ZENAIDA C. SALVADOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. BIENVENIDO S. SALAMANCA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH XIV, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.

Salvador versus Salamanca

The Case

This is an administrative case. Zenaida Salvador filed a sworn complaint against Judge Bienvenido Salamanca, the presiding judge of a Metropolitan Trial Court branch in Manila, charging him with culpable dereliction of duty and gross inefficiency. The charge arose from his handling of a forcible entry case and the urgent motions for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction filed in that case. The case matters because it fixes the standard of judicial promptness in summary proceedings: a judge may not sit on an injunction prayer in a forcible entry case, and may not wait for memoranda before deciding. It is a leading administrative authority on delay in the rendition of judgment.

Procedural History

The case began as an administrative complaint filed directly with the Supreme Court, not as an ordinary action in the lower courts. The complainant instituted the petition on September 20, 1984. The Supreme Court required the respondent judge to comment, and he did so, explaining that the ninety-day period for deciding the forcible entry case had not yet expired. The complainant then filed a reply on October 29, 1984, adding charges of gross ignorance of the law and delayed rendition of judgment. The respondent judge rendered his decision in the forcible entry case on November 19, 1984, while the administrative matter was pending. The Supreme Court resolved the administrative complaint in a resolution promulgated on September 24, 1986.

Facts

On April 26, 1982, Zenaida Salvador and others filed a complaint for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila against Lily Arreza and several others. The case was raffled to the sala of the respondent judge. The complaint prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and the plaintiffs reiterated that prayer in a motion filed on May 16, 1983. The respondent judge temporarily denied that motion in an order dated August 2, 1983, in view of the defendants' defense that the plaintiffs did not have prior possession of the premises.

On April 5, 1984, after almost two years of litigation, the parties rested their case. They agreed to submit their memoranda simultaneously within twenty days from receipt of the last copy of the transcript of stenographic notes. On April 18, 1984, the plaintiffs filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and on May 3, 1984, they submitted their memorandum. On May 16, 1984, the respondent judge issued an order deferring action on the injunction motion because the case had already been submitted for decision and the motion rested on factual allegations still to be resolved in the decision on the merits.

On June 25, 1984, when the defendants failed to submit their memorandum within the agreed period, the complainant manifested that failure to the respondent judge and moved for resolution of the case without the defendants' memorandum. When no decision came, she filed the administrative complaint on September 20, 1984. The respondent judge justified himself by saying that the case was deemed submitted for decision only after the lapse of five days from the defendants' receipt of the court's order of August 22, 1984, which granted them another five days to file their memorandum. He rendered his decision in the forcible entry case on November 19, 1984.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for culpable dereliction of duty and gross inefficiency for delaying the resolution of the motions for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the forcible entry case.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for delaying the rendition of judgment in the forcible entry case, considering his claim that the case was not yet submitted for decision because the defendants had not filed their memorandum.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, as it then stood, governed the disposition of the injunction prayer in a forcible entry case. Its last sentence provides:

It shall be the duty of the court to resolve the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction within thirty days from the filing thereof.

This provision fixes the deadline the respondent judge missed, and it is the textual basis for the Court's finding that the injunction motion should have been resolved with dispatch, one way or another.

The Court also relied on the rule that the filing of memoranda is not essential to the submission of a case for decision. As the Court put it, quoting its own ruling in the case of People versus Terrobias:

The filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case may be submitted for decision.

This passage disposes of the respondent judge's defense that the ninety-day period had not yet begun to run because the defendants' memorandum was still awaited.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the facts irrefutably established a delay in the resolution of the motions for preliminary injunction. The urgency of the relief sought through a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in a forcible entry case requires that an application therefor be resolved with dispatch, one way or another. That is precisely why the last sentence of Section 3 of Rule 70 fixes a thirty-day period from the filing of the application. The respondent judge failed to respond to the situation with the speed required by the Rules.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the respondent judge's claim that the case was deemed submitted for decision only after the lapse of five days from the defendants' receipt of the order of August 22, 1984. His own order of May 16, 1984 belied that claim, for there he had stated that the case had already been submitted for resolution. The Court agreed with the complainant that the case should have been deemed submitted for resolution at the end of the twenty-day period agreed upon by the parties for the submission of memoranda. The Court held that judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda within the given periods, and that non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not part of the trial, and the memorandum is not an essential or indispensable pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. It merely aids the court in rendering the decision in accordance with law and evidence, which the court can do even in its absence on the basis of the judge's personal notes and the records. Non-submission of memoranda has invariably been considered a waiver of the privilege.

The Court added that cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature because they involve perturbation of social order, which must be restored as promptly as possible. Technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. The Court also noted that under the Rules on Summary Procedure, memoranda are prohibited.

Doctrine

First, an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in a forcible entry case must be resolved within thirty days from its filing, as required by Section 3 of Rule 70. The judge must act on it with dispatch, one way or another, and may not simply defer it until the decision on the merits.

Second, the non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide a case. A case is deemed submitted for decision at the end of the period agreed upon or fixed for the submission of memoranda, and the judge must decide on the basis of the law, the evidence, his personal notes, and the records. The filing of memoranda is not part of the trial, and the memorandum is not an indispensable pleading.

Third, forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in nature because they involve perturbation of social order, which must be restored as promptly as possible. Technicalities and details of procedure that may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided.

Disposition

The Court reprimanded the respondent judge for the delayed rendition of judgment in the forcible entry case, with a warning that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely, and ordered that copies of the resolution be attached to his records.

Remember This

Memoranda are a privilege, not a condition for decision: a case is submitted for decision when the period for memoranda expires, and the judge must decide even without them. Examiners use this case to test the thirty-day rule on injunction applications in forcible entry cases and the rule that delay in rendering judgment is a ground for administrative liability.