G.R. No. L-26001. October 29, 1968
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, RESPONDENTS.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
The Philippine National Bank – hereinafter referred to as the PNB
– seeks the review by certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint against the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank – hereinafter referred to as the PCIB – for the recovery of
P57,415.00.
A partial stipulation of facts entered into by the parties and
the decision of the Court of Appeals show that, on or about January 15, 1962,
one Augusto Lim deposited in his current account with
the PCIB branch at Padre Faura, Manila, GSIS Check
No. 645915-B, in the sum of P57,415.00, drawn against the PNB; that, following
an established banking practice in the Philippines, the check was, on the same
date, forwarded, for clearing, through the Central Bank, to the PNB, which did
not return said check the next day, or at any other time, but retained it and
paid its amount to the PCIB, as well as debited it against the account of the
GSIS in the PNB; that, subsequently, or on January 31, 1962, upon demand from
the GSIS, said sum of P57,415.00 was re-credited to the latter’s account, for
the reason that the signatures of its officers on the check were forged; and
that, thereupon, or on February 2, 1962, the PNB demanded from the PCIB the
refund of said sum, which the PCIB refused to do. Hence, the present action against the PCIB,
which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila, whose decision
was, in turn, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
It is not disputed that the signatures of the General Manager and
the Auditor of the GSIS on the check, as drawer thereof, are forged; that the
person named in the check as its payee was one Mariano D. Pulido,
who purportedly indorsed it to one Manuel Go; that the check purports to have
been indorsed by Manuel Go to Augusto Lim, who, in
turn, deposited it with the PCIB, on January 15, 1962; that, thereupon, the
PCIB stamped the following on the back of the check: “All prior indorsements and/or Lack of Endorsement Guaranteed,
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,” Padre Faura
Branch, Manila; that, on the same date, the PCIB sent the check to the PNB, for
clearance, through the Central Bank; and that, over two (2) months before, or
on November 13, 1961, the GSIS had notified the PNB, which acknowledged receipt
of the notice, that said check had been lost, and, accordingly, requested that
its payment be stopped.
In its brief, the PNB maintains that the lower court erred: (1)
in not finding the PCIB guilty of negligence; (2) in not finding that the indorsements at the back of the check are forged; (3) in
not finding the PCIB liable to the PNB by virtue of the former’s
warranty on the back of the check; (4) in not holding that “clearing”
is not “acceptance”, in contemplation of the Negotiable Instruments
Law; (5) in not finding that, since the check had not been accepted by the PNB,
the latter is entitled to reimbursement therefor; and
(6) in denying the PNB’s right to recover from the
PCIB.
The first assignment of error will be discussed later, together
with the last, with which it is interrelated.
As regards the second assignment of error, the PNB argues that,
since the signatures of the drawer are forged, so must the signatures of the
supposed indorsers be; but this conclusion does not
necessarily follow from said premise.
Besides, there is absolutely no evidence, and the PNB has not even tried
to prove that the aforementioned indorsements are
spurious. Again, the PNB refunded the
amount of the check to the GSIS, on account of the forgery in the signatures, not
of the indorsers or supposed indorsers,
but of the officers of the GSIS as drawer of the instrument. In other words, the question whether or not
the indorsements have been falsified is immaterial to
the PNB’ s liability as a drawee,
or to its right to recover from the PCIB,[1]
for, as against the drawee, the indorsement
of an intermediate bank does not guarantee the signature of the drawer,[2]
since the forgery of the indorsement is not
the cause of the loss.[3]
With respect to the warranty on the back of the check, to which
the third assignment of error refers, it should be noted that the PCIB thereby
guaranteed “all prior indorsements”, not
the authenticity of the signatures of the officers of the GSIS who signed on
its behalf, because the GSIS is not an indorser
of the check, but its drawer[4]
Said warranty is irrelevant, therefore, to the PNB’s
alleged right to recover from the PCIB.
It could have been availed of by a subsequent indorsee[5]
or a holder in due course[6]
subsequent to the PCIB, but, the PNB is neither.[7]
Indeed, upon payment by the PNB, as drawee, the check
ceased to be a negotiable instrument, and became a mere voucher or proof of
payment.[8]
Referring to the fourth and fifth assignments of error, we must
bear in mind that, in general, “acceptance”, in the sense in which
this term is used in the Negotiable Instruments Law[9]
is not required for checks, for the same are payable on demand.[10]
Indeed, “acceptance” and “payment” are, within the purview
of said Law, essentially different things, for the former is “a promise
to perform an act,” whereas the latter is the “actual performance”
thereof.[11]
In the words of the Law,[12]
“the acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee
of his assent to the order of the drawer,” which,
in the case of checks, is the payment, on demand, of a given sum of money. Upon the other hand, actual payment of the
amount of a check implies not only an assent to said order of the drawer
and a recognition of the drawee’s
obligation to pay the aforementioned sum, but, also, a compliance with
such obligation.
Let us now consider the first and the last assignments of
error. The PNB maintains that the lower
court erred in not finding that the PCIB had been guilty of negligence in not
discovering that the check was forged.
Assuming that there had been such negligence on the part of the PCIB, it
is undeniable, however, that the PNB has, also, been negligent, with the
particularity that the PNB had been guilty of a greater degree of
negligence, because it had a previous and formal notice from the GSIS that
the check had been lost, with the request that payment thereof be
stopped. Just as important, if not more
important and decisive, is the fact that the PNB’s
negligence was the main or proximate cause for the corresponding loss.
In this connection, it will be recalled that the PCIB did not
cash the check upon its presentation by Augusto
Lim; that the latter had merely deposited it in his current account with
the PCIB; that, on the same day, the PCIB sent it, through the Central Bank, to
the PNB, for clearing; that the PNB did not return the check to the PCIB
the next day or at any other time; that said failure to return the check to the
PCIB implied, under the current banking practice, that the PNB considered the
check good and would honor it; that, in fact, the PNB honored the check and
paid its amount to the PCIB; and that only then did the PCIB allow Augusto Lim to draw said amount from his aforementioned
current account.
Thus, by not returning the check to the PCIB, by thereby
indicating that the PNB had found nothing wrong with the check and would honor
the same, and by actually paying its amount to the PCIB, the PNB induced the
latter, not only to believe that the check was genuine and good in every
respect; but, also, to pay its amount to Augusto
Lim. In other words, the PNB was the
primary or proximate cause of the loss, and, hence, may not recover from the
PCIB.[13]
It is a well-settled maxim of law and equity that when one of two
(2) innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third person, the
loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the
loss or who put it into the power of the third person to perpetrate the wrong.[14]
Then, again, it has, likewise, been held that, where the
collecting (PCIB) and the drawee (PNB) banks are
equally at fault, the court will leave the parties where it finds them.[15]
Lastly, Section 62 of Act
No. 2031 provides:
“The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will
pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits:
“(a) The existence of the drawer, the
genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the
instrument; and
“(b) The existence of the payee and his then
capacity to indorse.”
The prevailing view is that the same rule applies in the case of
a drawee who pays a bill
without having previously accepted it.[16]
WHEREFORE,
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
Philippine National Bank.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando, and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., did not take part.
[1] First National Bank of Wichita Falls v.
First National Bank of Borger, 37 S.W.
(2d) 802.
[2]
VI Banks and Banking, Zollmann, 378.
[3]
First National Bank of Marshalltown
v. Marshalltown State Bank, 77 N.W. 1045.
[4] First National Bank of Wichita Falls v.
First National Bank of Borger, supra.
[5] American Hominy Co. v. Millikin
National Bank, 273 F. 550, 556.
[6]
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.
v. Bank of Italy,
4 P (2d) 781, 784-785.
[7]
The PNB had previous notice of the infirmity of the check when it came into its
possession. Art. 52 (d),
Act No. 2031.
[8] National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Seattle
Nat. Bank, 187 P. 342, 346.
[9] Section 132, Act No. 2031.
[10] Sections
143 and 185, Act No. 2031; Phil. Nat. Bank v.
Nat. City Bank of New York, 63 Phil. 711; I Morse on Banks and Banking, 6th ed.
898, 899; Wachtel v.
Rosen, 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.E. 326.
[11] First National Bank of Washington v. Whitman, 94 U.S.
343, 347, 24 L. ed. 229.
[12] Section 132 thereof.
[13] Marlin National Bank v.
Reed, 164 S.W. (2d) 260; First National Bank of Wichita Falls v. First
National Bank of Borger, 37 S.W. (2d) 802.
See, also, Commerce-Guardian Bank v.
Toledo Trust Co., 21 N.E. (2d) 173, 176; National Bank of Rolla v. First National Bank
of Salem, 125 S.W. 513, 516; Philippine National Bank v. National City Bank of NY, supra;
VIII Banks and Banking, Zollman, 421.
[14] Blondeau v. Nano, 61 Phil. 625, 631, 632.
[15] VI
Banks and Banking by Zollman, 416.
[16] First
National Bank of Portland v. United
States National Bank of Portland, 197 P. 547; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
New York v. Planenscheck,
227 NW 387; US v. Bank of NY,
National Banking Association, 219 F. 648; US Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 260 NW 798;
First National Bank of Cottage Grove v.
Bank of Cottage Grove, 117 B. 293.