PRIMITIVO LOVINA AND NELLY MONTILLA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES VS. HON. FLORENCIO MORENO AND BENJAMIN YONZON, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal from a decision of Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch X), in its Civil Case No. 41639, enjoining the Secretary
of Public Worlds and Communications from causing the removal of certain
dams and dikes in a fishpond owned by Primitivo and Nelly Lovina in the
Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, covered by T.C.T. No.
15905.

The case started by a petition of numerous residents of the said
municipality to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
complaining that appellees had blocked the “Sapang Bulati”, a navigable
river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be
ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After
notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the
constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his
decision dated 11 August 1959, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina
to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary
would order their removal at the expense of the respondent. After
receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing
his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent
injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal.

The respondents-appellants, Florencio Moreno, Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, and Benjamin Yonson, investigator, question
the jurisdiction of the trial court, and attribute to it the following
errors:

“1. The trial court erred in holding in effect that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional;
2. The trial court erred in receiving evidence de novo at the trial of the case;
3. The trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of
defendant Secretary of Public Works and Communications and in reversing
the latter’s finding that the stream in question is a navigable river
which was illegally closed by plaintiffs;
4. The trial court erred in holding that the Sapang Bulati is a private stream; and
5. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiffs should first
exhaust administrative remedy before filing the instant petition.”

The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that
Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping,
unrestrained, final, and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues
of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam
encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance,
and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby constituting
an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.

Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act 2056 provides:

“Section 1. Any provision or provisions of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, the construction or building of dams,
dikes or any other works which encroaches into any public navigable
river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or
waterways as well as the construction or building of dams, dikes or any
other works in areas declared as communal fishing grounds, shall be
ordered removed as public nuisances or as prohibited constructions as
herein provided; Provided, however, That the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications may authorize the construction of any
such works when public interests or safety so requires, or when it is
absolutely necessary for the protection of private property.

“Section
2. When it is found by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, after due notice and hearing, that any dam, dike or any
other works now existing or may hereinafter be constructed encroaches
into any public navigable waters or waterways, or that they are
constructed in areas declared as communal fishing grounds, he shall
have the authority to order the removal of any such works and shall
give the party concerned a period not to exceed thirty days for the
removal of the same: Provided, That fishpond constructions or
works on communal fishing grounds introduced in good faith before the
areas were proclaimed as fishing grounds shall be exempted from the
provisions of this Act, provided such constructions or works do not
obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river, stream, or
would not cause inundations of agricultural areas: Provided, further,
That should the party concerned fail to comply with the order of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications within the period so
stated in the order, such removal shall be effected by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications at the expense of the said party within
ten days following the expiration of the period given the party
concerned: Provided, furthermore, That the investigation and
hearing to be conducted by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications under this section shall be terminated and decided by
him within a period which shall not exceed ninety days from the time he
shall have been notified in writing or a written complaint shall have
been filed with him by any interested party apprising him of the
existence of a dam, dike or any other works that encroaches into any
public navigable river, stream, coastal waters or any other public
navigable waters or waterways, and in areas declared as communal
fishing grounds: Provided, still furthermore, That the
failure on the part of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
without justifiable or valid reason to terminate and decide a case or
effect the removal of any such works, as provided for in this section,
shall constitute an offense punishable under section three of this Act:
And provided, finally, That the removal of any such works
shall not impair fishponds completed or about to be completed which do
not encroach or obstruct any public navigable river or stream and/or
which would not cause inundations of agricultural areas and which have
been constructed in good faith before the area was declared communal
fishing grounds.”

The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the
Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and
arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that the Act (R. A. 2056)
merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person
was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is
public property, and ownership, thereof is not acquirable by adverse
possession (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary’s power under the Act
necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such
as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character;
but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely
incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear
navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and
authorities are clear that they are validly conferable upon executive
officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard,
as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.

“It thus appears that the delegation by Congress to
executive or administrative agencies of functions of judicial, or at
least, quasi-judicial character, provided the exercise of those
functions is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their
executive or administrative powers, is not in violation of the
Separation of Powers so far as that principle is recognized by the
Federal Constitution nor is it in violation of due process of law.” (3
Willoughby on the Const. of the U.S., pp. 1654-1655)

“The
mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence
of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine
what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.
Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to
declare the existence of facts which call into operation its
provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and other
subordinate officers power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts
as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws.” (11
Am. Jur., Const. Law, p. 950, sec. 235)

“s. 237. Powers to
determine cases within Statute—One important class of cases in which
discretion may properly be vested in administrative officers, which
class is almost an operation of the general rule relating to the
ascertainment of facts, consists of those cases in which a general rule
or prohibition, is laid down and power is vested in an executive
officer to determine when particular cases do or do not fall within
such rule or prohibition. Power exercised under such statutes, calling
for the exercise of judgment in the execution of a ministerial act, is
never judicial in nature within the sense prohibited by the
Constitution.” (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. 237, p. 952)

A direct precedent can be found in the “Bridge cases” upholding the
constitutionality of the U.S. River and Harbor Act of March 3, 1899,
that empowered (sec. 18) the Secretary of War to take action, after
hearing, for the removal or alteration of bridges unreasonably
obstructing navigation. On the issue of undue delegation of power, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:

“Congress thereby declared that whenever the
Secretary of War should find any bridge theretofore or thereafter
constructed over any of the navigable waterways of the United States to
be an unreasonable obstruction to the free navigation of such waters on
account of insufficient height, width of span, or otherwise, it should
be the duty of the Secretary, after hearing the parties concerned, to
take action looking to the removal or alteration of the bridge, so as
to render navigation through or under it reasonably free, easy, and
unobstructed. As this court repeatedly has held, this is not unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power to the Secretary. Union Bridge Co. vs. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385, 51 L. ed. 523, 533, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Monongahela Bridge Co. vs. United States 216 U.S. 177, 192, 54 L. ed. 435, 441, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356; Hannibal Bridge Co. vs.
United States, 221 U.S. 194, 205, 55 L. ed. 699, 703, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep.
603. The statute itself prescribed the general rule applicable to all
navigable waters, and merely charged the Secretary of War with the duty
of ascertaining in each case, upon notice to the parties concerned,
whether the particular bridge came within the general rule. Of course,
the Secretary’s finding must be based upon the conditions as they exist
at the time he acts. But the law imposing this duty upon him speaks
from the time of its enactment.” (Louisville Bridge Co. vs. U.S. 61 L. Ed., 395. (Italic supplied)

Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisance of
properties of great value can not be done except through court
proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements without
previous hearings, and are inapplicable to the case before us, where
the law provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with
notice to the complainants and the appellees, who appeared therein. It
is noteworthy that Republic Act 2056 authorizes removal of the
unauthorized dikes either as “public nuisances or as prohibited
constructions” on public navigable streams, and those of appellees
clearly are in the latter class.

It may not be amiss to state that the power of the Secretary of
Public Works to investigate and clear public streams free from
unauthorized encroachments and obstructions was granted as far back as
Act 3208 of the old Philippine Legislature, and has been upheld by this
Court (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, supra; Meneses vs.
Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 647). We do not believe that the absence of an
express appeal to the courts under the present Republic Act 2056 is a
substantial difference, so far as the Constitution is concerned, for it
is a well-known rule that due process does not have to be judicial
process; and moreover, the judicial review of the Secretary’s decision
would always remain, even if not expressly granted, whenever his act
violates the law or the Constitution, or imports abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

The argument that the action of the Secretary amounts to a
confiscation of private property leads us directly to the issue of fact
whether a navigable portion of the Bulati creek had once traversed the
registered lot of the appellees Lovina and connected with the Manampil
creek that borders said lot on the north-west before it was closed by
Jose de Jesus, Lovina’s predecessor. The Secretary of Public Works had
found from the evidence before him that, originally, the sapang (creek) Bulati flowed across the property in question, and connected the Nasi river with sapang
Manampil; that in 1962 or thereabouts, the Bulati creek was 2 meters
deep at high tide and 1/2 meter deep at low tide, and the people used
it as fishing grounds and as a communication way, navigating along its
length in bancas; that the former registered owner, Jose de Jesus,
closed about 800 meters of the course of the sapang Bulati that lay within the lot in question by constructing dams or dikes at both ends, and converting the lot into a fishpond.

The appellees, on the other hand, rely on the 1916 registration plan
of the property (Exh. C), showing it to be merely bounded by the Bulati
creek on the south-east, as well as on the testimony introduced at the
hearing of the prohibition case (over the objection of the Government
counsel) that the Bulati creek did not enter the property.

The court of first instance found that “according to the location
plan, Exhibit C”, the “Bulati creek, on which the dikes and dams in
question were constructed was a mere estero and could not be considered
a navigable stream then”. It is not explained how such fact could
appear solely from the plan Exhibit “C” (no other proof being referred
to), unless indeed the court below so concluded from the fact that in
said plan the Bulati creek does not appear to run within the registered
lot. The conclusion of the lower court is not supported by its
premises, because by law, the issuance of a Torrens title does not
confer title to navigable streams (which are fluvial highways) within
the registered property, nor is it conclusive on their non-existence,
unless the boundaries of such streams had been expressly delimited in
the registration plan (Act 496, sec. 39, of Palanca vs. Commonwealth 69 Phil. 449; Meneses vs.
Commonwealth 69 Phil. 647), so that delimitation of their course may be
made even after the decree of registration has become final. In the
present case, in truth, the very plan of the appellees, Exhibit “C”,
shows parallel re-entrant lines, around its point 65 and between points
44 and 45, that indicate the existence of a stream connecting the sapang Bulati on the southeast and the sapang
Manampil on the northwest, and which the surveyor apparently failed to
delimit for some undisclosed reason. That the stream was the
prolongation of the sapang Bulati, that formerly flowed
across the registered lot, is also shown by the fact that in appellees’
plan Exhibit “C”, the westward continuation of the Bulati creek (west
of point 65), which bounds the registered lot, is labelled “Estero
Mabao”. The plan thus corroborates the previously summarized testimony
laid before investigator Yonson and relied upon by the Secretary in his
administrative decicion. Even more, appellees’ own caretaker, Yambao,
showed investigator Yonson the old course of the Bulati within the
fishpond itself; and this evidence is, likewise, confirmed by the
cross-section profile of the ground near the dams in question (See plan
Annex “AA” of Yonson’s Report), where the old channel of the creek is
clearly discernible. To be sure, appellees contend that they were not
shown this plan; but in their evidence before the court of first
instance, they never attempted, or offered, to prove that said plan is
incorrect.

That the creek was navigable in fact before it was closed was also
testified to by the government witnesses, whose version is corroborated
as we have seen.

Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in
executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are entitled
to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave
abuse of discretion (Comm. Customs vs. Valencia, 100 Phil.,
165, 54 Off. Gaz. 3505), none of which has been shown to exist in this
case, we agree with appellant that the court below erred in rejecting
the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works.

The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence
not laid before him, for that would be tantamount to holding a new
investigation, and to substitute for the discretion and judgment of the
Secretary the discretion and judgment of the court, to whom the statute
had not entrusted the case. It is immaterial that the present action
should be one for prohibition or injunction and not one for certiorari;
in either event the case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted
to the Secretary, since a judicial review of executive decisions does
not import a trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of
whether the executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution
or of the laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they
find reasonable support in the evidence.^[1] Here, the proof preponderates in favor of the Secretary’s decision.

Nevertheless, we agree with appellees that they can not be charged
with failure to exhaust administrative remedies, for the Secretary’s
decision is that of the President, in the absence of disapproval
(Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451).

Finally, there being a possibility that when they purchased the
property in question the appellees Lovina were not informed of the
illegal closure of the Bulati creek, their action, if any, against
their vendor, should be, and is hereby, reserved.

In resumé, we rule:

(1) That Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works;

(2) That absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a
property covered by Torrens title does not confer title to it nor
preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of its existence;

(3) That the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works under
Republic Act No. 2056 should be respected in the absence of illegality,
error of law, fraud, or imposition, so long as the said findings’ are
supported by substantial evidence submitted to him.

(4) That ownership of a navigable stream or of its bed is not acquirable by prescription.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed,
and the writs of injunction issued therein are annulled and set aside.
Costs against appellees Lovina.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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^[1] CF. Manabat vs. Cruz, L-11228, Apr. 30, 1958; Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682; Ortua vs. Singson, 59 Phil. 440; Julian vs. Apostol, 52 Phil. 422.