G.R. No. L-17079. January 29, 1962
BRAULIO CASTILLO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, VS. SIMPLICIA NAGTALON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. SIMPLICIA NAGTALON, MOVANT AND APPELLEE VS. DESIDERIO SEGUNDO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.
BARRERA, J.:
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte (Castillo, et al. vs. Nagtalon, et al.),
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court renders judgment declaring
the plaintiffs owners pro-indiviso of the land described in the complaint with
the right to possess it and that the defendants are ordered to restore the
possession of the eastern portion thereof to the plaintiffs, to pay damages in
the amount of P210.00 every year since 1943 until they deliver the possession of
said portion to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs.”
On appeal by the defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed said decision in
all respects, with costs against the defendants-appellants therein.
The decision having become final, a writ of execution was issued under date
of April 27, 1957, against all the defendants, twelve in number, to satisfy the
damages and costs awarded therein which, together with the expenses incidental
to such execution, amounted to P3,401.00. Consequently, ten parcels of land,
three of which belonged exclusively to herein appellee Simplicia Nagtalon, one
of the defendants, were levied upon and sold for P3,401.00 at the execution sale
conducted on July 8, 1957. The certificate of sale was issued on the same day to
Martmiano Factor, the purchaser, who was a third party not involved in the
original case.
On July 8, 1958, the last day of the one-year period for redemption, appellee
Simplicia Nagtalon who, as already stated, was one of the judgment debtors and
the exclusive owner of three of the ten parcels of land sold in public auction,
deposited with the Deputy Provincial Sheriff the sum of P317.44 representing 1/12
of the consideration of the sale plus 1% interest thereon, and prayed for the
issuance of the corresponding deed of redemption as to the three parcels of land
belonging to her. The purchaser, however, opposed the same on the ground that
the amount thus tendered did not cover the full redemption price of the said
three parcels of land which were auctioned separately at P1,240.00, P21.00, and
P30.00, respectively or a total of P1,291.00 (see parcels 1, 2 and 4 of the
certificate of sale executed by the Sheriff, pp. 27-28, Record on Appeal). In
view of said opposition, Nagtalon filed a motion with the court to compel the
Sheriff to issue the deed of redemption prayed for.
On August 26, 1958, the court, acting on said motion, issued an order holding
that the liability of the defendants, as appearing in the dispositive part of
the executed decision, was only joint and that the tender of movant Nagtalon of
the sum corresponding to 1/12 of the purchase price was sufficient to redeem her
properties sold at public auction. Thus, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff was
directed to execute and deliver to movant Nagtalon the certificate of redemption
covering the three parcels of land owned by her. The purchaser’s and the
Sheriff’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, they instituted the
instant appeal.[1]
The only question to be determined in this appeal is whether the lower court
committed an error in holding movant’s tender of the sum of P317.44 as valid
redemption of the three parcels of land owned by her, and in ordering the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of redemption therefor.
It is the contention of the appellee Nagtalon, and upheld by the lower court
that her obligation under the judgment is merely “joint”, as the dispositive
portion of the decision ordered, aside from the restoration of the land involved
in the controversy, the payment by the defendants of “damages in the amount of P210.00 every year since 1943 until they deliver the possession of said portion
to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs.” Appellants sustain on the other hand,
that although defendants’ liability was not specifically declared to be joint
and several in the said dispositive part, nevertheless, considering that in the
body of the decision the defendants were in effect pronounced guilty of a
tortious act, their obligation constituted an exception to the general rule and
made their liability therefor solidary.[2]
While this might have been a proper argument in a timely motion for
modification of the judgment, it loses its efficacy at this stage of the
proceedings when the decision has already become final and executory. As held by
this Court, the portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution is
that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion thereof.[3] In the absence therein of express declaration to
the contrary, the liability of the defendants in this case must be taken—as did
the lower court correctly—to be join;t only and not solidary.
The directive, however, to execute the deed of redemption of the three
parcels of land belonging to the movant, upon payment of her pro-rata share of
the obligation, is not in order. It appears from the Sheriff’s Certificate of
Sale (pp. 27-28, Record on Appeal) that said three parcels of land were bidded
and so sold for the sums of P1,240.00, P21.00, and P30.00, respectively, or for
a total amount of P1,291.00. Although it may be contended that the sale of these
properties to satisfy movant’s 1/12 share of the obligation, which was only
P317.44 might have been improper, yet by not objecting to the sale of her
properties at the opportune time, and by offering instead to redeem the same,
she impliedly admitted the regularity of the Sheriff’s sale and estopped her
from impugning later its validity on tins ground alone. (See Tiaoqui vs. Chaves,
L-10086, May 20, 1957.) Her claim made for the first time at this late hour when
her offer of redemption is opposed, that she had no knowledge of the purchase
price of her parcels of land, for the reason that she was not furnished with a
copy of the certificate of sale, and that the same was not registered with the
registry of deeds, is of no avail. There is no pretense that the provisions of
Section 16, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, regarding notice cf the execution
sale, were not duly observed. Appellee, as judgment debtor whose properties
wfere levied upon and made subject to such public sale, could have attended the
sale, directed the conduct thereof,[4] and
even prevented the disposition of her properties insofar as it exceeded the
amount due from her individually as one of the judgment debtors. Having failed
to do so, she cannot later be heard to complain solely on this ground, against
the regularity thereof[5] which becomes
binding on her.
In connection with appellee’s contention that the sale was unregistered, it
may be stated that while under Section 24, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, a
duplicate of the certificate of sale must be filed by the executing officer in
the office of the register of deeds of the province, noncompliance therewith
does not necessarily affect the validity of the sale. Execution sales made in
accordance with the provisions of Section 19, Rule 39 of said Rule are
considered final and any irregularity committed in the course thereof will not
vitiate their validity, unless it appears that injury has been caused
thereby.[6] In the instant case, there is
no showing that appellee’s alleged lack of knowledge of the exact purchase price
of the properties was attributable to the executing officer’s failure to
register the sale and, even assuming, arguendo, that it is, such
situation could have been averted had appellee availed of the privilege granted
her under said Section 19 of Rule 39.
The procedure for the redemption of properties sold at execution sale is
prescribed in Section 26, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court. Thereunder, the
judgment debtor or redemptioner may redeem the property from the purchaser,
within 12 months after the sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his
purchase, with 1% per month interest thereon up to the time of redemption,
together with the taxes paid by the purchaser after the purchase, if any. In
other words, in the redemption of properties sold at an execution sale, the
amount payable is no longer the judgment debt but the purchase price.
Considering that appellee tendered payment only of the sum of P317.44, whereas
the three parcels of land she was seeking to redeem were sold for the sums of P1,240.00, P21.00 and P30.00, respectively, the aforementioned amount of P317.44
is insufficient to effectively release the properties. However, as the tender of
payment was timely made and in good faith, in the interest of justice we incline
to give the appellee opportunity to complete the redemption purchase of the
three parcels, as provided in Section 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from the time this decision becomes final and executory. In
this wise, justice is done to the appellee who had been made to pay more than
her share in the judgment, without doing an injustice to the purchaser who shall
get the corresponding interest of 1% per month on the amount of his purchase up
to the time of redemption.
Should appellee fail to complete the redemption price as herein indicated,
the sheriff may either release to appellee the two smaller lots and return to
her the balance of her deposit, or return the entire deposit without releasing
any of the three lots, as the appellee may elect.
As thus modified, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L., Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
[1] This appeal was originally filed in
the Court of Appeals, but was certified to this Court, on the ground that the
issues raised are purely of law.
[2] Article 2194, New Civil Code.
[3] Oriental Commercial Co., Inc. vs.
Abeto and Mabanag, 60 Phil. 723, 728; Nery Edwards vs. Arce, 98 Phil., 688; 52
Off. Gaz., 2537; Robles vs. Timario, 107 Phil., 809; 58 Off. Gaz., (8) 1507;
Segarra vs. Maronilla, 108 Phil., 1086; 60 Off. Gaz., (42) 6791.
[4] Section 19, Rule 39, Rules of
Court
[5] See Herman vs. La Urbana, 59 Phil.
621.
[6] Herman v8. La Urbana, supra; See
also Tria, et al. V8. Villareal, et al., 69 Phil. 478.