CESAR T. ROSALES, ET. AL., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals (in CA-G.
R. No. 35519-R) ordering the Court of First Instance of Quezon
to approve the appeals in its Civil
Case No. 5483 and Land Registration Case No. N-250 previously disallowed by the
latter court; requiring the appellants Escuderos to
post an additional appeal bond of P120.00
in 10 days; and suspending the effectivity of the
pertinent decrees and titles (issued in connection with the land registration
case) until the Escuderos‘ joint appeal has been
finally resolved by the appellate court.

The basic facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are not controverted:

“In Civil Case 5483, CFI Quezon
Province, instituted on November 5, 1953, wherein the Rosaleses^[1]
are the plaintiffs and Arsenio Escudero,
the defendant, involving a pacto de retro
sale of P35,000.00 over four (4) parcels of land with a total area of 1,386
hectares, more or less, situated in the Municipality of Mulanay, Province of Quezon,
the Lower Court rendered judgment on November 19, 1962 in favor of the Rosaleses and against Escudero
declaring the pacto de retro sale and
the affidavit of consolidation dated July 12, 1951 as null and void and without
force and effect, absolving the Rosaleses from paying
defendant Escudero the liability of P35,000.00, the
consideration of the  pacto
de retro, without pronouncement as to costs (Record 68).

“On November 7, 1953, in
Land Registration Case N-250, the Rosaleses
filed an application for registration over 16 lots which included the lands
subject of the pacto de retro sale,
involved in Civil Case 5483 above cited. 
Spouses Arsenio Escudero
and Rosario Adap filed an opposition upon the ground
that the redemption period of the pacto de
retro sale had already expired on October 31, 1947 without any repurchase
having been made (Record 40).

“Upon the order of the Lower Court on March 1, 1954, the joint
trial of Civil Case 5483 and Land Registration Case N-250 was decreed (Record
42).  After a joint hearing of the two
cases, the Lower Court rendered a separate judgment in Land Registration Case
N-250, on November 21, 1962, adjudicating the pacto
de retro properties in favor of the Rosaleses
(Record 71).”

The records show that
copies of the decisions in both the civil and land registration cases, mailed
together in one envelope, were received by counsel for the Escuderos
on January 28, 1963.  On February 23,
1963, the Escuderos filed in the two cases a motion
for new trial, which motion was denied on March 7, 1963.  Notice of this denial order was received by
Atty. Ruben Roxas, counsel for the Escuderos, on April 8, 1963.

On April 10, 1963, a
messenger of Atty. Roxas filed in the Clerk’s office
(of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province),
for both cases, a notice of appeal and record on appeal.  The notice of appeal, which was incorporated
in the record on appeal, contained the following statement:

“Simultaneously with this Notice of Appeal, defendants in
Civil Case No. 5483 and oppositors in L. R. C. Case
No. N-250 have deposited with the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court the
amount of P60.00 as the Escuderos‘ appeal bond as
shown by O. R. No. H-3038791 dated April 10, 1963.” (p. 174, Rollo)

As
by order of January 26, 1965 the trial court disapproved their appeals for
being out of time, the Escuderos resorted to the
Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and mandamus.  And, upon proper showing that during
the pendency in the trial court of the motion for
approval of the appeals the corresponding decrees and certificates of title
over the properties subject of the proceeding were issued in favor of the Rosaleses, the Court of Appeals, at the instance of therein
petitioners, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the exercise by the Rosaleses of any act
of ownership of the same properties.

On October 15, 1965, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, as stated
at the beginning of this opinion. 
Motions for reconsideration of the decision were denied by resolutions
of February 9 and March 16, 1966.

The parties herein are agreed that the filing by the Escuderos on April 10, 1963 of the notice of appeal and record
on appeal was on time.  The present
petition against the ruling of the Court of Appeals approving the appeals,
however, was based mainly on two grounds: 
(1) the alleged failure of the Escuderos to
furnish herein petitioners with copy of the appeal bond; and (2) the invalidity
of the deposit of the appeal bond for P60.00, petitioners claiming that said bond was not only inadequate^[2]
but also that it was deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Quezon and not with the Clerk of Court, contrary to the requirement
of Section 3, Rule 41, of the old Rules of Court ^[3]
which is applicable to the case.

We find no error in the Court of Appeals’ overruling of the
allegation of lack of service of the appeal bond upon the petitioners.  As appeal bond in the two cases, the Escuderos made a cash deposit of P60.00 on April 10,
1963.  This was specifically alleged in
the record on appeal, of which the Rosaleses were
duly served with copy.  The inclusion of
the statement in the record on appeal, which put petitioners on notice of the
amount and date of filing of the appeal bond, constitutes sufficient compliance
with the rules.  For it may be observed
that Section 3 of the old Rule 41 simply required that said party be furnished
with the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal, and did not
prescribe any particular mode or manner in which the adverse party is to be
informed of the filing of the necessary papers. 
The rules could not have confined compliance therewith to the service of
separate or individual copies of the notices, but should have contemplated also
of notices placed together in a single pleading or instrument.  In fact, judicial cognizance may be taken of
the practice of incorporating the notice of appeal in the record on appeal as
part of said record, in which practice we see nothing objectionable.  Indeed, no practical benefit would be
attained in requiring individual and separate service to the adverse party of
the notice of appeal and the record on appeal. 
As this Court had previously ruled, the act of filing a record on appeal
is by itself eloquent indication of the party’s intention to appeal; thus,
although there was no proof that a notice of appeal had been filed, the appeal
was nevertheless allowed, upon proper showing that there was a record on appeal
already submitted to the court for approval.^[4]
It is true that in this case the statement or certification re­garding the
appeal bond was not entirely accurate as to the office where the bond was
filed.  Nonetheless, it cannot be denied
that the notification made in the record on appeal was adequate enough to
satisfy the purpose of the requirement, which is to inform and enable the
adverse party to object to the amount of the deposited bond and
accordingly guide the court into deciding whether or not the appeal is to be
allowed.^[5]

The primary issue in this
case actually lies on the effect of the deposit of P60.00, intended as appeal bond, with the
Provincial Treasurer of Quezon, petitioners claiming
that the deposit was irregular and defective and did not result in the
perfection of the appeals.  Respondents Escuderos, on the other hand, argue (a) that the deposit
with the Provincial Treasurer is equivalent to the filing of the appeal bond
with the Clerk of Court, since the Provincial Treasurer is the representative
of the National Treasurer to whom the Clerk of Court anyway would ultimately
deliver the funds he has collected; and (b) that the collection by the
Provincial Treasurer of only P60.00 as appeal bond for the two cases, instead
of P120.00, was an in­nocent
mistake that should not bar the appeal.

There is evidence on
record that on April 10, 1963, or prior to the ex­piration of the
period to appeal, which was April 12, 1963, a messenger of Atty. Roxas, carrying with him the sum of P120.00, travelled from Manila to Quezon
province to file the appeal with the trial court.  For one reason or another, while he was able
to file the record on appeal in the Clerk’s office, he was not able to deposit
the appeal bond and was directed instead by somebody in the said office to make
the payment to the Provincial Treasurer. 
The Deputy Provincial Treasurer accepted the payment, but only in the sum of P60.00, specifying in
the corresponding receipt issued to the payee (O. R. H-3038791) that it was
“for appeal bond deposit on Civil Case 5483 & Land Reg. Case No. N-250″.  The
receipt number, date of payment, and amount of deposit was not only annotated
on the court’s copy of the notice of appeal but also, appeared in the record on
appeal filed with the Clerk of Court and furnished to the adverse party.  In the circumstances, we hold that the appeal
in the two cases should have been allowed.

Considering that under
the Judiciary Act –

“All moneys accruing to the Government, in the Supreme Court,
in the Court of Appeals, and in the Courts of First Instance, including fees,
fines, forfeitures, costs; or other miscellaneous receipts, and all trust or
depository funds paid into the courts shall be received by the corresponding
clerk of court and in the absence of special provision, shall be paid by
him into the National Treasury to the credit of the proper account or fund
and under such regulations as shall be prescribed, by the Auditor General”
(Sec. 6, Republic Act 296; underlining supplied);

considering further that an appeal bond
is one such trust or depository fund that has to be transmitted to the National
Treasury; that the Provincial Treasurer is a person authorized to receive
payments; and that there is no showing that the deposit so made has not been
actually remitted to the National Treasury and credited to the proper account
or fund therefor, the deposit in question, made
within the reglementary period and duly annotated on
the records, can be considered in substantial compliance with Section 3 of Rule
41.

Of course, it is true that for the two cases the appeal bond
should be P120.00.  The objection,
however, to the allowance of the appeals on ground of insufficiency of the bond
could be met by the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Aquino
vs. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 824.  In that
case, a civil case and a land registration case, involving the same parties
represented by the same attorneys, were tried jointly.  Judgment in both cases having been rendered,
counsel for the losing party presented a notice of appeal, a joint record on
appeal, and an appeal bond for P60.00, which was deposited in the civil
case.  The bond in the registration case
was filed about two months thereafter. 
Granting certiorari against the trial court’s order allowing only the
appeal in the civil case, this Court said:

“But while we hold that there is no error of law committed by
the court a quo in dismissing the appeal in the registration
case, there are potent reasons why, in the exercise of its discretion, it
should have decreed otherwise.  One is
the fact that the civil case is entirely dependent upon the regis­tration case;
no recovery of possession can be decreed in favor of, and no damages can accrue
to, the plaintiff unless he is declared the owner of the property subject of both
cases.  When defendant, therefore,
questioned plaintiff’s right to the possession and to damages, he must have
meant to question plaintiff’s title to the property.  The other reason is the fact that as the two
cases were so inextricably related to each other, and they were tried jointly,
and only one joint record on appeal presented, appellant’s attorney or his
client or both may have overlooked the need of filing two bonds, or thought
that one was sufficient without the other. 
This constitutes an excusable oversight.

Petitioners belabor the point that, unlike in the case cited
above, there were two separate decisions of the trial court involved herein,
and that there were parties in the land registration proceeding who were not
included in the civil case.  We find no
significance in the distinction: 
precisely, it was held in the Aquino
case that the rendition of a single decision did not alter the fact that there
were actually two cases therein involved; and the opposition of the Escuderos in the land registration case was based on the pacto de retro contract and their
consolidation of ownership of the disputed lots, and the validity of these acts
were exactly the subject of the civil case. 
In short, between the petitioners and the Escuderos,
the controversial issues in both the civil and land registration cases are, if
not the same, at least inextricably related to each other.  We have here the situation that brought about
the ruling in the Aquino case.

Needless to state, there being a finding of excusable oversight
in the deposit of only P60.00 as appeal bond in the two cases, the Court of
Appeals’ order to the Escuderos to pay an additional
bond for P60.00 (not P120.00), is in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under
review is affirmed, with costs against the peti­tioners.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Cesar T. Rosales, Leon T. Rosales, Rizalina R.
Samson, Lolita T. Rosales, Filipina R. Cayabyab, Petria R. Moorehouse and Manuel
T. Rosales, brothers and sisters, and children of the deceased Atanacio Rosales and Fidela Tesalona, original owners of the properties in question.

^[2]
For two cases, appeal bond for P120.00 was necessary (Section 5, old Rule 41).

^[3]
“SEC. 3.  How
appeal is taken.  – Appeal
may be taken by serving upon
the adverse party and
filing with the trial court within thirty days from notice of
order or judgment a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal.  The time during which a motion
to set aside has been pending shall be deducted.” (Rule 41, old Rules of
Court; underlining ours)

^[4]
Lopez vs. Lopez, 77 Phil. 133; Pablo vs. Enage, 53 Phil. 328; Luengo vs.
Herrero, 17 Phil. 29.

^[5]
Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Castelo, 87
Phil. 714; also Phil. Resources Development Corp. vs. Narvasa, L-12803, February 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 414; Alkuino vs. Arrieta,
L-21538-40, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 458.