ALFONSO DY CUECO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE HON. SEC. OF JUSTICE AND THE HON. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
case is before us for the main facts have been stipulated and only
questions of law are involved in the appeal.

It appears that on May 19, 1951, counsel for petitioner Alfonso Dy
Cueco wrote to the Commissioner of Immigration a letter requesting the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration, upon the ground
that he had exercised the right to elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Article IV, section 1(4) of the Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 625. Said election appears in an affidavit dated
May 15, 1951, stating, among other things, that petitioner was born in
Dapa, Surigao, on February 16, 1923; that his parents are “Benito Dy
Cueco, Chinese (now deceased)” and “Julita Duyapat, Filipina, a native
of Surigao, Philippines”; that he is “married to Rosalinda Villanueva,
a Filipina”, by whom he has four (4) legitimate children; that he
renounces all allegiance to the Republic of China; that he recognizes
and accepts the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that he will
obey support and defend the Constitution and laws of the Philippines.
On the same date, petitioner, likewise, took the corresponding oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to the Secretary
of Justice, who, on June 18, 1957, rendered an opinion (No. 129)
holding that the alleged Philippine citizenship of petitioner’s mother
had not been sufficiently established, that said election of Philippine
citizenship by petitioner herein was legally ineffectual and that he
did not thereby become a Filipino citizen. Petitioner sought a
rehearing and a reconsideration of said opinion. In the course of said
hearing he tried to establish that his delay in electing Philippine
citizenship was due to the belief that he was a citizen of the
Philippines. Once again, the Commissioner of Immigration referred to
the Secretary of Justice, who denied the petition for reconsideration
on January 27, 1959.

About a year later, or on January 9, 1960, petitioner instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Manila the present action for mandamus
against the Secretary of Justice and the Commissioner of Immigration,
to compel them to recognize as valid said election of Philippine
citizenship by petitioner and to cancel his alien’s certificate of
registration. In their answer to the petition for mandamus, respondents
assailed petitioner’s right to said writ, but, after appropriate
proceedings, said court rendered judgment for the petitioner. Hence,
this appeal by respondents.

Petitioner’s cause of action is based upon Article IV of our Constitution, the pertinent part of which reads:

“SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

* * * * * * *

“(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.”

Pursuant to this provisions, two (2) conditions must concur in order
that the election of Philippine citizenship therein mentioned may he
effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election
must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be
made “upon reaching the age of majority”.

In the case at bar, the only evidence on the political status of
petitioner’s mother, Julita Duyapat, consists of a certificate of
baptism, stating that Julita Gonzaga was born in General Luna,
Surigao, on July 30, 1881, and that her parents were Marcelino Duyapat
and Consolacion Gonzaga, and a picture showing that she has the
features of a Filipina and is attired in the typical dress of a
Filipina. Considering that the writ of mandamus will issue, not to
control the exercise of judgment in the construction of a law and the
application of the facts thereto (Policarpio vs. Veterans Board 99
Phil., 791; 52 Off. Gaz., 6178; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Antholtz, 51
Phil. 796), but merely to exact compliance with a clear legal duty
resulting from an office, trust or station (Viuda e Hijos de C. Zamora
vs. Wright, 53 Phil. 613; Ng Gioc Lin vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
85 Phil., 842; 47 Off. Gaz., 5112), we are not prepared to hold that
the Secretary of Justice erred in finding that said proof is
insufficient to establish that petitioner’s mother was a citizen of the
Philippines.

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16,
1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15,1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28)
years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not been made “upon
reaching the age of majority”.

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable
time after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of
Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to
above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. For
this reason, petitioner introduced evidence to the effect that he is
referred to as a Filipino in his birth certificate, in his marriage
contract and in the birth certificate of his children; that he married
a Filipina; and that he enlisted in the Philippine guerilla forces in
December 1942.

It should be noted, however, that he joined a unit of Chinese
volunteers and that he registered himself in the Bureau of Immigration
as a Chinese. Moreover, it appears that, as early, as 1947, petitioner
knew that he had to make a formal election, if he wanted to be a
citizen of the Philippines, and yet he did not do so until four (4)
years later, or in May 1951. The reasons given by him for such delay
were his alleged financial difficulties and the illness of members of
his family. We agree with the Secretary of Justice, that such
explanation is patently insufficient to excuse said delay or to warrant
extension of the period to elect Philippine citizenship.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and
another one shall be entered dismissing the petition, with costs
against petitioner. It is so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.