THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSAN POBLADOR, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

A rather unique feature of this prosecution for rape was the fact
that the accused, a young man in his early twenties, was alleged to have
assaulted a woman in her middle forties, with eleven children, some of them
young girls above the age of puberty, right at a room in her house likewise
occupied by another man, with her husband and other members of the family in
the immediate vicinity.  It may be
recalled that it was partly on the basis of disparity in age that in People v. Mirasol,^[1]
Justice Recto acquitted a youth of twenty-four prosecuted at the instance of a
widow of thirty-six, her claim being that there was an attempt to have forcible
intercourse with her.  That distinguished
jurist found it “inexplicable why he had to set his eyes precisely on the
complainant and not on [the daughter] who, by reason of her youth and
virginity, should excel her mother in point of exciting the lust * * *.”^[2]
Appellant Josan Poblador’s
fate was different, having been convicted of the crime of rape.  He could not quite convince the lower court
that he was entitled to acquittal, notwithstanding the weakness of the evidence
for the prosecution, the attendant circumstances moreover militating against
his culpability.  He could therefore rely
on the presumption of innocence.^[3]
It is understandable why that constitutional mandate would be vigorously
stressed in the Brief submitted by his counsel. 
Thereafter, on April 19 of this month, a Manifestation in lieu of Brief
was filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza^[4]
on behalf of the People of the Philippines
recommending “the reversal of the decision appealed from and the acquittal
of the appellant on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio.”^[5]
He was quite emphatic about the matter too: “Much as it is to be desired
that the author of the alleged abominable offense, were it committed, be
penalized and given the corresponding punishment he deserves, punishing
appellant herein, who may be really innocent thereof, will not serve the ends
of justice but rather subvert it, which is worse than the crime itself.”^[6] A
careful study of the evidence of record yields the same conclusion.  We accept such recommendation.  The judgment of conviction, which moreover is
tainted with unorthodoxy, appellant being ordered to pay damages for defamation
in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as the further sum of P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages, must be reversed.

The established facts about which there can be no conflict were
set forth in the Manifestation of the Solicitor General thus: “On the
night of August 29, 1972, defendant [Josan Poblador] and [Jason Mateus] were
riding on a jeep driven by the latter on their way to the house of the former’s second cousin, Abdon Bedro to [get] fertilizer. 
However, the jeep went out of order about half a kilometer from their aforesaid
destination and finally stalled near the house of the spouses Dominador Baylon and Angelina Baylon at the barrio of Aglosong,
Concepcion, Iloilo, where at the time said spouses
and their five children were asleep * * *. 
As the jeep could not be started and it was then about 10 o’clock, Poblador and Mateus were
constrained to seek shelter and pass the night in the aforestated
house, where they were allowed to sleep in a room, the door of which had no
shutter * * *.  Poblador
and Mateus left the house at about 5 o’clock the next
morning but could not proceed to their destination until 8 o’clock when they
were able to start the jeep after pushing it to a distance of around 150 meters
with the help of Dominador Baylon
and three others, namely, Floro Trinidad, Junior Balida and Eliseo Obillos * * *.”^[7]

After which the Manifestation discussed the conflicting versions
as to what transpired.  First came the
summary of the evidence for the prosecution. 
The facts testified to were set forth in a detailed and objective
manner.  It was narrated that “Poblador and Mateus, both armed
with guns, called on the house of the Baylons and on
entering it, Poblador asked where the latter’s
daughter Nenet was because he would marry her; that
Angelina Baylon replied that Nenet
was in Iloilo City and that in any event he could not marry her as he was
already ‘married’ or had a concubine, one Trining Piosca; that on hearing this remark of Angelina, Poblador [was enraged], ordered the spouses Baylons to put out the light in the house and said, ‘Now
that you sent Nenet to Iloilo City, you sleep with me
till morning’ and, poking a gun on her chest, told her, Angelina, to come
inside the room, where Poblador and Mateus were to sleep, which she did out of fear * * *; that
once Angelina was inside the room, Poblador, without
as much as kissing her or touching her breasts or any part of her body, pushed
her to the edge of a bed therein; that he ordered her to take off her shorts
and panties, which she also did; that thereafter Poblador
ordered her to lie down on the bed, which she likewise complied with; that he
then raised her duster; placed himself on top of her and ravished her without
any struggle on her part to defend her honor, much less make any outcry for
help, not only to her husband but also to the neighbors whose houses surrounded
the Baylons‘ house, because of fear as he had a gun *
* *; that having felt the urge to urinate, she stood up and urinated; that
thereafter, she returned to the bed and Poblador
again [had intercourse with her]; that she stayed the whole night with [him],
save the time when her eight-month old still breast-fed baby cried, and [he]
told her to attend to the child * * *; that Angelina’s husband, who was in the sala near the door of the room which had no shutter, did
not do anything during the time his wife was being raped, which he was
witnessing, because Mateus was pointing his gun at
him * * *; that when his wife came out of the room to attend to the child, he
asked her if Poblador succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her * * *; that although she replied in the affirmative, he
did not as much try to avenge the outrage to his wife’s honor when Poblador and Mateus finally fell
asleep, because of fear that they might be just pretending * * *; that Poblador, before leaving the house, warned the spouses Baylons not to report the incident to the authorities,
otherwise he would kill all of them; that although Dominador
Baylon, did not believe said threat, he did not
report on the following day, the nefarious crime to the barrio captain of Aglosong * * *; that they reported the incident to Mayor Nerio Salcedo of Concepcion, Iloilo, but he merely advised them to relax as
it would not happen again * * *; that Angelina Baylon’s
complaint was not filed with the Court a quo by the Provincial
Fiscal until August 26, 1974, or almost two (2) years after the commission of
the offense.”^[8]

Solicitor General Mendoza in his Manifestation recommend­ing
acquittal stated that the evidence for the defense is substantially “a
denial of the charge of rape by defendant Poblador, a
24-year old bachelor, who testified that he could not have embarrassed himself
by having sexual intercourse with Angelina Baylon, an
old woman of about 45 years of age whom he respected, much less do it in the
presence of her husband, Dominador Baylon * * *; that he could not have forced her to have
coition with him at the point of a gun, because he did not own a gun; that he
was taken aback by the instant charge, which he later learned from Angelina herself
that she did so at the instigation and pressure made to bear on her by the CIS
and one Conte Baldoza who suspected him of having
been the one who killed the latter’s son, so that he, Poblador,
could be jailed; that had he desired to have sexual intercourse, he would have
gone to Iloilo City for the said purpose; and that Teodorico
Piosca, the father of his common-law wife, Ofelia,
likewise urged her, Angelina, to prosecute this unfounded charge for spite,
because Teodorico was mad at him as he did not
approve of his cohabiting with his daughter Ofelia Piosca.  * * *.”^[9]

It is thus easily understandable why counsel for appellant in the
able brief^[10]
he submitted was quite vehement in his denunciation of the decision rendered by
the lower court.  It is a fair appraisal
that the guilt of his client was not shown beyond reasonable doubt.  The constitutional presumption of innocence
was thus not overcome.  The Solicitor
General, after a thorough study of the record, reached the same
conclusion.  It could not be
otherwise.  He had to recommend the
acquittal of appellant.  As mentioned at
the outset, we are in agreement.

1. The evidence for the prosecution, to put it at its mildest,
leaves much to be desired.  There was a
failure to live up to the moral certainty as to the guilt of an accused being
shown to justify his conviction.  As
stated in People v. Dramayo:^[11]
“The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.”^[12]
It would appear that the lower court did not pay due heed to such admonition,
which is merely a reiteration of a host of decisions with a similar
approach.  That is as it should be.  To view it differently would result in
rendering illusory the constitutional mandate that an accused is presumed
innocent.  There must be proof beyond
reasonable doubt.  Failing that, he must
be acquitted. “Accusation,” to quote from Dramayo
anew, “is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with
guilt.  It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies.”^[13]
The lower court, in considering the version of the prosecution, failed to
exhibit that requisite measure of objectivity and detachment.  It could be that the natural sympathy for a
woman claiming to have been the victim of a man’s lustful desires and the
abhorrence such an act provokes led him astray. 
Not so the Solicitor General, who in his Manifestation took pains to
point out the lack of credibility of the version for the prosecution, which he
characterized as “fantastic” as well as the contradictions and
inconsistencies that vitiated it.^[14]
He did not stop there.  He went
further.  He mentioned other
circumstances, the fact that the previous relationship between the appellant
and the Baylons was characterized by respect and
deference on the part of the former; that if it were a case of the former’s wanting to satisfy his carnal desire, he could
have, as he testified, gone to Iloilo City, and there indulged such proclivity;
that if he had committed an outrage on the Baylons,
the husband certainly would have refrained from helping appellant push his jeep
to make it start; that it was rather strange that the Baylons
failed to report such occurrence at the earliest possible opportunity, the
complaint being filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo City on August 26,
1974, or almost two years after the perpetration of the alleged offense.^[15]
The recommendation, considering the above, had to be one of acquittal.

2. On a specific level, to refer to our decisions where the
offense charged is rape, it is not amiss to recall People v. Delfinado,^[16]
the opinion being penned by Justice Recto. 
After a careful examination of previous cases starting from United
States v. Flores,^[17]
promulgated as early as 1906, he stated that it could be laid down as a general
rule that a judgment of conviction for the crime of rape cannot be based on the
testimony of the offended party unless such testimony is “clear, positive
and convincing, or supported by other undisputed facts and strong circumstantial
evidence disclosed by the record.”^[18]
In support of such a holding, he cited in addition to Flores,
United States v. De la
Paz;^[19] United
States v. Magsisi;^[20] United
States v. Tan Teng;^[21]
and United States
v. Ramos.^[22]
He did affirm that in the above decisions, “the accused were acquitted
because the only evidence of their guilt was the uncorroborated, contra­dictory,
and unconvincing testimony of the alleged victims.”^[23]
Then came this citation from United States v. Ramos: “The mere apparent
improbability that the alleged crime could have been committed in the manner
and form described by the witnesses for the prosecution does not necessarily
justify an acquittal if the evidence submitted by the prosecution is otherwise
clear, satisfactory and convincing, unless the degree of improbability is such
as to amount to a practical impossibility—but in the absence of a clear,
satisfactory and convincing testimony in support of the charge, a judgment of
conviction will not be sustained in the face of the apparent improbability that
the crime could have been committed as charged.”^[24]
There is no need to reiterate that appellant’s position is much stronger
considering the strain on human credulity posed by the testimony of
complainant.  What is undoubted is the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence against appellant.  In recommending acquittal, the Solicitor
General’s position has the clear support of authoritative doctrines.  Moreover, it is bolstered by decisions of the
past three years where the constitutional presumption of innocence sufficed to
call for acquittal in rape prosecutions. 
Mention may be made of People v. Alvarez;^[25]
People v. Barbo;^[26]
People v. Castro;^[27]
People v. Reyes;^[28]
People v. Joven;^[29]
People v. Ilagan;^[30]
People v. Ramirez;^[31]
People v. Godoy;^[32]
People v. Lopez;^[33]
and People v. Omega.^[34]

3. The tenor of this opinion is not to be misinterpreted.  It goes no further than to accept the plea of
the Solicitor General after a careful study of the record that the accused is
entitled to acquittal, his guilt not having been shown beyond reasonable
doubt.  He is thus entitled to the
protection afforded by the constitutional presumption of innocence.  The motivation that led the Baylons to testify as they did is immaterial.  It suffices to state that what they said
could not be given credence.  There are
indications that appellant had displeased one or more individuals of
influence.  That could have led, as he
asserted, to the filing of this complaint. 
The matter, however, need not be pursued further.  It could be that there are puzzles still
unresolved.  That may very well be, but
for the disposition of this appeal, the inquiry is necessarily limited to the
quantum of proof that must exist.  That
is all that is relevant to the decision reached.

WHEREFORE, the decision of January 24, 1976 finding the accused Josan
Poblador guilty of the crime of rape is reversed and
he is acquitted of such a charge.  This
decision is immediately executory.  Costs de oficio.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

^[1]
62 Phil. 120 (1935).

^[2] Ibid,
123.

^[3]
According to Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, * * *.”

^[4] He
was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato
S. Puno and Solicitor Ramon Barcelona.

^[5]
Manifestation, 15.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Ibid,
3-4.  The transcript of the sessions of
December 20, 1974, 10, 15, 18, 27-28; of January 22, 1975, 23, 24, 29, 31, 34;
and of October 23, 1975, 4-5, 6, were referred to in support of the above
narration.

^[8] Ibid,
4-6.  Reference was made to the
transcript of December 20, 1974,
11-20 and of January 22, 1975,
24, 27-28, 31, 37.

^[9] Ibid,
7-8.  The transcript of January 12, 1975, 24-28 and 34; of July 25, 1975, 2-5; of October 23, 1975, 6 and of January 22, 1976, 39-42, were cited.

^[10]
In the discussion of the legal issues involved, it could have been improved had
there been reference to decisions of more obvious significance.

^[11]
L-21325, October 29, 1971,
42 SCRA 59.

^[12] Ibid,
64.

^[13] Ibid.

^[14] Ibid,
9-13.

^[15] Ibid,
13-14.

^[16]
61 Phil. 694 (1935).

^[17]
6 Phil. 420.

^[18]
61 Phil. 694, 700.

^[19]
9 Phil. 738 (1907).

^[20]
9 Phil. 739 (1907).

^[21]
23 Phil. 145 (1912).

^[22]
35 Phil. 671 (1916).

^[23]
61 Phil. 694, 700.

^[24] 35
Phil. 671, 677.

^[25]
L-34644, January 17, 1974,
55 SCRA 81.

^[26]
L-30988, March 29, 1974, 56
SCRA 459.

^[27]
L-33175, August 19, 1974,
58 SCRA 473.

^[28]
L-36874, September 30, 1974,
60 SCRA 126.

^[29]
L-36022, May 22, 1975, 64 SCRA 126.

^[30]
L-36560, May 28, 1975, 64 SCRA 170.

^[31]
L-30635, January 29, 1976,
69 SCRA 144.

^[32]
L-31177, July 16, 1976, 72 SCRA 69.

^[33]
L-41974, November 29, 1976.

^[34]
L-29091, April 14, 1977.