EDILBERTO ESGUERRA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OP FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, AND ASSISTANT FISCAL GREGORIO T. LANTIN, RESPONDENTS.

On January 31, 1952 an information was filed in the Manila Court of
First Instance accusing Edilberto Esguerra of bigamy for having married
Arsenia Yabut while his first marriage with Sabina Barcelona was still
subsisting.

Arraigned on February 13, 1953, he pleaded not guilty. Trial was set
for April 24, 1953; but on that date, due to non-appearance of a
prosecution witness (Arsenia Yabut) the case was postponed. Then it was
called on May 22, 1953, and on that day some evidence was taken;
however owing to the absence again of Arsenia Yabut the prosecution
prayed for continuance, which was granted, because the court was
informed there were reasonable grounds to believe Arsenia Yabut and
another vital witness were being hidden by parties interested in the
defendant’s acquittal.

On May 29, 1953 the case was again slated for trial but upon request
of the defendant, who alleged illness and inability to attend for about
3 months a continuance was directed.

On July 20, 1953 the case was called; but upon learning that the two
wives had not been served with subpoenas because they were hidding or
being hidden, the court postponed the hearing and ordered the arrest of
said witnesses.

Seized and brought before the judge, Arsenia Yabut explained that she had changed to a new address; wherefore she was set free.

Thereafter the case was newly scheduled for March 31, 1954; but the
prosecution was again unable to present said Arsenia Yabut, because
when last taken before the judge, she deliberately gave a fictitious
address to forestall her being summoned and other consequence.

For the fifth time the trial judge ordered postponement

This exhausted defendant’s patience; and having objected to every
postponement, except the third, he promptly started these proceedings
in April 1954 pleading for an order to require the court of first
instance to dismiss the criminal information against him. He invoked
his constitutional right to speedy trial, as applied in Conde vs.
Rivera, 45 Phil., 650 and other decisions of this court.^[1]

The fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial is a distinct
feature of the American system of criminal procedure after which our
own is patterned. Many states of the Union have approved laws
implementing it, by fixing definite periods for trial, the expiration
of which constitutes prima facie a violation of defendant’s
basic right to speedy trial and entitles him to demand dismissal of the
information. Here no such period has been fixed by the Legislative
Department; yet we may apply the unquestionable judicial opinion that
speedy trial means “one that can be had as soon after indictment as the
prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for it, trial * * *
free from vexations, capricious and oppressive delays” [Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court (1952) Ed. Vol. II p. 7<87 citing cases]. Such
right is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not
preclude the rights of public justice. (Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil., 215.)

From the pleadings and the oral argument it appears that the several
postponements of which the petitioner complains were due to the absence
of material witnesses for the prosecution, who were hiding or were
being hidden by friends of the accused, probably with his knowledge or
connivance. Such being the situation, the law will not help him defeat
itself. The constitutional privilege was never intended as furnishing a
technical means for escaping trial. (State vs. Miller, 129 Pac, 1100.)

Construing statutes in furtherance of defendant’s right to speedy
trial, the courts are unanimous in that he will not be allowed to
complain if he keeps the State witnesses away.

“The defendant cannot be discharged under such
statutes where he kept the state’s witness out of the way.”
Commonwealth ex rel. Haggerty vs. Superintendent of Philadelphia county
Prison, 4 Brewst. (Pa.) 320. Respublica vs. Arnold, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 263.

In the cast; of Commonwealth vs. Haggerty, supra,
the court said: “This defendant has voluntarily delayed his trial. He
has succeeded in carrying off all the commonwealth’s witnesses.
Possibly when he did this, he had no intention of securing the present
result. Like the defendants in Respublica vs. Arnold, 3 Yeats
(Yeates [Pa.]) 263, he doubtless supposed that if he stripped the
commonwealth of her weapons, the victory would of necessity be with
him. He is not the first artificer who has been caught in his own
toils, and by the very means employed to defeat justice he finds
himself confounded. Upon principle and upon authority, therefore, there
is no escape for such a prisoner.”

In the case of Clark vs.
Commonwealth, 29 Pa. (5 Casey) 129, Mr. Justice Woodward said: “The
statute was made to restrain the malice and oppression of prosecutors,
and to relieve wrongful imprisonment; not to embarass the
administration of the criminal law; not to relieve righteous
imprisonment, and to defeat public justice.” (Ex parte Morgan, M. D.
[1929] 224 N. W., p. 210.)

And in Massachussetts it was held that where a prosecution witness
avoids or is enticed away and such avoidance is collusive, the accused
can not complain of unconstitutional delay even if such avoidance or
enticement was not caused by him. (Note at page 444, 16 C. J.)

Indeed, had the respondent judge denied postponement and dismissed
the information for insufficiency of evidence, it would have permitted
the case to go by default, and would deserve the same criticism leveled
at judges granting suits for annulment of marriage upon defendant’s
absence or even connivance. Because the dismissal of the bigamy charge
would have enabled herein petitioner to live with two wives—if he has
really married twice. And the situation would all the more be
scandalous if it is borne in mind that accused is a member of the Bar
and the alleged second wife, elusive and reluctant, is an applicant for
admission to the Bar Examinations.^[2]

Hence it would seem there is no reason to blame His Honor for
sanctioning a few continuances to enable the State to get hold of its
principal witnesses.

The petitioner emphasizes the circumstance that most postponements had been ordered motu proprio
by the respondent judge. On this point, we find the following statement
of principles about statutes implementing defendant’s right to speedy
trial:

“Some courts hold that the statutes operate only
when there is some laches on the part of the prosecution, and that the
accused is not entitled to his discharge if the delay is cause by
continuances made by the court on its own motion.” (C. J. S. Vol. 22,
p. 725).

And in State vs. Pierson, 123 S. W. (2d) 151, the Supreme Court of Missouri explained:

“Mindful of the rights of the accused, and also of
those of the public, this court has held that, in considering whether a
defendant is entitled to a discharge under these statutes, the bar cannot be invoked where the continuances were made by the court on its own motion;
and, if the phrase ‘on its own motion’ were not a sufficient statement
of the reason for same, the presumption would nevertheless obtain that
the state was in no manner responsible for the delay in the trial thus
occasioned. State vs. Marshall, 115 Mo. 383, 22 S. W. 452
(Italics ours) (See also State vs. Nelson; 279 S. W., 401; Ex p.
Meadows, 112 Pac. [2nd] 419).

Wherefore upon the showing made, we do not feel justified to declare
that in this instance there was vexatious 6r oppressive delay, in
violation of the Constitution. However it is hoped that the Government
agencies will hereafter take a more active interest in the matter, the
prosecution availing itself if necessary, of the sections concerning
“bail to secure appearance of witness of prosecution” and/or the
conditional examination of such witness (Rule 115, sections 6 and 7).

The petition will be denied, with costs. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

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^[1] Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil., 215; Kalaw vs. Apostol, 64 Phil., 852.

^[2] The Fiscal may take note of this to the end of
securing her appearance, and for other purposes. He is also requested
to inform this Court about the outcome of the bigamy charge.