G.R. Nos. L-23584-85. August 31, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LOURDES ITCHON VDA. DE FORMOSO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANGELINO C. SALANGA, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS SUR, TERIO PERALTA, ALIAS “…
ZALDIVAR, J.:
These are two petitions for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of respondent Judge Angelino C. Salanga in Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 of the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
dated September 16, 1964, wherein said respondent judge held that he had
authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide those cases, and to enjoin him
from hearing and deciding said cases.
The pertinent facts, as shown in the record, are summarized as
follows:
As an aftermath of the incident which resulted in the killing of
Mayor Lorenzo Formoso, Sr., of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, and of another
person, and the wounding of two other persons, Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and
3965 were filed, in August, 1958, before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the first case for
double murder and the second for double attempted murder. In each case the accused were Terio de Peralta, alias Leproso,
Lucio Fabillaran and Johnny
Fabillaran.
These two cases were assigned to Branch I of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur, stationed at
Vigan, Ilocos Sur and then presided over by Judge Felix Antonio. Upon arraignment, the accused in these two
cases pleaded not guilty and moved for separate trials. The motion for separate trials was granted,
and Judge Antonio commenced hearing the two cases.
On June 29, 1962, Hon. Angelino Salanga
– herein respondent – was appointed, ad interim Judge of the
Court of First Instance to preside over the newly-created Branch III of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
with station at Vigan, Ilocos
Sur. On May 23, 1963, the Commission on
Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines
confirmed the appointment of Judge Salanga. When Judge Salanga
started to preside over Branch III, Judge Florencio Villamor was presiding over Branch I which had been vacated
by Judge Felix Antonio who was appointed Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila; while Judge Ulpiano Dumaual
was presiding over Branch II which was vacated by Judge Jose Bautista who was
appointed Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Because the judges presiding over the three
branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur were all new, they agreed among themselves to raffle
the cases that were then pending in the three branches of the court which were
all stationed at Vigan. As a result of the raffle, Criminal Cases
Nos. 3692 and 3965 were assigned to Branch III, and so Judge Salanga resumed the hearing of the two cases which had been
started by Judge Antonio. At that stage
of the hearing when the prosecution had already rested its case against accused
Terio Peralta and was about to finish presenting its
evidence against the other accused (the Fabillaran
brothers), Judge Salanga was appointed judge to
preside over the newly-created Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur with station at Candon, Ilocos Sur. At about the same time Hon. Deogracias Solis was appointed judge to preside over Branch
III that had been vacated by Judge Salanga. Judge Solis started to preside over Branch
III on June 15, 1964. On the same day when Judge Solis assumed
office as presiding Judge of Branch III, the Secretary of Justice issued
Administrative Order No. 184, dated June
15, 1964, which reads as follows:
“In the interest of the administration of Justice and pursuant
to Section 56 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the Honorable Angelino Salanga, District Judge for the Province of Ilocos Sur, Fourth Branch, with
station at Candon, same province, is hereby
authorized to continue holding court at Vigan, effective
immediately and until further orders, for the purpose of trying all kinds of
cases and to enter judgment therein.”
Pursuant to the afore-quoted administrative order, Judge Salanga continued holding court at Vigan,
presiding over Branch I which had become vacant because Judge Florencio Villamor who presided
that branch was appointed Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
Since Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 were among the cases
assigned to Branch III Judge Solis set said cases for hearing on July 21, 1964. However, on the day of the scheduled
hearing, when counsel for the parties informed Judge Solis that Judge Salanga had partially heard the two cases, Judge Solis
issued an order in open court postponing the hearing of the two cases and
turning over the records of the cases to Branch I, presided over by Judge Salanga.
Believing that under Administrative Order No. 184 of the
Secretary of Justice and in virtue of the indorsement
by Judge Solis of Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 to Branch I he had the
authority and jurisdiction to continue trying and deciding those two cases,
Judge Salanga set the two cases for hearing before
him on September 15, 16 and 17, 1964.
On the first day of the scheduled hearing, or on September 15,
1964, the private prosecutors filed a motion raising the question regarding the
authority and/or jurisdiction of Judge Salanga to
take cognizance of the two criminal cases, upon the ground that those two
cases properly belonged to Branch III presided over by Judge Solis and not to
Branch I, and praying that further hearings of the cases be suspended until
after the question shall have been decided by the competent authority. The motion was denied in open court by Judge Salanga who forthwith set the continuation of the hearing
for September 16 and 17, 1964. On
September 16, 1964, the private prosecutors filed a motion for postponement of
the hearing, which motion was virtually a motion for reconsideration of the
order of respondent Judge the day before, reiterating their prayer to “suspend
the hearing and continuation of the above-entitled cases in order to give the
prosecution an ample time to elevate the case to the Higher Court for their
resolution.”[1]
On the same day, September
16, 1964, Judge Salanga issued an order
which reads as follows:
“Considering the petition for postponement filed by Atty. Constante Pimentel, one of the private prosecutors in
these two cases, to suspend the further hearing of these cases to enable the
prosecution to file a proper pleading before the Supreme Court on the
propriety of the authority of this Court to continue and terminate these two
cases originally scheduled and heard in Branch III of this Court, which
petition has been conformed to by the Fiscal In-Charge to be reasonable, the
Court is hereby constrained to grant this petition to solve once and for all
the issues raised in the aforementioned petition.
“The Court, however, has held the belief in denying the
original petition of the private prosecution for lack of merit, that it has
still full authority and jurisdiction to continue and terminate these cases by
virtue of an Administrative Order of the Department of Justice which allows him
to continue hearing cases and terminate thereof in the Court of First Instance
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. In spite of the
vigorous objections of defense counsels that said petitions are only filed by
the private prosecutors for the purpose of delaying the speedy termination of
these cases, the Court, after granting the time period requested by the
prosecution to file any proper pleading before the Supreme Court in these cases
also hereby directs the Clerk of Court to set for three days from October 6, 7,
and 8, 1964 consecutively for the continuation of the trial of these cases in
order to terminate the same.
“Let copy of this order be furnished to all parties concerned
for their information and guidance.”[2]
On September 30, 1964,
Lourdes Itchon
Vda. de Formoso, widow of
the late Mayor Lorenzo Formoso, Sr., as one of the
offended parties in Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965, filed, through counsel,
the present petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, naming as respondents Judge Angelino Salanga
and the accused Terio Peralta, Lucio
Fabillaran and Johnny Fabillaran. The People of the Philippines
is included as one of the petitioners because the petition stemmed from the
incidents in connection with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and
3965. In their petitions the petitioners
allege that in holding that he has still authority and jurisdiction to continue
with the hearing of the two criminal cases which are assigned to and are pending
in Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur at Vigan
notwithstanding his appointment as Judge of Branch IV of the said court at Candon and the fact that Branch III was actually presided
over by Judge Solis, respondent Judge Salanga
“has clearly acted without jurisdiction, or at least in excess
thereof….”[3]
On October 2, 1964, this Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents to file their answers to the petition on or before October 15,
1964, and restraining respondent Judge from further proceeding with the trial
of Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur until October 21,
1964, the day when the case was set for hearing. In due time the respondents filed their
answers.
At the hearing on October
21, 1964, petitioners did not appear but upon written motion filed
by their counsel they were given up to November
15, 1964 within which to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral
argument. The attorneys for respondents
appeared and were granted leave to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from
receipt of petitioners’ memorandum.
On November 13, 1964, counsel for petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file petitioners’ memorandum and for the issuance anew of
a restraining order, upon the ground that he would not be able to submit his
memorandum on time, and that respondent Judge Salanga
had set Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 for hearing on December 8, 9 and 10,
1964 in spite of the pendency of the present
proceedings before this Court. On November 19, 1964, this Court
granted the motion for extension, but deferred action on the issuance of
another restraining order until after the parties had submitted their
memoranda.
On December 3, 1964, after he had filed a memorandum, counsel for
petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Court of
November 19, 1964 insofar as said resolution had deferred action on the motion
for the issuance of a restraining order, and prayed that a restraining order
be issued enjoining the respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 which he had set for December 8, 9 and 10,
1964. Being of the impression that the
two criminal cases had been heard by respondent Judge on December 8, 9 and 10,
1964, this Court, in its resolution of December
14, 1964, did not take action on the motion for
reconsideration. Actually, however, respondent
Judge postponed the hearing of the two criminal cases which was scheduled for
December 8, 9 and 10, 1964.
On March 8, 1965, respondent Judge issued an order setting again
the trial of the two criminal cases for April 6, 7 and 8, 1965, with the
warning “that this Court will not grant any further postponement, and the
trial shall proceed on the dates aforementioned.”[4]
This order prompted petitioners to file, on March 11, 1965, an urgent motion praying this Court to
issue a restraining order directing respondent Judge to desist from hearing the
two criminal cases on April 6, 7 and 8, 1965, and on such other days, before final
judgment in the present case shall have been rendered. On March
15, 1965, this Court issued an order restraining the respondent
Judge from hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur
until further order from this Court.
The question to be resolved in the present case is whether or
not, under the facts and circumstances herein-above related, respondent Judge
Angelino Salanga had authority to continue hearing
and to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur.
It is the settled rule that jurisdiction is vested in the court,
not in the judge. In the case of Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No.
L-22488, October 26, 1967,[5]
this Court held:
“…. The various branches of the Court of First Instance…
are coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one
Court of First Instance. The
jurisdiction is vested in the court not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch
jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the judge or branch alone, to the
exclusion of the other branches. Trial
may be held or proceedings continued by and before another branch or judge
…. The apportionment and distribution
of cases do not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the
province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.”[6]
It is clear, therefore, that any of the branches of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur
has jurisdiction to try and decide Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 — the
crimes involved in those cases being those of murder and frustrated murder and
the accused were all validly brought before the court for trial. And so, it cannot be said, as maintained by
the petitioners, that because these two criminal cases had been assigned to
Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur by raffle that branch has the exclusive jurisdiction to
try and decide those cases and that it is only the judge presiding that branch
that has authority to hear and decide those cases. A case may be assigned to any branch of the
Court of First Instance, and a case already assigned to one branch may be
transferred to another branch. Section
7 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
“Sec. 7. Assignment
of cases. – In the assignment of
cases to the different branches of a Court of First Instance, or their transfer
from one branch to another whether by raffle or otherwise, the parties or their
counsel shall be given written notice sufficiently in advance so that they may
be present therein if they so desire.”
Under the foregoing provision of the Rules of Court the
assignment of cases to the different branches of the court, or the transfer of
cases from one branch to another branch thereof, may be done by raffle or upon
proper accord among the judges. What is
required, as contemplated in the provision of Section 7 of Rule 22 of the Rules
of Court, is that the parties are given notice so that they may be present when
the raffle is made or when the transfer from one branch to another is ordered
by a judge. Certainly a clerk of court
can not, by his own initiative, transfer a case already assigned to one branch
of the court to another branch.[7]
Neither may a judge cause a case to be transferred to the branch presided by
him under circumstances which would warrant a charge that the judge has
demonstrated “unusual interest” in the case.[8]
Indeed the matter regarding the transfer of cases from one branch of the court
to another branch is left to the sound discretion of the judges presiding the
different branches of the court.
In the case now at bar the record shows that on July 21, 1964
when Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 were called for hearing before Judge Deogracias Solis of Branch III of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, the
parties — prosecution and defense — were present, and the parties themselves
informed the court that these two cases had been partly heard by Judge Salanga. Acting on
that information, Judge Solis, taking into consideration that Judge Salanga was holding court in Vigan,
issued an order stating: “let the
trial of these two cases be postponed and the records be returned to the court
being presided by Judge Salanga.”[9]
The parties to the cases, which include the petitioners herein, who were
present in court, therefore, had due notice of said order of Judge Solis of the
transfer of the two cases to Branch I.
The record does not show that the prosecution, or the petitioners
herein, had filed any motion for reconsideration of that order of Judge
Solis. We hold that the requirement of
Section 7 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court regarding notice to the parties
regarding the transfer of a case from one branch of the court to another branch
had been sufficiently satisfied.[10]
The order of Judge Solis transferring those two cases from Branch III to Branch
I was not only reasonable but proper.
Judge Salanga had already heard practically
all the main evidence of the prosecution in those two cases. Judge Salanga was
certainly best situated to continue hearing, and finally deciding, those two
cases. In the case of People vs. Buslon, G. R. No. L-22778, Nov. 29, 1965[11]
this Court held that a judge of the court of first instance of one province who
was assigned as a vacation judge to another province by the Secretary of
Justice, “for the purpose of trying all kinds of cases and to enter
judgment therein”, may hear and decide cases already begun and partly
tried by the regular judge. If a
vacation judge detailed temporarily by the Secretary of Justice from one
province to another to act in place of a regular judge can continue to hear and
decide cases already partly tried by the latter, with more reason that in the
case at bar respondent Judge Salanga may continue
hearing, and later decide, the two criminal cases above adverted to,
considering that he had already partly heard said cases. Administrative Order No. 184, dated June 15,
1964, of the Secretary of Justice authorizing Judge Salanga
to continue holding court in Vigan “for the
purpose of trying all kinds of cases and to enter judgment therein,” which
was issued pursuant to the provision of Section 56 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
(R. A. 296), had vested in Judge Salanga a perfectly
valid authority to preside over Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur and to try and decide
all cases assigned to, or transferred to, that branch. In the case now before Us, We hold that the
transfer of Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 from Branch III to Branch I of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur was proper, and respondent Judge Salanga
could continue to hear, and to decide, those cases under the authority of
Administrative Order No. 184, dated June 15, 1964, of the Secretary of Justice.[12]
This Court has taken note of the fact that in the record it is
not shown that when Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 were first heard by Judge
Salanga, when he was yet presiding Branch III of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
the prosecution, or the petitioners herein, had raised any objection against
said judge trying of hearing the two cases.
It is only when Judge Salanga had been
transferred to Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur and was assigned by the Secretary of Justice to
hold court in Vigan — temporarily presiding over
Branch I to which Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 had been transferred —
that petitioners for the first time objected to Judge Salanga’s
hearing the two cases. In their petition
before this Court petitioners allege probable bias on the part of Judge Salanga, insinuating that said Judge might decide the cases
against the prosecution because of his alleged connections with the powerful
political leaders of Ilocos Sur. However, We do not find in the record any
showing of partiality, arbitrariness, or prejudice on the part of respondent
judge when these cases were partially heard by him. Prejudice is not to be presumed, and this
Court will not indulge in assumption. We
cannot accept the insinuation of the petitioners that Judge Salanga
would act with bias in hearing and deciding the two cases in question. On the contrary, this Court believes that
Judge Salanga, as every Judge is expected to do,
would act in accordance with his oath to administer justice without fear or
favor.[13]
Be that as it may, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that as of the date this opinion is being written respondent Judge Angelino Salanga is no longer the presiding judge of Branch IV of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, because presently he is the presiding judge of one of
the branches of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
in the Third Judicial District, with station at Dagupan
City. The question, as to whether or not
respondent Judge Salanga can continue hearing
Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3965 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur under the authority of
Administrative Order No. 184 dated June 15, 1964 of the Secretary of Justice,
has, therefore, become moot. This Court
also takes judicial notice that Judge Deogracias
Solis who presided over Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur is now dead. Inasmuch as the records of Criminal Cases
Nos. 3692 and 3965 were turned over to Branch I of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur, said cases
should be tried by the judge who presides over said branch.
Nevertheless, if any of the parties in those two criminal cases
desire that Judge Angelino Salanga continue to hear
and decide them, said party may move to secure from the Supreme Court an
authority for Judge Salanga to continue hearing and
to decide those cases pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of
Section 51 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R. A. 296), as amended, which reads
as follows:
“Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or
branch of a court in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction without having decided a case
totally heard by him and which was duly argued or opportunity given for
argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be lawful for him to prepare
and sign his decision in said case anywhere within the Philippines and send the
same by registered mail to the clerk of the Court to be filed in the court as
of the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if
the judge had been present in the court to direct the filing of the
judgment: Provided however, That if a
case has been heard only in part, the
Supreme Court, upon petition of any of the parties to the case and the
recommendation of the respective district judge, may also authorize the judge
who has partly heard the case to continue hearing and to decide said case
notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction.”[14]
The Rules of Court has a provision practically similar to the
above-quoted provision of the second paragraph of Section 51 of R. A. 296, as
amended. Thus Section 9 of Rule 135 of
the Rules of Court reads as follows:
“Sec. 9. Signing
judgments out of province. –
Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch of a Court of
First Instance in a province shall leave the province by transfer or assignment
to another court of equal jurisdiction, or by expiration of his temporary
assignment, without having decided a case totally heard by him and which was
argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it
shall be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere
within the Philippines. He shall send
the same by registered mail to the clerk of the court where the case was heard
or argued to be filed therein as of the date when the same was received by the
clerk, in the same manner as it he had been present in court to direct the filing
of the judgment. If a case has been
heard only part, the Supreme Court, upon petition of any of the parties to the
case recommendation of the respective district judge, may also authorize the
judge who has partly heard the case, if no other judge had heard the case in
part, to continue hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his transfer
or appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction.[15]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the herein petitions for
certiorari and prohibition are dismissed, and the restraining order issued by
this Court on March 15, 1965
is lifted. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
[1]
As quoted from the motion for postponement, page 22 of the record.
[2]
Pages 25-26, record.
[3]
As quoted from petition, page 5 of record.
[4]
As quoted from order of March 2, 1965,
page 84, record.
[5]
21 SCRA 519, 523-524.
[6]
See also Ella vs. Salanga, L-23826, Sept. 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 86; Lumpay vs. Moscoso, 105
Phil. 968, 973; Ruiz vs. Topacio, 40 O. G.
8th. Supp. 201.
[7] Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, Dec. 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 475, 486.
[8] Luque vs. Kayanan,
L-26826, August 29, 1969;
29 SCRA 165, 183.
[9]
(See Annex H to answer of respondent Judge Salanga,
p. 44, record.)
[10]
Commissioner of Immigration, etc. vs. Reyes, et al., G. R. No. L-23838, Dec. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 728-731-32.
[11]
15 SCRA, 460, 463.
[12]
Ella vs. Salanga, L-23826, Sept. 28, 1970; 35 SCRA 86, 93.
[13]
Pimentel vs. Salanga, L-27934, Sept. 18, 1967; 21 SCRA 160, 167.
[14]
Underscoring, supplied.
[15]
Underscoring, supplied.