruthful statements or
narration of facts in the’ said public and official documents to the
effect that such relief supplies as are appearing to .have been
purchased by the accused PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES (formerly Pacita M.
Warns) at such, prieesvand from such persons or business
establishments, at such times and places, mentioned in the following
described public and official documents, were immediately distributed
to calamity victims’ or sufferers when in truth and in fact no such
distributions of such relief supplies, valued and purchased by said
accused PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES (formerly Pacita M. Warns) at so much
prices as are mentioned and stated in said public and official
documents, were, ever made. * * *.”

That on the same date, August 23, 1956, and
accompanying the filing of said 27 separate informations, for
falsification and one single information for malversation, the
prosecution filed ex parte petition for the consolidation of all said
27 falsification cases and one malversation case before only one branch
or gala of the Court of First Instance of Manila; or ex parto petition
being couched in the tenor following:

“The plaintiff, thru the undersigned, respectfully moves
exparte that all the above-entitled cases be assigned to one sala or
branch of the Court and a joint trial be held thereon-all the charges
being related to similar if not the same transactions and the evidence
of the prosecution being in great part the same for all said charges.
As can be seem from the allegations of the informations, the
falsifications were’ committed to conceal the malversation. Having been
committed to conceal rather than to commit the malversation, the
offense is not a complex one and the separate charges had to be made in
several, informations.”

and accordingly granted by the trial court.

That after the Court of First Instance of Manila granted the ex-parte
petition consolidating1 the said cases before Branch II of the Manila
Court, then presided by the Honorable Francisco E. Jose, the
prosecution suddenly reversed its stand and sought a reconsideration of
said order of consolidation and prayed instead for the distribution or
farming out of said 27 falsification cases before all branches of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, as a consequence of which, and over
the repeated objections of the defense, said 27 cases for falsification
were ordered distributed among the 18 different branches of said Court,
to wit:

* * * * * * *

The
prosecution, however, maintained the assignment of the lone case for
malversation with Branch II of the lower Court to which was assigned
also three cases for falsification as above enumerated.

That after protracted quibbling on various
procedural and technical aspects of the distribution of said 27
falsification cases in the manner above described before the 18
branches of the lower court, the herein accused-appellees filed on or
about October 15, 1956, a motion to quash Criminal Cases Nos. 36878 and
36883 to 36884, inclusive, assigned to Branch XVIII of the lower Court
on the ground of double jeopardy, said motion having been filed also in
each of the other 16 salas or branches of the lower court before which
the said, cases were docketed, accused-appellees predicating the
aforesaid motion on the grounds: (a) that said 27 separate informations
for falsification indeed constitute only one indictable offense of
falsification considering that the falsifications allegedly committed
separately as described under said separate informations were but the
result or product of one single criminal-impulse or interil, and the
same are therefore in the nature of a continuing offense which should
be alleged and prosecuted only under one information; and (b) that the
accused Pacita Madrigal. Gonzales and her 7 co-accused had already been
arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty in Criminal Case No. 36885
before Branch XIII of said lower court and in Criminal Case ‘No,’ 36882
assigned to Branch X of the same court, by reason of which all the
eight accused were already placed in jeopardy with,respect to the-25
other falsification charges before the 16 other branches of said court;

That after hearing the arguments pro and con on the
said motion to quash * * * with the prosecution and the defense1 filing
memorandum and rebuttal memorandum on the issue of double jeopardy,
Branch XVIII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by the
Honorable Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., to which was assigned Criminal Cases.
Nos, 36894, 36899 and 36904, all for falsification, in an order
promulgated on January 19, 1960, granted the aforesaid motion to quash
on the ground of double jeopardy, and held (a) that the 27 separate
Cases of falsification should indeed be tried and/or prosecuted only
under one information for the crime of falsification as a continuing
offense resulting from only one criminal intent or impulse, and (b)
that according to the spirit rather than the letter of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and the complementary
provision on the matter in our Rules of Court, the accused Pacita
Madrigal Gonzales and her seven co-accused were ‘placed in jeopardy of
trial for the same offense immediately after entering their pleas with
Branch X of the said court, and therefore, said plea could be pleaded
as a bar to their further prosecution for the other offenses of
falsification pending before said Branch XVIII;

That dissatisfied with the foregoing dismissal, the
prosecution has interposed the instant appeal on purely questions of
law on January 21, 1960;

That after the perfection of the instant appeal,
however, and during the pendency hereof, Branch X of the Court of First
Instance,of Manila, presided by the Honorable Higinio Macadaeg,
dismissed the information in Criminal Case No. 36882 against the said
accused-appellees herein without their consent; while Branch XIII of
the same Court of First Instance, presided by the Hon. Bienvenido Tan,
after presentation by the prosecution of the available evidence against
the same accused-appellees herein in Criminal Case No. 36885 for
falsification, dismissed the said case by finding all said accused
innocent, with costs de oficio, in its decision promulgated on March
24, 1960.

The Solicitor General is of the belief that the dismissals of the
cases by the three branches of the Manila CFI, constituted double
jeopardy and, therefore, they are a bar to the further prosecution of
the remaining 24 informations for falsification. Upon the other hand,
the amicus curias claims that the appeal of the State is meritorious;
there is no double jeopardy; and the Orders granting the motions to
quash (Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904) were erroneous.

It would seem that the dominant issue which needs determination in the
instant cases, is “whether the Orders of the three (3) different
branches of the Manila CFI, namely: the Order of Dismissal issued by
Judge Ruperto Kapunan (Branch XVIII) dated January 19, 1960, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904; the Order of Judge
Macadaeg, dated March 23, 1960 (Branch X) dismissing Criminal Cases No.
36882; and the decision of Judge Tan (Branch XIII) dated March 24,
1960, in ‘Criminal Case No. 36885, acquitting the accused, constitute a
bar to the prosecution of the remaining 22 falsification charges, filed
against the same accused-appellees, which were lodged and still pending
resolution with the other branches of said Court, on the ground of
double jeopardy.” The resolution of this legal issue revolves on the
circumstance of whether or not the twenty-seven (27) falsifications,
were the product of only one criminal intent. It is argued
that since all the falsifications were supposedly committed within a
specific period (from December 1954 to September, 1955), and that the
allegations in the different informations for falsification are the
same, said acts were but the product or result of a singular criminal
intent; that
no less than the prosecution in said cases, had admitted in a
manifestation, that the charges are “related to similar if not the same
transactions and the evidence of the prosecution being in great part
the same for all said charges”; and that the falsifications were
committed to
conceal the malversation.

One reason advanced by the trial court and the Solicitor General in
holding that the falsifications constituted a continuing offense,
proceeding from, a single criminal intent is that, according to the
manifestation of the City Fiscal and Special Prosecutor, the motive for
these falsifications, was to conceal the malversation. The appellees
seem to confuse motive with criminal intent. Motive is not an element
of a felony; it.is merely a prospectant circumstantial evidence.
Criminal intent renders an act a felony. Motive is a state of the mind
of the accused, and it is he who can state his real motive in
committing a crime. Whatever the fiscal had manifested,” as to the
motive which had impelled the accused to trans gress the law, was but a
speculation gathered in the process of investigation. The existence of
a motive, not having been alleged in the informations for
falsification, in order to be available to the accused in his defense
of double jeopardy, or any ground for that matter, must have to be
proven, being, aa heretofore stated, a prospect&nt circumstantial
evidence. In other words, the existence of the motive to conceal the
malversation, in the cases at bar, is a question of fact which should
be ventilated in a formal trial, in connection with the “defense of
double jeopardy. The Court cannot assume that the purpose of committing
the tweixty-seven (27) falsifications was to conceal the malversation.
This is so because there is no showing that for every particular amount
they had malversed on a certain period, they had purposely perpetrated
the corresponding falsification, to cover up such amount, until the
whole amount proposed to be malversed, shall have been completely
misappropriated. In the absence of such showing, it is to be presumed
that in the falsification of each document, the criminal intent was
separate and distinct.

In effect, it will be noted that although all the informations in the
27 falsification cases were uniformly worded, the numbers of the
vouchers alleged to have been falsified and the amounts thereof, are
different. We have in the three (3) cases, subject of the proceeding at
bar. Voucher No. 4, dated September 3, 1955, for P2,275.00; Voucher No.
6 dated September 6, 1955, for P3,590.00 and Voucher No. 13, dated
September 6, 1955, for P3,410.00. The other informations also show
different vouchers, dates and amounts. These undeniable facts, alleged
in the informations, evidently show that different acts of
falsification were committed on different vouchers and covering
distinct amounts. Each information did not refer to all said acts of
falsification. Neither is there merit in the argument that said aets of
falsification constituted a continuing offense, so as to have them all
prosecuted in only one information. This Court in a number of cases,
dealing on the same subject, held:

“The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and
distinct documents. They had no relation to each other us members of a
series of instruments, so intimately related, that the falsification of
one individual of the series would be, in effect, a falsification of
the entire series. The crime of falsification of a, private document
was complete and consummated when, with intent to prejudice a third
person, the first pawn ticket was actually falsified; and a wholly
separate and distinct crime was initiated and consummated when thy
second ticket was falsified. That both documents may
have been falsified to be used together in the perpetration of an
embezzlement in no wise affects the case, as under the definition of
the crime of the falsification of private documents set out in Article
304 of the Penal Code, the crime is consummated and complete at the
moment when such a document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of,
or with intent to prejudice a third person, it mutters not to what use
the document may be put thereafter. * * ” (U.S. vs. Infante & Barreto, 36 Phi., 148-149).

“The falsification of each of these six money orders committed
seperately by means of different acts constitutes independent crimes of
falsification (U.S. vs.
Infante & Barreto,36 Phil, 146), and the appropriation of the
respective amounts thereof by the defendant, likewise constitutes
different crimes of malversation. In the record of payments then kept
by the defendant, it appears that the respective amounts of the money
orders, had been pajd on different dates, proving that the
appropriation thereof was made on different occasions. Furthermore, no
objection had been filed to any of the informations presented in the
trial court.” (People v». “Villanuevu.,
“* * * By reading the four information, inserted above, It clearly
appears that the alleged acts of falsification and malversation imputed
to the accused-appellant were, committed by him. * * * .It
may therefore be said that the malversations as well as the
falsifications imputed to the accused in the four cases under
consideration were not the result of only one purpose or of only
resolution to embezzle and falsify, but of four or as many abstractions
or misappropriations had of tlie funds entrusted to his care, mid of as
vwmy falsifications aho committed to conceal each of said acts. * * * (People vs.
Cid, 66 Phil., 354). “The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
falsifications committed on April 30, 1931 and on May 2 of the same
year were not necessary means for the commission of the malversations m
the same dates, is correct. Each falsificatimi and each tiiulversation
constitute independent offenses which must be punished separately * *
* The acts being independent from each other and executed by Mfferent
voluntary actions, each constitutes an independent offense.”(Regis vs, People, 67 Phil,, 43).

Upon the basis of the above authorities, we need not proceed any
further to determine whether the 27 falsifications perpetrated on
separate vouchers, at different dates and in various amounts,
constitute 27 separate and independent crimes, which were not
continuous. It becomes, likewise, unnecessary to inquire into the
merits of the question of double jeopardy, because of the above
opinion.

“In respect of the defense of former jeopardy, made to a prosecution
for forgery, it must appear by the plea that the offense charged in
both cases was the same in law and in fact. The plea will be bad if the
offenses charged in the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point
of law, however nearly they may he connected in fact. As
to several acts of forgery, each generally constitutes a separate
crime, even though they are committed in the course of a continuous
transaction, on the same date, or even on the same piece of paper,
unless each act constitutes merely
component part of an indivisible instrument. * * *.” (23 Am, Jur., p. 700-701).

Moreover, under the facts and circumstances appearing In the record,
the grounds upon which the appellees their defense of double jeopardy
in the motion to quash, are not clear and indubitable. One cannot build
up the defense of double jeopardy on mere hypothesis.

Wherefore, the Order of the lower court (Branch XVIII) dismissing
Criminal Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904 on the ground of double
jeopardy is set aside and another entered remanding the said case for
further proceedings. The Motion for Leave to Withdraw Appeal, presented
by the Solicitor General should be, as it is hereby denied. No special
pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, J.J., concur.