Adm. Matter No. RTJ-88-216. March 01, 1993
BEN MEDINA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE LETICIA MARIANO DE GUIA, RTC-BALANGA, BATAAN, BRANCH 3, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
These several
administrative complaints involve Judge Leticia Mariano De Guia, RTC-Balanga,
Bataan, Branch 3 Presiding Judge, either as respondent or as complainant. The complaints were consolidated and assigned
to Associate Justice Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. of the Court of Appeals for
investigation. Justice Pronove, Jr.
submitted his findings in each case on different dates. The facts of each case as found by the investigating
Justice and as may be gleaned from the records are summarized hereunder.
In A.M. No. RTJ-88-216, Judge De Guia tried three adoption cases — Special Proceeding Nos. 5586,
5587 and 5593. The charge states that
notices of hearing were published without the benefit of a raffle
conducted by the executive judge as required under Presidential Decree No. 1079
which provides:
“Section. 2. The executive
judge of the court of first instance shall designate a regular working day and
definite time each week during which the said judicial notices or
advertisements shall be distributed personally by him for publication to
qualified newspapers or periodicals as defined in the preceding section, which
distribution shall be done by raffle;
Provided, That should the circumstances require that another day be set for the
purpose, he shall notify in writing the editors and publishers concerned at
least three (3) days in advance of the designated date; Provided further, that
the distribution of the said notices by raffle shall be dispensed with in case
only one newspaper or periodical is in operation in a particular province or
city.”
Section. 6. Violation of
any provision of this Decree shall be punished by a fine of not less than five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and imprisonment for not less
than six (6) months nor more
than two years. The offending executive
judge or court personnel shall be perpetually disqualified from holding any
public office in the government.”
In each of the
above-mentioned adoption cases, Judge De Guia issued on February 15, 1988 an
order setting each respective case for hearing, ordering the publication of
said order, pursuant to sec. 4, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, and the
furnishing of the required notices to the parties.
Estela Bascarra, Staff
Assistant I in Judge De Guia’s sala with the duty of releasing the court’s
orders, testified in the hearings conducted by the investigating Justice that
Deputy Sheriff Ricardo Navarro, coming directly from Judge De Guia’s chambers, asked for and got the copies meant
for the clerk of court for raffling from her. (TSN, October 18, 1990, pp. 27, 41-43) “Pinakukuha po ni Judge De Guia”,
Deputy Sheriff Navarro said to Estela, adding “she would be the one to give the
copies to the publishers.” (TSN, Oct. 18, 1990, pp. 31, 46-47) As a result, no
copy was sent to the RTC clerk of court and no raffle of the notices in the
three cases was conducted.
It was also shown that the copies of the orders intended for the
parties were not released through or by Bascarra, but were given to the parties
by Process Server Ricardo Flores and Deputy Sheriff Navarro. The notations
of these two employees to that effect were written on the back of the orders.
The records show that the order in S.P. No. 5586 was published in
the Mt. Samat Weekly Forum, and those of S.P. Nos. 5587 and 5593, in the Bataan
Journal. Personal inquiries made by herein complainant, Ben P. Medina, the
publisher of The Bataan Today, revealed that the orders were given to Zeny
Soriano, business manager of the Mt. Samat Weekly Forum, and Esperanza Poblete
of the Bataan Journal, by Judge De Guia. (TS N, October 18, 1990, pp. 70-71)
Judge De Guia, on the other hand, denies any knowledge or
participation in the release and subsequent publication without raffle of the
three orders. She alleges that after
herself conducting an inquiry, she found out that it was the parties themselves
or their counsels who requested for copies either from Process Server Flores or
Deputy Sheriff Navarro, and caused their publication. Moreover, she alleges that the complaint should have been filed
against Judge Maglalang as executive judge and Erlinda Perez as clerk of court
who had the duty, under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 1079 of conducting
the mandated raffle.
We take note of the investigating Justice’s careful evaluation of
the foregoing evidence as follows:
“In the face of Judge De Guia’s denials that she had nothing to do
with the release and publication of the orders in question, the testimony of
Estela Bascarra has to be scrutinized carefully. This is so because it is the testimony of Estela, not the
declarations of Ben Medina, nor clerk of court Erlinda Perez, that directly links
the respondent Judge to the publication of the orders containing the notices of
hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly then, if these statements of Estela were true, it would
mean that Judge De Guia had a hand in the publication of the notices made
without the benefit of a raffle.
After evaluating the declarations of Estela, Your Investigator
finds her testimony credible and deserving of weight.
It should be noted that Estela’s assertion that copies of the
orders intended for the Clerk of court were taken from her and that she was not
the one who released said orders to the parties and/or their counsel can hardly
be disputed. xxx The notations of
[Process Server Flores and Deputy Sheriff Navarro] written on the back of the
order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, it bears emphasis that neither process server
Flores nor deputy sheriff Navarro had the duty of releasing the order of the
court. While they could serve orders
they could do so only after they had been released for service by the releasing
clerk who was Estela Bascarra.
Who authorized the release of the orders to the parties on the
three cases, is therefore, a pivotal question. It is submitted that only Judge De Guia had the power to do so. She alone could change the usual procedure
of releasing orders by directing the process server and deputy sheriff to give
to the parties the copies intended for the clerk of court. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the
two minor court process servers would act the way they did without the prior
authorization of Judge De Guia.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that after being given a copy
of the orders, the petitioners and their lawyers simply went to the publishers
and made arrangements for the publication without any court approval. This was the impression Judge De Guia wanted
to create in her testimony. But
considering that the publication of the orders was a legal requirement
well-known to the parties and their lawyers, no one among them would have dared
to publish the orders without the go signal of the court. Under the circumstances, only Judge De Guia
could have given that approval and it is shown by the fact that she directed
her process server and deputy sheriff to give copies of the orders to the
petitioners and their lawyers. The act
of giving said copies could not have been for any purpose other than
publication because as testified to by Estela Bascarra, she had already mailed
to the parties their copies of the orders.” (Report, June 8, 1992, pp. 6-10)
We agree with the investigating Justice’s
evaluation of the evidence of the parties and accordingly find Judge De Guia guilty of the above charges.
At this point we find it pertinent to emphasize the
indispensability of the raffle system, not only because it is the mandate of the law, but in order to avoid favoritism — a rung away from the
ladder of graft and corruption — by judges. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Bartolome, 203 SCRA 328
[1991]) This Court will not countenance any deviation or disregard of the system,
devised as it is to shield judges from any suspicion of impropriety.
In A.M. No.
RTJ-88-228, Angelito Vero,
court aide in Judge De Guia’s sala, charges that Judge De Guia accepted bribes
from litigants in cases pending before her. Complainant Vero alone testified. His testimony is summarized in the Report as follows:
“As court aide, his principal duty was to clean the court premises
where he was allowed by Judge Elizaga and then by Judge De Guia, to sleep and
cook his meals (pp. 11-12, TSN, November 14, 1991). Sometime in December, 1987, he stayed in the house of Judge De
Guia at Parañaque, Metro Manila. While
there, out of “pakikisama” he agreed to act as bodyguard of Atty. Manny De
Guia, respondent’s husband, who was then running for town councilor in the
local elections (pp. 4-5, TSN, November 14, 1991). In addition, he was
asked to help in the campaign by distributing the leaflets of Atty. De Guia
(pp. 4-5, TSN, November 14, 1991).
He stayed in Parañaque until the end of January, 1988 and for the
two months that he was there, he submitted daily time records which were
subsequently approved by Judge De Guia (pp. 5-6, TSN, November 14, 1991).
After the elections, Judge De Guia asked him to look for a
housemaid (p. 32, TSN, November 14, 1991). When he replied that it would be difficult because his recomendee might
steal from her, Judge De Guia said: “No, that will not happen” (p. 30, TSN, November 14, 1991). Eventually, he was able to give her a maid
who, after borrowing P1,000 from Judge De Guia, failed to return from Nueva
Ecija. Judge De Guia told him
thereafter that the maid “stole things from her including some dollars.” (p.
30, TSN, November 14, 1991).
Because of the incident, Judge De Guia wanted him to pay what the
maid stole and borrowed (p. 30, TSN, November 14, 1991). When he refused, she scolded him, saying
‘leche’, and blamed him for what happened. She said that she did not want to have a ‘snake inside her office’, and
threatened to dismiss him from the service if he would not pay the maid’s
indebtedness (p. 31, TSN, November 14, 1991). Since then, whenever he would be late by 5 or 10 minutes, Judge De Guia would note his undertime in
the logbook while ignoring the tardiness of his co-employees (p. 31, TSN,
November 14, 1991).
Because of his worsening relations with Judge De Guia, he
approached Atty. Democrito Perez and asked his advice (p. 32, TSN, November 14,
1991). Atty. Perez told him that it
would be difficult to quarrel with the respondent because she was a judge (p.
32, TSN, November 14, 1991). But he
replied that Judge De Guia was not treating him like a human being (p. 33, TSN,
November 14, 1991). Whereupon, Atty.
Perez asked him what he could do against the Judge and he showed to him the
notebook, Exhibit B, saying ‘ito po ang aking panglaban sa kanya’ (p. 33, TSN,
November 14, 1991).
It was in this notebook where he copied the contents of a yellow
pad paper, that was lost during a typhoon, on which he wrote the names of the
persons with pending cases in branch 3 who gave to Judge De Guia (pp. 19-20,
TSN, November 14, 1991). As listed in
his notebook, he saw the following persons giving gifts to Judge De
Guia:
1) JOSE ZABALA- Prior to court sessions in the morning, Jose Zabala
gave to him gifts of prawns, crabs, bangos and even ‘punda ng unan’ and towels
with the instruction to give them to Judge De Guia. Following Judge De Guia’s order, he kept the gifts inside the
comfort room. Later in the afternoon,
he was asked by Judge De Guia to carry the bags containing the gifts to the bus
station where she took her ride
for Manila (pp. 8-10, TSN, October 29, 1991).
As stated in his affidavit, Exhibit A, Jose Zabala gave gifts to
Judge De Guia on February 23,
1987, March 25, 1987, April 9, 1987, May 12, 1987, June 16, 1987, August 20, 1987, October 8, 1987, January 28, 1988,
April 7, 1988 and July 21, 1988 (p. 18, TSN, August 29, 1991).
2) GUILLERMO REYES also gave gifts of prawns and milkfish to Judge
De Guia. Once, the seafood were placed in
a bag which was about 2 feet in height, 1 1/2 feet in width and topped with
ice. When he gave the gifts to Judge De
Guia, he was told to keep them inside the toilet. As before, he carried the bags of seafood to the bus station when
Judge De Guia went home at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon on Thursdays (pp.
11-14, TSN, August 29, 1991).
The gifts were given on October 14, 1987, November 20, 1987,
November 24, 1987, February 8, 1988, March 2, 1988, April 14, 1988, April 18,
1988 and June 1, 1988 (p. 17, TSN, August 29, 1991).
3) SANTOS FORBES gave gifts of prawns, milkfish, seeds of kasoy,
and mango fruits to Judge De Guia which he also kept inside the comfort room
and he brought to the bus station for
Judge De Guia. As stated in his
affidavit, the gifts were given on April 6, 1987, April 9, 1987, June 5, 1987,
June 10, 1987, August 12, 1987, August 19, 1987, August 31, 1987, October 28,
1987, February 11, 1988, March 9, 1988, April 19, 1988 and July 12, 1988 (pp.
19-21, TSN, October 29, 1991).
4) SOLEDAD NERY gave hamburger, cooked spaghetti, and others which
he could no longer remember. He bought
the food with the money given by Soledad Nery. When Judge De Guia inquired who gave the food and he would mention the
name of Soledad Nery, she accepted them
(pp. 22-23, TSN, August 29, 1991).
5) OSCAR TARNATE on many occasions handed envelopes containing
money to Judge De Guia (pp. 23-24, TSN, August 29, 1991).
With the help of Atty. Democrito Perez, he prepared the affidavit
containing his charges against Judge De Guia (p. 16, TSN, November 14,
1991). After filing his complaint on July 26, 1988, he stopped
sleeping and cooking his meals in the court premises (p. 13, TSN, November 14,
1991).” (Report, October 12, 1992, pp. 2-5)
Judge De Guia denies the
allegations. She alleges that Vero was
a disgruntled employee who willingly allowed himself to be used by Atty.
Democrito Perez, a practicing lawyer and former president of the IBP Bataan
Chapter, in a campaign to discredit her. Judge De Guia presented the affidavits of the litigants Jose Zabala,
Santos Forbes, Guillermo Reyes and Soledad Nery denying the bribery
incidents. She further alleges that it
was her husband’s relatives in Mariveles who gave the various gifts.
The investigating Justice
did not find the testimony of Vero credible. Vero was perceived as a biased witness, as it was shown in his testimony that even before
Judge De Guia arrived in Balanga, Bataan, Vero had formed the impression that
Judge De Guia accepted bribes as “when she was in Balayan, Batangas [her
previous post], she was already in the newspaper.” (TSN, November 14, 1991, p.
29) The aftermath of the said incident,
where Vero felt that he was being maltreated, nurtured his animosity towards Judge De Guia, making his motive in filing
the bribery charges dubious.
The investigating Justice also maintained that no incident of
bribery could have occurred on February 25, 1988, one of the dates listed in
the notebook, because this day was declared a special non-working holiday under
Proclamation No. 217. The Daily Time
Records of the employees of Branch 3 showed this fact. Also, the earliest date listed in Vero’s
notebook was February 9, 1988, and yet the
minutes of that day’s hearings showed that it was still Judge Elizaga who had
presided in court. Judge De Guia had taken her oath of office
only on February 4, 1988.
We
have held that a mere preponderance of evidence is required to hold a
judge liable in an administrative proceeding (Sabitsana, Jr. v. Judge Villamor,
202 SCRA 435 [1991]) In view of
complainant’s uncorroborated testimony and its inherent flaws, the bribery
charges were not proven.
Anent Judge De Guia’s defenses, it is significant to note that,
as admitted by the litigants, their affidavits were procured upon the “request”
of Judge De Guia, during the investigation of the bribery charges. (See TSN, June 4, 1992, p. 20 and p. 35)
Some of these litigants still had pending cases before Judge De Guia’s court
(See TSN, June 4, 1992, p. 19 and p. 43), and could have been unduly persuaded
into making the affidavits. Hence, it
is doubtful if much weight can be given to the litigants’ affidavits and
testimony. The same may be said of the
affidavits and testimony of the relatives
of Judge De Guia’s husband.
And though Judge De Guia cannot be held liable for bribery for
lack of sufficient evidence, her other actuations recounted in connection with
this case cannot be ignored. It was
found that Angelito Vero was made to stay in Parañaque in Judge De Guia’s
household in December, 1987 until January, 1988. Vero was made to serve as bodyguard to Atty. Manny De Guia, Judge
De Guia’s husband, who was then running for councilor in the Parañaque local
elections, and made to distribute campaign
leaflets. During this period Judge De
Guia signed Vero’s Daily Time Records, and consequently, Vero’s salary was
drawn from the judiciary.
In A.M. No. RTJ-88-273 original
complainants were Donato Perez and Atty. Democrito Perez. Atty. Democrito Perez was shot under mysterious circumstances by an unknown assailant
in front of his house on the night of March 21, 1991, and Judge De Guia filed a
motion to dismiss in view
thereof. However, Donato Perez remains
as complainant, and the investigation continued.
Only Donato Perez
testified in this case. His testimony
is summarized in the Report as follows:
“He declared that his daughter, Jenelle Perez, was being adopted by
his brother, Pedro Perez, who was living in the United States (TSN, July 1, 1992, p. 14). The petition for adoption was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Bataan and docketed therein as SP No. 5484. The case was assigned to Branch 3 then being
presided by Judge Luciano Elizaga. When
Judge Elizaga was assigned to Bulacan, Judge De Guia took over and continued
hearing the case.
After the trial, petitioner Pedro Perez filed a formal offer of
evidence on July 27, 1987 (Exhibit C, p. 5, Folder of Exhibits). On October 19, 1987, Judge De Guia issued
the following order considering the case submitted for decision after the lapse of five (5) days:
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, while the case was still pending decision, complainant
Donato Perez mentioned the case to Atty. Simplicio Angeles who was then running
for mayor of Morong (p. 5A, TSN, July 1,
1992). At that time, complainant
was also a candidate but for vice?mayor
of Morong (p. 5A, TSN, July 1, 1992). He solicited the help of Atty. Angeles because the latter was a former
associate of Judge De Guia at the Philippine National Bank (pp. 5B, 8, TSN,
July 1, 1992). He was told not to worry by Atty. Angeles who promised to help him (p. 9, TSN, July 1, 1992).
After the elections, where both of them lost, Atty. Angeles asked
him if he had money to he given to Judge De Guia (p. 7, TSN, July 1, 1992). When complainant replied that he was willing to sell even his carabaos,
Atty. Angeles told him that on February 25, 1988, both of them would go to the office of Judge De Guia (p. 7, TSN, July 1, 1992). On the appointed date, while inside the
office at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning, Judge De Guia asked Donato Perez
how much he could afford (p.7, TSN, July 1, 1992). When he answered P1,000.000, she did not agree, prompting him to
increase the amount to P2,000.000 (pp.7 8, TSN, July 1, 1992). When he eventually handed to Judge De Guia
the amount in cash, she accepted it saying that the decision would come out (p.
8, TSN, July 1, 1992).
On March 15, 1988, judgment was rendered granting the petition for adoption. A copy of the decision was received by complainant’s lawyer, Atty. Bruno Flores on April 5, 1988. When complainant told Atty. Flores what happened, he replied
‘talagang ganyan’ (p. 14, TSN, July 1, 1992).
Although judgment was favorable to his daughter, complainant felt
bad that he had to give money for the decision to come out (pp. 10-11, TSN, July
1, 1992). Because of his displeasure,
he decided to see Atty. Democrito Perez before whom he executed a sworn
statement, on October 7, 1988, containing his charge against Judge De Guia (p.
14, TSN, July 1, 1992). Then, on
December 2, 1988, he and Atty.
Democrito Perez jointly filed the instant complaint with this Honorable Court.
Notwithstanding that the daughter was adopted by his brother
pursuant to the decision, she was not able to leave for the United States to
join her new parents (p. 19, TSN, July 1, 1992). On August 29, 1991, Donato Perez received a letter from his
brother stating that because of certain representations made by Judge De Guia
with the U. S. Embassy, her daughter
was not allowed to leave for the United Estates (Exhibit B, p. 3, Folder of
Exhibits; pp. 19-2-, TSN, July 1, 1992).” (Report, October 12, 1992, pp. 2-4)
Judge De Guia denies the
charges, alleging that Donato Perez, like Angelito Vero, was a willing tool in
Atty. Democrito’s vendetta. In her
defense, she presented the affidavit of Atty. Simplicio Angeles.
The investigating Justice
recommends the exoneration of Judge De Guia of the bribery charge mainly on the
ground that Donato Perez’ lone and uncorroborated testimony was not
credible. Donato Perez was seen as a
partial witness due to his kinship to and close relationship with Atty.
Democrito Perez. Also, complainant’s
inaction for eight months was perceived as unnatural. Donato Perez’ testimony was also discredited because the alleged
bribery incident was recounted to have taken place on February 25, 1988, a
special non-working holiday, when the courts were closed. The failure to present Atty. Simplicio
Angeles to corroborate Donato Perez’ testimony was also deemed fatal.
Although we agree that
there is insufficient evidence to hold Judge De Guia liable in view of the complainant’s
failure to substantiate his charge, we would like to make several observations
regarding this case. We note Donato
Perez’ difficulty in proving his case, largely because Atty. Simplicio Angeles,
the only other witness to the alleged bribery incident, had executed an
affidavit belying the charge. Yet a
study of this affidavit would show that there is no categorical and specific
denial that the incident complained of happened, but only a general statement,
as follows: “I am executing this
affidavit to belie the statement of Mr. Donato Perez, in the interest of
justice and fair play, for I firmly and sincerely believe that Judge De Guia is
an honest and dedicated magistrate who renders judgment based on the evidence
presented and the merits of the case for I have had the occasion to know her as a
practicing lawyer in the province of Bataan.” It is also averred that Atty. Angeles’
sister, upon his request, had approached Donato Perez to persuade him (Perez) to sign a piece of paper on which
is written a retraction of the bribery charge. (TSN, July 1, 1992, p. 16) Moreover, Atty. Simplicio Angeles was not
cross-examined on his affidavit.
What is disturbing here is
the finding that, after Donato Perez filed this administrative case, Judge De
Guia made representations with the United States Embassy to the effect
that she signed the decision granting the petition for adoption by force. As a result, Jenelle Perez was not allowed
to enter the United States.
The second cause of
action in A.M. No. RTJ-273 is
the failure of Judge De Guia to decide S.P. No. 5484 within the 90-day period
mandated by Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The record shows that S.P.
No. 5484 was deemed submitted for decision on October 24, 1987 following Judge De Guia’s order of October 15,
1987. However, it was only on March 15, 1988, or after nearly five (5)
months when the case was decided.
Judge De Guia contends that she needed more time to prepare the
decision because she was not the
judge who initially heard the evidence. We agree with the investigating Justice that this contention is not
meritorious. This court has repeatedly
held that failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency. (Adriano v. Judge Sto. Domingo, 202 SCRA 446 [1991]; Longboan v. Judge
Polig, 186 SCRA 557 [1991]; Ubarra v. Judge
Tecson, 134 SCRA 4 [1985]; De Leon v. Judge Castro, 104 SCRA 241 [1981]; In Re:
Judge Jose F. Madara, 104 SCRA 245 [1981]).
A.M. No. RTJ-89-297 is
a complaint filed by Judge De Guia against Judge Maglalang for interference
constituting misconduct. Judge
Maglalang, on July 10, 1987, received a surety bond filed by the accused in
Criminal Case No. 4000 for violation of Sec. 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act then
pending before Judge De Guia.
As shown in the testimony of Judge De Guia quoted in connection with A.M. RTJ-
91-681, Judge De Guia admitted being absent on July 10, 1987, a Friday, Judge
Maglalang himself had seen Judge De Guia leave Balanga, Bataan the previous
afternoon. In view of Judge De Guia’s
absence, Judge Maglalang took cognizance of the matter pursuant to Sec. 14 of
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides as follows:
“SEC. 14 Bail, where filed. – (a)
Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending,
or, in the absence of unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch
of the same court within the province or city. xxx”
It appears from the records that Judge De Guia had previously
fixed the amount of bail in her order of June 30, 1987, where she
granted the accused’s motion for bail “in the spirit of humanitarian consideration,”
and had even reduced the amount of bail from P50,000 to P40,000 in an order
dated July 1, 1987. All Judge Maglalang
did was to receive the surety bond filed in the amount already fixed by Judge
De Guia.
We cannot help but notice that the complaint filed by Judge De
Guia omitted to state the fact that she had issued orders fixing the amount of
bail in Criminal Case No. 4000. Such
omission, we believe, was deliberate and meant to mislead this Court.
Judge De Guia also
contends that because the identity of the accused was in doubt, Judge Maglalang should not have received the surety bond sought to be filed. The fact is the caption in Criminal Case No. 4000 names the accused as
“Lourdes M. Bocales, also known as
Lourdes I. Vocales”. Consequently,
as pointed out correctly by the investigating Justice, that the accused signed her name “Lourdes M. Bocales” is not a legal obstacle to the approval of bailbond.
Judge De Guia further
contends that it was improper for Judge Maglalang to have ordered the records of
Criminal Case No. 4000 taken from her
chambers and brought to him. Again, the
investigating Justice correctly points out the folly of Judge De Guia’s accusation. It is elementary knowledge that the records of a case are public records. (See Perez v. Judge Alpuerto, 200 SCRA 591
[1991]; and Baldoza v. Judge Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 [1976]) The public may have
access to these records, subject only to limitations set by law and
reasonable restrictions. Moreover,
production of the records was undoubtedly necessary so that Judge Maglalang could act on the matter before him.
Judge De Guia further charges that Judge Maglalang failed to
immediately issue a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 4211 entitled
“People of the Philippines v. Benjamin de la Cruz”, such failure constituting
dereliction of duty. Records show that
the information was filed on August 29, 1988, but Judge Maglalang issued the
warrant only on October 4, 1988. Judge
De Guia presented a hand-written letter dated January 24, 1989 of a Sgt. Carlos
R. Corpus of the local Philippine Constabulary command wherein it was stated
that the accused, having been detained since August 25, 1988, was released
“sometime September, 1988” for fear
that he “might be charged for arbitrary or illegal detention.”
It is noted that this
court issued on September 20, 1988 a resolution requiring Judge Maglalang “to
issue the necessary warrants of arrest or search warrants on the basis of
informations filed by the fiscal or on his own determination of the existence
of probable cause to justify such warrants.” This resolution was rendered in
answer to a letter of the then Secretary of Justice to the Chief Justice
regarding Judge Maglalang’s refusal to issue a warrant of arrest in Criminal
Case No.
4209.
We presume that Judge Maglalang issued the arrest warrant in
Criminal Case No. 4211 on October 4, 1988, in compliance with our September 20,
1988 resolution. There is no evidence
that Judge Maglalang defied and continued to defy said resolution.
A.M. No. RTJ-89-306
is another administrative complaint filed by
Judge De Guia against Judge Maglalang. In her March 2, 1989 letter-complaint, Judge De Guia charges that Judge
Maglalang issued a wrong warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 4280 entitled
“People of the Philippines v. Mercado Taba y Angeles.” The second charge is
that Judge Maglalang fixed the bail of Mercado Taba at P30,000 without allowing
the prosecution an opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. The accused was charged with statutory rape, punishable with reclusion
perpetua, a non-bailable offense.[*]
The investigating Justice
recommends that Judge Maglalang be exonerated of the first charge, and we
agree. As stated in his Report:
“In his answer and testimony, the respondent admitted that an error
had been committed in writing the name of the accused on the warrant of
arrest. But he averred that the error
was made not by him but by the clerk who prepared the writ, Ernesto G. De Jesus,
an employee in the office of the clerk of court. Through oversight and excusable neglect, he failed to notice the
mistake when he signed the warrant.
The failure of Judge Maglalang to notice the error may be
considered an honest mistake in the absence of evidence to the contrary. This
is so because in the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, it was shown
that after the raffle of cases and before the transmission of the records
to the branches, it was the office of the clerk of court which prepared the
warrants of arrest for the signature of the judges to which the cases were
assigned. This, according to Judge
Maglalang, was the procedure followed even by his predecessors in office.”
(Report, June 15, 1992, pp. 1-2)
In the absence of any
showing of bad faith on his part, we agree that Judge Maglalang’s act is a
mistake not warranting administrative sanctions against him.
Anent the second charge,
Judge Maglalang contends mainly that the only evidence on
record — the sworn statements of the complaining witness and her guardian — were
not sufficient to justify the denial of bail.
It is an established legal principle that in cases where a person
is accused of a capital offense the trial court must conduct a hearing in a
summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of
bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail amounts to a violation of due process. (Libarios v. Judge Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48
[1991]; and People v. Sola, 103 SCRRA 393 [1981])
It appears from the records that Judge Maglalang, when he issued
the warrant of arrest, also fixed the bail of the accused at P30,000.00,
notwithstanding the fact that the accused was charged with an offense which is
ordinarily non-bailable. However, the
records also show that the warrant was returned unserved, and that, as
testified to by Judge De Guia, after the case was raffled to her sala, the
warrant was set aside or cancelled. (TSN, June 8, 1991, p. 47) There is no evidence on record showing
whether the approved bail was revoked by Judge De Guia or whether the accused
was apprehended, or whether the accused filed an application for bail.
We cannot, of course, ignore the fact that Judge Maglalang’s act
of having fixed the amount of bail without a hearing and even before the
accused was apprehended, was contrary
to the requirements of the Constitution, procedural law, and established
principles. (Pico v. Judge Combong, A.
M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992) This cannot be countenanced. It calls for administrative sanctions.
In A.M. No. RTJ-89-420, Judge De Guia charges that Judge
Luciano Elizaga, her predecessor as Presiding Judge of Branch 3, RTC-Balanga,
Bataan clerk of court Erlinda
Perez, and Atty. Democrito Perez violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. She also charges them with
falsifying court records. Judge De Guia
alleges that herein respondents made it appear that cases in which Atty.
Democrito Perez, husband of Erlinda Perez, served as counsel, were duly raffled
to Branch 3 when in fact no such raffle was conducted. In five cases – Civil Case Nos. 5100, 5147, 5264, 5361 and 6421, the docket
books of Branch 3 showed no
entry date when the said cases were raffled or when notice of raffle was
received.
Respondents Judge Elizaga and Erlinda Perez deny the charges
alleging that the accusations against them were filed by Judge De Guia in retaliation
for the administrative complaints filed by Angelito Vero and Atty. Democrito Perez against her.
The evaluation of the
evidence presented by the
parties is summarized by the investigating Justice as follows:
“The fact that in the docket book for civil cases there were no
entries stating when the case was raffled or when notice of raffle was received
by branch 3 does not necessarily mean that no raffle was conducted in the five
cases. Such lack of entries might be
due to oversight or lack of uniformity in recording on the part of the clerk
in-charge of the docket book. It should
be noted that in course of many years not one but several clerks were assigned
to handle the book.
More importantly, the lack of entries are not significant enough to
prevail over the minutes of the raffle showing that the five cases were duly
assigned to branch 3. Said Minutes
which were presented by the respondents,
enjoy the presumption of regularity and constitute strong evidence on the
holding of raffles with respect to the five cases.
The accusation that all the cases being handled by Atty. Democrito
Perez found their way to branch 3 is not also borne out by the evidence. Particularly, it is belied by the fact that
after investigation conducted on orders of the Tanodbayan, the NBI found that
‘the certified list prepared by the Branch Clerks of Court of 1 and 3 shows a
fair number of cases handled by subject Perez in both branches xxx; (2) subject
Perez handled mostly cadastral cases,
again in both branches. However, it
must be noted that these cases are non-adversarial/non-litigious in nature,
i.e., petition for issuance of owners duplicate copy of TCT. This being so, it cannot be said that, in
these cadastral cases, justice is denied to an oftentimes non-existent
adversary.’” (Report, pp. 3-5)
We agree with the above evaluation of the investigating Justice and further sustain his recommendation that Judge
Luciano Elizaga and Erlinda Perez be exonerated of the charges.
It was found, however, that
the minutes of the raffle proceedings involving the five cases were signed only
by Erlinda Perez and attested to by the stenographer who took down the
proceedings. Contrary to the provisions of Administrative Order No. 7, the minutes
were not signed by the Judges or
their representatives. It appears as
testified to by Erlinda Perez during the hearings conducted by the
investigating Justice, that the minutes were not signed by the Judges or their
representatives because the RTC-Balanga, Bataan had always adopted the
procedure of requiring the representatives of the different branches attending
the raffle to initial the original copy of the complaint or information of the
case assigned to their respective branch during the raffle proceedings itself. (TSN,
June 17, 1992, pp. 22, 32-33).
The investigating Justice
recommends that Erlinda Perez be held liable for her failure to comply with the
provisions of Administrative Order No. 7, September 23, 1974. We note, however, that there is no showing
of bad faith or improper motive on her part. She is, therefore, warned and we further enjoin all court
employees, particularly clerks of court, to adhere strictly to the requirements
of the law on the raffling of cases in order to avoid any suspicion of
impropriety. As we have consistently
held:
“The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, like the courts below, from the
presiding judge to the lowest clerk, should be circumscribed with
responsiblity. His conduct, at all
times, must not only be characterized by propriety and above all must be above
suspicion.
Considering that the duties of the clerk of court are vast as well
as sensitive, this Court has ruled in Bello vs. Mabbun (Adm. Matter P-88-178
[1988] that there is need for utmost integrity and dedication in the performance of such functions.” (Unknown
Municipal Councilor of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija v. Alomia, Jr., Adm. Matter
P-91-660, August 8, 1992)
It is pertinent to
mention here that in our resolution in A.M. No. R-249-RTJ dated September 17,
1987, Judge De Guia herself was found guilty of misconduct in office and
accordingly imposed a fine equivalent to her three (3) months salary, with a
stern warning that repetition of the same offense or commission of a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely. The misconduct pertained to the raffle of a criminal Case in
RTC-Balayan, Batangas where Judge De Guia was formerly
stationed. The complainants therein,
court personnel of RTC-Balayan, Batangas alleged that Judge De Guia “requested
them to affix their initials on the information filed in a criminal case
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Ruben Rodriguez, et al.”, with the
explanation that they (the affiants) had failed to sign the same as one of the
criminal cases raffled to respondent Judge’s sala. Believing that an oversight on their part had occurred, affiants
stated, they complied with respondent Judge’s request and affixed their
signature on the information in said criminal case. Upon return to their respective branches, affiants consulted the
list of cases raffled on 22 November 1984 and found that the Ruben Rodriguez
case was not among the criminal cases raffled on said date. Affiants further referred to respondent
Judge as stating that ‘she is interested in personally handling the Murder Case
involving Ruben Rodriguez as she allegedly had an understanding with (the)
Executive Judge. (Rollo, p. 3).’” The
Court agreed with the findings of the investigating Justice and stated in the Resolution
as follows:
“After a careful review of the report and of the transcript of the
hearings held by Justice Torres, the Court agrees with the findings of Justice
Torres. The Court is satisfied that
respondent Judge induced the two court employees to make it appear that the
Ruben Rodriguez case had been raffled to her sala when it had not in fact been
so raffled. The Court is further
satisfied that a violation of Circular No. 7 dated 23 September 1974, as amended, has been committed by respondent Judge who
has been unable to account for the Ruben Rodriguez case winding up in her sala.
The behavior of respondent Judge complained of and proven in this
case is of such a character as to create a substantial suspicion that
respondent Judge may have been moved by corrupt motives in taking over the
criminal case against Ruben Rodriguez, et al. and acquitting the accused in
view of the inability of the fiscal to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt because his witnesses
had turned hostile.” (Rollo, pp. 115-116)
The need for strict
compliance with the rules on raffle cannot be over-emphasized.
In A.M. No. RTJ-89-421, Judge De
Guia charges Judge Maglalang with abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to
the interest of the service for having authorized the detail of Angelito Vero
to another branch.
Vero, in a letter dated July 25, 1988, requested Judge Maglalang
to re-assign him to another office or unit
in view of his pending complaint against Judge De Guia. Vero alleged in his letter that Judge
Maglalang “told me that she does not want to see my ugly face again and that
everytime she sees my presence in the office, she would curse me with words
‘Leche ka, hayup ka’”.
Judge Maglalang, on July
29, 1988, wrote Judge De Guia for her comment on Vero’s request. When Judge De Guia did not comment after
seventeen (17) days, Judge Maglalang granted Vero’s request in a letter dated
August 19, 1988. On August 25, 1988,
Judge Maglalang received Judge De Guia’s comment wherein she interposed no
objection to the re-assignment of Vero. Yet in this complaint, she alleges that Judge Maglalang abused his power
in removing Vero from Branch 3.
As pointed out by the investigating Justice, Judge Maglalang had
the power to order the detail of Vero to another unit or branch of the court
under Section IV-4 of Administrative
Order No. 6 dated June 30, 1975,
which provides as follows:
“4. To re-assign
temporarily the personnel of one branch (sala) to another branch (sala) or to
the Office of the Clerk of Court, in case of vacancy in the position of
Presiding Judge of a branch (sala), or when the interest of the service
requires. In the latter case, the
assignment shall be made in consultation with the Presiding Judge of the branch
(sala) concerned; and, in cases disagreement,
the assignment by the Executive Judge shall be effective immediately, unless
revoked by the Supreme Court.”
The re-assignment of Vero
was evidently for valid reasons. Vero
had filed the bribery charges discussed above, and as a consequence, his relations
with Judge De Guia became strained. Vero was also not on good terms with some of the court personnel, such
as Deputy Sheriff Ricardo Navarro, who we may note, was a direct participant in the publication anomaly in A.M. No. RTJ?88-216.
There appears to be no
basis for the charges filed by Judge De Guia against Judge Maglalang in this case. Judge Maglalang, as
Executive Judge, had the power to temporarily re-assign personnel under the
conditions stated in Sec. IV-4 of Administrative Order No. 6. His determination that the interest of the
service requires the re-assignment of Vero was well within the power granted,
and in the present situation, was the only prudent recourse.
In A.M. No. P-90-394, Judge de
Guia filed a complaint dated January 9, 1990 charging Angelito Vero with falsification,
forgery, abandonment of work, gross negligence, and inefficiency.
In a resolution dated November 11, 1991, this Court dismissed for
lack of merit the charges of forgery, gross negligence and inefficiency. However, Vero was found guilty of having
falsified his
personal data sheet and statement of personal history for which he was
fined the sum of P2,500.00 and given a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
Judge De Guia filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on the date of the hearing of said
motion, Judge De Guia manifested that she was no longer interested in
presenting evidence to support her charges. The investigating Justice recommends that
Judge De Guia’s motion for reconsideration be denied, and we agree, the matter
having been settled and closed in our November 11, 1991 resolution.
We note that the filing of the administrative complaint against
Vero, taken in conjunction with the other actuations of Judge De Guia narrated
in A.M No. RTJ-88-228 as well in A.M. No. 89-421, puts into fore Judge De
Guia’s oppressive and vindictive manner against Vero, obviously in retaliation
to Vero’s having filed the bribery
charges. We quote from the November 11,
1991 resolution:
“We agree with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator
that the charges of forgery, gross ignorance, and inefficiency against respondent are devoid of merit. Respondent was not only able to explain
satisfactorily the aforesaid charges but was also able to refute each and every
incriminatory allegation hurled against him by the complainant. The complaint was not only directed against
him but apparently also imputes some bad faith to her colleagues in the bench,
Judge Maglalang and Judge Elizaga. Clearly, the filing of this case is a case of harassment and
intimidation, considering the fact that respondent had previously filed before
this Court a case against the herein complainant.”
The records also reveal
that Vero had complained to the Office of the Court Administrator regarding
Judge De Guia’s unwarranted refusal to sign his Daily Time Records and his
Application for Leave, resulting in the withholding of Vero’s
salary. This is another showing of
Judge De Guia’s oppressive behavior.
Judge de Guia’s
retaliatory manner is most certainly unbecoming of a Judge who is expected to
exercise proper restraint and decorum in his dealings with the most lowly
employee in his chambers. His position
is intimidating enough and to use his position in an oppressive and vindictive
manner is certainly unwarranted. (Macuse
v. Judge Lapena, 202 SCRA 34 [1991]); Judge Ballellos v. Refuso, 67 SCRA 465
[1975])
In A.M. No. 90-406, Judge De
Guia charges Erlinda Perez with “usurpation of judicial functions,
falsification and disbursement.” Specifically she is charged with using her
public office to enhance the practice of law of her husband Atty. Democrito
Perez.
On September 12, 1989,
Atty. Democrito Perez, as counsel for plaintiff, filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money with the RTC-Balanga, Bataan docketed as Civil
Case No. 5743. Upon filing of the
complaint, Erlinda Perez immediately caused the preparation and issuance of
summons to the defendant. Subsequently,
the raffle of cases was conducted, and Civil Case No. 5743 was raffled to
Branch 3, the sala of Judge De Guia.
On September 29, 1989, the defendant filed a “motion for
extension of time to file responsive pleading”, which was granted. An answer with counterclaim was filed on
October 6, 1989. A pre-trial notice was
issued by Judge De Guia on October 6, 1989, and pre-trial was held. On November 15, 1989 Judge De Guia issued an
order stating that “upon oral motion of counsel for defendant, he is given ten
(10) days x x x within which to submit his motion for leave of court to file
third party complaint.” On December 13, 1989, the defendant filed said motion
with the Office of the Clerk of Court, and not with Branch 3. Upon receipt of the motion, Ernesto de
Jesus, an employee in the Office of the Clerk of Court, prepared the summons,
as shown by the initials “egj” at the bottom of the page. On December 18, 1989, the motion and the prepared summons were transmitted
to and received by Branch 3.
Although the hearing of the motion was scheduled on December 19,
1989, the motion was heard on that date. On December 21, 1989, summons was served on the third party defendants
by Deputy Sheriff Ricardo Navarro of Branch 3.
Thereafter, the third-party defendants filed a motion for
extension of time to file answer. In an
order dated January 10, 1990, Judge De Guia granted said motion. An answer to the third-party complaint was
filed on January 16, 1990. On February 15, 1990, Judge De Guia
issued an order giving the third-party defendants a period within which to file
fourth-party complaint and setting the case for pre-trial. On March 15, 1990, Judge de Guia’s pre-trial
proceedings were terminated and the case was set for initial hearing. As shown in Judge De Guia’s order dated May
17, 1990, the plaintiff’s witness testified.
Judge De Guia charges that Erlinda Perez issued the initial
summons in Civil Case No. 5743 as well as the summons for the third-party
complaint because her husband was counsel for one of the parties in the civil
case.
The investigating Justice found that it was the procedure in the
RTC-Balanga, Bataan for the clerk of court
to issue the summons in civil
cases. This procedure was practiced even before Erlinda Perez assumed office in 1983. It was only after the issuance of the Manual of Clerk of Courts in 1991 that the practice was stopped and the
branch clerks of courts were empowered to issue summons.
As to the issuance of the summons to the third-party defendants we find it significant that the
summons was prepared by the Office of the Clerk of Court but was transmitted,
together with the motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, to Branch
3. It was the branch 3 deputy sheriff
who served the summons to the third?party
defendant.
Moreover, it was Judge De Guia who apparently admitted the
third-party complaint and who further acted upon the pleadings filed by the
parties until hearing was actually conducted. Had she believed the summons was irregularly issued and served, she
would have acted timely in order to rectify the perceived anomaly. Yet she allowed the case to take its course.
In A.M. No. RTJ-90-565, Judge De Guia charges Judge
Maglalang, Judge Elizaga, and Erlinda Perez with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1079 and Administrative Circular
No. 16. Judge De Guia alleges that herein respondents failed to furnish her
with certain documents pertaining to
the raffle of cases in Branch 3.
On November 7, 1988, Judge De Guia wrote a memorandum to Erlinda Perez asking for a copy of
the “(1) notices of raffle of judicial notices issued by the office of the
clerk of court; and, (2) minutes of the raffle proceedings conducted by the
Regional Trial Court of Bataan from February 1987 up to the present (1988).”
Acting on the memorandum upon referral to him by Erlinda Perez,
Judge Maglalang, as Executive Judge, wrote a letter dated November 10, 1988 to
Judge De Guia saying that “there are no extra copies of such notices of raffle
spare except those retained for record purposes”, and advising Judge De Guia to
“please let (him) know as soon as possible whether (Judge De Guia) would like
to have such documents copied by typewriter or by xerox machine.”
Judge De Guia sent to Erlinda Perez a similar memorandum on March
20, 1990. Erlinda Perez also referred
this memorandum to Judge Mariano M. Dizon, who succeeded Judge Maglalang as Executive Judge. Judge Dizon decided to adopt Judge Maglalang’s directive on the
matter, in view of the voluminous records.
The investigating Justice recommends the exoneration of Judge
Maglalang and Erlinda Perez, and we agree. It was proper for Erlinda Perez to refer
Judge De Guia’s request to the Executive Judge. Under paragraph IV-2 of Administrative Order No. 6, the executive
judge directly supervises the work and activities of the clerk of court and his
staff. We note that Erlinda Perez
promptly referred the matter to her superior.
Judge Maglalang’s action was the only prudent recourse in view of the circumstances. He had allowed the copying of the documents
requested; all Judge De Guia had to do was to set the date, at her pleasure,
for doing so. Instead, Judge De Guia
filed this complaint.
We must note, as the
investigating Justice did, the fact that Judge Elizaga was made a respondent
herein. Yet the complaint does not set
out any particular accusation, nor was there any evidence presented against him
during the investigation conducted.
In A.M. No. RTJ-90-573, Erlinda
Perez charges Judge De Guia with ignorance of the law, incompetence, grave
misconduct, encroachment of authority and corrupt practices.
Civil Case No. 5341, an
action for support with alimony pendente lite filed by the natural
mother of the Pingol minors, was assigned to Branch 2 of RTC-Balanga, Bataan, presided by Judge
Maglalang. Judgment was rendered based
on a compromise agreement entered into by the parties.
Subsequently, the court
issued an order dated March 14, 1986, requiring among others, the appointment
of a guardian ad litem in view of the departure for abroad of the children’s mother. Instead of
merely filing a motion in Civil Case No. 5341, Santos Forbes, the minor’s
grandfather, filed a verified petition for appointment as guardian ad litem
with the office of the clerk of court. The petition, captioned “In Re: Petition for Appointment of Guardian Ad
Litem of the Minors: Sherlotte,
Mark Sergi, Jr., Serylot and Sheryl Anne, all surnamed Pingol”, was raffled and
assigned to Branch 3 presided by Judge De Guia.
On June 2, 1987, Judge De
Guia issued an order where, notwithstanding her stating that “the court takes
judicial notice of an action for Support with Alimony Pendente Lite filed by
herein minors in Civil Case No. 5241 xxx before RTC, Branch 2, Balanga,
Bataan”, the petition was granted and Santos Forbes appointed guardian ad litem.
In
a motion filed in Branch 2, Santos Forbes informed the court of his
appointment as guardian ad litem, with a prayer for the release
of the amount for support deposited in said court. Judge Maglalang ordered the release of the money, commenting in
his order “that counsel for plaintiffs did not have to go into all the trouble
and expense of filing a separate special proceeding xxx (a)ll that was
necessary was a motion to that effect in this very cause.”
Subsequently, Santos
Forbes filed, in Judge De Guia’s sala, a motion praying that the minor’s father
be ordered
to pay the support in arrears, which motion was taken cognizance of by Judge De
Guia. Judge De Guia, on July 11, 1988
further ordered the minor’s father to explain why he should not be punished for
contempt for not paying support, making express reference to Judge Maglalang’s
March 14, 1986 order.
The above acts form the
basis of the charges in this administrative complaint. We find, as the investigating Justice
recommends, Judge De Guia guilty of ignorance of the law, incompetence, gross
misconduct and encroachment of authority for having taken cognizance of the
petition for appointment of guardian ad litem filed by Santos Forbes,
notwithstanding her expressed knowledge that Civil Case No. 5241 was pending
before Judge Maglalang’s sala. As
explained in the Report:
“It is clear from the foregoing facts that Judge De
Guia should not have entertained the petition of Santos Forbes to be appointed
as guardian ad litem of the minors. This is because
such appointment was merely an incident to the main case for support then pending before Judge MagIalang. Considering its nature and purpose, a guardian ad litem is
appointed only in the case or proceeding where the minor is either a party
plaintiff or defendant
xxx xxx xxx
xxx (T)he petition for appointment of guardian ad litem
is different from a petition for guardianship filed under the provision of Rules 92 to 97 of the Rules of Court. Guardianship a special proceeding while a
prayer for appointment of guardian ad litem is not.” (Report, July 8, 1992, pp. 6 -7)
Anent the corruption
charge, it is alleged that Judge De Guia received material consideration for
her taking cognizance of and granting the petition filed by Santos Forbes. Reference must be made to A. M. No. RTJ-88-228
where Santos Forbes is one of the litigants alleged to have given Judge De Guia
various gifts. In said administrative
complaint, we could not hold Judge De Guia liable for the bribery charges
because of insufficient evidence. Significant, however, is the admission of Santos Forbes, as witness for Judge De
Guia, made during his cross-examination on his affidavit, that the petition, as
well as the various motions filed in connection with the case, were prepared by
Judge De Guia. (TSN, June 4, 1992, p. 45) We find this an act of grave
misconduct. It would be impossible for
Judge De Guia to consider Santos Forbes’ petition and motions with the
requisite impartiality, when she herself was the very one who penned the
pleadings filed before her.
In A.M. No.
RTJ-91-681, Judge De Guia is charged with not
working and observing office hours on Fridays, contrary to Administrative Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, which strictly enjoins trial judges to render at least eight (8) hours of service a day, five
(5) hours of which should be devoted to trial, specifically from 8:30 a.m. to
12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. as required in paragraph 5 of the
Internal Rules of January 11, 1983, pursuant to Section 13 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
Judge De Guia denies the
accusation. She presented as her
witness Process Server Ricardo Flores, who, contradicting Judge De Guia’s
averment, admitted in his cross-examination, that Judge De Guia usually went
home to Parañaque on Thursday afternoons. (TSN, June 11, 1992, p. 9).
Corroborating Flores’
testimony is the fact that on July 10, 1987, a Friday, Judge Maglalang had to
act on the surety bond filed by the accused in Criminal Case No. 4000 pending
before Judge De Guia’s sala. Judge
Maglalang’s taking cognizance of said request was the ground for a complaint for interference constituting misconduct filed by Judge De Guia against
Judge Maglalang A.M. No. RTJ-89-297, also discussed in this resolution.
Judge De Guia’s vain
offer of an excuse is shown in her testimony in A.M. No. RTJ-89-297, where,
upon being cross-examined by therein respondent Judge Maglalang, Judge De Guia
testified as follows:
“JUDGE MAGLALANG:
Q. In July 10, 1987, Judge
De Guia you were not present or performing your work in your sala, branch 3 of
then Regional Trial Court of Bataan, and you were not performing your duties as
such, were you?
A. I may not be in my sala but I have been
performing my duties in branch 3.
Q. So you were not present
physically in your sala on July 10, 1987?
A. I was not because I was
in the Supreme Court.
Q. You were in the Supreme
Court in connection with what business, Judge De Guia?
A. To confer regarding the
problems affecting my sala.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So you admit that you
have no official documentation of your alleged presence in the Supreme Court on
July 10, 1987?
A. Maybe in my record I may
be able to show it.
Q. Please answer the question categorically.
A. I don’t have it with me.
JUSTICE PRONOVE:
You mean you have but you don’t have it
now?
JUDGE DE GUIA:
The question is 5 years ago and he asked
me the question now.
JUSTICE PRONOVE:
Then what is your answer?
JUDGE DE GUIA:
I don’t have it now.
JUSTICE PRONOVE:
But you have it, only you don’t have it
now, is that what you want to say?
JUDGE DE GUIA:
I don’t know what the respondent judge
would like to show but…
JUDGE MAGLALANG:
Q. Alright, Judge De Guia, I
will repeat the question. Is there any
document or any kind of official paper that would evidence your physical
presence in the Supreme Court on July 10, 1987?
A. I don’t have any now.
Q. Since you now admit that
you don’t have any documentary evidence to show that you were physically
present in the Supreme Court on July 10, 1987, Judge De Guia…
A. I want to make my answer
clear, I don’t have it now!
JUSTICE PRONOVE:
But you had it before?
JUDGE DE GUIA:
I would have to check with the records,
your Honor.
JUSTICE PRONOVE:
So you cannot say for sure now whether you
have or don’t have the proof, is that what you want to say?
JUDGE DE GUIA:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q. Who issued to you that
documentary evidence showing your presence or appearance in the Supreme Court
on July 10, 1987?
A. I said I don’t have the
record now.
JUSTICE PRONOVE:
She cannot say whether she had or didn’t
have, that’s her answer.
JUDGE MAGLALANG:
Q. Are you aware what
provisions of the Rules of Court, Judge De Guia, to the effect that if the
judge in a particular sala in any court is absent, the other judge or judges of
the other branches of that court may approve bail bonds which had previously
been granted or fixed by the court?
A. I am aware of that but I
said I don’t think I consider myself absent on that day.
Q. So you did not consider
yourself absent. Did you not admit a
while ago that you were not physically present in your sala, branch 3, RTC of
Bataan, in July 10, 1987?
A. Yes, I may not be in my
sala but I am performing some duties concerning my court.” (TSN, June 8, 1992,
pp. 8-11; Report, October 12, 1992, pp. 13-17)
We agree with Justice Pronove, Jr.’s finding that Judge De Guia
is guilty of the above charge. Judge De
Guia would be present in her sala and conduct hearings only three and a half days in a week, from Monday to Thursday.
We can empathize with Judge De Guia’s urge to be with her family in their home
in Parañaque which is quite some distance from her detail in Balanga,
Bataan. Yet we must remind her and all
judges in the same situation that when one accepts his or her appointment as a
member of the judiciary, he or she embraces all the responsibilities attached to that
office. One of these responsibilities
is to render eight (8) hours of service every working day, five (5) hours of
which are devoted to trial. As a judge
and also as a public officer duty-bound to render public service, nothing less
is expected of Judge De Guia. Indeed,
Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly states that “[a] judge
should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with
judicial duties.”
We quote from In Re: Echiverri, (67 SCRA 467 [1975]):
“Judges are duty bound to comply with the above [service
requirement] to insure the maximum efficiency of the trial courts for a speedy administration of justice. Daily trials at a minimum of five hours per
working day of the week will enable the judge to calendar as many cases as
possible and to dispose with regular dispatch the increasing number of
litigations pending with the court. All
other matters needing the attention of the judge are to be attended to outside
of this five-hour schedule of trial.”
In A.M. No. 91-11-1985-RTC Erlinda Perez, in a letter-complaint dated
October 9, 1991, charges that a motion for disqualification filed on December
5, 1988 by her late husband before Judge De Guia was not resolved for almost
three years.
On December 5, 1988,
Atty. Democrito Perez, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 5264 pending
before Judge De Guia, filed a motion for disqualification praying that Judge De
Guia inhibit herself from hearing and deciding the case. Atty. Perez was the counsel of Angelito Vero
and Donato Perez, complainants in A.M. Nos. RTJ-88-228 and RTJ-88-273,
respectively. In his motion Atty. Perez
alleged:
xxx xxx xxx
“5. That on September 29, and on October 20, 1988 while her honor was presiding over her sala, in
obvious reference to undersigned being a counsel of her court employee who
filed charges against her, referred to undersigned as treacherous – one who is stabbing her at the back.
6. That in the last local
elections (January 18, 1988) where her honor’s husband, Atty. Manny “Gigi” de
Guia, was a candidate for councilor in Parañaque, Metro Manila, Atty. Oscar
Karaan, counsel for the plaintiffs in the above-entitled case, donated political
hand bills to the said Atty. de Guia. xxx xxx xxx.
7. That undersigned respectfully submits that under the present
milieu, which ever way her honor would decide the above-entitled case, she will
always be suspected as not free, disinterested, impartial and independent and that the parties in this case, specially the
undersigned, would not feel that their case (this case) has not been decided by
a fair, honest and impartial tribunal.”
xxx xxx xxx
Although the motion was set
for hearing on December 8, 1988, it remained unresolved.
Following Atty. Democrito
Perez’ death, Erlinda Perez filed the present letter-complaint. This Court, acting on said complaint, issued
a resolution on November 28, 1991, resolving to grant the motion, which it
treated as a motion for inhibition. The
resolution further directed the clerk of court of Branch 3 to “personally
forward the records of Civil Case No. 5264 to Acting Executive Judge Pedro
Villafuerte, Jr., so that the case could be re-raffled to the other branches of
the court.” Judge De Guia was also directed to show cause why she should not be
administratively dealt with for not deciding the motion within the
reglementary period.
Judge De Guia received a
copy of the resolution on January 9, 1992, as shown by the records. Instead of complying with the directives of
said resolution, Judge De Guia issued an order in Civil Case No. 5264 resolving
the motion and inhibiting herself from hearing the case, and directing her
legal researcher to forward the case to the Supreme Court. Her action was premised on a finding made by her that Civil Case No. 5264 was not duly
raffled to Branch 3, and consequently she “cannot just forward
this case for re-raffle” to the executive judge “considering that this case had
not, on the first place, been raffled before, and this matter is in fact the
subject matter of A.M. No. RTJ-89-420” discussed earlier.
Apparently antedated
December 19, 1991, a copy of the above order was sent to and received
by the Office of the Chief Justice only on January 20, 1992. On January 30, 1992, the officer-in-charge
of Branch 3, Amelita Manlapaz, wrote this Court a letter informing us that the
records of Civil Case No. 5264 were in Judge
De Guia’s possession and consequently, she could not transmit said records to
the executive judge as ordered in our November 28, 1991 resolution.
On March 3, 1992, Judge
Villafuerte, Jr. sent a memorandum to Judge De Guia enjoining her to forward
to his office the records concerned within 48 hours. Judge De Guia replied in a memorandum dated March 4, 1992 “that
said records have been transmitted to the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court,
Daniel Martinez, by the legal researcher of this Branch [3], pursuant to the order of this Court dated December 19, 1991.”
On March 18, 1992, Judge
Villafuerte, Jr. sent a memorandum to Alan Mijares, legal researcher of
Branch 3, inquiring whether or
not, as stated in Judge De
Guia’s March 4, 1992 memorandum, the
records of Civil Case No. 5264 had been sent to the Supreme Court. Alan Mijares replied in a letter dated March 19, 1992 as follows:
“The undersigned would like to respectfully inform you that the
records of Civil Case No. 5264 were brought by the undersigned
sometime during the last week of January to the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court pursuant to an order issued by the Hon. Leticia M. de Guia, Presiding Judge of Branch 3 of this Court dated December 19,
1992. Said records, however, were not accepted by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court and the undersigned was told by some personnel
there to submit them to the Office of the Court Administrator. Following said advice, the undersigned went
to the Office of the Court Administrator and presented said records but said
office likewise refused to accept the records of the above-cited case and was
instructed to go to the Office of Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo
Suarez. When the undersigned was at
said office, the Deputy Court Administrator told the undersigned that the
records of Civil Case No. 5264 must be returned to the Regional Trial Court of
Bataan for re-raffle, pursuant to a resolution of the Supreme Court dated
November 28, 1991, and a copy of said resolution was even given by the Deputy
Court Administrator to the undersigned.
In consonance with the instruction given to the undersigned, the
records of Civil Case No. 5264 were returned by the undersigned to Hon. Leticia
de Guia, and the last thing that the undersigned knows about the records of
said case was that the Hon. Leticia de Guia told the undersigned that she will
personally bring said records to the Supreme Court herself.” (Rollo, p. 81)
In a letter dated March 23, 1992 Judge Villafuerte, Jr. informed
this Court of Judge De Guia’s continued defiance of our November 28, 1991
resolution.
On the basis of the foregoing, we find Judge De Guia guilty of
undue delay in resolving the motion for disqualification (inhibition). The records clearly show that although said
motion was filed way back in December 5, 1988, it remained unacted upon until
December 19, 1991, and at the time Judge De Guia issued her order granting said
motion, this Court had already ruled
upon the same. Judge De Guia’s
act was clearly no longer necessary,
and does not negate the fact that she failed to act upon the motion for three
long years.
It is at once obvious
that Judge De Guia could not have been expected to be impartial in hearing and
deciding Civil Case No. 5264, where Atty. Democrito Perez was a
defendant. Certainly, Judge de
Guia knew that Atty. Perez was Angelito Vero’s counsel, and had himself filed
an administrative complaint against Judge De Guia.
We have stated that the
mere filing of an administrative case against a judge by one of the parties
before him is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing a case and the
court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice. (Aparicio
v. Judge Andal, 175 SCRA 569 [1989];
cited cases omitted) In the instant case, Atty. Perez in his affidavit had
alleged that plaintiffs’ counsel had donated handbills to Judge De Guia’s husband’s campaign during the January 1988 local elections and also, that Judge De Guia
had called Atty. Perez “treacherous” in open court. These are sufficient indices showing that Judge de Guia does not
enjoy the party litigants’ trust and faith that she shall hear and decide the
case with the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge.
What compounds Judge de
Guia’s failure to decide the motion within the mandated period is her defiance of our directive in our
November 28, 1991 resolution. As found
by the investigating Justice, up
to the present time the records are still in the possession of Judge de
Guia. We consider this willful
disobedience and continued disregard of our resolution as grave and serious misconduct. (Longbuan v. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 [1990]) The respondent has shown
inexcusable conduct and motives in holding on to the records of the case and
irresponsibly having them hand-carried to the Supreme Court.
From a consideration of the findings of the investigating Justice
in these cases and the totality of the records before us, we find no
alternative but to DISMISS Judge Leticia Mariano De Guia. She has shown herself unworthy of the honor
and prestige of her position.
In her relations with her fellow judges, with court employees,
and with the complainants in the adminstrative charges against her, she has
displayed sheer vindictiveness and outright oppressive behavior. Against Judge Maglalang, Judge De Guia
filed, several administrative complaints, probably because of Judge Maglalang’s
endorsement to the Supreme Court of publisher Ben Medina’s complaint in
1988. The letter-complaints against
Judge Maglalang are replete with uncalled for statements and unwarranted
accusations, and are often deliberately misleading. Her court aide Angelito Vero, after filing the bribery charges,
became the target of insulting and abusive language from Judge De Guia. An administrative complaint, and an adamant
refusal to sign Vero’s Daily Time Records, were utilized as a form
of harrassment. Erlinda Perez,
RTC-Balanga, Bataan Clerk of Court, also became the subject of several
administrative complaints, in apparent retaliation for her late husband Atty.
Democrito Perez’ participation in the filing of the bribery charges. Donato Perez also did not escape Judge De
Guia’s ire. Judge De Guia’s actuations
and attitude are indeed unbecoming of a judge who is expected to exercise
proper restraint and decorum in her dealings with people. (Macuse v. Judge Lapeña, supra). A judge may understandably repent the filing
of cases against her but she should know how to handle the situation in a
manner befitting a Judge.
Judge De Guia has shown that she is incapable of meeting
the exacting standards of conduct and integrity expected of members of the
judiciary. Her involvement in the
publication irregularity exposed by Ben Medina, as well as her involvement in the raffle anomaly
recounted in A.M. No. R-249-RTJ (September 17, 1987), glaringly bespeaks
improbity and infidelity. Public faith
in the judicial system is eroded by such acts.
As public officer, Judge
De Guia falls short in service and dedication. She was found to hold hearings only
three and a half days a week. She was
likewise found to decide a case
beyond the 90-day reglementary period, Judge De Guia’s lack of diligence runs
contrary to Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial which provides that “[a] judge
shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.”
Anent the bribery
charges, we would like to quote from Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Bartolome, (203 SCRA 328 [1991]):
“While the charge of demanding bribes has not been proven, the
Court is just as concerned about the poor reputation that Judge Jose Bartolome
has developed in Bataan. A Judge
anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as no better than a mulcting
traffic cop or a corrupt bureaucrat out to make money at every turn. The reputation of the respondent
unfortunately appears to have perceded him, and while situations are possible
where a judge is unfairly ruined by well-orchestrated attempts of disgruntled
litigants or power blocks of influential members of the community whose
interests are threatened by a judge’s zeal and integrity, Judge Bartolome has
in this case shown not one shred of evidence that the mounting complaints
against him are the byproducts of similar maneuvers. At any rate, the thing itself has spoken, and it has spoken eloquently.”
WHEREFORE, this COURT RESOLVED to:
1. DISMISS the charges in A.M. No. RTJ-89-297 against Judge Romeo
G. Maglalang;
2. DISMISS the first charge
of issuing a wrong warrant of arrest, but impose a fine of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) on Judge Romeo G.
Maglalang in connection with the second charge of precipitate grant of bail in
A.M. No. RTJ-89-306;
3. DISMISS the charges in
A.M. No. RTJ-89-420 against Judge Luciano Elizaga and Erlinda Perez;
4. DISMISS the charge in
A.M. No. RTJ-89-421 against Judge Romeo G. Maglalang;
5. DENY the motion for
reconsideration filed by Judge De Guia
in A.M. No. P-90-394;
6. DISMISS the charges in
A.M. No. P-90-406 against Erlinda Perez;
7. DISMISS the charges in A.M. No. RTJ-90-565 against Judge
Romeo G. Maglalang, Judge Luciano Elizaga and
Erlinda Perez;
8. DISMISS the charges in A.
M. Nos. RTJ-88-228 and RTJ-88-273 against Judge Leticia Mariano De Guia for
lack of sufficient evidence; and
9. On the basis of the findings
in A. M. Nos. RTJ-88-216; RTJ-90-573; RTJ-91-681; and 91-11-1985-RTC, DISMISS
JUDGE LETICIA MARIANO DE GUIA, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Balanga,
Bataan, FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all her accrued retirement
benefits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and
Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., on terminal
leave.
Bellosillo and Quiason,
JJ., no part.
Campos, Jr., J., he was Court
Administrator when ????? of the case have ?????.
[*]xxx where the evidence of guilt
is strong.