PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AMADO TAVERA Y MOLINA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DICDICAN, J.:
An appeal had been made to this Court from the Decision[4] rendered by Judge Roberto A. Escaro, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fifth Judicial Region in Daet, Camarines Norte (“trial court”), on August 9, 2012 in Criminal Case No. 13016 convicting herein accused-appellant Amado Tavera y Molina (“accused-appellant”) of the crime of homicide punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information[5] which reads:
“That on or about or a few minutes after 8:30 in the evening of October 12, 2006 in Calero, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and repeatedly hack with a bladed weapon Arturo Enriquez who was hit in different parts of his face, head and body resulting to his untimely death, to the damage of his heirs.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
On August 23, 2011, upon being arraigned of the crime with which he had been charged, the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty[6] thereto. Subsequently, a pre-trial was conducted on September 23, 2011[7]. A trial on the merits of said case ensued thereafter.
During the trial, the prosecution adduced in evidence the testimonies of the following persons: (1) Emelita Enriquez (“Emelita”), the widow of the victim, Arturo Enriquez (“Arturo”); (2) Dr. Antonio Fulong (“Dr. Fulong”), the Municipal Health Officer at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte who conducted a post-mortem examination upon the body of the victim; (3) Roberto Buenaflor (“Buenaflor”), a barangay tanod of Barangay Calero who responded to the scene of the crime; (4) Benjie Reyes (“Reyes”), a barriomate and neighbor of the accused-appellant who saw the accused-appellant during the incident; (5) Daniel de Guzman Morante (“Daniel”); (6) John de Guzman Morante (“John”), both are stepsons of the victim who testified with respect to the search that they conducted to locate their stepfather; and (7) Mariano Raymundo Seeping (“Seeping”), a Barangay Captain of Calero who authenticated the barangay blotters caused to be made by the victim against the accused-appellant prior to the commission of the crime.
For his part, the accused-appellant adduced in evidence his own testimony as well as the testimony of his wife, Emma Tavera (“Emma”).
The prosecution’s recital of established facts is summarized as follows:
On October 12, 2006, at around 8:30 o’clock in the evening, Arturo went to their pastured land in Palanas to get their carabaos.
The evening went by but Arturo had not returned from their farm. Emelita then decided to look for Arturo at 4:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day. Likewise worried for his stepfather, Daniel immediately left the house to join the search.
As Emelita reached the pastured land, the accused-appellant, who was drenching wet, suddenly appeared. He was armed with a bolo. Upon inquiry as to his knowledge of Arturo’s whereabouts, the accused-appellant prevented her from going through and sternly warned her that the person who she was searching for was not there.
The same encounter happened with Daniel. Daniel saw the accused-appellant in his stepfather’s property with a bolo in his hand. He was also told that whoever he was looking for was not there.
Terrified, Emelita and Daniel walked away and proceeded to go home.
Meanwhile, John reported the matter that Arturo had not returned home from the farm to the Office of the Barangay Tanod. Four barangay tanods, including Buenaflor, thereafter aided him in their search for his stepfather.
Their group started the search on the other side of the hill, a property owned by his stepfather, which was 100 meters away from their house. However, the group failed to locate Arturo.
As there was still no sign of his stepfather anywhere, John went back to the hill and, this time, he found a pair of sandals. Not so far away, John saw the lifeless body of his stepfather, Arturo. Rattled, John shouted for help. Fortunately, one of their neighbor named Jun-jun heard his call for help and immediately assisted him.
Arturo’s body was covered with freshly cut grass which made the search more difficult. He sustained hacked wounds on different parts of his body.
Dr. Fulong, the Municipal Health Officer at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim. According to Dr. Fulong, the victim suffered hacked wounds particularly at the frontal area to the supra orbital area which caused the exposure of the skull bone. There was also one near the forehead and another in the victim’s jaw. Arturo’s scalp was also sliced open from the back of his head which caused the opening of the skull and exposure of a portion of brain tissue. There was also an incised wound on Arturo’s neck. Aside from his mortal wounds, the victim’s right wrist was also amputated. All in all, the victim sustained twenty two (22) wounds, eight (8) of which were mortal wounds which could immediately cause his death.
In the death certificate, it was indicated that the victim died of hemorrhagic shock caused by multiple hacked wounds[8].
Reyes testified that, sometime in the afternoon of October 12, 2006, between 5:00 to 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon, he saw the accused-appellant with his son passed by while he was at the porch of his house.
Subsequently, he went to the house of Arturo to ask for his permission to allow him to gather gabi, guava shoots and other leaves from the former’s property at the mountains. He then proceeded to Arturo’s property.
While he was collecting the leaves that he needed to feed his pigs, he saw the accused-appellant some twelve (12) meters away. Apparently, the accused-appellant appeared to be hacking something on the ground with the use of a bolo. He simply ignored the latter and left.
Reyes was already in his house at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening when he saw the accused-appellant and his son coming down from the mountains. Since the accused-appellant’s house was situated just in front of his house, he witnessed the accused-appellant headed towards home. Simultaneously, Reyes observed that, upon the arrival of the accused-appellant in their house, a commotion took place which lasted for about an hour.
It was in the following morning when Reyes learned that Arturo was found dead in the mountains where he gathered leaves the night before. Curious and nervous, Reyes went back to the mountains and there he saw the lifeless body of Arturo.
The family members of the victim testified that the accused-appellant harbored a grudge against Arturo. According to the testimony of Barangay Captain Seeping, several blotter incidents were reported by the victim against the accused-appellant before his gruesome and untimely death. From the blotter reports, it was indicated that the accused-appellant was caught entering the property of the victim and stealing coconuts therefrom.
To absolve himself from any criminal liability, the accused-appellant vehemently denied all the accusations hurled against him. He claimed that, on October 12, 2006, he went to Daet along with his wife to register his motorcycle with the Land Transportation Office (“LTO”) in Daet, Camarines Norte. He allegedly finished the registration of his vehicle at around 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon and directly headed home to Purok 3, Calero, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
Allegedly, it was already past 6:00 o’clock in the evening when they arrived at Calero and, since it was raining hard at that time, he just stayed at home.
When accosted by the police officers with regard to the death of the victim, he went with them to the Police Headquarters where he was detained for three nights.
He denied any involvement in the hacking incident but admitted that there were some issues between him and the victim with respect to land ownership but the same had been purportedly amicably settled.
Finding circumstantial evidence, together with the positive identification by Reyes of the presence of the accused-appellant at the scene of the crime during the incident, that would point unerringly to the latter as the assailant, the court a quo rendered a Decision on August 9, 2012 which convicted the accused-appellant of homicide. The dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused AMADO TAVERA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, he is hereby sentenced to indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Arturo Enriquez, the following:
Civil Indemnity – Moral damages – Loss of Earning Capacity – Actual damages – Total damages – “SO ORDERED.”
Aggrieved by the foregoing decision, herein accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal raising the following errors purportedly committed by the trial court, to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY DESPITE NON-PRESENTATION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE SAME.
In sum, the primordial issue brought before this Court for resolution is whether the court a quo erred in convicting herein accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge against him.
After a careful and thorough review of the facts, law and issues of this case, we affirm the trial court’s conviction of the accused-appellant of the crime of homicide.
The accused-appellant asserted that the trial court erred in convicting him of the charge against him, considering that the prosecution purportedly failed to establish its case against him with moral certainty. He averred that the totality of the prosecution’s circumstancial evidence palpably failed to constitute an unbroken chain leading, beyond reasonable doubt, to his guilt.
We believe otherwise. The prosecution established the accused-appellant’s complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence which were credible and sufficient that would lead to the inescapable conclusion that the accused-appellant committed the said crime. The circumstances, when considered in their totality, pointed to the accused-appellant as the culprit of the crime.
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites are complied with:
(1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under a condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove[9].
There are instances when, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the type of positive identification which forms part of circumstantial evidence[10].
Based on the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution’s witnesses, the accused-appellant was in the same place where the victim was seen at the time of the incident. During the search for the victim on the day after the killing, the accused-appellant was seen holding a bolo in the same place where the lifeless body of the victim was later found. The accused-appellant was the only person in the place where the incident happened which, incidentally, was the same place where the body of Arturo was found.
Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime[11].
After a thorough review of the records of the case, We find that the circumstantial evidences proved by the prosecution, when viewed in their entirety, point unerringly to the accused-appellant as the person responsible for the death of the victim, Arturo. As correctly found by the trial court, the following combination of the circumstances which comprised such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to the accused-appellant, and no other, as the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
(1) The victim left his house at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of October 12, 2006 to go to his pastured land where his carabaos were located;
(2) Between 5:00 o’clock to 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused-appellant passed by the house of Reyes, together with his son, and walked towards the property of the victim on the mountains;
(3) At past 6:00 o’clock in the evening, Reyes saw the accused-appellant in the victim’s property holding a bolo in his hand and appeared to be hacking something on the ground;
(4) Reyes saw the accused-appellant coming down from the mountains at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening;
(5) The victim never reached home;
(6) In the early morning of October 13, 2006, the accused-appellant was seen by Emelita in her husband’s property, still with a bolo in his hand;
(7) The accused-appellant told Emelita that whatever she was searching for was not there;
(8) Daniel, who was also in search for his father in that morning, likewise saw the accused-appellant in his stepfather’s property, with a bolo in his hand;
(9) Upon seeing Daniel, the accused-appellant also told him that the person that he was looking for was not there;
(10) The victim was found dead with multiple wounds on his body and covered with freshly cut grass in the same place where the accused-appellant was seen by the prosecution witnesses prior to the incident and during the search for the victim;
(11) The autopsy report showed that the victim died of multiple hacked wounds at approximately 9:30 p.m. or earlier on October 12, 2006;
(12) The time of death of the victim coincided with the time that the accused-appellant was seen by Reyes at the place where the former appeared to be hacking something on the ground. It was also the same place where the dead body of the victim was found with multiple hacked wounds the following morning; and
(13) Prior to the gruesome death of the victim, a blotter report was recorded at the barangay which indicated that death threats were made by the accused-appellant towards the victim.
It is a well-entrenched rule that, before conviction can be had based upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime[12]. In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution point to the accused-appellant as having committed the crime charged, and to no other person.
In the same vein, while there was no one who directly witnessed the hacking, the accused-appellant, however, had the motive to do away with the victim because of their previous altercations. The prosecution’s witnesses had shown that the accused-appellant had motive to kill the victim. There was evidence presented to demonstrate that the accused-appellant and the victim had some disagreements in the past, which brought about the death threats made by accused-appellant against the victim. We are mindful of the jurisprudence that motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. However, when coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction[13].
The accused-appellant furthermore questioned the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. Specifically, the accused-appellant insisted that Reyes’ testimony was flawed as he did not actually see the accused-appellant hacking the victim. The testimony of Reyes with respect to the time when the accused-appellant was seen in the victim’s property purportedly could not directly point to him as the author of the crime since the time of the death of the victim was 9:30 p.m. while, according to Reyes, he saw the accused-appellant coming down from the mountains at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening.
When it comes to the credibility of witnesses, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence[14]. It is worthy to note that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate testimonial evidence properly because it has the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying[15].
Although not constrained to blindly accept the findings of fact of trial courts, appellate courts can rest assured that such facts were gathered from witnesses who presented their statements live and in person in open court[16]. In cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the trial courts are in the best position to recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from rehearsed spiel, straightforward assertion from a stuttering claim, definite statement from tentative disclosure and, to a certain degree, truth from untruth[17].
In the present case, there is no compelling reason for us to reverse the findings of fact of the trial court. The inconsistencies raised by the accused-appellant were merely trivial, minor and immaterial as they refer only to irrelevant and collateral matters which have nothing to do with the elements of the crime.
Where the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to[18]. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility[19]. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction[20].
As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the word “approximate” as used in the victim’s death certificate as to the time of death implicitly means that the hacking could have taken place earlier than the time provided.
Against the evidence of the prosecution, the accused-appellant merely denied the accusations against him.
Well-settled is the rule that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused’s denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime[21].
Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the witness[22]. In People of the Phils. v. Carlito Mateo y Patawid[23], the Supreme Court had the occasion to state:
“Accused-appellant’s bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and affirmative testimony offered by the prosecution. x x x. A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters. x x x”.
Indeed, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Denial or alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion and received with caution, because it can easily be fabricated[24]. For denial or alibi to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission[25].
With respect to the lower court’s award for loss of compensatory income, Article 2206 of the New Civil Code provides that the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of earning capacity. Indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best obtainable evidence thereof[26].
By way of exception, testimonial evidence may suffice if the victim was either (1) self-employed, earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws[27]. Emelita testified that her husband was a coconut farmer earning P5,000. These statements remain unchallenged and uncontroverted by the accused-appellant. Thus, the trial court’s findings as to the monetary award was proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case. The Decision dated August 9, 2012 rendered by Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fifth Judicial Region, in Daet, Camarines Norte, in Criminal Case No. 13016 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio-Valenzuela[*] and Peredes, JJ., concur.
[*] Acting Senior Member vice J. Elbinias per Office Order No. 239-14-ABR dated May 23, 2014.
[1] People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 131151, August 25, 1999, 313 SCRA 114.
[2] People v. Ayola, G.R. No. 138923, September 4, 1002, 364 SCRA 451.
[3] People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 104497, January 18, 1995, 240 SCRA 191.
[4] Record, Criminal Case No. 13016, pp. .
[5] Ibid, Information, pp. 1-2.
[6] Ibid, Order, p. 39.
[7] Ibid, Pre-Trial Order, pp. 50-52.
[8] Ibid, Certificate of Death, p. 15.
[9] People v. Manalo, G.R. No. 173054, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 664, 670.
[10] Ibid.
[11] People v. Matignas, 428 Phil. 834, 869-870 (2002).
[12] People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942).
[13] People v. de Mesa, G.R. No. 137036, March 14, 2001.
[14] People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 444.
[15] Ibid.
[16] People v. Willie Midenilla, et al., G.R. No. 186470, September 27, 2010.
[17] Ibid.
[18] People v. Villahermosa, G.R. No. 186465, June 1, 2011.
[19] People v. Sabardan, G.R. No. 132135, 21 May 2004, 429 SCRA 9, 19 citing People v. Monieva, G.R. No. 123912, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 244, 252.
[20] People v. Ignas, Supra, Note No. 36.
[21] People vs. De Mesa, G.R. No. 87216, July 28, 1990, 188 SCRA 48.
[22] People of the Phils. v. Donato Bulasag y Arellano alias “Dong,” G.R. No. 172869, July 28, 2008.
[23] G.R. No. 179036, July 28, 2008.
[24] People v. Penaso, 383 Phil. 200, 210 (2000).
[25] People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 134762, July 23, 2002, 385 SCRA 38, 51.
[26] Chan vs. Maceda, Jr., G.R. No. 142591, 30 April 2003.
[27] People vs. Duban, G.R. No. 141217, 26 September 2003; People vs. Mallari, G.R. No. 145993, 17 June 2003; People vs. Caraig, G.R. Nos. 116224-27, 28 March 2003.