PHILIPPINE CAN COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LIBERAL LABOR UNION, RESPONDENTS.

The facts in this case as may be gathered from the pleadings are
the following: The petitioner Philippine Can Company is a domestic
company engaged in the manufacture of tin cans for packing biscuits,
candles, etc. and for making pails for carrying water and basins for
washing purposes. The respondent Liberal Labor Union is a labor
organization.

On March 14, 1949, a number of laborers belonging to said union and
working in Petitioner’s can factory located at 400 Pampanga street,
Manila, staged a strike and established a picket line around the
company’s compound. According to the petitioner, said strikers and
picketers used threats and intimidation to prevent the other laborers
from continuing to work in the factory so that the company officials
were compelled to appeal to the Police Department which sent policemen
to the premises to restore order and protect the loyal workers and
officials. That same morning the company posted notices at the gate of
the company compound notifying the strikers that those who did not
return to work at one o’clock in the afternoon will be considered
dismissed; in fact those who did not return to work were declared
dismissed and dropped from the payroll.

Five days later, that is on March 19, 1949, respondent Liberal
Labor Union filed a petition with the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations alleging that from February 26, 1949, the Philippine Can
Company had reduced the wages of seven laborers, and that after the
corresponding negotiations had failed, the strike was declared. The
Union asked the industrial court after due hearing and consideration to
order the Philippine Can Company to restore the former rate of wages
and to refund; all deductions made in their salaries.

Answering said petition of the labor union, the can company
specifically denied the allegation to the effect that the company had
reduced the wages of its laborers as alleged in the petition, calling
said allegation as having been falsely made and constituting contempt
of court; and that the wages of the seven laborers involved prior to
February 26, 1949, are the same as those they had been receiving after
said date and up to the day of the strike. The Company further alleged:

“That the strike declared by several members of the
petitioning union on March 14, 1949 was illegal and unjustified, the
same having been declared without due and proper notice to the
management, no verbal nor written demand or demands having been
presented beforehand to said management for its study, consideration
and/or actuation;

“That as soon as the strike was called,
the President of the petitioning union together with other members of
said union prevented other laborers from rendering service to the
company against their will by the use of threat and intimidation;

“That in view of this illegal and unjustified strike, the management
posted several notices in conspicuous places at the gate of the can
factory at 400 Pampanga St., Tondo, Manila, notifying all the laborers
that whoever failed to report for duty at 1:00 p.m. of March 11, 1949
would be considered discharged from service as in fact said respondent
discharged from its service those laborers who did not report for duty
on the aforesaid time and date, (1 p.m., March 14, 1949)

“That the respondent had been steadily losing in its can factory
business since 1948, and from Jan, 1st, 1949 to Feb.. 28, 1949, the
said can factory suffered a further loss of P24,000, a little more or
less; and

“That in view of said great financial losses, the
laying-off of laborers not necessary in the operation of the can
factory had become Imperative in order to save the said company from
bankruptcy.”

The can company prayed the industrial court to deny the petition of
the labor union of March 19, 1949, and to order the lay-off of laborers
not necessary in the operation of the can factory by confirming the
permanent discharge from its service of the laborers who declared the
strike on March 14, 1949, and who did not return to work in the
afternoon of that same day.

The first hearing of the petition and answer was held on March 25,
at which hearing the President of the labor union testified. The next
hearing was scheduled to be held on April 8, 1949, but on that date
counsel for the can company, tho present, due to sickness, was unable
to continue with the hearing and asked for the postponement of the same
for a few days. Counsel for the labor union agreed to the postponement
but asked that the strikers be ordered back to work. The attorney for
the can company vigorously objected to this request, saying that the
illegality of the strike had been raised squarely in issue before the
court and consequently, it would be highly unfair to compel the can
company to readmit the strikers without first deciding whether or not
said strike was legal and whether or not the dismissal of the strikers
was proper.

That same day, April 8, 1949, Judge Jose S. Bautista of the Court
of Industrial Relations issued an order directing the laborers of the
labor union to immediately return to work and the can company to admit
them under the same conditions which prevailed before the conflict
arose. The reason in support of the order ?as stated therein was to
maintain the parties in status quo before the strike, and because in the opinion of the Judge the conflict could not be promptly decided.

The can company filed a motion for reconsideration of said order of
April 8, 1949, reiterating its contention that the strike was illegal,
and that it was highly unfair and unjust to require the can company to
readmit these laborers who had been properly discharged, without giving
the can company an opportunity to be heard and prove its claim; that
the can company, because of the financial losses suffered by it, was
not in a financial position to re-employ the strikers; in fact it
wanted to lay off some of its laborers and in proof of this it did not
ask the industrial court to allow it to employ new laborers to take the
places of the strikers.

Acting upon said petition for reconsideration, Judge Bautista and
two other judges of the Court of Industrial Relations in a resolution
dated June 10, 1949, denied the same, holding that it was not enough
that the can company alleged that the strike was illegal and that it
considered the strikers as dismissed, and that the order directing the
strikers to go back to work will not cause damage or prejudice to the
can company because said strikers will render service to said company
and produce wealth for it. Presiding Judge Roldan and Judge Juan A,
Lanting of the same Court of IndustMil Relations dissented from the
said resolution, saying that the Supreme Court has held in several
cases that a company cannot be compelled to readmit laborers who have
committed illegal acts against said company; that the can company in
this case has put in issue the illegality of the strike staged; that it
was premature and unjust to order the strikers back to work because if
after hearing it was found that the strike was really illegal, then
injustice will have been committed against said can company in having
been compelled to re-employ and pay laborers who have been legitimately
discharged; that on the other hand, even if later it is found that the
strike was legal and that the strikers had been improperly discharged,
no damage will be suffered by them for the reason that the can company
could always be ordered to pay their back wages.

The Philippine Can Company has now filed the present petition for
certiorari asking that the order of April 8, 1949, including the
resolution of June 10, 1949, denying the petition for reconsideration,
be set aside for being an abuse of discretion and as creating a
dangerous precedent.

A careful study of the case inclines us to agree with Presiding
Judge Roldan and Judge Lanting in their dissenting opinion. Judge
Bautista in his order of April 8, 1949, and later he and two other
judges of the industrial court in their resolution denying the petition
for reconsideration, relied upon section 19 of Commonwealth Act 103 to
the effect that in a ease submitted to the industrial court where the
laborers have already struck, said laborers may be ordered back to work
pending decision of the case, said order to be issued only after hearing
when public interest so requires, or when the court believes that the
ease cannot be promptly decided. Section 19 may be applied in ordinary
cases and in the majority of strikes where for instance, the laborers
have asked for an increase in wages or vacation leave, hospital
privileges, etc. and where the employer company has rejected the
demands. In such eases, no prejudice or damage would be caused to the
company by the early return of the laborers. In fact, the employer
company would even be favored by said return of the laborers pending
decision.

We should bear in mind that ordinarily, a strike is a coercive
measure resorted to by laborers to enforce their demands. The idea
behind a strike is that a company engaged in a profitable business
cannot afford to have its production or activities interrupted, much
less, paralyzed. Any interruption or stoppage of production spells
loss,even disaster. The capital invested in machinery, factory and
other properties connected with the business would be unproductive
during a strike or the stoppage of the business. On the other hand, the
overhead expenses consisting of salaries of its officials, including
real estate taxes and license fees continue, Knowing this, the strikers
by going on strike seek to interrupt and paralyze the business and
production of the company. The employer company is on the defensive. It
almost invariably wants the strike stopped and the strikers back to
work so as to resume and continue production. Because of this threat or
danger of loss to the company, it not infrequently gives in to the
demands of the strikers, just so it can maintain the continuity of its
production. Or, if the strikers refuse to return to work, the employer
company seeks permission from the court to employ other laborers to
take their places. In such cases, pending determination of the
conflict, especially where public interests so require or when the
court cannot promptly decide the case, the strikers are ordered back to
work.

But the facts in the present case are far different. Public
interests are hardly affected or involved in the present strike. The
business of the can company is not such that the public is keenly
interested in its continuance. According to the can company, it
manufactures tin cans for packing biscuits, candies, etc. and pails for
carrying water and basins for washing purposes. Many similar companies
have sprung up since 1947, resulting in intense and even ruinous
competition, thus explaining the downward trend in the business of the
can company and its;

What the Court of Industrial Relations should have done as
suggested by Presiding Judge Roldan, was to give priority to this case
so that it could be decided in the shortest time possible.

In the case of Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Zulueta, 69 Phil., 485, it was held:

“But much as we should expand beyond economic
orthodoxy, we hold that an employer cannot legally be compelled to
continue with employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of
misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance
in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interests. The
law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither
oppression nor self destruction of the employer.”

If we now compel the can company to readmit the strikers who later
on might be declared to have been properly dismissed by their employer
because they not only staged an illegal strike but because they tried
to prevent other loyal laborers from continuing to work, we will be
committing a grave injustice to the employer company without first
giving it a chance to be heard, especially since it has, as already
stated, squarely raised in issue the alleged illegality of the strike.

We hold that where an employer claims that the strike of some of
its laborers was illegal and so it has dismissed said laborers for
refusing to return to work, and raises such alleged illegality squarely
in issue in a case pending before the Court of Industrial Relations,
and further asserts that because of the loss in its business, it does
not presently need the services of said strikers nor of substitutes to
take their places in the employer’s factory, the Court of Industrial
Relations instead of ordering the strikers back to work, should first
determine whether or not the strike was legal and whether or not the
strikers had been properly and lawfully discharged, and for this
purpose the lower court should give priority to the hearing and
determination of the case, so as to avoid committing any possible
injustice to the employer. This,especially in a case where like the
present, as we understand it, only a portion of the workers had gone on
strike, thereby not unduly interrupting, much less, paralyzing the work
and production of the Company, which production by the way, does not,
because of its nature, involve public interest.

In view of the foregoing, the order of April 8, and the resolution
of July 10, 1949, are hereby set aside. Let the writ of certiorari
issued with costs.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.