THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. E. C. CAÑADA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

People versus Cañada

The Case

This is People versus Cañada, a criminal case for violation of a price-control executive order, decided by the Supreme Court in May 1949. The People of the Philippines prosecuted E. C. Cañada for selling two combs at a price fixed by Executive Order Number 24, as amended by Executive Order Number 28, issued by the President of the Philippines. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules a reviewee must carry into the bar: a penal executive order cannot be applied to acts done before it took effect, and a conviction must rest on the very order charged in the information, not on a later one the prosecution never pleaded.

Procedural History

The municipal court of the City of Zamboanga convicted the accused of violating Executive Order Number 24, as amended by Executive Order Number 28, and sentenced him to pay a fine of one hundred pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. There he filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that under Executive Order Number 62, dated August 14, 1945, a comb is not among the articles with fixed ceiling prices, and that this later and favorable order should be applied. The motion was denied. Upon arraignment he entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to fifteen days of arresto menor and to pay the costs. He appealed again, his counsel asking only that the judgment be modified to impose a minimum fine. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal, and the Solicitor General recommended acquittal.

Facts

On June 19, 1945, E. C. Cañada sold two combs at twenty-five centavos each. The prosecution charged him with violating Executive Order Number 24, as amended by Executive Order Number 28, which fixed maximum prices for certain commodities.

On August 14, 1945, after the sale, Executive Order Number 62 was promulgated. It repealed all executive orders in conflict with it, and it contained certain items that may be construed as comprising combs.

The accused was convicted in the municipal court, moved to quash in the Court of First Instance on the ground that a comb was not a price-controlled article, and, after denial of that motion, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to fifteen days of arresto menor. He appealed, and the Solicitor General recommended acquittal.

Issues

• Whether or not a comb is included in the list of commodities for which maximum prices are fixed under Executive Order Number 24, as amended by Executive Order Number 28.
• Whether or not the accused may be convicted under Executive Order Number 62, which was promulgated only on August 14, 1945, after the sale on June 19, 1945.
• Whether or not a conviction may rest on an executive order other than the one charged in the information.

Applicable Provisions

Executive Order Number 24, as amended by Executive Order Number 28, is the order charged in the information and the one under which the accused was prosecuted. The Court held that a comb is not included in its list of commodities with fixed maximum prices, so the conviction cannot stand on it.

Executive Order Number 62, dated August 14, 1945, is the later order that repealed all executive orders in conflict with it. The Court held that even if it may be construed as comprising combs, it cannot support the conviction because it was promulgated after the sale.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the appellant cannot be convicted of a violation of Executive Order Number 24, as amended by Executive Orders Numbers 26 and 28, because a comb is not included in the list of commodities for which maximum prices are fixed therein.

On the second issue, the Court acknowledged that certain items in Executive Order Number 62 may be construed as comprising combs, but held that the conviction cannot be predicated on that order, which was promulgated only on August 14, 1945, subsequent to the sale on June 19, 1945. A penal order cannot reach backward to punish an act done before it existed.

On the third issue, the Court stressed that the information charges a violation of Executive Order Number 24, as amended by Executive Order Number 28. The conviction must therefore rest on that order, and it cannot be saved by a different order the prosecution never charged.

Doctrine

First, a penal executive order cannot be applied retroactively to acts committed before its promulgation. Executive Order Number 62, though it may cover combs, could not convict the accused for a sale made before it took effect.

Second, a conviction must rest on the very order charged in the information. Where the information charges a violation of Executive Order Number 24, as amended by Executive Order Number 28, the accused cannot be convicted under a different order, Executive Order Number 62, that the prosecution never pleaded.

Third, penal provisions are construed strictly against the State. Where a comb is not among the commodities with fixed ceiling prices under the order charged, the sale does not constitute the offense alleged, and the accused must be acquitted.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the appellant, with costs de oficio.

Remember This

The single line to memorize: a penal executive order cannot be applied to acts done before its promulgation, and a conviction must rest on the very order charged in the information. Examiners use this case to test retroactivity of penal orders and the rule that the information fixes the offense and the law under which the accused is convicted.