LEODEGARIA BAUTISTA, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE (BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS), RESPO…

Leodegaria Bautista,
petitioner-claimant in this proceeding, was appointed teacher in 1938 by the
Bureau of Public Schools with assignment in Barrio Cabacungan
Elementary School, municipality of Dulag, province of
Leyte, and served continuously as such until she
retired on March 23, 1975 at the age of 60 years, 5 months and 20 days as she
was suffering from coronary arteriosclerosis which disabled her from continuing
with her teaching.  (pp. 20-21, rollo)

A claim for compensation against the Bureau of Public Schools was
filed with Regional Office No. 9 of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit, Tacloban City,
and copy of said claim was sent on April
4, 1975, to the Office of the Solicitor General which did not file
any controversion to the claim in behalf of the
employer Bureau.  (p. 12, ibid.)

A hearing was held by the Acting Referee, Mr. Fernando T. Collantes, during which the claimant and respondent Bureau
were represented by counsel, and the parties agreed on the following
stipulations:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“1.  Employer-employee
relationship;

“2.  Salary
in the amount of P4,303.00 per annum;

“3.  That claimant has been assigned in Dulag, Leyte
as public school teacher; and

“4.  That claimant has retired under the Disability
Retirement Plan.” (p. 12, ibid.)

On August 15, 1975,
the Hearing Officer rendered his decision with the following dispositive portion:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the claimant Leodegaria Bautista as against
the respondent Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Public Schools and it is
hereby ordered that respondent should pay:

“1.     To the claimant Leodegaria Bautista the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00)
PESOS (ma­ximum) as compensation benefits under Secs.
14 and 18 of the Act, as amended…..;

“2.     To the claimant the
additional amount of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE & 99/100 (P281.99) PESOS as
reimbursement of the duly receipted medical expenses and evaluated hospital and
medical bills by the CRMO pursuant to Sec. 13 of the act as amended;

“3.     To Atty. Leon
Tumandao the amount of THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS
as attorney’s fee pursuant to Sec. 31 of the Act; and

“4.     To this office the
amount of SIXTY ONE (P61.00) PESOS as administrative fee pursuant to Section 55
of the Act.” (pp. 15-16, ibid.)

Copy of this decision was received by the Office of the Solicitor
General on September 1, 1975
(p. 17, ibid.).  A motion for
reconsideration dated September 17,
1975, but postmarked September
23, 1975, was received by the referee who however denied it for
lack of merit in an Order of October
22, 1975.  (p. 19, ibid.) In
the same Order the record of the case was elevated to the Commission for
review.

On December 16, 1975
the respondent Commission set aside the award of the hearing officer and
“absolved respondent Bureau from any liability under the Act as
amended.” (pp. 20-22, ibid.)

Leodegaria Bautista now submits that
(1) the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission is null and void as
it was rendered seven days after the decision of the acting referee, Atty. Collantes, had become final and executory,
and (2) claimant is entitled to receive compensation for a disability caused by
an ailment which supervened and was aggravated in the course of her employment
as a public school teacher.

There is merit in petitioner’s allegations.

1. It is not disputed that the 15-day period within which to seek a
reconsideration of the referee’s decision had elapsed when respondent
employer’s motion for reconsideration was filed.^[1]
Nor was there a petition for relief from judgment filed with the Commission en
banc.^[2]
The record of the case was perfunctorily elevated to the Commission upon the
denial of the employer’s motion for reconsideration; by that time, however, and
at that stage of the proceedings the referee’s decision had become final and executory.

To restate the ruling of this Court in the recent case of Soliven vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et
al.,^[3]
a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission reversing that of the hearing referee is null
and void when it is rendered after the referee’s decision had become final and executory for failure of the employer to appeal the same
and to file a petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary
period.

Respondent Bureau contends in its memorandum filed with the Court
that the hearing officer’s decision was null and void and could not have
attained finality as the “hearing officer had no jurisdiction to hear the
claim for compensation in view of the absence of any employer-employee
relationship between respondent Bureau of Public Schools and the claimant at
the time she filed her claim for compensation as she was then retired.”^[4]

It is however correctly claimed by petitioner that respondent
employer is now estopped from invoking the absence of
employer-employee relationship for the simple reason that during the hearing
below the Bureau was represented by Assistant City Fiscal Jose F. Sano and
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Joventino Isidro who
admitted and agreed on a stipulation of facts among which was the existence of
employer-employee relationship between the parties.^[5]

An equally valid point is that petitioner’s right to claim disability
compensation arose only from the time she was disabled to work and had to
retire prematurely by reason of her ailment. 
Necessarily, the claim for compensation for total permanent disability
could be filed only after retirement from the service.  But so long as petitioner’s action had not
prescribed,^[6]
respondent Commission had jurisdiction to act on her claim even if at the time
of the filing thereof the employer-employee relationship had terminated, for
what vests jurisdiction is the fact that the illness which caused the
disability supervened and/or was aggravated in the course of her teaching
job.  In other words, the employment was
coeval with the ailment, and with the two coexisting, an alleged absence of
employer-employee relationship at the time of the filing of the claim is
untenable as a defense.

1. Anent the issue of compensability, the employer herein cannot
evade liability on the ground that “claimant’s (herein petitioner)
ailments were degenerative in nature, and were caused by the aging
process.” (p. 52, rollo) Not having controverted this claim for compensation, the employer
suffers the legal consequences of non-controversion
“loss of non-jurisdictional defenses and ultimate admission of
compensability.”^[7]

2. Moreover, the Workmen’s Compensation Act which governs the
present situation expressly provides in its Section 44 that in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary it shall be presumed that a claim comes
within the provisions of this Act.  Under
this declaration of a benign sound public policy, an employee is freed from the
burden of proving that his illness or injury was caused or aggravated by the
nature of his work; all that is expected of him is to establish the
employer-employee relationship and the occurrence of the injury at the time
such relationship existed, after which the burden is shifted to the employer to
overthrow by substantial evidence the pre­sumed link between the injury and the
work of the employee.

Thus, under the presumption of compensability established by the
law, the Court awarded compensation benefits to employees who in the ordinary
course of their employment suffered ailments of the heart, such as:  a disease of the coronary artery whereby an
artery supplying blood to the muscular walls of the heart is blocked by a clot;^[8]
myocardial infarction,^[9]
cardiac enlargement,^[10]
coronary thrombosis, acute heart failure, or heart attack.^[11]

Coronary arteriosclerosis is a condition characterized by a hardening and thickening of the
arteries which supply blood to the heart muscle.^[12]
While We do not discount the possibility that such ailment may be “caused
by the aging process” as claimed by respondent employer, nonetheless that
fact alone will not be sufficient to remove the ailment from the periphery of
compensable disabling diseases under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.  The law applies to the young as well as to
the aged, and while advancing age may be a contributing factor to the
occurrence of an injury, the constant physical and mental exertions, strain,
and tension in teaching children of tender age for a period of almost 37
years are equally contributing and aggravating causes which render the
resulting disabling injury or ailment compensable under the law.

“* * * an accident exists when a man undertaking work is
unable to withstand the exertion required to do it, whatever may be the degree
of exertion used or the condition of the workman’s health.” Devlin v.
Department of Labor and Industries, 194 Wash. 549, 78 P. 2d 959, cited in
McCormick Lumber Co. v. Department of Labor and Industries, et al., 1941, 108
P. 2d 807, 812.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Commission is set aside and the award
granted to petitioner, Leodegaria Bautista, quoted in
page 2 hereof is hereby ordered immediately executory.

So Ordered.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Martin, Fernandez, and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Sec. 50, Workmen’s Compensation Act as amended provides that “Fifteen days
after the promulgation of the decision the same shall become final unless
previously appealed.”

See also Sections 1 & 4, Rule 19, Rules of the Work­men’s
Compensation Commission.

^[2]
See Sections 2 & 3, Rule 22, ibid.

^[3]
L-44763, June 30, 1977.  See also Quintos
and others vs. Republic of the Philippines,
et al., L-46249-52, August 31, 1977.

^[4]
p. 49, rollo

^[5]
pp. 12 & 59, 60, ibid.

^[6]
In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Perez and the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 1965, 14 SCRA 504, and Vallo vs.
WCC, et al., 1976, 73 SCRA 623, the Court held that compensation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act as amended is a liability vested by statute which
prescribes in ten years pursuant to Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code.

^[7]
Justo vs. WCC, et al., L-43681, Jan. 31, 1977; Bael,
et al. vs. WCC, et al., L-42255, Jan.
31, 1977; Bihag, et al. vs. WCC,
et al., L-43162, Feb. 28, 1977;
Despe vs. WCC, et al., L-42828, Feb. 28, 1977; National Housing
Corpora­tion vs. WCC and Vda. de Niones, et al., L-37907, September 30, 1977

^[8]
Lopez vs. WCC, et al., L-42582, Oct.
21, 1977

^[9]
Caling vs. WCC, et al., L-43209, May 3, 1977

^[10]
Sudario, Jr. vs. R.P., L-44088, Oct. 6, 1977

^[11]
Cuyno, Jr. vs. WCC, et al., L-44271, Sept. 22, 1977; Evangelista vs.
WCC, et al., L-43572, June 30, 1977;
Catibog vs. WCC, et al., L-43416, Dec. 8, 1976, 74 SCRA 243;

Talip vs. WCC, et al.,
L-42574, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 218, citing Visayan
Stevedore & Transporta­tion Co. vs. WCC, al., 1974, 59 SCRA 89

^[12]
Schmidt’s Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine, 1965 Sup., p. 96