LEONARDO CATAIN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. HERMINIO RIOS AND MARIANO TAMAYO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

This appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, dismissing Civil Case No. 313 thereof, is before
Us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, only questions of law being
raised therein.

Before the institution of said case, plaintiff Leonardo Catain had
filed Civil Case No. 268 of the same court, which was dismissed, upon the
ground that, although its object was to recover the possession of a land, the
right thereto hinged on the ownership thereof, in view of which the court
reserved to the parties the right to settle this question in another action therefor.  Hence, the
aforementioned Case No. 313.^[1]

It appears that, on March
8, 1954, defendant Herminio Rios sold the
land in question – which is situated in the sitio of Ituan, municipality
of Busuanga,
province of Palawan – to plaintiff
Leonardo Catain. 
Over a year later, or on August
20, 1955, Rios sold the same land to his co-defendant herein,
Mariano Tamayo. 
When, sometime after the second sale, plaintiff sought to take physical
possession of said land, Tamayo refused to turn it
over to him.  Accordingly, plaintiff
commenced the former action for the recovery of possession, and, upon its
dismissal, as above stated, the present case, against Herminio
Rios and Mariano Tamayo, to establish title to said
property, as well as to secure its possession and recover damages.  Defendant Herminio
Rios did not care to file his answer to the complaint or otherwise contest the
same.

Relying upon Article 1544 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,2 the lower court rendered judgment for Tamayo and against the plain­tiff, upon the theory that,
since neither the deed of sale to Tamayo nor that
executed in favor of the plaintiff had been registered, the former has a better
right, he having been first in the physical possession of the disputed land.

Upon a review of the record, we find that the decision appealed from cannot be sustained.  Indeed, it is well settled that the
possession referred to in the last paragraph of said Art. 1544, includes
actual, as well as constructive possession.3 In the
case at bar, both sales had been made through public instruments, so that, upon
execution of the deed of conveyance in favor of plaintiff herein, the property
sold was deemed symbolically delivered to him, inasmuch as the contrary does
not appear and cannot be clearly inferred from said instrument.4 What is
more, as hereafter pointed out, the intent of the parties, at the time of the
execution thereof, was to thereby consummate a full transfer of the
corresponding right in rem, in and to the
property in litigation, to plaintiff herein.

It is true that Tamayo was then in
actual possession thereof.  Such
possession was, however, a precarious one, for, admittedly, he then held the
land, not adversely to, but with the consent and, therefore, on behalf
of defendant Herminio Rios.  This was due to the fact that prior thereto, Tamayo had bought from Honesto
Rios, father of Herminio Rios, another land –
located in the sitio of Malabnao
– which, however, could not be delivered to Tamayo
because it was the object of a litigation. 
Pending final determination thereof, it was agreed, therefore, between Herminio Rios – his father having died in the meantime – and Tamayo, that the latter would meanwhile hold the
property now in question – located in the sitio of Ituan – although not in a proprietary
character.  Hence, it has been
stipulated, between the parties herein, that Tamayo’s
possession was not that of an owner, until August 20, 1955, when – owing to subsequent develop­ments,
making it impossible to turn over to Tamayo the land
situated in Malabnao – Herminio
Rios executed the aforementioned deed of sale in his (Tamayo’s)
favor.

At the time of the sale to plaintiff herein, on March 8, 1954,
and for over a year thereafter, Rios was, therefore, in civil pos­session of
the land in question, in much the same way as he would have been in such
possession had the land been physically held by his tenant, administrator or
agent.  And his intent to make a symbolic
and effective delivery of that civil possession to the plaintiff could be and
was carried out through the execution of the public instrument evidencing the
sale to the latter.

There is, besides, a decisive factor in favor of plaintiff
herein, and that is that the property
in question is registered, not in the name of Herminio
Rios, but in that of plaintiff’s father, Vicente Catain.  In this connection, it is alleged in
plaintiff’s complaint, and not denied in defendants’ answer, that said property
is covered by Patent No. 2127 and Original Certificate of Title No. 344 of Palawan, both in the name of said Vicente Catain.  It appears
that, sometime before 1951, the latter had sold the property to Honesto Rios, father of defendant Herminio
Rios, subject to redemption, which was exercised by plain­tiff Leonardo Catain, on March 8,
1954, his own father having died prior thereto.  For one reason or another, said conditional
sale by Vicente Catain to Honesto
Rios was not registered, although the owner’s duplicate of said Original
Certificate of Title No. 344 had been delivered to him.  Hence, when, on March 8, 1954, plaintiff
redeemed the property from Herminio Rios, hose father
had, also, died in the meantime, Herminio turned over
to plaintiff said owner’s
duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 344 and the corres­ponding tax
declaration, as well as executed, before the Municipal Treasurer of Busuanga, Palawan, an affidavit
of transfer of said property to him (plaintiff).  As heretofore adverted to, the public
instrument evidencing the sale in his favor, coupled with the surrender of the owner’s
duplicate of said original certificate of title and the tax declaration, and
the execution of said affidavit of transfer of real estate, for purposes of
taxation, manifestly reveal the intent of Herminio
Rios to do everything necessary to fully convey and transfer effectively to
plaintiff herein the real right of ownership over the land in question.

At any rate, inasmuch as said land was registered in the name of
Vicente Catain when Herminio
Rios sold it to Tamayo – as well as at present – and
this appeared and still appears in public records, in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Palawan, Tamayo
must be deemed to have notice of such fact 5 and
cannot legally claim that he bought the land in the belief, in good faith, that
it belonged to Rios, who could
not even produce – at the time of the sale
to Tamayo – the owner’s duplicate of the
original certificate of title in the name of Vicente Catain,
the same having been previously delivered to plain­tiff herein.

In fact, Tamayo did not allege in his answer that he
bought the property in question in good faith or that he acted in good faith
when, on August 20, 1955, he converted his, up to then,
precarious possession, into one as owner. 
Although the lower court found that there was good faith on his part,
when his possession began in 1951, this did not suffice to place him
within the purview of the third paragraph of the aforementioned Article 1544,
because – as already pointed out – such possession was one held with the
consent of Honesto Rios, and, hence, in his
representation and behalf, not adversely to him.  In other words, Tamayo
is not entitled to the benefits of said legal provision.6

Moreover, a deed conveying a land covered by a certificate of
title, under the Torrens system, does not transmit a
right in rem until the registration of said
instrument,7 and that executed in favor of Tamayo has
not been registered.  In fact, it could not have been registered, it
having been executed by Herminio Rios, whereas the
land is registered in the name of Vicente Catain, and
Tamayo could not have presented the owner’s duplicate
of the certificate of title.

It is urged in plaintiff’ s brief that, in view of Tamayo’s unjusti­fied and illegal refusal to surrender the
physical possession of the property in question, the former has suffered
damages equivalent to 50 cavanes of palay yearly, at the rate of P8.00 a cavan.  Without contesting the sufficiency of the
evidence on this point, Tamayo argues that plaintiff
is not entitled to recover said damages, because said refusal was justified by
law.  Inasmuch, however, as Tamayo’s stand is not legally tenable, it follows
necessarily that he should indemnify said damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and another one shall be entered ordering the defendants herein to vacate the
property in question and to deliver the possession thereof to plaintiff herein,
as well as sentencing said defendants to pay him by way of damages the price of
50 cavanes of palay a year,
from August 20, 1955, up to the date on which said delivery shall have taken
place, computed at the rate of P8.00 a cavan, with
interest thereon at the legal rate, from September 22, 1958, when this action
was be­gun, in addition to attorney’s fees in the sum of P1,000.00, and the costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., in the result.

Sanchez, J., did not take part.

^[1]
The records do not show why the title to said land could not be determined in
Civil Case No. 268.  Perhaps the same was an appeal from a
forcible entry or detainer case initiated in the
Justice of the Peace or Municipal Court, and appealed to the Court of First
Instance.

2
“If the same thing should
have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.

“Should
it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

“Should
there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.” (Art. 1544,
Civil Code of the Philippines).

3
Bautista v. Sioson, 39 Phil. 615; Lichauco v. Berenguer, 39
Phil. 643.

4
“ART. 1498.  When the sale is made
through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot
clearly be inferred.

“With regard
to movable property, its delivery may also be made by the delivery of the keys
of the place or depository where it is stored or kept.” (Civil Code of the
Philippines).

5
Palanca v. Director of Lands, 43 Phil. 149.

6
Paylago v. Pastrana Jarabe, G.R. No. L-20046, March 27, 1968; Bernas v.
Bolo, 81 Phil. 16.

7
Section 50, Act No. 496.