APOLINARIO OKOL AND EVARISTO ALCANTARA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. TAYUG RURAL BANK, INC., VALERIANO MAGNAAN AND ENRIQUE CO SUE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

In the brief for plaintiffs Apolinario Okol and Evaristo Alcantara, now appellants, from an order of dismissal by
the lower court, there is an admission that what motivated their complaint was
their desire to prevent the execution of a judgment final and executory.  They did
absolutely nothing about the plight into which they had fallen when there was
time enough to do so, but waited until the stage of execution was reached with a presentation of
this complaint that was dismissed, the only justification for refusing to be
bound by the decision being an asserted assignment of rights to a third party,
the relationship of whom to the creditor, Tayug Rural
Bank, being alleged but not quite supported by the very annex attached to such
complaint.  They ought not to have been
surprised when a motion to dismiss
based on a bar by prior judgment was filed. 
They ought not to have been surprised either when such motion to dismiss
was granted by the lower court.  Now they
would want us to reverse such order of dismissal.  They ought to have known better.  The law is against them.  We have no choice but to affirm.

The complaint, which was subsequently dismissed, was filed by
appellants on January 23, 1966.  In all candor, they
acknowledged that such case was instituted “principally for the purpose of
securing a judgment from the lower court releasing them from their obligation
on the promissory notes, subject-matter of the decision in Civil Case
No.T-1070.”^[1] They would
seek exculpation from a liability
already adjudged by including in such complaint a deed of assignment allegedly
executed by them in favor of defendant Tayug Rural
Bank, now appellee, not directly but through a
certain Enrique Co Sue.   For appellants,
this deed of assignment extinguished by novation
their obligation, subject matter of the aforesaid civil case, the judgment in
which had already reached the stage of finality and was therefore executory.  Nowhere
in such deed of assignment attached to their complaint is there any mention,
express or implied, that such CoSue
was acting for and in behalf of appellee Bank.^[2]

It must be noted that appellants received copy of the decision in
Civil Case No. T-1070 on February 17,
1966.  The deed of assignment
was dated January 4, 1966.  Surprisingly, they did nothing to seek relief
from such judgment or to appeal.  They
just folded their hands.  The decision
became final and executory, and an order for a writ
of execution came from the lower court on April 21, 1966.^[3]
Prior to defendant deputy provincial sheriff, Valeriano
Magnaan, now appellee, proceeding with the scheduled sale at public auction of the personal properties of appellant, Apolinario R. Okol, on October
18, 1966, this case, as above noted, was
filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch V, on September 23, 1966
against the appellees.  Again,
it was reiterated in their brief
that appellants seek “a decision releasing the appellants from their
obligations sought to be enforced in Civil Case No.  T-1070 and to temporarily
restrain the appellee, Valeriano
Magnaan, deputy sheriff of Pangasinan,
from proceeding with the scheduled execution
sale, until the termination of the case.”^[4]

There was a motion to dismiss based, among others, on bar by
prior judgment, favorably acted on, as mentioned by the lower court, in its
order of April 24, 1967.  A reconsideration
was sought, but it was unsuccessful.  Hence, this appeal on a question of law.  We repeat that no error of law was committed by the lower court
in its challenged order of dismissal.

Considering the controlling facts as set forth in the very brief
for plaintiffs-appellants, the lower court had no other choice but to grant the
motion to dismiss filed by appellee Tayug Rural Bank.  It
could not act otherwise, as to allow the complaint to go on would be to deprive
of force and effectivity a judgment that had become
final and executory. 
Appellants ought to have been aware that if such a stage were reached,
it was due to their fault and to their fault solely.  They could have invoked the appropriate legal
remedies before it was impressed with finality. 
They failed to do so.  Certainly,
it would be a disservice to the legal order if they could still seek to
restrain the enforcement thereof.  What
is worse, is that the very complaint which was
dismissed on its face failed to show convincingly that the third party, whose
actuations they would impute to the appellee Bank,
was in fact duly authorized to act on its behalf.  Nothing could be plainer, therefore, than
that the lower court did precisely what in law it had to do.

The principle on which such a doctrine is based is succinctly summarized in the
authoritative work of former Chief Justice Moran on the Rules of Court.  Thus: 
“It has been held that it is a general rule common to all civilized
system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law,
pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts,
should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question
litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest.  Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an
important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that
it is a fundamental concept in
the organization of every jural system.  Public policy and sound practice demand that,
at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law.  The
very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies.”^[5]
According to this work, this is the reason for the rule:  “The fundamental principle upon which
the doctrine of res judicata
rests is that parties ought not
to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right
or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given the judgment of
the court, so long as it remains unreversed should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate.”^[6]

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of April 24, 1966 is affirmed.  Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., no part.

Makasiar, J., on official leave.

^[1]
Statement of the Case, Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 2.

^[2]
Annex C, Record on Appeal, p. 12.

^[3]
Ibid, pp. 20-21.

^[4]
Statement of Facts, Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 5.

^[5] 2
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 360-361 (1970).

^[6] Ibid
p. 362.