EXALTACION CAÑETE, SOFIA CAVITE AND FATHER MANUEL V. GOMEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GENEROSA V. MAZO, CORNELIA FLORES, EUTROPIA GOBENCIONG, JACINTA ANIBAN, MERCEDES C…

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the
reversal of the August 12, 1976
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. NO. 57172-R entitled “Generosa V. Mazo, et al.,
plaintiffs-appellees v. Exaltacion
Cañete, et al., defendants-appellants” affirming
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
Branch IV, in Civil Case No. 4929 entitled “Generosa
Mazo, et. al., plaintiffs v. Exaltacion
Cañete., et. al., defendants” for “Recovery
of Personal Properties with Damages” which declared the plaintiffs
(private respondent herein) as members of the Cofradia
de Nuestre Señora de Belen
of Tanuan, the true owners of the images, vestments, standarte and funds and ordered the defendants (petitioners
herein) to pay jointly and severally private respondent, damages and attorney’s
fees and the Order of said appellate court dated November 24, 1976 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of said decision.

The findings of fact by the trial and appellate courts are as
follows:

In the early 1900’s a certain Inocenta
de Veyra from Tanuan, Leyte founded the “Confradia
de Nuestra Señora be
Belen”, a voluntary religious group of hermanos mayores.  In 1919 and
1930, Inocenta denoted for the Conradia
the disputed images of the Holy Infant Jesus and of Blessed Virgin (de Belen)
respectively.  The Confradia
is responsible for the material care of the religious icons, as well as for the
ceremonies and rites which culminate in the annual observance of the
fiesta.  Said religious group has been
largely governed through the years of the customs and traditions.  It is not known if there are by-laws within
the association.

It was the unbroken practice in the Confradia
that the hermana mayor, during her
incumbency, would keep on her custody
as trustee, the two images, the vestments, garments and standarte,
including the cash contributions of its members, with the tacit understanding
that the said religious images and the unspent funds would be turned over to
the next hermana mayor on the first
day of the succeeding year.

In January of 1972,
petitioner Exaltacion Cañete
was elected as the hermana mayor and as
such she took possession of the subject religious articles and funds of the Cofradia.

Because of the quarrel
between the parish priest of Tanauan, Fr. Manuel
Gomez and Bishop Salvador of the Diocese, resulting in the suspension and
relief of the former, the Cofradia, an erstwhile
cohesive group of women devotees, had been drawn into the controversy and was
now split into two camps:  one loyal to
the ex-parish priest:  Fr. Gomez, and the
other, identified with the newly-designated parish priest Fr. Parilla.  The Cofradia members with Fr. Gomez elected Sofia Cavite as the hermana
mayor for 1973, replacing Exaltacion Cañete, while the
group with Fr. Parilla chose Bienvenida
Casas.  Exaltacion Cañete surrendered the
images to Sofia Cavite. 

Claiming to be members of
the Cofradia and owners in common of its properties
including the disputed images of the Blessed Virgin (de Belen) and the Holy
Infant Jesus, respondents, originally twenty-one in number, brought an action
against Exaltacion Cañete
and Sofia Cavite for the “Recovery of Personal
Properties with Writ of Attachment and Damages” before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch IV (Civil Case No. 4929).

Petitioners countered
that the subject images were ecclesiastical properties and therefore outside
the province of the civil courts, and that respondents, as members of an
unregistered organization, had no legal personality to sue.  On the other hand, the plaintiffs (private
respondents herein) maintain that these chattels are properties of their Cofradia.^[1]

The complaint was later
amended to include Fr. Gomez as additional defendant because according to
defendants’ answer, the image of the Blessed Virgin (de Belen) was in Fr. Gomez’ custody.^[2]

Pursuant to a writ of replevin issued by the trial court against petitioners, the
latter delivered to respondents the possession of the chattels in question and
the amount of P142.65 representing the funds of the Cofradia.^[3]

On October
14, 1974, the trial
court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
plaintiffs, as members of the Cofradia de Nuestra Señora de Belen of Tanauan,
the true owners with right to
possession of the images, vestments, standards and funds in question; ordering
the defendants to respect the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs of
said chattels; ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the
plaintiffs moral damages in the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) and other
sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation; and pay the costs.

“SO ORDERED.”^[4]

Eleven days later and over petitioners’ vigorous objection, the
trial court allowed the immediate execution of the aforesaid judgment upon the
filing by respondents of a bond in the amount of P4,000.00.^[5]

On Appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the findings of the lower court were substantially adopted by the
appellate court except for the award of moral damages.^[6]

Hence, this petition.

In this case, petitioners
raised the following assignments of errors:

I.     THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFFS TO SUE UNDER THE NAME OF
THE COFRADIA DE BELEN WHICH HAS NO CORPORATE PERSONALITY TO SUE AND TO BE SUED.

II.    THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE
OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LITIGATION BY TRYING AND DECIDING THE CASE SINCE
THE ISSUE INVOLVED THE DETERMINATION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF CHURCH PROPERTIES AND
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RECOGNIZING THE COMPLAINTS OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
WHO HAVE NOT EVEN ESTABLISHED OWNERSHIP BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
PROPERTIES SEIZED.

III.   THE COURT EXCEEDED ITS POWERS, OR HAD NO
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT TREATED AND DECIDED THE ISSUE ON THE VALIDITY OR
NON-VALIDITY OF THE SUSPENSION OF FATHER MANUEL GOMEZ AND THE ISSUE AS TO WHO
IS THE LAWFUL PARISH PRIEST OF TANAUAN,
LEYTE, WHICH ACCORDING TO THE COURT WAS THE VERY ROOT OF THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY, THE MATTER HAVING BEEN ALREADY DECIDED
BY ROME IN FAVOR OF FATHER MANUEL GOMEZ.

IV.   THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN REJECTING THE
COUNTERBOND FILED BY, THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, THOUGH THE SAME WAS SUFFICIENT AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE
AND WAS FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF FIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
SEIZURE OF SUBJECT RELIGIOUS
PROPERTIES, THUS PREVENTING THE RETURN OF THE SAME TO THE DEFENDANTS.

V.   THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN JUMPING TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT THE IMAGES ARE NOT CHURCH PROPERTY MERELY ON THE INCOMPLETE
INVENTORY PRESENTED BY FATHER DENNY PARILLA, A NEWLY ORDAINED PRIEST, WHICH
INVENTORY OMITTED THE OTHER PAGES WHERE OTHER IMAGES ARE MENTIONED INCLUDING THE CONTROVERSIAL IMAGES SUBJECT
OF THE INSTANT CASE.

VI.   THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO REALIZE
THAT THE PROPERTIES IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE GOVERNED BY “ECCLESIASTICAL
LAW, CUSTOM, AND RULE OF THE CHURCH.” THE COURT A QUO ALSO ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE TESTIMONY OF SIMPLICIA CREER TO MEAN THAT BECAUSE
SHE ADMITTED THAT THE IMAGES BELONGED TO THE COFRADIA THEREFORE
THEY ARE NOT CHURCH PROPERTY.  THE COURT
A QUO ALSO ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE CLAIM OF THE PLAINTIFFS THAT THE PARISH
PRIEST HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE COFRADIA AND ITS PROPERTIES.

VII.  THE COURT A QUO ERRED APPLYING ARTICLE 559 OF
THE CIVIL CODE TO THE INSTANT CASE, SINCE THE ORIGINAL OWNER, INOCENTA DE
VEYRA, HAD DONATED THE IMAGES TO THE COFRADIA, AND THEREFORE HAD NOT BEEN
UNLAWFULLY DEPRIVED OF HER PROPERTY.  THE
DEFENDANTS, WHO ARE BONA FIDE MEMBERS OF THE COFRADIA, CANNOT BE CALLED
UNLAWFUL POSSESSORS OF THE IMAGES. 
NEITHER CAN THE COURT CONSIDER SEVERINA DE VEYRA AND GENEROSA MAZO, THE
GRANDCHILDREN OF INOCENTA DE VEYRA, THE LAWFUL HEIRS, AND THEREFORE OWNERS OF
THE IMAGES IN LIEU OF INOCENTA DE VEYRA.

VIII. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BUILDING UP ITS THEORY
OF THE ORIGINAL OWNERSHIP, FIRST BECAUSE THERE IS NO QUESTION OF RESTORING IT
TO THE ORIGINAL OWNER (OR THE HEIRS), AND SECONDLY, BECAUSE THOSE IN POSSESSION
BECAME SO LAWFULLY.

IX.   THE
COURT A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEIR SUPPOSED SUFFERINGS, MORAL OR SPIRITUAL WERE CLEARLY IMAGINARY AND
INCONCEIVABLE, AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS WERE THE
ONES WHO HAD REALLY, AND ACTUALLY SUFFERED FROM THE HARASSMENTS BY THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES.

X.   THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING VERY PREMATURELY THE MOTION OF THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL EVEN BEFORE THE DEFENDANTS
APPELLANTS BECAME AWARE OF THE ADVERSE DECISION AND ALSO BEFORE THEY COULD
AVAIL OF THEIR RIGHT TO APPEAL THE CASE WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWABLE BY LAW AND IN
SPITE OF ABSENCE OF JUSTIFIED, VALID,
AND SPECIAL REASONS STATED IN THE MOTION WHY EXECUTION SHOULD ISSUE PENDING APPEAL OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,
ESPECIALLY WHEN THE OBJECTS OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ACTION
FOR REPLEVIN WERE ALREADY SECURELY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE COURT, AND AFTER A FEW
DAYS AWARDED THE SAME TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES.^[7]

Stripped to bare
essentials, it will be observed that the issues raised herein such as:  (a) competence of the civil courts to rule on
allegedly ecclesiastical issues; (b) ownership of the controversial images; and
(c) respondents’ legal personality to sue are but a reiteration of what petitioners have advanced before the
Court of Appeals and the latter has already passed upon them after making a careful discussion of the evidence.

Thus, the Court of
Appeals concluded:

“The plaintiffs are suing in their own behalf as co-owners of
the images in question.  They merely
allege to be members of the Cofradia de Belen.

“The images in question are not church properties.  They belonged to the founder of the Cofradia who donated said images to the members of said
religious association.

“The suspension of the defendant Fr. Manuel Gomez is not
relevant to the issue involved.  The lower court simply mentioned the incident
as a background of the case.

“The evidence justifies the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation to the
plaintiffs.  The defendants had no
rights to retain the images in
question.  To recover said images and their vestments the
plaintiffs had to go to court and employ counsel.

“However, the equity
and circumstances of the case do not warrant any award of moral damages to the
plaintiffs.  As to other matters, the
lower court did not commit a reversible
error.”^[8]

Being based on
substantial evidence, no cogent reason could be found to disturb the above
findings of the Court of Appeals.  As
reiterated in a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.  In
petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court is confined to a
review of questions of law, except where the findings of fact are not supported
by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion.^[9]

However, the crux of the controversy appears to be who of
the two factions would be entitled to possession of the properties in
litigation, all of them being members of the same association.

As correctly ruled by
the trial court, the question which
came before it concerns rights of property held by a religious society,
strictly independent of the church. 
Hence, the rights of such an organization to the use of its property must
accordingly be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary
association.^[10]

Citing Watson
v. Jones^[11] in a similar case, this Court ruled that the
use of properties of a “religious congregation” in case of schism, is
controlled by the numerical majority of the members.  The minority in choosing to separate
themselves into a distinct body, and refusing
to recognize the authority of the government
body, can claim no rights in the
property from the fact that they once had been members.^[12]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals Is hereby affirmed, in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Record on Appeal, p. 37

^[2]
Record on Appeal, p. 13

^[3]
Record on Appeal, p. 23

^[4]
Record on Appeal, pp. 44-45

^[5]
Record on Appeal, pp. 47-48

^[6]
Rollo, p. 32

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 7-10

^[8]
Rollo, p. 32

^[9]
Lim v. C. A., 158 SCRA 308 (1988); Samsom v.
C. A., 141 SCRA 194 (1986); Republic v. IAC, 144 SCRA 705 (1986); Municipality
of Meycauayan,
Bulacan v. IAC 157 SCRA 640 (1986)

^[10]
Record on Appeal, p. 39

^[11]
20 Law Ed., 674-676

^[12]
Fonacier v. C. A., 98 Phil. 442-443 (1955)