THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEONARDO DAHIL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XI, in Criminal Case No. 15893, con­victing the
defendant-appellant Leonardo Dahil of the crime of qua­lified theft and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.^[1]

The record discloses that in the morning of October 6, 1966,
former Assistant City Fiscal, now Municipal Judge, Ben­jamin Abalos discovered
that his 4-door sedan, Toyota Crown de Luxe, Model 1966 with a value then of
P15,400.00 was not on the driveway of his house in Mandaluyong, Rizal, where he
had parked it the day before.  Realizing
that his car had been stolen, he im­mediately reported the matter to the
Mandaluyong Police Department.  Benjamin
Abalos also sought the assistance of the Police Depart­ments of Pasay City,
Pateros, Taguig and Manila.  Benjamin
Abalos personally searched for his car with the help of one Sgt. Eusebio of the
Pasay City Police Department.^[2]

Finally, through the assistance of said Sgt. Eusebio, the
complainant, Benjamin Abalos, was able to locate and recover his car somewhere
in Malate, Manila in the yard of Virgilio Apolinario who was prosecuted and
convicted of the crime of qualified theft in Criminal Case No. 15893 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.

After the arrest of Virgilio Apolinario, he executed an affidavit
on November 8, 1966, the pertinent portion of which reads:

“4.  Maaari mo bang isalaysay sa akin ang mga
pangyayari kung bakit ikaw ay nasangkot sa pagnanakaw ng isang auto na iyong
sinasabi?

Nuong pong humigit
kumulang sa 1:00 ng umaga petsa ika-29, 1966 ako po at si Kamlon (the affiant
does not know the real name of said KAMLON) ay nakaupo sa isang banko sa daang
San Juan, sakop ng Lungsod ng Pasay, at nuon ay dumaan noon si Nardo (Leonardo
Dahil) na nakasakay sa isang taxi, at nuon ay tinawag niya si Kamlon at sila ay
nag-usap, makaraan ang ilang sandali ay tinawag nila ako at si­nabi sa aking
sumama lang daw ako sa kanila, kung kaya ako ay sumakay din at kami ay nagpunta
sa Mandalu­yong, Rizal at ako ay ibinaba sa panulukan ng Gen. Kalentong at
daang Shaw Blvd., Mand., Rizal. 
Samantalang sila ay lumipat sa ibang taksi at sinabing mayroon lamang
silang pupuntahan.  Wala pang kalahating
oras ay nagbalik si Nardo doon sa panulukan ng Gen. Kalentong at Shaw Blvd. at
ako ay tinawag at ako ay sumakay na rin sa kanyang taksing sinasakyan at kami
ay nagpunta sa isang lugar na di ko alam ngunit alam ko pong sakop pa rin ng
Mandaluyong, at doon ay nakita ko si Kamlon na nagiintay sa harap ng
Apartment.  At nuon ay bumaba na kami at
ako ay naiwan sa harap ng nasabing apartment at si Nardo at Kamlon ay pumasok
sa bukas ng tarangkan ng ‘Carport’ at sumakay si Nardo sa kotseng nakagarahe
doon (the affiant pointing to the Toyota Car, painted white, Model-66 with
plate No. Temp-4527) at si Kamlon ay itinulak ng papalabas ang nasa­bing kotse,
at ng ito ay nasasa labas na ay pinaandar na ni Nardo, at ng umandar na ang
nasabing kotse ay sumakay na kami at dito ay mina­neho ni Nardo hanggang doon
sa amin at ang ginawa ko ay binuksan ko ang garahe namin at ipinasok na roon
ang kotse at ang ginawa ko ay isinara ko na. 
At nuon ay sinabi sa amin ni Nardo na ‘Tatlong araw lamang ay maypera na
tayo’.  At kami ay naghiwahiwalay na.

“5.  Hindi
mo ba alam ang tunay na pang­alan ni Kamlon?

       Hindi
po, sa tawag na Kamlon ko lamang nakilala yon.

“6.  Alam
mo ba kung saan umuuwi si Nardo (Leonardo Dahil) at si Kamlon?

       Si Kamlon po at si Leonardo Dahil ay sa
panulukan ng Harrison at San Juan naninirahan. 
(San Juan and Harrison St., Pasay City)”^[3]

Thereafter defendant-appellant Leonardo Dahil was charged with
the crime of qualified theft before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the
following:

”
I N F O R M A T I O N

The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accuses Leonardo Dahil of the
crime of Qualified Theft, com­mitted as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of October, 1966, in the Municipality
of Mandaluyong, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with Virgilio
Apolinario y Tagorda, who has already been convicted and sentenced by this
Court, and John Doe alias ‘Kamlon’, whose true iden­tity and whereabouts
is still unknown, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
and aiding one another, with intent of gain, with grave abuse of confidence and
with­out the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and fe­loniously take, steal and carry away a motor
vehicle, a four-door sedan Toyota Crown de Luxe, Model 1966, then with
temporary license plate No. 4527 (Philippines, 1966), with original white
paint, and valued at P15,400.00, belonging to one Ben­jamin Abalos, to the
latter’s damage and prejudice in the afore-stated amount of P15,400.00.

Contrary to law.

Pasig, Rizal, August 4, 1967.

(Sgd.) JOSE P. SANTOS

      
Assistant Fiscal”^[4]

Defendant-appellant pleaded not guilty and denied any parti­cipation
in the commission of the crime.

The lower court after trial rendered under date of July 25, 1968
its judgment of conviction, finding defendant-appellant guilty of qualified
theft and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, as follows:

“The crime committed by the accused Leonardo Dahil, alias
Nardo, carries with it the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, considering that the value of the car stolen is P15,400.00
(Art. 309, par. 1) But since the crime is qualified theft because the property
stolen is a motor vehicle, the penalty must be higher by two degrees (See Art.
310, Revised Penal Code).  The penalty to
be imposed on the accused must therefore be reclusion perpetua. “

The trial court rejected defendant-appellant’s raising of the
question of his identity as a defense and refused to believe the disclaimer of
the witness Virgilio Apolinario, who had previously been convicted and
sentenced as a co-principal with the defendant-appellant for the theft of the
same vehicle, that the defendant-appellant was not the same person who in
company with a third co-principal, Kam­lon, had brought the stolen Toyota car
to his yard, analyzing the evi­dence of the parties, as follows:

“On the other hand, the evidence of the de­fense is merely a
denial of the imputation against him.  x
x x.

“On cross-examination, the accused Leonardo Dahil, alias
Nardo, admitted that he is at present answering for the crime of Frustrated
Murder he allegedly committed before the Pasay Court of First Instance.  Also, he admitted that he was accused of
robbery with physical injuries, but because the accused Leonardo Dahil, alias
Nardo, went into hiding, the offended party’s in­terest to prosecute the case
waned, and the case has been dismissed. 
Further, Leonardo Dahil, alias Nardo, admitted that there were so many
warrants of arrest issued against him which he had signed and the contents of
which he does not know.

“The Court, after analyzing the evidence, finds that the
herein accused Leonardo Dahil, alias Nardo, raised the question of his identity
as a defense.  It must be remembered,
however, that in the affidavit, Exhibit A-Dahil, which has been introduced
during the trial of Virgilio Apo­linario, Virgilio stated that one Kamlon and
Leo­nardo Dahil went to his house between 1:00 and 2:00 o’clock a. m. to invite
him and left the car in ques­tion in the yard of his house.  However, while tes­tifying in the instant
case, Virgilio Apolinario states that Leonardo Dahil who is now in court on
trial is not the same person who, in company with Kamlon, brought the Toyota
car to his yard.  The Court refuses to
believe him.  The law presumes that
identity of name is identity of person. 
Besides, in Crim. Case No. 15893 for the theft of the same car where
Virgilio Apolinario has been prosecuted and con­victed, his defense was that
his affidavit, Exhibit A-Dahil, wherein he admitted that the Toyota car of
Fiscal Abalos has been left in his yard by Kam­lon and the accused Leonardo
Dahil, has been ex­tracted from him by means of force and threats.  However, in the instant case, when Virgilio
Apo­linario was called by the prosecution to testify, he admits what has been
stated in his affidavit, ‘Ex­hibit A-Dahil’, ‘that Kamlon and Leonardo Dahil,
alias Nardo, have brought the Toyota car of Fiscal Abalos in his yard,’ but
that Leonardo Dahil, alias Nardo, named in his said affidavit, is not the same
person now in Court.  He has two versions
of his affidavit to suit his convenience and the convenience of his friend,
Leonardo Dahil, alias Nardo.

“This squid tactic of Virgilio is the modus operandi of
criminals.  They deny or pretend not to
know their companions in the commission of the crime in order to confuse the
police authorities as well as the Court. 
With the two criminal cases for frustrated murder and robbery filed
against him and the many warrants of arrest issued for his appre­hension as a
background in the instant case, the Court has absolutely no doubt that Leonardo
Dahil, alias Nardo, in company with one Kamlon, brought the car of the offended
party to Virgilio’s yard after the said car has been stolen by the two, Kamlon
and Nardo.

“Another reason why the Court does not be­lieve in the
testimony of this witness is that he stated, when asked about his personal
circumstances, that he is a businessman, when the truth is, he is a mere cook
in his father’s restaurant, receiving a paltry sum of P20.00 a week.”

On appeal, defendant-appellant through his counsel de oficio,
Atty. Salvador San Juan, in a well-written brief made the following assignment
of errors:

“I.    The lower court erred in giving credit to
the extrajudicial confession of Virgilio Apolinario, Ex­hibit ‘A’; and

“II.   The lower court erred in not acquitting
defendant-appellant on the ground that his participation in the commission of
the offense charged has not been es­tablished beyond reasonable doubt.”

The errors assigned boil down to the question of whether the
prosecution had sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt the
appellant’s participation in the theft in that according to Virgilio
Apolinario’s sworn statement (which was duly submitted in evidence by the
prosecution) defendant-appellant was the one who drove away the stolen Toyota car
after Kamlon had pushed it from the carport of the owner’s house and that the
three of them thereafter drove away and hid the car in the yard of his house in
Malate.  In turn, this re­volves on the
identity of defendant-appellant Leonardo Dahil as pointed out by Virgilio
Apolinario himself, together with other identifying data such as his address
and record of arrests, although at the trial Apolinario sought to save
defendant-appellant by brazenly declaring that defendant-appellant who was in
court was not the same person who had driven the stolen car to his yard.

Upon a review of the record and the evidence, the Court is not
inclined to agree with the brief manifestation of then Solicitor General Felix
Q. Antonio, now a member of this Court, believing the disclaimer of Apolinario
and stating that “hence, the evidence is too meager to produce certainty
beyond reasonable doubt of appellant’s guilt in this case,” and,
therefore, recommending appellant’s acquittal, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, appellee is constrained to agree with the argument
in appellant’s brief that the participation of the appellant in the offense
charged has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.  Hence, appellee begs leave to submit this
case for decision without appellee’s brief and, in the interest of justice,
recommends the acquittal of the accused.”

The whole issue after all before the Court is one of
credibility.  The trial court from its
vantage point of observing and hearing the wit­nesses flatly refused to believe
Apolinario’s brass disclaimer and de­fendant-appellant’s bare denial of any
participation in the theft and stated weighty reasons therefor in its decision
hereinabove quoted.  Its findings of fact
and conclusions on the lack of credibility of the witnesses are entitled to
great respect and weight and will not be dis­turbed on appeal,
defendant-appellant having failed to establish any of the recognized grounds
for it to do so.

On June 4 this year, defendant-appellant filed a manifestation
with prayer for the withdrawal of his appeal even if it is “certainly
against my conscience and against all assigned errors of fact and law in my
appeal,” citing, among other things, the attack on April 22, 1977 against
him by elements of the notorious “Sputnik” gang group where he
sustained seventeen stab wounds and complaining against the conditions in the
National Penitentiary, as follows:

“That conditions actually prevailing in the detention quarters
of this National Penitentiary in particular, are miserably far below the modest
standard set for human beings who by law [are] as­sured to be treated as
INNOCENT CITIZENS UNTIL THE CONTRARY IS PROVED so that, driven to despair and
the hopelessness of their cause, we often hear of detainees who became mentally
deranged contracted serious physical ailments, or took to sudden and violent
suicidal acts that end up in the death both of his victims and himself.”

The Court, taking note of appellant’s said manifestation, re­calls
that in several cases in the past it has called attention to the “incredible
overcrowding of prison cells” that lead inevitably to the formation of
wolfpacks, and confine prisoners “under circumstances that strangle all
sense of decency, reduce convicts to the level of animals, and convert a prison
term into prolonged torture and slow death.”

In People vs. De los Santos,^[5]
then Justice J. B. L. Reyes had graphically described such conditions, as
follows:

“The evidence compels us to agree with the trial court that
the accused-appellants are guilty be­yond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.  But the members of the Court
cannot in conscience concur in the death penalty imposed, because they find it
im­possible to ignore the contributory role played by the inhuman conditions
then reigning in the penitentiary, vividly described by the trial Judge in his
decision.  It is evident that the
incredible overcrowding of the prison cells, that taxed facilities beyond
measure and the starvation allowance of ten centavos per meal for each
prisoner, must have rubbed raw the nerves and dispositions of the unfortunate
inmates, and predis­posed them to all sorts of violence to seize from their
owners the meager supplies from outside in order to eke out their miserable
existence.  All this led inevitably to
the formation of gangs that preyed like wolf packs on the weak, and ultimately
to pitiless gang rivalry for the control of the prisoners, abetted by the
inability of the outnumbered guards to enforce discipline, and which culminated
in violent riots.  The government cannot
evade responsibility for keeping prisoners under such subhuman and dantesque
conditions.  Society must not close its
eyes to the fact that if it has the right to ex­clude from its midst those who
attack it, it has no right at all to confine them under circumstances that
strangle all sense of decency, reduce convicts to the level of animals, and
convert a prison term into prolonged tor­ture and slow death.”

In People vs. Simeon,^[6]
in setting aside the death penalty imposed by the trial court on an improvident
guilty plea and remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings
in conformity with law, Mr. Justice Felix V. Makasiar, speaking for the Court,
again decried how the miserable conditions in prison have reduced the in­mates
into animal packs, as follows:

“x x x If the counsels de oficio in this case were given such
a reasonable period of time and opportunity to go to the New Bilibid Prisons,
where the crime was allegedly committed, they would have acquainted themselves
with the oppressive as well as explosive condition in a brigade where the ten
accused herein were packed along with hun­dreds of convicts lying on the
concrete floor because of lack of beds and lack of space.  The New Bilibid Prisons is so jampacked with
about 10,000 pri­soners built as it was for only 2,000.  Medium and maximum security prisoners have no
separate cells and are mixed with the minimum security convicts.  The ten defendants were serving merely terms
of imprisonment when the crime was allegedly committed.  Able advocate stressed further that the
counsels de oficio designated by the trial court had virtually only few minutes
to advise appellants herein, more pre­occupied as they were with the cases of
their paying clients for which they were in court that day of the arraignment
of the accused.  He further recalled that
the crowded brigades or cells had been the cause of riots among the prisoners,
who have been reduced into animal packs by the miserable conditions in pri­son,
resulting in the death of many convicts.”

The Court, however, could not give due course to appellant’s
proposed withdrawal of his appeal because such withdrawal, if given due course,
would mean that the erroneously excessive penalty of reclusion perpetua
imposed by the lower court would be allowed to stand.  Defendant-appellant is entitled to the
Court’s judgment imposing the appropriate penalty, as hereinafter stated.

While the trial court correctly stated that under Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime committed was qualified theft (of a motor
vehicle) and the imposable penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods has to be raised by two degrees, it imposed an erroneously
excessive penalty in two particulars:

1.     
The penalty higher by two degrees would be reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods, not reclusion perpetua;
and

2.     
The indeterminate sentence law should be
applied.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment finding
defendant-appellant Leonardo Dahil guilty of quali­fied theft is hereby
affirmed with the modification that in accordance with the indeterminate
sentence law and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circum­stances, the
sentence imposed upon him should be an imprisonment of ten (10) years and one
(1) day of pri­sion mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.  Should the defendant-appellant have already
served the minimum sentence herein imposed, it is recommended that he be
granted immediate parole by the Board of Pardons and Parole, if qualified
therefor; and considering further the ordeal that he has undergone during his
confinement at the National Pe­nitentiary, it is further recommended that he be
granted Executive Clemency.

Let copies hereof be furnished the Office of the President of the
Philippines and the Board of Pardons and Parole.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., no part.

^[1] Rollo,
pp. 7-12.

^[2] Rollo,
pp. 112-113.

^[3]
Exhibit A-Dahil, p. 1.

^[4]
Record of Criminal Case No. 15893, Court of First Instance of Rizal, p. 1.

^[5]
14 SCRA 702, 712 (1965).

^[6]
47 SCRA 129, 134-135 (1972).