NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR RIZALINO LOPEZ (NOW PEDRO G. DUMOL), PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL 8TH DIVISION), HON.…

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Republic Act No.
5440 (as amended by RA No. 6038), in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
to review the Decision promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals, dated August
17, 1970, in CA-G.R. No. 45376-R, entitled “National Electrification
Administration versus Hon. Eloy B. Bello, et al.” denying the petition in said case, and
dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in connection therewith on June 3, 1970.

The undisputed facts follow: 
On June 14, 1965,
respondents Rural Power Corporation, Eusebio E. Ferrer,
Lourdes Sison, and Eduardo Ferrer
(hereinafter referred to as Rural Power) executed a Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA) in the sum of
P985,000.00 for the purpose of improving the former’s
services to the public.  On the same
date, Rural Power was required to execute two other real estate mortgages to
secure two other loans for the amounts of P98,000.00 and P81,000.00, but said
amounts were never released.  Of the
three deeds of mortgages, only the
first in the amount of P985,000.00 has been the object of implementation.

The mortgage deed provided for a “program of work”
divided into Phases A, B and C and pursuant thereto P68,000.00 was released on July 8, 1965, P247,000.00 on September 19, 1965, and P125,000.00
on January 16, 1966, with
deductions for expenses, interests, and insurance.  Among the conditions of the mortgage were
that the amount to be released to Rural Power would be utilized for the
“purposes therein specified subject to availability of funds”, and
“that the respondents shall adhere strictly with the program of work and
specifications attached to the deed”.

Due to alleged violations of the above-stated conditions,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on May 11, 1969 pursuant to the deed of
real estate mortgage for the amount of P985,000.00.  On May
11, 1969 the Sheriff of Alaminos, Pangasinan set the sale of the properties involved for
public auction.

On April 24, 1969,
Rural Power initiated Civil Case No. 14742 before the then Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan for Injunction, release of a
sum of money, cancellation of mortgages, and damages.  Respondent Trial Judge, Eloy
B. Bello, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
stopping the auction sale and subsequently decided in favor of Rural Power
after trial on the merits (Annex “G”).

On December 23, 1969,
petitioner corporation filed its notice of appeal and appeal bond.

On January 3, 1970,
petitioner filed its Record on Appeal. 
However, this was disapproved by respondent Judge in an Order issued on January 14, 1970 for alleged
non-compliance with Section 6 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and directed
petitioner to comply therewith and file an Amended Record on Appeal.

The Order in question, is quoted hereunder as follows:

“The record on appeal filed by the defendants was submitted to
this court for its approval on January
8, 1970.  Section 6, Rule 41
of the Revised Rules of Court referring to the form and contents of the record
on appeal provides in part as follows:

‘If an issue of fact is to be raised on appeal, the record on
appeal shall include by reference all the evidence, oral and documentary, taken
upon the issue involved.  The reference
shall specify the documentary evidence by the exhibit numbers or letters by which it was identified when admitted or
offered at the hearing, and the oral evidence by the names of the corresponding
witnesses.  If the whole oral and
documentary evidence in the case is to be included, a statement to that effect will be sufficient without mentioning the
names of the witnesses or the numbers or letters of exhibits.’

Going over the record on appeal this Court does not find any
compliance with the above-mentioned portion of Section 6, Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE,
the defendants-appellants are hereby ordered to submit an amended record on
appeal wherein the requirements above-mentioned appear”.  (Annex “G”)

On February 13, 1970,
petitioner filed an Amended Record on Appeal supplying the deficiencies with
the prayer that “all oral and documentary evidence presented in the
instant case be elevated together with all the records to the Court of
Appeals”.  Again, respondent Judge
disapproved the Amended Record on Appeal for alleged non-compliance with
Section 6 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court in an Order, dated March 4,
1970, reading in full as follows:

“In the order of this Court, dated January 14, 1970, this Court quoted Section 6,
Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court, declaring that the record on appeal does not
comply with the said Section 6, Rule 41, of the Revised Rules of Court.  Going over the amended record on appeal, this
Court still does not find compliance with the provision of Section 6, Rule 41,
of the Revised Rules of Court.

“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby disapproves the amended record
on appeal.

“SO ORDERED.” (Annex “C”)

Petitioner corporation did not file a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order of March 4, 1970.

On May 27, 1970,
petitioner instituted a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction before respondent Court of Appeals.  However, the Appellate Court ruled that the
failure of petitioner to ask respondent Judge to reconsider his Order of March 4, 1970 before resorting to the
remedies of Certiorari and Mandamus with preliminary injunction
was “fatal” to petitioner’s position (Annex “B”).

Hence, this petition.

The primordial issue is whether or not respondent Appellate Court
gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioner’s omission to move for
reconsideration before the Trial Court prior to filing a petition for certiorari
and mandamus was fatal to the petition. 
This issue would, in turn, hinge on the question of whether or not respondent Trial Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in disapproving petitioner’s Record on Appeal and the
subsequent Amended Record on Appeal.

We hold in the
affirmative for the following reasons:

First of all, respondent Trial Judge’s Order of January 14, 1970
as well as that of March 4, 1970 disapproving petitioner’s original and amended
Record on Appeal, respectively, for alleged non-compliance with Section 6 of
Rule 41 were both vague because they did not specify the requirements not
complied with nor the errors or additions that had to be corrected or
added.  As the Appellate Court had
observed “it is possible that the respondent (Judge) was referring to
deficiencies other than that specified in (the) order of January 14, 1970”.^[1]
Hence, petitioner cannot be faulted if its Amended Record on Appeal did not
meet the standards set by the Trial
Judge as there weren’t any.

Secondly, whatever defects the original Record on Appeal may have
contained had been cured in the Amended Record on Appeal by petitioner’s prayer
that all the documentary and oral evidence be elevated to the Appellate Court
as expressly provided for by Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. 
Therefore, respondent Judge’s disputed Order of March 4, 1970 (Annex
“C”) again disapproving the Amended Record on Appeal on the same
ground of alleged non-compliance with Section
6, Rule 41 was arbitrary and constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.  In
the eyes of the law, the two disputed Orders were patent nullities, thus
excepting the instant case from the general rule that before Certiorari
or Mandamus may be availed of petitioner must first file a Motion for
Reconsideration.^[2]
In other words, respondent Judge, in effect, deprived petitioner of its right
to appeal and any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, hence, making petitioner’s resort to the instant petition a
virtual necessity.  As was held in People v. Palacio,
108 Phil. 220, 223 (1960), a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed with
if under the circumstances, such as in the case at bar, it would have been
useless.

Third, petitioner is a government corporation performing
governmental functions pursuant to Republic Act No. 2717, as amended.  Public interest being involved, a Motion for Reconsideration need not be availed of.^[3]

Fourth, petitioner averred that time was of the essence because
respondents were in the process of executing the assailed judgment of the Trial
Court with precipitate haste, the enforcement of which would have impaired
petitioner corporation’s operations and funds. 
In Vivo vs. Cloribel, 18 SCRA 713 (1966), and
Bache and Co. (Phil). Inc., et al vs. Hon. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 836 (1971), this
Court held that a Motion for Reconsideration is no longer a prerequisite where there is urgent necessity and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.

Finally, to sustain Rural Power’s stand would be to put a premium
on procedural technicality, which should not be made to prevail over
petitioner’s substantive right to appeal. 
Considering the fact that the two Records on Appeal were totally
unopposed by Rural Power and that giving the appeal due course would not have
prejudiced its rights nor substantially affected the merits of the case, the
spirit of liberality which animates the Rules rather than strict technicality
would be more in keeping with the ends of justice.  As this Court, speaking through Justice
Moreland, in the case of Alonzo vs. Villamor, 16
Phil. 321 (1910), said:

“The error in this case is purely technical.  To take advantage of it rather than to cure
it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. 
Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff’s case smacks of skill rather
than right.  A litigation is not a game
of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle
art of movement and position entraps and destroys the other.  It is, rather, a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue, and
then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form
and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits.  Lawsuits, unlike duels are not to be won by
the rapier’s thrust.  Technicality when
it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice becomes its great hindrance
and enemy, and deserves scant consideration from the courts.  There are no vested rights in
technicalities.”

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Decision of respondent Appellate Court (former Special 8th Division), dated
August 17, 1970, is hereby annulled and the Regional Trial Court corresponding
to the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Lingayen Branch) is hereby directed to transmit the entire
original record of the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court (the Record on
Appeal having been eliminated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1] pp. 6-7, Decision, Court of Appeals.

^[2] Detective and Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Cloribel, 26 SCRA 255 (1969).

^[3] PALEA vs. PAL, 111 SCRA 215 (1982).