G.R. No. L-49379. June 29, 1981
TEODORA A. ARITAO, RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ AND HILARIO ALVAREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, COL. VICTOR M. PUNZALAN, POTENCIANA PUNZALAN, JULIANA PUNZALAN AND VICTORIA PUNZ…
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Under review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. SP-07045,* which annulled and set aside the Orders in Civil Case No. S-146
of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City, Branch
V, dated June 22, 1977 approving
petitioners’ Record on Appeal, and that of August 9, 1977, denying private respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondents herein, Col. Victor M. Punzalan, Potenciana Punzalan
and Victoria Punzalan (the Punzalans, for short), filed on July 8, 1975 with
the Municipal Court of Pangil, Laguna, an action for Forcible Entry with
Damages against Teodora A. Aritao, Raymundo Alvarez and Hilario Alvarez,
petitioners herein (the Aritaos, for brevity), docketed as Civil Case No. 53. On May
25, 1976, the Municipal Court rendered its Decision awarding
possession to the Punzalans, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudges
that the plaintiffs are the lawful prior possessors of the disputed lot,
Exhibit 1-C, which the defendants deprived the plaintiffs of their actual
possession against the law.
It is hereby ordered for the defendants that all persons claiming
rights under them to remove the newly constructed fence, to vacate the premises
and to turn it over to the plaintiffs and to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
twenty five (P25.00), Philippine currency, representing the value of the
coconut fruits gathered by said defendants for every harvest once every two (2)
months for the whole period of deprivation covering from February 18, 1975 up
to the date of the return of same disputed portion to the plaintiffs.
Further, this Court orders the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs
by way of reimbursements the reasonable amount of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00), Philippine Currency, representing attorney’s fees. Said party defendants are further more
adjudged to pay the costs of this suit.”
The Aritaos appealed to the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch V (Civil Case No. S-146). On October 22, 1976, the said Court
affirmed in toto the judgment of the Municipal Court. The Aritaos filed Notice of Appeal, Appeal
Bond and Record on Appeal. For their
part, the Punzalans filed a Motion to remand the case and/or return the records
to the Municipal Court for execution, on the ground that the Decision had
already become final, as no Petition for Review had been filed within the
reglementary period in accordance with Rep. Act No. 296 as amended by Rep. Act
No. 6031. The trial Court approved the Record
on Appeal on June 22, 1977. The Punzalans moved for reconsideration, but
this was denied on August 9, 1977.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction was filed by the Punzalans with the Court of Appeals seeking to
annul the aforementioned Orders of the Court of First Instance for the reason
that the Decision appealed from is not subject to appeal, the proper remedy
being a Petition for Review.
On March 14, 1978,
the Court of Appeals made the following pronouncement in its judgment:
“From the foregoing, it is apparent that counsel for private
respondents (the Aritaos in that case) should have filed a petition for review
within the reglementary period which is the prescribed procedure.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the orders of the respondent Judge dated June 22, 1977 and August 9, 1977 are hereby annulled and
set aside.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on September 28, 1977 is hereby made
permanent.”
In this Petition for Certiorari, the Aritaos assign the
following errors to the Court of Appeals:
“1. The Court of Appeals erred on a question of
law when it made a strict and/or literal interpretation of a procedural law at
the expense or sacrifice of justice.
2. The
Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it failed to apply the
provisions of the Rules of Court regarding the liberal construction thereof to
promote their objective and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of their cases (Sec. 2, Rule 1) and applicable
decisions it rendered on similar cases and decisions rendered by this
Honorable Court.
3. The
Court of Appeals erred in not exercising its power and discretion in accordance
with the applicable provisions of law and jurisprudence.”
The Forcible Entry suit instituted in the Municipal Court of
Pangil, Laguna, by the Punzalans on July
8, 1975 falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of said
Court after it had become a Court of record.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance affirmed the judgment in favor of
the Punzalans in its entirety. Thus,
this case comes squarely within the purview of Section 45 of the Judiciary Act,
as amended by Republic Act No. 6031, approved on August 4, 1969, which provides:
“Sec. 45. Appellate
jurisdiction. – Courts of First Instance
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in city and municipal
courts, in their respective provinces, except over appeals from cases tried by
municipal judges of provincial capitals or city judges pursuant to the
authority granted under the last paragraph of section 87 of this Act.
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the
basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal
courts: Provided, That the parties may
submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested: Provided, however, That if the case was tried
in a city or municipal court before the latter became a court of record, then
on appeal the case shall proceed by trial de novo.
In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal
and city courts which are appealed to the courts of first instance, the
decision of the latter shall be final:
Provided, That the findings of facts contained in said decision are
supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the conclusions are
not clearly against the law and jurisprudence; in cases falling under the
concurrent jurisdiction of the municipal and city courts with the courts of
first instance, the appeal shall be made directly to the court of appeals whose
decision shall be final: Provided,
however, That the Supreme Court in its discretion may, in any case involving a
question of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and
under rules and conditions it may prescribe, require by certiorari that
the case be certified to it for review and determination, as if the case had
been brought before it on appeal.”
Construing the foregoing provision, we held categorically in the
case of Gutierrez vs. Magat, 67 SCRA 262 (1975) that:
“Sec. 45 of the Judiciary Law as amended by R.A. 6031 does not
allow an appeal by record on appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance in an appealed case falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the municipal or city court.”
Similarly, in Buenbrazo vs. Marave,[1]
also a Forcible Entry case, this Court ruled:
“x x x
“we hold that the lower Court erred in giving due course to
Abelardo’s appeal to the Court of Appeals by means of a record on appeal.”
x x x x x
“x x x there is no controversy that the
review of the decision of the Court of First Instance in a case exclusively
cognizable by the inferior court (as in this case) cannot be made in an ordinary
appeal or by record on appeal.”
x x x x x
“Therefore, respondent Jose V. Abelardo could not appeal by
record on appeal. The lower court’s
order giving due course to Abelardo’s appeal by record on appeal is
erroneous.”
It is settled then that the only mode of appeal in cases covered
by Republic Act No. 6031 is by Petition for Review and not by Record on
Appeal. The evident purpose of the
enactment of said Act was to do away with ordinary appeals in appealed cases
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Municipal or City Courts.
Whether it is the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, which
should review the Decision of the Court of First Instance in cases of this
nature, is not in issue.
During the pendency of this appeal, the Aritaos submitted a
Manifestation stating that in an action for quieting of title filed by them
against the Punzalans before the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City, Branch V, Siniloan (Civil Case No. S-151), judgment was rendered in
their (Aritaos’) favor. Asked to
comment, the Punzalans manifested that they have interposed an appeal from the
said judgment to the Court of Appeals where the case is still pending.
Although the final outcome of this later case would be more
decisive of the controversy between the parties as it involves the question of
ownership and not merely material possession, as a matter of equity, the
Aritaos may be given a chance to file a Petition for Review, their appeal
before the trial Court having been filed within the reglementary period.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, but the petitioners, Teodora A. Aritao, et als., are hereby given
fifteen (15) days from notice within which to file a Petition for Review.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, and Abad Santos,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concur with J.
Aquino’s dissent.
De Castro, J., took no part.
[1]
L-41144, December 29, 1980.