CALINGAN CALEB, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (BUREAU OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS), RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review^[1]
of the reversal made by the respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission of the
award issued in petitioner’s favor by the Workmen’s Compensation Section, Baguio City Sub-regional Office, Department of Labor, on
her claim for compensation benefits for the death of her husband, Bagay Caleb, a construction helper employed by respondent
Republic (Bureau of Public Highways, Mountain Province
Engineering District).

The records disclose the following facts:

On August 3, 1974, the Baguio City
Sub-regional Office received petitioner’s notice and claim for death benefits
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the claim alleging that petitioner’s
husband, Bagay Caleb, died on December 10, 1971, as a
result of an injury received sometime in March, 1970 when he was hit by a big stone
while working on one of the roads of Otucan, Bauko, Mt. Province. 
Notice of petitioner’s claim was received by the Bureau of Public
Highways, Mt. Province Engineering District on August 19, 1974 as evidenced by the Registry Return
Receipt attached to the records of the case. 
The records do not reveal that
the respondent Republic (Bureau of Public Highways) filed its notice to contro­vert
the claim.  However, a Motion to Dismiss
dated September 9, 1974 was filed by the Office of the Soli­citor General for
the respondent Republic contending, among others, that (1) it had no prior
knowledge of the injury allegedly suffered by the deceased until the filing of
said notice and claim for compensation, which was beyond the periods prescribed
by Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, thereby barring further
proceedings on said claim; and that, (2) the supposed injury was not
service-connected.

Without resolving the aforestated
Motion to Dismiss and without notifying the Republic of a hearing on the claim,
the Chief of the Workmen’s Compensation Section, Baguio
City Sub-regional Office, found merit in the claim and issued an award in favor
of petitioner Calingan Caleb in the amounts of (1)
Four Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Pesos (P4,680.00) as
compensation benefits equivalent to forty-five (45%) Percentum
of decedent’s average weekly wage for 208 weeks under Section 12 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, and (2) Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), as
reimbursement of burial expenses, and ordered res­pondent Republic to pay the
administrative fee of Forty-seven Pesos (P47.00).

A motion for reconsideration of the award was filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General but the same was denied.  Thereupon, the entire record of the case was
elevated to the respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review.

On review, the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission dismissed the claim for lack of merit in the following
wise and manner, thus –

“After a careful examination of the entire records, we cannot
but conclude that the herein claimant has miserably failed to establish her
case.  No suffi­cient evidence was
presented or submitted by the claimant to establish, at least, some causal
connection of the knee injury that Bagay Caleb
sustained allegedly some­time in March, 1970 with his work causing his
disability for labor, and that said injury led to his death.  The records of his leave of absence after the
alleged incident to prove that he was disabled for labor was not presented.  Neither was the death certificate submitted
to estab­lish the facts of death, and from which the cause that led to his
demise could be ascertained.  Likewise,
the marriage contract and the affidavit of dependency as evidence of claimant’s
relationship to the deceased and of her dependency on him for support, were not submitted.

Much as we sympathize with the claimant in this case, we cannot
decide it in her favor as the evidence on record does not justify an
award.” (Decision of WCC, p. 2).

Hence, this petition for review by petitioner.

After a thorough perusal of the records of the case, We reverse the decision of the respondent Workmen’s
Compensation Commission sought to be reviewed, and thus reinstate the award of
death benefits and burial expenses granted to petitioner Calingan
Caleb by the Chief of the Workmen’s Compensation Section, Baguio
City Sub-regional Office in his Order dated September 16, 1974.

In deciding adversely against the compensability of petitioner’s
claim on the ground that petitioner failed to substantially establish her case,
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission committed a grave error.  We find as clearly established the fact that
the injury, alleged to be the cause of death of petitioner’s husband, is
service-connected.  Attached to the
records is the Phy­sician’s Report of Sickness or Accident accomplished by Dr.
Edgar N. Rapisora of the Mt. Province Provincial
Hospital, clearly stating the following: 
that upon examination, Bagay Caleb had an old
fracture dislocation on the right knee joint (Item 4); that the cause of injury
was a “fall while working on the road due to and in pursuance of the
employment (Items 7 & 8); that the injury resulted in permanent total
disability for labor (Item 21); that the injured limb had already developed
great impairment of movement and normal function (General Remarks).  Thus, since petitioner’s evidence clearly
established the causal connection between the injury alleged to be the cause of
death, and the deceased’s employment, it then devolved upon the employer (the
Repub­lic) to show by substantial evidence that the injury and death of
petitioner’s husband was not so service-connected.  This must be so because petitioner, as
claimant, enjoys in her favor the legal presumption of the compensability of
her claim.  In other words, by virtue of
said presumption, which the respondent Commission once again ignored so
blatantly, petitioner need not be required to establish her case by substantial
evidence, for precisely, the purpose of such presumption is to dispense with
proof.  Upon the other hand, respondent
Republic as employer, required by law to overcome by substantial evidence said
presumption, failed to discharge the burden laid by the law on its door.

As stated earlier in Our decision, the
records do not reveal any timely controversion made
by the respondent Republic after receipt of the notice of the claim on August 19, 1974.  Even if We were to
consider the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Office of the Solicitor General as
a controversion of the claim, the fact still remains
that the said motion was filed only on September
9, 1974.  Clearly, the filing
thereof was beyond the 10-day period after receipt of the notice of claim
within which an em­ployer must file its notice of controversion
under Section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.  Thus, by failing to controvert the claim
within the time pres­cribed by Section 45 of the above Act, and by its failure
to have its right to controvert reinstated, the employer (Republic) is deemed
to have waived its right to inter­pose any non-jurisdictional defenses, and
could not prove anything in relation thereto. 
Stated otherwise, the compensability of the present claim, its
reasonable­ness and validity are now beyond challenge; in effect, an ultimate
admission of liability.^[2]
Hence, the outright award in favor of petitioner-claimant was properly
issued.  Rule 9, section 1 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission Rules expressly provides for the outright
issuance of an award “where liability is admitted by the employer”
and in uncontroverted cases.^[3]

The respondent Republic maintains that it was deprived of its
right to due process as the award was issued without having been notified of
the hearing on the claim.  This is devoid
of merit.  In the case of Security
Services Unlimited, Inc. vs. WCC, et al., 69 SCRA 269, this Court, thru
Justice Esguerra said:

“When petitioner
failed to comply with the aforementioned requirement of the law (Section 45 of
Act 3428), by its own act, it waived its right to controvert the claim,
hence with its presumed knowledge of the law, it voluntarily waived its right
to due process (hearing and presentation of evidence to prove its
defenses).  Petitioner has nobody to
blame but itself for its failure to controvert the claim on time.”

The Court, declaring that it is a well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that failure to controvert a claim on time also means waiver of
the right to due process, cited the following authorities:  Dangue vs. Franklin
Baker Co. of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. L­-15838, April 29, 1960; La Mallorca vs. WCC, 30 SCRA 619, 620; Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. vs. WCC, et al., G.R. No. L-10533, May 13, 1957; Fuentez vs. Dinamira, L-14965,
Aug. 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 1133; Blanco vs. WCC, 29 SCRA 12; Aboitis
Shipping Corp. vs. Pepito, L-21335, Dec. 17, 1966.

We reiterate the same rule in the instant petition and so hold
that petitioner’s claim for death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, not having been controverted nor overcome by
substantial evidence, must be granted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission sought to be reviewed is set aside and the award dated September 16,
1974 made in favor of the petitioner-claimant by the Workmen’s Compensation
Section, Baguio City Sub-regional Office is
reinstated, and modified to include an additional order for respondent to pay
peti­tioner’s counsel the amount of Four Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos (P468.00) as
and for attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Treated as a special civil action per resolution of April 28, 1976.

^[2]
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. WCC, et al.,
L-10533, May 13, 1957; Fuentez vs. Dinamira, L-14965, August 31, 1961; Dangue
vs. Franklin Baker Co. of the Phil., et al., L-15838, April 29, 1960;
Bautista vs. WCC, L-42885, November 23, 1977; Justo
vs. WCC, et al., L-43681, January
31, 1977; Despe vs. WCC, et al.,
L-42828, February 28, 1977.

^[3]
Dinaro vs. WCC, L-42457, March 31, 1967.