THE MABALACAT SUGAR COMPANY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE V. RAMIREZ ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

It must be conceded that any lease, right, title or interest which
the plaintiff ever had to the use or possession of the strip of land in
question had expired, and that the plaintiff was nothing more than a
tenant at will or sufferance. That is to say, at the time of the
alleged acts of which plaintiff complains, it had no legal right to the
use or possession of the land, and that any right which it ever did
have had expired with the contract for the lease of the land by the
defendants to Dizon and Tiglao. In this situation, the defendants had
the legal right to remove plaintiff’s railway from their land, and
plaintiff cannot recover damages from the defendants for the doing of
that which they had a legal right to do. It is true that after the
lease had expired by the terms there were negotiations between the
parties for a renewal or extension of the lease. It is also true that
such negotiations fell through, and that the lease was never renewed or
extended. Hence, it follows that the defendants are not liable for any
damages which the plaintiff may have sustained growing out of the
failure to renew the lease, and for such reasons plaintiff’s first
assignment of error is not well taken.

Be that as it may, the railway track in question has lawfully been
on the defendants’ land and in the use and possession of the plaintiff
for about seven years, and while it is i true that after the expiration
of the lease, the defendant, upon notice to the plaintiff, had the
legal right to terminate the lease and remove the track, yet they had
no right to do so in the manner in which it was done. In its removal it
was the duty of the defendants to remove the track without any
unnecessary damage to the plaintiff. That is to say, in such removal
the defendants had no legal right to bend or twist the rails or to
destroy the railway ties, fishplates, bolts and nuts and spikes, and
that such removal should have been made without any serious injury or
damage to the materials of which the railway was constructed. For such
wrongful acts, the lower court awarded damages to the plaintiff in the
sum of P2,083.99.

In the opinion of the writer the amount of such damages is about
P4,000. Be that as it may, my associates are all of the opinion that
the amount awarded by the lower court is reasonable, and that its
judgment in that respect should also be affirmed.

From what has been said, it follows that there is no merit in the
defendants’ appeal. If the defendants had torn up and removed the track
in a peaceful and orderly manner and without any unnecessary
destruction to plaintiff’s property, they would not then be liable for
any damages. But the proof is conclusive that it was done with a large
body of men and in a hasty manner, and with force and violence, and
that the whole track was torn up and removed in about two days’ time
and without any regard to plaintiff’s rights.

The evidence is conclusive that the track was removed at the
instance and request of Tomasa C. Vda. de Pamintuan, the guardian of
the minor defendants, and the lower court rendered judgment against her
as such guardian. That was error. The judgment for the amount of
damages awarded to plaintiff should be against Tomasa C. Vda. de
Pamintuan personally and in person, and not as guardian, for the simple
reason that the minors are not legally liable for a tort committed by
their guardian. That is to say, the judgment of the lower court for
damages against Tomasa C. Vda. de Pamintuan, as guardian of the minors,
is reversed, and in lieu thereof a corresponding judgment will be
entered against Tomasa C. Vda. de Pamintuan personally and in person,
and that in all other things and respects, the judgment of the lower
court is affirmed, with costs against the plaintiff. So ordered,

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.