G.R. No. L-49760. October 23, 1979
PEDRO N. CALIMLIN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION V, BUREAU OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ISIDORO A. VERA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH II, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE …
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On January 9, 1976, private respondent Jaime R. Alegre, filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II, presided over by respondent
Judge, a petition for mandamus with damages against the petitioner Pedro
Calimlim and Dionisio
Belen, Regional Director and Administrative Officer of the Bureau of Lands,
Region V, Legaspi City, respectively,[1]
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2728.
On September 8, 1978,
respondent Judge rendered a decision,[2]
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
“(a) ordering the respondent Pedro Kalimlim
to immediately make the assignment of petitioner as Hearing Officer I (R-48);
“(b) ordering
respondent Pedro Kalimlin to pay petitioner his unearned salary
as Hearing Officer I (R-48) at the rate of P520.00 a month from December 2, 1975 up to the time he
makes the assignment;
“(c) ordering the respondent Pedro Kalimlim
to pay petitioner moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00;
“(d) ordering the respondent Pedro Kalimlim
to pay petitioner exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00;
“(e) ordering respondent Pedro Kalimlim
to pay petitioner attorney’ s fees in the amount of P1,000.00;
“(f) and to pay the costs.
“SO ORDERED.”[3]
a copy of which was received by
petitioner, thru counsel, on October
19, 1978.
Thereafter, on November
7, 1978, petitioner, thru the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed a notice of appeal[4]
signifying his intention to appeal to the Court of Appeals, and alleging that
“having been sued in his official capacity, is exempt from filing the
appeal bond.”
On November 29, 1978,
respondent Judge issued an order,[5]
reading as follows:
“The intended appeal by respondent Pedro Calimlim,
will not be given due course unless he files an appeal bond within the reglementary period.
His being sued in his official capacity does not exempt him from the
filing of an appeal bond. Only the
government of the Republic of the Philippines is exempt from the filing of an
appeal bond since under Section 1 of Rule 142, the government of the Republic
of the Philippines is not liable for costs, unless the law so provides. (Government of the Philippines vs. The Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, 34 Phil. 157; Hongkong
& Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. Rafferty, 39 Phil. 145).
“The Rules of Court does not exempt a public official sued in
his official capacity from paying the required appeal bond especially as in
this case where respondent was made liable for damages in his private capacity.
“SO ORDERED.”
The petitioner moved for reconsideration;[6]
however, the same was denied by respondent Judge in his order dated January 3, 1979, with a warning that
unless the appeal bond was filed within five (5) days from receipt of the
order, he would issue a writ of execution as prayed by private respondent in
his motion for execution.[7]
Hence, the petitioner, thru the Solicitor General, interposed the
present petition.
As prayed for by the petitioner, this Court issued on February 2, 1979 a temporary
restraining order “effective as of this date and continuing until
otherwise ordered by the Court.”[8]
The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or
not the petitioner is legally required to file an appeal bond for the
perfection of his appeal from the decision of respondent Judge in Civil Case
No. 2728 – a special civil action for mandamus with damages.
The Solicitor General contends that since the petitioner was sued
in his official capacity as Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, then it
was not required of him to file an appeal bond.
Only the notice of appeal was necessary for the perfection of his
appeal, and in support thereof cited the cases of Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Romero[9]
and Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board vs. Cloribel.[10]
The instant petition is devoid of merit. The exemption from the filing of an appeal
bond applies only in cases where the action is brought by or against public
officers impleaded merely as nominal representatives
of the Government and sued purely in their official capacity,[11]
as in the cases cited by the Solicitor General.
However, when a public officer is sued not only in his official capacity
but also in his personal capacity, he is not exempted from the filing of an
appeal bond. Thus, in the case of Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals,[12]
which is also a case of mandamus with damages, this Court rejected the
claim of the respondent Director of the Forest Research Institute that he was
exempted from the filing of an appeal bond in the following tenor:
“We find this conclusion untenable. The general rule is that an appeal bond is
required for the purpose of paying for the costs which the appellate court may
award against the appellant (Sec. 5, Rule 41).
As an exception, an appeal bond is not required of the Government when
it is the unsuccessful party, because no costs are supposed to accrue against
the Republic of the Philippines
unless otherwise provided by law (Sec. 1, Rule 31). But exemption from the filing of bonds
applies only where the action is brought by or against public officers impleaded merely as nominal representatives of the Government,
and sued purely in their official capacity (Tolentino
vs. Carlos, 66 Phil. 140; Chan vs. Villanueva, et al., L-5420, April, 1952; Araneta, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, et
al., L-8895 & L-9191, April 30, 1957; Hongkong
& Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Rafferty, 39 Phil. 145; Gov’t.
of PI vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance, 34 Phil. 157).
“It appears exceedingly clear in this case that respondent De
la Cruz was sued not only in his official capacity as Director of the Forest
Research Institute, but also in his personal capacity for having acted
allegedly in manifest bad faith, ‘with the purpose of persecuting,
discriminating against or committing injustice to the petitioner’ (par. 13,
Ann. “F”); and accordingly, the judgment of the court of origin made
him personally liable for damages in varying concepts. Whether or not the trial court committed
error in awarding damages against De la Cruz in his personal capacity is
immaterial here, this being more properly cognizable in an appeal from the main
case. For our purpose, what is decisive
is the dual character in which he was sued and the judgment rendered by the
trial court. At least on principle, a
public officer, by virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in
his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith (Art. 27,
N.C.C.; 43 Am. Jur., 86, 89-90). A different rule would sanction the use of
public office as a tool of oppression.”
In the case at bar, the herein petitioner – like the respondent
public officer in the Tabuena case – was sued
not only in his official capacity as Regional Director, Region V of the Bureau
of Lands, but also in his personal capacity.
Thus, in his petition below, the private respondent Jaime Alegre alleged that the actuations of the petitioner Pedro Calimlim in depriving him of his right to assume his
position as Hearing Officer I, subjected him to ridicule, humiliation and
embarrassment, and as such, he suffered moral and consequential damages, and,
accordingly, the court a quo in its decision made him personally
liable for damages. Consequently, We
hold that petitioner Pedro Calimlim is not exempted
from the filing of an appeal bond to perfect his appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition should be, as it is
hereby, DISMISSED, and the petitioner is hereby given a period of ten (10)
days from entry of our judgment within which to file his appeal bond in Civil
Case No. 2728, and thereafter, the court a quo shall conduct
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. The restraining order heretofore issued is
hereby dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio, Aquino, Santos, and Abad Santos,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurs, but were it not because the Solicitor General had agreed with
petitioner as to his right to exemption from filing an appeal bond, he would
have voted to declare the judgment of the trial court final.
[1]
Annex “D”, p. 38, rollo.
[2]
Annex “L”, p. 69, Id.
[3]
p. 76, rollo.
[4]
Annex “M”, p. 77, rollo.
[5]
Annex “N”, p. 79, Id.
[6]
Annex “O”, p. 80, Id.
[7]
Annex “P”, p. 83, Id.
[8]
p. 100, rollo.
[9]
10 SCRA 216 (1964).
[10]
20 SCRA 517 (1967).
[11]
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 413
(1961).
[12]
supra.