G.R. No. L-39419. April 12, 1982
MAPALAD AISPORNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DE CASTRO*,
J.:
reversal of the decision dated August 14, 1974[1] in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled “People
of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna,
defendant-appellant” of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
the City Court of Cabanatuan[2] rendered
on August 2, 1971 which found the petitioner guilty for having violated Section
189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a
fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation
of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970 in an information[3] which reads as follows:
“That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of Cabanatuan,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of an application
for insurance by soliciting therefor the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro,
for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized insurance
company, registered under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, resulting
in the issuance of a Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the
amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969,
without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as
such agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner, Republic of the
Philippines.“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
The facts,[4] as found by the
respondent Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder:
“IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7 March, 1969 and as of 21
June, 1969, appellant’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by
Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, with license to
expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at Cabanatuan City, Personal
Accident Policy, Exh. D was issued by Perla thru its authorized representative,
Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana
M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during
lifetime of policy, and for reasons not explained in record, present information
was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private prosecutor, charging wife of
Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously acted,
‘as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaña de
Seguros, x x x without said accused having first secured a certificate of
authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commission,
Republic of the Philippines.’
and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly disputed, that
aforementioned policy was issued with active participation of appellant wife of
Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being the
wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and
that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by
telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so
she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew x x x.”
Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On
appeal, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the respondent appellate
court finding the petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, this present recourse was filed on
October 22, 1974.[5]
In its resolution of October 28, 1974,[6] this Court resolved, without giving due
course to this instant petition, to require the respondent to comment on the
aforesaid petition. In the comment[7]
filed on December 20, 1974, the respondent, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, submitted that petitioner may not be considered as having
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.[8] On April 3, 1975, petitioner submitted his
Brief[9] while the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the respondent, filed a manifestation[10] in lieu of a Brief on May 3, 1975
reiterating his stand that the petitioner has not violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the
following errors[11] allegedly committed
by the appellate court:
“1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF
COMPENSATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY THE FIRST
PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE INSURANCE ACT.“2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F,
F-1, TO F-17, INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER’S GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.“3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN
PETITIONER.”
We find the petition meritorious.
The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of having
violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without
reference to the second paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is
necessary to determine whether or not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph
of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent
found on its second paragraph.
The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:
“No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any
agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for
services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first
procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an
agent of such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent,
subagent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for
insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or
other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine
Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority so
to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the
first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be
issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of
persons desiring such authority, such application being approved and
countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon
a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he may
require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or
renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate
shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of the year
following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued
upon the application of the company.“Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of
any insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an
application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or
assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent
within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the
duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such
company is subject.“Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be
fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting
as agent, subagent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with
the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke
the certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall
thereafter be issued to such convicted person.”
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first
paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in
the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner,
while its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent
of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty
to be imposed for its violation.
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not
under the second paragraph of Section 189 of the aforesaid Act but under its
first paragraph. Thus –
“x x x it can no longer be denied that it was appellant’s most active
endeavors that resulted in issuance of policy to Isidro, she was there and then
acting as agent, and received the pay therefor – her defense that she was only
acting as helper of her husband can no longer be sustained, neither her point
that she received no compensation for issuance of the policy because
‘any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of
any insurance company or transmits for a person other than himself an
application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or
assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent
within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the
duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties, to which an agent of such
company is subject.’ paragraph 2, Sec. 189, Insurance Law,
now it is true that information does not even allege that she had obtained
the insurance,
‘for compensation’
which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance Law in its
2nd paragraph, but what appellant apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted
not under the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it is provided
that,
‘No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker, in the solicitation or
procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining
new insurance any commission or other compensation from any insurance company
doing business in the Philippine Island, or agent thereof, without first
procuring a certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner,
which must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months
thereafter.’
therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of the charge, so
that Errors 2 and 4 must be overruled.”[12]
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court seems to
imply that the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph of
Section 189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first
paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that under the second
paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and
obtains an insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph, there is no
necessity that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be
called an insurance agent.
We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second
paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the
first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its
second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance
agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence –
“Any person who for compensation x x x shall be an insurance agent within the
intent of this section, x x x.”
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph
holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of
the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and
interpretative clause intended to qualify the term “agent” mentioned in both the
first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the
agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the
aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious
whole.[13] A statute must be so construed
as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.[14] The meaning of the law, it must be borne
in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from
isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole.[15] Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and
independently.[16] More importantly, the
doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a
particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific
by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is
associated.[17]
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second
paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to
receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of
the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has
established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate court for, according to
the latter, the receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not
an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act.
We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a
misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit
insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an
information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation
either directly or indirectly, charges no offense.[18] In the case of Bolen vs. Stake,[19] the provision of Section 3750, Snyder’s
Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as
insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in such capacity
negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted
that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation
of an insurance contract by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a
conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be
alleged and proved.[20]
After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the
Solicitor General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the
accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
SO
ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., Makasiar, Fernandez,
Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Plana,
J., no part.
[*] Mr. Justice de Castro was designated to sit with
the First Division under Special Order No. 225.
[1] p. 21, Rollo.
[2] p. 11, CA Rollo.
[3] p. 10, CA Rollo.
[4] pp. 21-22, Rollo.
[5] p. 7, Rollo.
[6] p. 36, Rollo.
[7] p. 51, Rollo.
[8] p. 58, Rollo.
[9] p. 69, Rollo.
[10] p. 71, Rollo.
[11] p. 69, Rollo; p. 6, Brief for the
Petitioner.
[12] pp. 25 and 26, Rollo.
[13] Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil.
709; Tamayo vs. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953; Lopez vs. El Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil. 249;
Chartered Bank vs. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931.
[14] People vs. Polmon, 86 Phil. 350.
[15] 82 C.J.S., Section 345, pp.
699-700.
[16] Tamayo vs. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953.
[17] Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
& Dizon, 75 Phil. 371.
[18] Jasper vs. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R
197; 164 S.W. 851.
[19] 149 p. 1074, 11 Okla. Crim. 594.
[20] People vs. Sy Gesiong, 60 Phil.
614.