🎧 Case Brief Lecture

EMILIA B. HERNANDEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 142, MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENT.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1064. January 22, 1996 January 22, 1996

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Hernandez versus De Guzman

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed with the Supreme Court by Emilia B. Hernandez against Judge Salvador P. de Guzman of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati City. The complainant was the private offended party in a criminal case for illegal recruitment, and she charged the judge with bias because the trial dragged on for about four years and because she was awarded only 5,000 pesos in indemnity. The case matters because it fixes the administrative liability of a judge who fails to control postponements and to decide a case within the period fixed by the Rules — and it draws the line between a judge's judicial act, which cannot be attacked administratively, and a judge's administrative duty, which can.

Procedural History

The complaint was a letter-complaint dated August 9, 1993. The respondent judge filed his Verified Comment on November 16, 1993. By resolution dated December 8, 1993, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. On November 20, 1995, the First Division transferred the case to the Third Division for disposition. The Court then agreed with the recommendation dated February 28, 1994 of Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, which had been approved by the Court Administrator, and resolved the case in this Resolution.

Facts

Emilia Hernandez was the complainant in a criminal case for illegal recruitment against Yadollah Sichani. The case was received at Branch 142 on March 16, 1989. After trial, Judge de Guzman rendered a judgment of conviction dated February 23, 1993, imposing a fine of 5,000 pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and ordering the accused to indemnify Emilia Hernandez in the sum of 5,000 pesos.

Hernandez was not satisfied. In her letter-complaint she alleged that the judge prolonged the case by resetting it again and again until four years had passed, and that within those four years she would receive only 5,000 pesos. She claimed bias.

In his Verified Comment, the judge contended that the delay was attributable to Hernandez herself, because after her testimony she was allowed seven dates for her witnesses, the airport guards, to take the stand. He said that after the case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 28, 1992, he immediately prepared the decision, but promulgation was delayed because the complainant frequently assured his staff that the guards had agreed to testify if the case were reopened. As to the 5,000 pesos, he said the complainant herself testified that she suffered only 3,000 pesos in damages, and that he relied on a POEA order finding the respondent there liable to her for a refund of only 3,000 pesos. He also pointed out that under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, complaints against judges should be sworn to, whereas her complaint was not under oath at all.

Issues

  • Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for the delay in hearing and deciding the criminal case.
  • Whether or not the award of only 5,000 pesos as indemnity to the complainant may be questioned in an administrative complaint against the judge.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which the respondent invoked, provides:

Section 1. How instituted. — Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for judges by law or the Rules of Court.

This provision bears on the form of the complaint, but the Court did not dismiss the case on that ground; it proceeded to evaluate the merits.

The Court also relied on Circular Number 1 dated January 28, 1988, which provides that trial judges should adopt a strict policy on postponement to avoid unnecessary delays in court procedure, and which mandates faithful adherence to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. This circular supplies the standard of conduct the respondent judge failed to meet.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the charge of undue delay is meritorious. Although the respondent admitted that the delay was not attributable to him but to the complainant, he should not have allowed such frequent postponements to delay the trial. The Court reminded him that he should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala and should adopt a firm policy against improvident postponements. More importantly, he should follow the time limit set for deciding cases. The case was deemed submitted for decision on May 28, 1992, and therefore should have been decided by August 1992. The fact that the complainant repeatedly assured court personnel that the airport guards had agreed to testify if the case were reopened did not justify the delay in the rendition of the judgment. The Court noted that the judgment is dated February 23, 1993, but the date of actual promulgation does not appear on record, so reckoned from February 23, 1993 there was already a six-month delay. The Court added that the judge should not have delayed the preparation and promulgation of the judgment on the hearsay information, which in itself is flimsy, that the complainant wanted the delay to present additional witnesses — after all, by convicting the accused, he did not really need their testimonies anyway.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the matter of the grant of only 5,000 pesos as indemnity is judicial in nature. The complainant could have resorted to other available legal remedies to question the propriety of the award. An administrative complaint is not the proper forum for questioning the propriety of a decision or order perceived to be unjust or unreasonable.

Doctrine

A judge must at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala and must adopt a firm policy against improvident postponements, in keeping with Circular Number 1 dated January 28, 1988 and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. A judge must decide a case within the period fixed by the Rules; delay in the rendition and promulgation of judgment, even if caused by the parties' own assurances, is not justified and is administratively punishable. The propriety of a judicial award of damages or indemnity is a judicial matter that must be questioned through available legal remedies, not through an administrative complaint against the judge.

Disposition

The Court imposed a fine of 5,000 pesos on the respondent judge for the delay in hearing and deciding the criminal case, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a judge must remain in full control of his sala and must decide cases within the reglementary period; delay, even if caused by the complainant's own assurances, is no excuse. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a judicial act, which cannot be the subject of an administrative complaint, and an administrative duty, such as the prompt disposition of cases, which can.