THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIA ABANILLA AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ISABELA, DEFENDANTS, MARIA ABANILLA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court on a pure question
of law from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, 1st Judicial District, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 1308, ordering the cancellation of Free Patent No. V-2317 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 issued
in favor of defendant-appellant.

Plaintiff-appellee (Director of Lands)
in his complaint alleged that defendant-appellant (Maria Abanilla)
had, through fraudulent means, secured a free patent and an original
certificate of title over a public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62,
situated in Roxas, Isabela;
that the said free patent and original certificate of title included portions of land occupied by Esteban
Esquivel and Wilson Nuesa; and that the portion occupied by Wilson Nuesa was sold to him
by Dominador Cullanan, who also bought the same from defendant-appellant Abanilla
herself.

Defendant-appellant Abanilla in her
answer alleged that her,
application for a free patent over a parcel of public land, known as Lot No.
5798, Pls-62, and the subsequent issuance of the original certificate of title, were lawful, since the occupancy
of Esteban Esquivel of the
portion claimed by him of Lot No. 5798,
Pls-62, was merely tolerated by her and was never
adverse, and Wilson Nuesa’s occupancy never affected
her right over the portion he claims, because the sale made by her to Dominador Cullanan was void ab initio.

The trial court entered a judgment, declaring Free Patent No. V-2317 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title
No. P-2317 null
and void; ordering the Director of Lands to cancel said patent and issue
another patent in favor of Maria Abanilla, excluding
the respective portions of land
possessed by Esteban Esquivel and Wilson Nuesa; and
ordering Maria Abanilla to surrender to the Register
of Deeds of Isabela Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723, who
was thereby ordered to cancel the same (p. 16, CFI rec.).

This being an appeal on question of law exclusively, We therefore consider as conclusive the following findings
of fact made by the trial court:

“The evidence shows that on April 5, 1949, Maria Abanilla applied for Free Patent over a public land
known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, situated in Roxas, Isabela; That on March 19, 1952, Esteban Esquivel
having discovered that the said Free Patent Application included a portion of
land occupied by him since before the
early part of 1949, registered his opposition therein and asked the Bureau of
Lands to investigate the matter (Exh. ‘G’); that on May 12, 1952, Dominador
Cullanan also registered his opposition to the
said Free Patent Application upon the ground that it included a portion of the land sold to him by Maria Abanilla
by virtue of a public document dated April 20,
1950 (Exh. ‘J’); that on July 3, 1952, for and in con­sideration of
the sum of P1,000.00, Dominador Cullanan
sold the same portion of land to Wilson Nuesa by virtue of a public instrument notarized before the Municipal Judge of Roxas (Exh. ‘K’); that pursuant
to the protest filed by Esteban
Esquivel, the Director of Lands, on March 29, 1952, ordered the investigation of said
protest (Exh. ‘E’); that by reason of the acquisition of the same land hold­ing
of Dominador Cullanan by
Wilson Nuesa, the latter intervened in the
Administrative Investigation of the land conflict between Esteban Esquivel and
Maria Abanilla, as claimant-intervenor
(Exh. ‘I’); that while the aforesaid administrative
case was pending investigation by the Fact Finding Committee composed of
representatives of the Bureau of Lands and the Land Settlement and Development
Corporation (LASEDECO), Maria Abanilla, on February
11, 1953, secured the issuance of Free Patent No. V-2317 in her name covering
the entire Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, with an area of 2.1664 hectares; that by
virtue of the said patent, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2723 was
issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Isabela
on June 16, 1953 (Exh. ‘1’); that on June 25, 1953, the Fact Finding
Committee heard the administrative case aforesaid and submitted its report on July
31, 1953, sustain­ing the ‘claim of preferential right’ of Esteban
Esquivel, and that of Claimant-Intervenor Wilson Nuesa and recommending the annul­ment of Patent No. P-2317, as well as the
Original Certificate of Title
No. P-2723 in the name of
Maria Abanilla
insofar as the portions claimed by them are concerned (Exh.
‘1’); that acting upon the said report the Director of Lands
rendered a decision holding that Maria Abanilla acted
in bad faith and procured the issuance of the aforesaid patent thru mispresentation and
directing that appropriate steps be taken to institute court action for
the voidance and cancellation of Patent No. V-2317 and the issuance of another
patent for the correct area adjudicated
to her in the said decision, excluding therefrom the
portions claimed by Nuesa and Esquivel (Exh. ‘N’); that Maria Abanilla
filed a motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 1954 (Exh.’O‘); to set aside the aforesaid decision, and
on August 30, 1956,
the motion for reconsideration was denied by the Director of Lands (Exh. ‘P’), that upon the denial of her motion she filed a second motion for
reconsideration dated September 28,
1956 (Exh. ‘Q’), which was similarly
denied by the Director of Lands in his Order dated October 19, 1956 (Exh.
‘R’); that on November 19, 1956, she filed a notice of appeal against
the decision of the Director of Lands and asked that the same be reviewed and reversed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Exh.
‘S’); that on January 16, 1958, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands appealed from and
dismissed the appeal; and that on August 27, 1958 the Secretary denied
the motion for reconsideration to set aside his confirmatory deci­sion (Exh. ‘U’).

“That on November 5, 1956, Maria Abanilla filed an action with this
Court against Esteban Esquivel, Wilson Nuesa and
three others for the recovery of
possession of the portions of land involved
in the administrative case between them in the land department; that after due trial, the Court rendered a decision in
favor of the defendants Wilson Nuesa and Esteban
Esquivel and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint; that Maria Abanilla brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision appealed from, on June 14, 1960
(Exh. ‘V’); that on August 11, 1959, the Director of Lands filed this present case to annul the patent and
original certificate of title issued to
Maria Abanilla” (pp. 13-14, CFI rec.).

The case is now before this Court on a pure question of law: Whether
the patent and original certificate of title issued by virtue of the said
patent can still be cancelled despite the lapse of six (6) years and six (6)
months from their issuance.

Defendant-appellant now claimed that the lower court erred: [1]
in ordering the cancellation of both Free Patent No. V-2317 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2327 of the
Register of Deeds of Isabela, both in the name of
Maria Abanilla; and [2] in not dismissing the action considering that a period of six (6) years and six (6) months had already elapsed
from February 11, 1953 when the land patent was issued, to August 11,
1959 when the present action was instituted in the trial court (pp. 48-49,
rec.).

WE find that the trial court did not commit either of the
assigned errors.

It should be noted that, pursuant to explicit and repeated
averments in the complaint, defendant-appellant Maria Abanilla
had acted in bad faith, with full knowledge of the factual background of the
case, particularly of the public, continuous and adverse possession of Esteban Esquivel at the time
she applied for patent over the land in question, and up to
the time she secured the issuance of an original certificate of title over the
said land. The fact that Maria Abanilla acted
fraudulently in securing patent No. V-2317
and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 was clearly and definitely
established in the decision of the Director of Lands
(Exh. ‘N’), where it was held
that Maria Abanilla acted in bad faith and procured
the issuance
of the aforesaid patent thru
misrepre­sentation and directed that appropriate steps be taken to institute a court
action for the voidance and cancellation of Patent No. V-2317 and the issuance of another patent for the correct area adjudicated to her in the said decision, excluding therefrom the portions claimed by Nuesa
and Esqui­vel. Appellant Maria Abanilla even exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now Minister of Natural Resources) [Exh. ‘S’], who affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands [Exh. ‘U’].

This Court held in the case of Eusebio
vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin (L-21 519, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 569) that the
factual findings of the Director of Lands, approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, are conclusive in the absence of proof of
fraud, imposition, error or abuse of discretion.

This Court reiterated said principle in Ramirez vs. Court of
Appeals (L-23591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297).

In the previous case filed by Abanilla
herself against the same claimants Esquivel and Nuesa,
decided on June 14, 1960,
the Court of Appeals, speaking thru then CA Justice, later Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court, Conrado Sanchez, concurred in by
then CA Justices Natividad and Angeles, both of whom
were promoted as Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, found:

“xx So that, as the case now stands, the
dispute solely is between appellant Maria Abanilla,
on the one hand, and appellees Esteban Esquivel and
Wilson Nuesa, on the other.

“On April 5, 1949, appel­lant Maria Abanilla
filed with the
Bureau
of Lands an application for free patent over Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, aforesaid.

“On March 19, 1952,
appellee Esteban Esquivel registered his opposition
to appellant’s application upon the ground that the same included a portion
of land — ­circumscribed by the letters C, D, G and H of the sketch shown in Exhibit 5 — which pertained to said appellee.

“On May 12,
1952, Dominador Cullanan
opposed appellant’s application upon the averment that the same also covered an
area — designated in the sketch set forth in Exhibit 5 by the letters A, B, E and F — which was sold to him by the very same applicant Maria Abanilla.
In view of the fact that Dominador Cullanan had since conveyed his holding to appellee Wilson Nuesa, the latter
intervened in the proceedings.

“On February 11, 1953,
while the protests heretofore mentioned were pending investigation, Free Patent
No. V-2317, covering the entire Lot No. 5798, PLs-62, with an area of 2.1664
hectares, was issued
in the name of appellant Maria Abanilla.

“On June 16, 1953,
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 covering the same land
was issued by the Register of Deeds of Isa­bela to
said Maria Abanilla.

“On June 25, 1953, the fact-finding committee of the Bureau of Lands and the Land
Settlement and
Development Corporation — ­obviously
unaware of the prior issuance of a
patent and title over the land — opened hear­ings on the protests of appellee Esquivel, and Cullanan
who was substituted by appellee Wilson Nuesa.

“On March 20,
1954, decision was rendered
by the Director of Lands holding that applicant Maria Abanilla was guilty of bad faith and that she procured the free patent over the land thru misrepresentation,
and stating that steps would
be taken to institute the
necessary court action for the cancellation of Patent No. V-2317 and the
issuance to Maria Abanilla of another patent for the
correct area adjudged to her in said decision, that
is, excluding the portions claimed by
Esquivel and Nuesa.

“On August 30,
1956, the motion for reconsideration filed by appellant Maria Aba­nilla was, denied by the Direc­tor of Lands.

“On October 19, 1956, appellant’s second motion for
reconsideration was similarly denied.

“On November 5, 1956, appellant started the present suit.

“It subsequently developed that on November 22, 1956,
appellant perfected an appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands
aforesaid to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.

“On January 16, 1958, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources affirmed in toto the decision
of the. Director of Lands.

“On August 27, 1958, the said Secretary denied appellant’s
motion to reconsider the con­firmatory decision.

“We will take up the case piecemeal.

“Appellee Esteban Esquivel, as
aforesaid, claimed the portion inclosed by corners C,
D, G and H in the sketch appearing in Exhibit 5. The evidence
shows that he first entered that tend in 1949 when the same was still covered
with forest. He cleared and levelled the same.
Since then, his occupancy was open, continuous and without molestation or interference
from anyone, much less from appellant. He introduced improvements thereon,
i.e.; his house, an annex thereto for restaurant and store purposes, a pumpwell, and a fence around the premises.

“Appellant claims that this portion of the land, together with
a house used as a shed for drying leaf tobacco, was ceded by her in 1952 to
Esquivel on a temporary basis as the latter had no place to live in; that one
time she sent her son to cut bamboos behind that house but Esquivel objected
and claimed that he owned the land and forthwith told appellant’s son to get out therefrom;
and that she requested Esquivel to pay P30.00 for the use of the lot, and
P20.00 for the use and occupa­tion of
the house.

“Apart from the fact that the foregoing version runs counter
to the decision of the Director of Lands which was confirmed by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the improbability of the same is quite apparent. If
appellant’s claim were true, it is
strange that no attempt was ever made by her to
promptly oust Esquivel from the land. Indeed, if at any time appellant ever
asserted that the portion occupied
by Esquivel was part of the land
applied for by her and that she made known this fact to Esquivel, the latter,
doubtless, would not have placed valuable improvements
thereon. That he did, is indicative of the fact that nobody ever challenged his
occupancy thereof.

“On the defense of appellee Wilson Nuesa, we find that on April 20, 1950, in consideration of
P500.00, appellant Maria Abanilla executed in favor
of Dominador Cullanan a
deed of sale covering the portion herein-before described. In that deed,
Exhibit 1, appellant warranted that she was the absolute owner of the portion
sold, the same being her share of the conjugal partnership with her late husband Donato Pilar. She never mentioned in that document that said
property was part of the public domain which, on April 5, 1949, she previously applied for under a free patent. Of courses, in court she tried to avoid the effects of
this writing. When confronted with her thumbmark
thereon, she stated in varying terms that she ‘Probably’ executed that
document, or that ‘I do not know whether that is my thumbmark,’
or that ‘I doubt if I impressed my thumbmark.’ The
obvious weakness of this explanation prevents us from accepting the same. Exhibit
1 is a notarial document. A rule so well settled as
to require citation of authorities is that which says that oral evidence to
overcome a notarial document must be clear,
convincing and beyond a mere preponderance. Here, appellant’s evidence — her
sole testimony — is notches below the legal yardstick.

“Alternatively, appellant states that the deed, Exhibit 1, is
null and void because the subject thereof is public land which is ‘beyond the
commerce of man. The sale was executed before the order for the issuance
of the patent in her favor. The same could, therefore, be treated as a
disposition of her rights as a free patent applicant which is sanctioned by
law. In pari mate­ria:
Gabon, et al. vs. Amboy, et al., CA-G.R. No. 20556-R, July 22, 1959.

“Appellee Wilson Nuesa
acquired the rights of Dominador Cullanan
to the portion sold to the latter by appellant under the deeds of sale,
Exhibits 2 and 4. Neither Dominador Cullanan nor Wilson Nuesa was
ever disturbed in their possession of said land.

“It will be observed, however, that upon examination of the
sketch in Exhibit 5, the land acquired from appellant by Cullanan
and subsequently sold to Nuesa included the strip of
land in the actual possession of Esteban Esqui­vel. As a result of the
investiga­tion of the protests against appellant’s application, Nuesa recognized the rights of Esquivel to the portion
occupied by him. So that no quarrel exists as between Esquivel, on the one hand, and Nuesa, on the other.

“We do not believe that appellant has any lawful claim against
appellee Wilson Nuesa. The
portion of land here involved was sold by appellant herself as her own private property. She cannot now turn back and say that said portion is public
land. Here, the matter is exclusively between her and Wilson Nuesa, her vendee’s successor-in-interest. The government
is not involved. As against appellee Wilson Nuesa, therefore, appellant is in estoppel. Section 68(a), Rule
123, Rules of Court; Article 1431 and 1434, Civil Code; Llacer
vs. Muñoz de Bustillos, et
al., 12 Phil. 328, 334.

“Furthermore, assuming
that the area sold by appellant to Cullanan was
public land, the free patent in favor of the former cannot be used as a weapon to oust appellee Wilson Nuesa — Cullanan’s vendee — from that land. In the same way, said
free patent did not give appellant protection against the adverse claim of
Esquivel. She knew or was charged with knowledge, of Esquivel’s actual
possession of the portion claimed by him. And, the patent in her favor is in
fraud of the rights of both Nuesa and Esquivel. Accordingly,
she must respect the rights of the two to their respective holdings.

“It would not help appellant any to say that the Director of
Lands was without jurisdiction in sustaining the claims afore­said. For, said
adverse claims were filed long before the patent was issued. As we have
heretofore intimated, that patent literally passed thru the backdoor.

“The following from Acot et al. vs. Kempis, et al., 55 Off. Gaz., No. 16, pp.
2907, 2912, is illuminating:

“‘We start with the premise, that appellant acquired the
patent and Torrens title through fraud. Appellant clings
to’ the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. But pierc­ing the shard of his paper title, we find that appellant bas no equitable right to the possession of the land
covered thereby. He cannot use that title as a shield to perpetuate fraud. Our reason is that no amount of legal tech­nicality may
serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. Fraus
et jus nunguam cohabitant.’

“WHEREFORE, finding that the decision appealed from is in con­formity
with the facts and the law, the same is
hereby affirmed.”

Said decision became final and executory
on July 18, 1960.

Therefore, it is beyond question that fraud was committed by
Maria Abanilla in securing her patent and original
certificate of title over a public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62,
situated in Roxas, Isabela.

In this regard the
controlling provisions of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141, as amended),
reads:

“Sec. 90. Every application filed
under the provisions of this Act shall be made under oath and shall set forth:

xx                  xx                     xx

“(g)  Whether all or part of the land is occupied
or cultivated or improved, and
by whom, giving his post-office address, and whether the land has been
occupied or cultivated or improved by the applicant or his ascendant, the date when the possession and cultivation
began, and a description of the improve­ments made, accompanying satisfactory
evidence of the relationship of the applicant with the ascend­ant, and of the
death of the latter and the descend­ants left by him, in case it is alleged that he occupied and cultivated
the land first; or whether there are indications of its having been
occupied, cultivated or improved entirely or partially, and if so, in what
such indica­tions consist, whether he has made investigations as to when and
by whom such improvements were made, and if so, how such inves­tigations
were made and what was the result there­of; or whether the land is not
occupied, improved or cultivated either entirely or partially, and there
are no indications of it having ever been occupied, or cultivated, and in this
case, what is the condition of the land” (underscoring supplied).

“Sec. 91. The statements made in
the application shall be considered as essential condition and parts of any
concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any
false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying
the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of
the material facts set, forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or
permit ranted. xx” (underlining supplied).

In the light of the above-quoted provisions, defendant-appellant
Maria Abanilla
cannot use her title as a shield to perpetuate fraud.
“No amount of legal technicality may
serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. Fraus et just numquam cohabitant” (Acot,
et al. vs. Kempis, et al., supra).

Section 91 of the C.A. No. 141, as amended, expressly provides
that any false statement in the application, which is an essential condition
of the patent
or title, “shall ipso facto produce the can­cellation of
the concession, title, or permit granted.”

Defendant-appellant clings to the legal fiction of
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. She claimed that the lower court erred in
not dismissing the action considering that a period of six years and six months had already elapsed when the
present action, was instituted, in view of the line of decisions of this Court
sustaining the indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued in pursuance of
a public land patent.

The doctrine in Heirs of Carle, Sumail,
and other cases cited by the appellant regarding the indefeasibility of title
issued pursuant to a free patent one year after its issuance does not apply to a grant tainted with fraud and
secured through mis­representation, such as the free patent invoked in this
case, since said grant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. As We held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog
(L-15398,
Dec. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938):

“We are in
accord with appellant’s contention that Act 496 is not intended to shield fraud
and that registration thereunder merely confirms
title but does not vest any, when there is none, because registration under the Torrens System
is not a mode of acquiring ownership.”

Furthermore, appellant Maria Abanilla
cannot pretend that her title has become indefeasible because no petition for
review thereof was filed within one year from its issuance, since proceed­ings
for the review of her patent was actually pending before and after the issuance
of appellant’s torrens title. According
to the findings of fact of the trial court, the patent of Maria Abanilla was under administrative investigation by the office of the appellee Director of Lands at the time she obtained
her torrens title pursuant thereto (Exhs. G, H, and I), and that the decision of the appellee ordering the cancellation of appil­lant’s
patent on the ground of fraud was rendered on March 20, 1954 (Exh. N), or less than a year from the issuance
of her torrens title on June
16, 1953 (Exh. I). It was also less than a year from the issuance of said torrens title that appellant, on May 5, 1954, filed
a motion for the reconsideration of said
decision of the Director of Lands (Exh. O),
which motion for reconsideration was denied on August 30, 1956 (Exh. P), from which denial appel­lant Abanilla
filed a second motion for reconsideration (Exh. Q),
and when said motion for reconsidera­tion was likewise denied (Exh. R), appellant Abanilla even
appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (Exh. S), who,
however, affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands ordering the cancellation of her patent.

In the previous action aforecited,
between herein appellant Maria Abanilla and the other
parties claimants Esteban Esquivel, Magno Velayo, Sotero Nuesa, Wilson Nuesa and Teofilo Nobleza of the same land
in question wherein appellant Abanilla sought to use
her torrens title as basis to recover portions of
said land from the defendants (Maria Abanilla vs.
Esteban Esquivel, et al., No. 22660-R, 57 O.G. No. 28, pp. 5104-5108, June 14,
1960), the Court of Appeals, speaking through the Honorable Conrado
V. Sanchez, expressly found appellant’s free patent to have been obtained
“in fraud of the rights” of the other private parties claimants
thereto, so that to hold that such patent, which “literally passed through
the backdoor,” cannot be used “as a shield to perpetrate a
fraud” (Exh. V, p. 39, Folder
of Exhibits; p. 73, rec.).

In Republic vs. Animas (L-37682, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 499),
petitioner Director of Lands
sought the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, dismissing the complaint instituted by the said
Director of Lands, to declare null and void a free patent and the original certificate of title based
thereon, which was fraudulently secured. WE
hereby quote pertinent portions thereof:

“The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol
was never in possession of the property prior to his filing the appli­cation,
contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant must have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at
least 30 years; xx         x.

“The above alleged circum­stances are indicative of fraud in the
filing of the application and obtaining title to the land, and if proven would
override re­spondent Judge’s order dismissing the case without hearing. The
misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating
the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of
the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law, xx         x.

“A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered
void if it is pro­cured through
fraud, as when a person applies for regis­tration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of
disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with
the conditions imposed by law
is a ground for holding such title void (Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 71, 79-80; italics supplied). The lapse of the one
year period with­in which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for
to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title
had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height
of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in secur­ing title. (J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398, December 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 938 page 38)” [underlining supplied].

This Court, in the same case, further held that prescription of
action to review a title after the lapse of one year from its issuance under Section 38 of
Act 496; cannot
be invoked against the State, since under paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the Civil Code, prescription
does not run against the State, and We quote:

“Considering that it is the State that is seeking the
cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has not
become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the State. A
title founded on fraud may be cancelled, not­withstanding the lapse of one year
from the issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Soli­citor General, x x x.”

Even granting that the Director of Lands can no longer question
the validity of a torrens
title after the lapse of one year from its registration under Section 38 of Act
496, still appellant Maria Abanilla is estopped from claiming that this action has already
prescribed. The estab­lished facts on the record of the administrative case in
the Lands Department involving the same subject
matter in
this case show that defendant
Maria Abanilla even before the grant of the subject
patent in
her favor had allowed
herself to submit to an administrative investigation of this case when she
appeared on one occasion in the course thereof and requested for the post­ponement
of the same on the ground that she desired to settle the case amicably. Thereafter,
she pursued her alleged right to the patent by exhausting all her administrative remedies in the Lands Department. Appellant
Maria Abanilla is now estopped
from claiming that this action had already prescribed, for the simple reason
that she can be considered an instrumental party in the delay in the filing of
the instant
action (p. 26, rec.).

In Cebedo vs. Director of Lands (2 SCRA
25), this Honorable Court held that “it is not only the right but the duty
of the Director of Lands to conduct investigation to determine whether steps
should be taken in the proper court for the annulment of the title or titles
theretofore issued, and to file
the corresponding court action for the reversion of the properties to the
State, if the facts disclosed in the course of the investigation so warrant.”

It was in pursuance of the above and similar rulings of this Court that the appellee Director of Lands filed the present action for cancellation
of Abanilla’s patent and title over the land in
question.

WHEREFORE, FINDING
THAT THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FACTS AND THE
LAW, THE SAME IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Aquino, Concepcion,
Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin,
JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.

Abad Santos, J., abroad.