FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE ANSBERTO P. PAREDES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, HON. AMADO GAT INCIONG, IN H…

Federation of Free Workers versus Paredes

The Case

This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari brought by the Federation of Free Workers against the presiding judge of the Court of Industrial Relations and the Undersecretary of Labor, to annul an order refusing the union's intervention in a scheduled certification election. The case matters because it settles a question every labor lawyer must know: whether the technical rule on intervention in ordinary civil actions may be used to shut out a bona fide labor organization from a certification election. The Court answers no, and clears the way for a three-way contest among competing unions.

Procedural History

The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation petitioned the Court of Industrial Relations for a certification election between two contending unions, the Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation and the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions. The industrial court, through then Judge Joaquin Salvador, issued an order directing a consent election between the two unions as agreed by the parties, and the Department of Labor scheduled the election. Before the scheduled date, the Federation of Free Workers filed a motion for intervention, and Judge Salvador suspended the election and conducted hearings on the union's legal interest. After Judge Salvador's resignation was accepted following the declaration of martial law, the respondent judge took over and issued an order denying the intervention, setting aside the suspension, and reviving the order for a two-union election. The union moved for reconsideration, and when it learned that the election had been rescheduled, it asked that the election be suspended. It also wrote the Undersecretary of Labor, who took no action and returned the letter. The union then filed this original petition with the Supreme Court, with a prayer for a restraining order. The Court required answers and issued a restraining order. The Undersecretary informed the Court that the election did not proceed because the industrial court en banc had suspended it until further orders. The respondent court and the Kapisanan merely reiterated that the intervention was improper under the Rules of Court. The industrial court took no further action on the motion for reconsideration, so the Court resolved the principal issue once and for all.

Facts

On August 18, 1972, after a hearing on the company's petition, the Court of Industrial Relations ordered a consent election between the Kapisanan and the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions, as the parties had agreed. The Department of Labor scheduled the certification election for September 14, 1972.

Well before that date, the Federation of Free Workers learned of the scheduled election and filed a motion for intervention on September 8, 1972. Judge Salvador suspended the scheduled election. Only the Kapisanan opposed the intervention; neither the employer nor the other union filed any opposition. At the hearings, the union showed that its intervention carried the signatures of more than one hundred member-employees, and witnesses identified some sixty of them, amounting to about ten percent of the approximately five hundred eighty rank and file employees.

After Judge Salvador resigned and the respondent judge took over, the latter issued an order on February 21, 1973 denying the intervention. He held that the motion was filed late, after the order of August 18, 1972 had become final, and was improper under the rule on intervention, which permits it only before or during a trial. He revived the election with only the two original unions participating. The union sought reconsideration and, learning that the election had been rescheduled, asked for its suspension. The election did not proceed because the industrial court en banc suspended it until further orders.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the timely motion for intervention of the Federation of Free Workers in the certification election on the ground that it was filed after the order for a consent election had become final and was improper under the rule on intervention.
• Whether or not a labor organization that has shown a substantial interest and timely applied before the holding of the election should be allowed to intervene and be voted for in a certification election.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, as invoked by the respondent judge, provides:

A person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.

The Court holds that this rule, meant for ordinary litigations, has no application to a certification proceeding, which is not a trial but a fact-finding investigation.

Section 7 of Commonwealth Act Number 103, which grants the industrial court broad powers, provides:

The Court shall have power to direct parties to be joined or stricken out from the proceedings, correct, amend or waive any error, defect or irregularity, whether in substance or in form.

This ample power supports the industrial court's authority to allow the intervention rather than deny it.

Section 12 of Republic Act Number 875, on the holding of a certification election, provides:

Whenever a petition for certification election is filed by a legitimate labor organization, it shall be the duty of the Court of Industrial Relations to order a certification election.

The Court reads this as making it mandatory to order an election participated in by a union that has shown it represents at least ten percent of the employees, where no election was held in the preceding twelve months.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. The rule on intervention applies only before or during a trial, but no trial was involved at all, because the parties had agreed on a consent election. A certification proceeding is not a litigation in the ordinary sense but a mere investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding character as to which union represents the genuine choice of the workers. The rule on intervention therefore has no application.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the intervention must be allowed. The industrial court had already verified at the hearing that the union had a substantial interest in the election. No certification election had been held during the twelve months prior to the union's request, and the union showed it represented at least ten percent of the employees. It was therefore mandatory to order a certification election participated in by the union as a contending union. The Court stressed that the paramount criterion is that the genuine choice of the workers be assured, and that all labor organizations which have shown a substantial interest at stake and have timely applied before the holding of the election should be allowed to intervene and be voted for. The Court distinguished the respondent judge's attempt to narrow the earlier ruling in Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan, holding that even had the other unions opposed the intervention, participation would have been allowed to carry out the fundamental objective of ascertaining by majority vote the workers' true choice.

Doctrine

A certification election is not a litigation but a non-adversary, fact-finding investigation of the workers' genuine choice of bargaining representative. The technical rule on intervention in ordinary civil actions, which permits intervention only before or during a trial, does not apply to it. The paramount criterion is that the genuine choice of the workers be assured, and every labor organization that has shown a substantial interest at stake and has timely applied to participate before the holding of the election should be allowed to intervene and be voted for. Where no certification election was held in the preceding twelve months and the union shows it represents at least ten percent of the employees, it is mandatory to order a certification election in which it participates. The industrial court is freed from the narrow constraints of technical procedure so that it may grant relief according to justice, equity, and the substantial merits of the case.

Disposition

The Court issued the writs of prohibition and certiorari, annulled and set aside the order of February 21, 1973, and directed the industrial court to allow the intervention and participation of the Federation of Free Workers, together with the two other competing unions, in the certification election to be conducted by the Department of Labor at the earliest practicable date.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a certification election is a fact-finding investigation, not a trial, so the rule on intervention does not apply, and every union with a substantial interest that timely applies must be allowed to participate. Examiners use this case to test the non-adversary nature of certification proceedings and the ten percent substantial interest requirement under the old labor law.