BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR AND MARIANO LEDESMA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGA…

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to annul certain orders of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the
action for unfair labor practice pending before it on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition, this Court
ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
without bond.

The action in question was—upon complaint of
the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU), Pacifico
Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran—filed
by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein
petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary
of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma, the
Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin
Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor
practice by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau
of Printing, particularly the members of the complaining association,
in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating
in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage
them from pursuing their union activities.

Answering the
complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and
Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed
to them and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other
things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano
Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an
administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service
rules and regulations; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an
industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of
the Republic performing governmental functions. For relief, they prayed
that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before
the case could be heard, petitioners filed an “Omnibus Motion” asking
for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by
them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the
merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The
motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the
Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the
jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the
Bureau of Printing are “exclusively proprietary in nature” and,
consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this
order having been also denied by the court en banc, the petitioners brought the case to this court through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

We find the petition to be meritorious.

The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the
Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of
the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is “charged with the
execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to
those processes, required by the National Government and such other
work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of
the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake * * *.” (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate
existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the
Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is obviously, not
engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.

It
is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of
Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid
for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these
facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are “exclusively
proprietary in nature.” Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done
only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm.
Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation
may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the
Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be
the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly
proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for
private persons, we find that such work is done upon request, as
distinguished from those solicited, and only “as the requirements of
Government work will permit” (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and “upon
terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the
Department Head” (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the
uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works consist
of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government
officials, and for printing of checks of private banking institutions.
On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the Bureau
of Printing is authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank checks,
only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official
documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done,
in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per cent, and
in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau
does not include profit, because it is not allowed to make any.
Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private
printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial
or business concern. The additional work it executes for private
parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work
may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the
employees performing said proprietary function are separate and
distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.

From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial
Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of
Printing, and is thus devoid of, any authority to take cognizance of
the case. This Court has already held in a long line of decisions that
the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the
complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or
corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, not an
industrial or business organization. This is so because the Industrial
Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to
govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and
occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees.
(University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., 107 Phil., 848; University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil., 439; La Consolacion College vs. CIR, 107 Phil., 636; See also the cases cited therein.)

Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or
juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1,
Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if
it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that
the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its
objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 79 Phil., 819; 45 Off. Gaz., [7] 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers’ Union, et al., 102 Phil., 789.)

The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing
of administrative charges against some officers of the respondent
Bureau of Printing Employees’ Association by the Acting Secretary of
General Services. Said administrative charges are for insubordination,
grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by
inciting the employees of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their
jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the
law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute
and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For
the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before
it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials
having to do with the discipline of government employees under them,
would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said
officials.

Wherefore, the petition for a writ of prohibition
is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint
for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with
costs against respondents other than the respondent court.

Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J. B. L., J., concurs in the result.