THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLE VS. ISSAC FAROL, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

The appellant Isaac Farol was, together with several other persons, charged
with kidnapping for ransom in three criminal cases (Nos. 584, 585 and 587) of
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, which were instituted following, an
investigation made by the Philippine Constabulary and other police authorities
in connection with the kidnapping of (1) Dr. Norberto Quisumbing on July 27,
1952, (2) a boy name Andres Lara in March, 1953, and (3) Dr. Timoteo Alday on
June 30 of that same year, the investigation having revealed that the
kidnappings were perpetrated by an organized gang headed by this appellant.

With some of the defendants still unapprehended, the three cases came up
for hearing and with the conformity of the defense were tried jointly. The trial
resulted in the conviction of Farol and Apolinar Plandez in Caso No. 584 (for
the kidnapping of Dr. Norberto Quisumbing), the acquittal of Farol and the
conviction of Manuel Silva and Apolinar Plandez in Case No. 585 (for the
kidnapping of Andres Lara) and the conviction of Farol, Manuel Silva, Exequiel
Silva and Bias Bejasa in Case No, 587 for the kidnapping of Dr. Timoteo Alday),
the sentence imposed in each case being life imprisonment plus indemnity and
costs. But though several defendants were convicted, the record now before us
discloses that only Farol has appealed, the appeal being from the sentence
imposed upon him for the kidnapping of Drs. Quisumbing and Alday in Cases Nos.
584 and 587, respectively.

With reference to the kidnapping of Dr. Norberto Quisumbing (Case No. 584),
the evidence shows and it is not disputed that in the morning of July 27, 1952
this doctor, then a resident of Pasay City, went with some companions to the
barrio of Castillo in the municipality of Rosario, Batangas, to inspect his race
horses. While he was there writing down the names of the horses to be examined,
a group of armed men, about seven or eight, came and, after identifying him,
seized and dragged him away from his companions. First they took him to San Juan
in the same province, where they passed the night, and thereafter they moved him
from barrio to barrio, keeping him all the time in custody until he was ransomed
by his family some days later. The negotiations for ransom were effected through
the Mediation of the appellant Farol, whom the family and friends of Dr.
Quisumbing had contacted for the purpose, the said appellant having been mayor
of the town (Rosario) where the kidnapping took place.

Appellant admitted having initiated and conducted the negotiations for
ransom, but claimed that he only did it out of pity to Dr. Quisumbing’s wife.
According to his version, while he was looking for someone to contact the gang
of kidnappers, a man – whose name he did not mention – came to tell him that the
gang wanted to speak to him. Through this man he learned that the gang was
demanding a ransom of P100,000. But again through this man he succeeded in
having the demand reduced to P20,000 on the plea that this was all the family of
Dr. Quisumbing could afford to pay. Following the instructions given by that
same man, he went by car to the appointed place near the Bantillan bridge in San
Juan, Batangas, on the night designated for the payment of the ransom. With him,
besides the driver, were Francisco Medrano, then technical adviser in the Import
Control Commission, Esteban Mayo of the Games and Amusement Board and
Quisumbing’s son-in-law Anselmo Villar. As they neared the appointed place, he
got off the car and walked alone till he entered a concrete gate with iron
grills. There he was met by a man who introduced himself as the one to receive
the ransom money and who also told him where Dr. Quisumbing would be found. He
did not believe the kidnappers would “double-cross” him and so he handed the
money to the man without even seeing the doctor. The man then told him to go
back to the car and drive in the direction of Candelaria, Quezon province, and
he would meet Dr. Quisumbing on the road. The man proved to be as good as his
word, for appellant and his companions soon found the doctor on the road
indicated, already free from his captors.

As to the kidnapping of Dr. Timoteo Alday (Case No. the evidence shows and it
is also not disputed that this doctor was, in the afternoon of June 30, 1953,
fetched from his house in San Jose, Batangas, by Blas Bejasa, one of the accused
in that case, supposedly to attend to the delivery of the latter’s wife in
barrio Galamayamo of that same municipality. But when the two were already out
of the poblacion, ths jeep on which they were riding was stopped by a group of
armed men. who, after identifying the doctor, asked him if he could go with them
and attend to a man who had been shot. The doctor begged to be excused, telling
them that he was on his way to a delivery case. But saying that theirs was an
urgent case, they forced him at gun point to go with them. First, he was taken
by them to a wooded place, where he was blindfolded and relieved of his watch
and money. Then when darkness came, they took him to a hut in Cuenca, Batangas.
From there he was moved from place to place – sometimes blindfolded – until he
was ransomed eight days later. During his captivity, he was made to write to his
wife that his kidnappers were demanding a ransom of P70,000 with the threat that
something serious would happen if the money was not sent and that his life would
be in danger if the Army should intervene. Through the mediation of Mayor Pasia
of Cuenca and Mayor Masiluñgan of San Jose, the ransom demanded was reduced to
P15,000, and this amount was paid by the doctor’s family to the
kidnappers-through Councilor Remo, now deceased.

Both Dr. Quisumbing and Dr. Alday, it would appear, were kidnapped by a gang organized by
appellant and operating under his direction. This is shown by the testimony of
the Government witnesses with corroboration from some of the defendants.

Sixto Fajardo, testifying for the prosecution, declared that he was a former
companion and errand boy of appellant’s and as such had on two occasions
delivered letters to Juaning Perez, appellant’s right-hand man in a gang headed
and armed by him; that the firearms furnished by appellant to the members of the
gang were those formerly used by his civilian guards (appellant having been a
‘mayor of the municipality of Rosario); that following his defeat as a candidate
for member of the provincial board of Batangas in the election of 1951,
appellant called the members of the gang to a meeting in his coconut grove in
the barrio of Macalamcam, Rosario, and his father even had a cow slaughtered for
the occasion; that the meeting was held at night and attended by about 62 men,
and appellant, taking his position in the middle of the group, Addressed them as
follows: “All political enemies in Rosario should be robbed and killed and those
who have money should be kidnapped and detained for ransom, so that we may have
money”; that of that gang which appellant had organized for the purpose of
robbing and killing his political enemies and kidnapping the rich for ransom,
he, witness, came to be a member and he was furnished with a carbine; that realizing later that nothing good could come out of it, he signified his desire
to quit but Juaning Perez told him not to do so because appellant had given
orders that he be liquidated should he separate from the group for the reason
that he already knew too much of the organization’s doings and in the event of
capture.might divulge their activities; and that of the members of the gang
there were seven who always went together, and those included himself, Juaning
Perez and Juan Carandang (one of the accused still at large).

Gregorio Albes, an accused who had been discharged so that he could be
utilized as a witness for the Government, confirmed the existence of the
kidnapping gang with appellant as its over-all commander. He declared that he
had been induced to join it by Juaning Perez in April, 1953, and that among its
members (those he could remember) were Bias Bejasa., Exequiel Silva, Tomas
Lajara, Manuel Silva, Abdon Bautista, Juaning Perez, Isaias Comia, Timoteo
Limbo, Victorio Umali, Julian Fortus and Ambrosio Umali; that Juaning Perez, who
was their immediate chief, often conferred with appellant in the latter’s house
in Macalamcam, and that he heard the two talking about a plan to kidnap Dr.
Alday, appellant saying that he would furnish the vehicle for the purpose and
that Dr. Alday should be the one they should kidnap because he was well-to-do;
that the group that were to apprehend this doctor set out from Macalamcam in a
car furnished by appellant; that after the kidnapping he heard appellant
instruct Juaning Perez to demand a large ransom because Alday was rid but that
he later learned that the ransom paid was only P15,000 that Perez gave him P75
as his share; that not long thereafter the gang disbanded because of continuous
raids by the Army and the Constabulary; that he left his firearm in Mabato
because word had come from appellant that their firearms should be left there
and that they should hide because the Army ant. the Constabulary were after
them; and that on October, 1953, he surrendered to the Chief of Police of
Rosario because Juaning Perez had already died and also because he realized that
their organization was against the law.

Appellant’s co-defendants Blas Bejasa and Exequiel Silva also made
incriminatory statements against him. Their extra-judicial confessions revealed
the existence of a snatch gang headed by appellant, and at the trial they
testified that they were with the group that kidnapped Dr. Alday; that the group
started from a place near appellant’s house in barrio Macalamcam; that just
before they left, appellant was near the car talking to Juaning Perez; and that
appellant was the one who ordered them to get on the car and proceed. Blay
Bejasa further testified that he saw appellant come on that same car the; same
day and that it was also appellant who furnished the firearms carried by the
group.

Disclaiming any part in the kidnapping of Drs. Alday and Quisumbing,
appellant denied having organized any kidnapping gang, and explained that in
January, 1952, he was, under deten-h tion for 22 days in the Constabulary
stockade at Canlubang while a criminal case was being prepared against him for
the murder of three persons; that during the trial of the said case between
January and July, 1952, he spent most of his time in Manila preparing his
defense; that he was acquitted in the case on July 12, 1952; that he only came
to know about the kidnapping of Dr. Quisumbing when he was approached by the
letter’s relatives and friends and asked to help in the search; that reluctant
though he was at first to intervene for fear of getting involved again in a
criminal case, he finally acceded to their request after being assured by
Francisco Medrano and Esteban Mayo that no harm would come to him. He further
testified that the early part of 1953, shortly after his father’s death, he was
busy in his farms at barrios Rosario and Macalamcam, and that the latter part of
that year he used to make trips to Quezon and the Bicol provinces looking for
some lucrative business to engage in.

Not giving credence to appellant’s exculpatory statements, and believing
instead the testimony of Sixto Fajardo and Gregorio Albes, which finds
corroboration in that of the defendants Bias Bejasa and Exequiel Silva, the
trial court found appellant guilty as principal in both cases.

After going over the record, we find no reason for disturbing this verdict.
The evidence is clear that following his defeat as a candidate for member of the
provincial board of Batangas in the election of 1951, appellant called his band
of followers to a night meeting and told them that they were to rob and kill
their political enemies and to kidnap the rich for ransom. He made Juaning
Perez, his right-hand man, their ostensible commander and furnished them
firearms to be used for the purpose. He did not take part in the actual
apprehension of the victims, preferring to remain, as it were, behind the
scenes. But it is obvious that he was keeping in touch with the snatch gang and
that it was his wishes or orders that were being followed. He appears in truth
to be the supreme leader as well as the mastermind of the group.

Thus, in the kidnapping of Dr. Quisumbing, appellant was not with the group
that snatched and hid this doctor. But it is established that he was sending
messages to Juaning Perez, his right-hand man, who was in direct command of the
gang. And the fact that he was in reality their over-all commander, that he kept
in touch with them and that it was his orders or wishes that were carried out
may be gleaned from the way he effected the release of this doctor. For he had
no difficulty in contacting the kidnappers and he was practically the one who
fixed the amount of the ransom by having it reduced from P100,000 to P20,000.
The ransom was handed by him to one who did not even have to give his name to
be recognized as the one authorized to receive it. And he also parted with the
money without even seeing the man to be ransomed. His very explanation that he
did not expect to be double-crossed bespeaks close connection between him and
the gang and jibes with the idea of his being its chief.

So also in the kidnapping of Dr. Alday, the appellant did not appear to be
with the group when this doctor was seized and taken to different places; but he
it was who named the do, tor as the one to be kidnapped and he was heard
discussing the plan with his right-hand man, Juaning Perez. The kidnappers
gathered at his place and it was he himself who started them off after
furnishing them a car. He it was also who gave them firearms. Then, after the
gang had seized Dr. Alday and already had him in custody, appellant instructed
Juaning Perez to demand a large sum because the doctor was rich. And then after
the ransom had been paid, appellant sent word to the members of the gang to
leave their firearms in a designated place and go in hiding because the Army and
the Constabulary were after them. These facts leave no room for doubt that the
appellant planned, masterminded and even ordered the kidnapping of Dr. Alday.

Counsel for appellant questions the trustworthiness of the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses Sixto Fajardo and Gregorio Albes, and of his own
co-accused Blas Bejasa and Exequiel Silva insomuch as the said testimony links
him with the kidnapping of the two doctors. This, however, is a matter of
credibility of which the trial court should be the best judge, having itself
heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witness on the stand. And
the record, in our opinion, discloses no compelling reason for holding that
their testimony was not entitled to the weight given to it by the learned trial
judge.

After going over the record, we have come to the conclusion that appellant’s
conviction in the two cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 584 and 587) now before us is
justified by the evidence.

In Criminal Case No. 587, which refers to the
kidnapping of Dr. Alday, the Solicitor-General recommends the imposition of the
death penalty on the theory that the crime was committed with the aggravating
circumstance of craft because Bias Bejasa, one of the kidnappers, succeeded in
taking the doctor from his house on the pretext that he was to attend to a
delivery case. There is, however, no sufficient vote for meting out that penalty
so that the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed below must be allowed to
stand.

As to Criminal Case No. 584, which refers to the kidnap ping of Dr.
Quisumbing, there appears to be no question that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by the lower court is in accordance with law.

Prior to the submission of his brief, the appellant filed a motion for new
trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence and nullity of judgment.

The alleged newly discovered evidence consists of sworn statements of Blas
Bejasa and Exequiel Silva, two of appellant’s co-accused now serving life
sentence in Bilibid, to the effect, that what they testified in court about
appellant being present when the kidnappers left his place in Macalamcam bound
for San Jose to kidnap Dr. Alday was not true and that they had been induced to
so testify (by the Constabulary) through torture, threat of bodily harm and
promise of acquittal, Bejasa even going to the extent of stating that the fiscal
joined ir that promise. But statements of this kind would, presumably, not be
hard to get from criminals who, like these affiants, are already in prison for
life and have therefore little or nothing at all to lose by making a retraction
that would save someone from the same fate. And we have observed, as a matter of
fact, that resort to the use of affidavits of recantation for that purpose is
becoming rather common. Appellate courts must, therefore, be wary of accepting
such affidavits at their face value, always bearing in mind that the testimony
which they purport to vary or contradict was taken in an open and free trial in
a court of justice and under conditions calculated to discourage and forestall
falsehood, those conditions being, as pointed out in the case of U. S. vs. Dacir
(26 Phil. 507) that such testimony “is given under the sanction of an oath and
of the penalties prescribed for perjury; that the witness’ story is told in the
presence of an impartial judge in the course a solemn trial in an open court;
that the witness is subject to cross-examination, with all the facilities
afforded thereby to test the truth and accuracy of his statements and to develop
his attitude of mind towards the parties, and his disposition to assist the
cause of truth rather than to further some personal end; that the proceedings
are had under the protection of the court and under such conditions as to
remove, so far as is humanly possible, all likelihood that undue or unfair
influences will be exercised to induce the witness to testify falsely; and
finally that under the watchful eye of a trained judge his manner, his general
bearing and demeanor and even the intonation of his voice often unconsciously
disclose the degree of credit to which he is entitled as a witness.” Unless
there be special circumstances which, coupled with the retraction of the
witness, really raise a doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by him at
the trial and accepted by the trial judge, and only if such testimony is
essential to the judgment of conviction so much so that its elimination would
lead the trial judge to a different conclusion, a new trial based on such
retraction would not be justified. Otherwise, there would never be an end to a
criminal litigation and the administration of justice would be at the mercy of
criminals and the unscrupulous. In the present case, the affidavits of
retraction furnished by the prisoners Bejasa and Silva, considered with the
other circumstances of the case, are not enough to raise doubt as to the truth
of what they testified in court, which testimony is, moreover, merely
corroborative since there is already the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
Gregorio Albes and Sixto Fajardo which links appellant to the kidnapping of Dr.
Quisumbing end Dr. Alday and when taken with the other facts proved, leave no
room for doubt as to his guilt. In our opinion the said affidavits do not
warrant a new trial.

As to the alleged nullity of judgment as second ground for new trial, the
defense alleges that Judge Juan T. Enrique, who heard these cases and signed the
decision, was no longer judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas when
the decision was promulgated in that court on July 9, 1954, having been already
been appointed judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and such
appointment was effective on July 1, 1954. But the allegation is not under oath,
legally insufficient to destroy the presumption that official duty has been duly
performed, whereas the following excerpt from the brief for the Government shows
the factual basis for the claim of nullity to be inaccurate:

“The argument that the decision appealed from is void because Judge Enriquez
was no longer Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas on July 9, 1954
when his decision dated June 30, 1954 was promulgated is absolutely without
merit as being contrary to fact. It is not true that Judge Enriquez became a
judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on July 1, 1954, as pretended by
the defense for the records in the Department of Justice disclose that Judge
Enriquez’ appointment for the Court of First Instance of Rizal was submitted for
confirmation to the Commission on Appointments only on July 19, 1954, and the
same was confirmed on July 30, 1954. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that
Judge Enriquez took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
very much after the promulgation of the decision in this case on July 9, 1954.
As a matter of fact, a personal verification from Judge Enriquez confirms our
belief that he assumed office as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
after the promulgation of his decision in the Farol case. Furthermore, the
records in the Department of Justice also show that Judge Luis Reyes who
succeeded Judge Enriquez in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, only took
his oath as Judge of the said court on November 13, 1954. It cannot be
questioned, therefore, that Judge Enriquez was still a judge de jure of Batangas
not only at the time when the Farol decision was signed and entered with the
Clerk of Court of Batangas but also when his decision was promulgated. While it
is true that he was not present in Batangas at the time of the promulgation of
the decision, that fact, however, will not affect the validity of the judgment
because Sec. 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, specifically states that ‘when
the judge is absent or outside of the province his presence is not necessary and
the judgment may be promulgated or read to the defendant by the Clerk of
Court.'”

In view of the foregoing, the motion for new trial is denied and the
judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Paras, Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.