PEDRO R. DIZON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. TITO V. TIZON, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATAAN; THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BATAAN; AND GUILLERMO ARCENAS, RESPONDE…

Dizon versus Tizon

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Pedro Dizon, a candidate for reelection as Provincial Governor of Bataan, against Judge Tito Tizon of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan, and Guillermo Arcenas, the opposing candidate. Dizon asked the courts to compel the provincial board of canvassers to exclude the votes of one precinct and to declare the election there null and void, on the ground that the election return was patently manufactured. The case matters because it draws the line between a return that is obviously manufactured on its face, which may be excluded from the canvass, and an alleged fraud that must be raised in a proper election contest.

Procedural History

Dizon filed a petition for mandamus and or prohibition before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, seeking to compel the provincial board of canvassers to exclude the votes cast in the questioned precinct and to annul the election there. Guillermo Arcenas, an opposing candidate, was allowed to intervene, and both he and the provincial board of canvassers answered, denying the material averments. The trial court dismissed the petition. Dizon then brought the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition, and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.

Facts

Pedro Dizon was a candidate for reelection to the position of Provincial Governor of Bataan in the elections of November 14, 1967. On December 21, 1967 he instituted his petition in the trial court, seeking to compel the provincial board of canvassers to exclude, not to count, the votes cast in precinct number 18 of the municipality of Dinalupihan, and to declare the election in that precinct null and void on the ground that the election return was patently manufactured.

He pointed particularly to the fact that while the return showed 279 ballots had been cast and counted, only 80 persons actually voted according to a certification of the election registrar in Dinalupihan. He alleged that the board of election inspectors in the precinct, through participation or tolerance, suffered at least 199 additional ballots to be falsified and allowed to be included in the election returns.

The trial court found that the return was regular and complete on its face, and that when it was canvassed on December 7, 1967, Dizon raised no objection to it. The certification of the election registrar stated that the 80 named persons were the only voters who actually voted as shown in the precinct book, although the minutes of the board of inspectors showed that 279 voters actually voted. The chairman of the board of inspectors and the poll clerk certified that the discrepancy was due to their failure to accomplish the voting record at the back of the form on account of lack of actual time, and noted that some registered voters who actually voted failed to sign their identification record but signed in the list of voters and their voting records in the poll clerk's charge. The trial court accepted this explanation, and the Supreme Court found it reasonable.

Issues

• Whether or not the election return for the questioned precinct was obviously manufactured within the meaning of the Lagumbay doctrine, so as to justify its exclusion from the canvass and the annulment of the election in that precinct.
• Whether or not the discrepancy between the number of ballots counted in the return and the number of voters who signed the precinct book was a defect appearing on the face of the return.
• Whether or not the proper remedy for the alleged fraud or irregularity was an election contest rather than a petition to exclude the return from the canvass.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. It applies instead the doctrine laid down in Lagumbay versus Commission on Elections, which permits the exclusion of a return that is obviously manufactured. The Court described the ministerial duty of the board of canvassers in these terms:

Its ministerial duty was to read and canvass the results of the election on the basis of the returns, once satisfied that the same were genuine.

This defines the narrow ground on which a board of canvassers may act, and explains why the registrar's certification could not be used to defeat a return regular on its face.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the return was not obviously manufactured. It was regular and complete on its face, and Dizon raised no objection when it was canvassed. The discrepancy relied upon did not appear on the face of the return but between the return and an entirely different document, the certification of the election registrar. That certification was not material to the board of canvassers, whose ministerial duty was to read and canvass the results on the basis of the returns once satisfied that they were genuine.

On the second issue, the Court explained that the precinct book showed only 80 voters had signed, but this did not mean no other voters cast their ballots. There were 279 according to the minutes of voting, and the certification of the board chairman and poll clerk reasonably explained the discrepancy, especially considering that there were 352 registered voters in the precinct. The explanation ruled out any conclusion that the return was obviously manufactured.

On the third issue, the Court held that if any fraud or irregularity was committed, the return could not for that reason be considered obviously manufactured. It would still reflect the actual number of ballots found and counted, and the remedy to correct the anomaly would be an election contest, not a petition to exclude the return and thus virtually annul the election in that precinct.

Doctrine

A return may be excluded from the canvass only when it is obviously manufactured on its face, following the Lagumbay doctrine. A discrepancy between the return and a separate document, such as the election registrar's certification, is not a facial defect and cannot justify exclusion. The board of canvassers performs a ministerial duty to read and canvass returns once satisfied they are genuine. Alleged fraud or irregularity in the casting of ballots is the proper subject of an election contest, not a petition to exclude the return and annul the election in the precinct.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner, thereby affirming the dismissal by the trial court and leaving the questioned return to be canvassed.

Remember This

Only a return obviously manufactured on its face may be excluded from the canvass; a discrepancy with an outside document is not such a defect. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the ministerial canvass and the proper remedy of an election contest.