PERFECTO D. KORDOVEZ, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. SOFRONIO C. CARMONA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF SAN CARLOS, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

Petitioner Perfecto D. Kordovez was a
desk sergeant of the police force of the City of San
Carlos, Province
of Negros Occidental,
with the required civil service eligibility. 
Having been charged administratively by the respondent mayor for
violation of law or duty, he was suspended from office on September 19, 1962.

After due investigation of the charges, the Municipal Board, on October 24, 1962, rendered a
decision dismissing him from the service. 
Thereupon and within the period provided for in Republic
Act No. 557, he appealed to the Com­missioner of Civil Service.

Sixty days after the date of his suspension (September 19, 1962)
petitioner asked the respondent mayor to order his reinstatement pending appeal, invoking the provisions of Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 557, and our ruling in the case of Paulino
Garcia vs. the Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. 
Respondent having refused to do so, the petitioner filed with the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for
Mandamus to secure an order for his reinstatement, to recover back salaries
from November 19, 1962, the date which he claimed to the end of his 60-day
preventive suspension, and damages (Civil Case No. 6862).

After due trial, however, the lower court rendered its decision
dismissing the petition.  Hence, this appeal.

To secure a reversal of
the appealed decision, the petitioner relies solely upon the proposition that
under the provisions of Section 35 of Republic Act 2260, otherwise known
as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he is
entitled to reinstatement because the Commissioner of Civil Service has
not decided his appeal within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of his preventive suspension.  We find no merit in this contention.

The law applicable to the present case is Republic Act No. 557,
Section 3, and not the one relied upon by the petitioner.  Contrary to his view, We
are of the opinion that no provision of the latter had repealed the
former.  Republic Act No. 2260 is a
general law which covers public officials
and employees, civil service eligibles or not, while Republic Act No. 557 is a special law which
applies only to provincial guards, city and municipal policemen with
civil service eligibility.  In case of conflict between the two kinds of
legislative enactment, the rule is that the one general in character shall not be deemed to have repealed the special law unless
that is expressly and clearly provided in the former.  The reason for this is that the special law evinces the particular
legislative intent more clearly.

That Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557 was not repealed by
Section 35 of Republic Act. No. 2260 may also be inferred from the fact that
Section 16 of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966
– which took effect on September 8, 1966
– reproduces the last part of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557 as follows:

“x x x   x x x   x x x Provided, however, That if
the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence, or
petition of the respondent, the period of the delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.  The respondent shall be entitled to his
salary for the period of suspension upon exoneration.”

In connection with such
provision, We have held here­tofore that although under Republic Act No. 557 a
suspended policeman is entitled to reinstatement if the administrative case
against him has not been finally decided within sixty (60) days after his
preventive suspension, such reinstatement can not be demanded if the delay in
the dis­position of his case is due to his own fault or petition as when the cause of the delay was the appeal to
the Com­missioner of Civil Service taken by him (Alacar
vs. City etc., 104 Phil. 1018; Martinez vs. Municipal Mayor etc., 103 Phil.
634.  

In the Martinez case (supra), we said the following which applies squarely to
the one before Us:

“It will be noticed however, that on the sixtieth day the
council voted by resolution to remove the petitioner from his position.  Such resolution would have decided the mat­ter
finally if petitioner has not filed a notice
of appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service. 
Therefore, his case was
not finally disposed of because of his own voluntary act of appealing which
amounted to a petition for review.  Such
petition excused any delay in the definite disposition of the charges.

“Indeed, it would be contrary to the spirit of mandamus
proceedings to compel reinstatement of a
suspended officer after the latter had been found guilty and dropped
from the service by the competent official body.  Such suspended official, it may be said, did
not have a clear legal right (to return) enforceable by mandamus.  And the court’s discretion should not be
exercised in a way injurious to
public interest; nor should mandamus issue where it would
not promote substantial justice.”

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.