GODOFREDO S. GONZAGA, PETITIONER, VS. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND LOVSTED & CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

This Petition for Review is directed at the Order dated 29 August 1977 of the Secretary of
Labor in WCU Case No. 1480 (entitied “Godofredo S. Gonzaga, claimant,
versus Lovsted & Co., Inc., respondent”).

Petitioner Godofredo S. Gonzaga was employed for several years as a sales
representative of respondent Lovsted & Co.,
Inc.  On 15 January 1975, petitioner Gonzaga,
then 46 years old, ceased
to work for respondent Company, having been diagnosed six months
earlier as suffering from cirrhosis of the liver and diabetes mellitus.  This diagnosis was confirmed on 19 March 1975 by Dr. Joretta A. Moreno of the Office of the City Health
Officer in Bacolod who, in addition, advised
petitioner to “retire from
his work.”^[1] It was later determined that petitioner had
also been afflicted with rheumatoid arthritis.^[2] Further, on 23 October 1975, Dr. Antonio M. Habana, Compensation Rating Medical Officer of Sub-Regional
Office No. 6 (Bacolod City) of the Department of
Labor Workmen’s Compensation Unit (WCU), evaluated the extent of petitioner’s disability at “50%
N.S.D.  (Section
18).”^[3]

Having thus been forced into an early retirement, petitioner Gonzaga, on 20 August 1975, filed a claim^[4]
for compensation benefits (docketed as WCU Case No. 1480) with the WCU
stationed at Bacolod City.  The applicable law then was Act No. 3428 (the Workmen’s Compensation
Act), as amended.

On 27 October 1975, the Acting Referee of the WCU rendered a
Decision,^[5]
the dispositive portion of which read:

“WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the
claimant and respondent is hereby ordered to pay the following:

1.       To pay to claimant compensation in the amount
of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) pursuant
to Section 18 of the Act;

2.       To reimburse claimant
of his medical and hospitalization expenses incurred in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FOUR AND 30/100 (P104.30) and to continue to provide claimant with such supplies, services and appliances as the nature of his
disability and the process of his recovery may require and that which will
promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity, pursuant to Section 13 of the Act; and,

3.       To pay to the
Workmen’s Compensation fund care to [sic] this Office, decision fee, in the
amount of P61.00, pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.

SO ORDERED.”

The Decision of the Acting Referee in due
time became final and executory.  Consequently, on 2 December 1975, respondent
Company paid petitioner Gonzaga the amount of P6,104.30, in
compliance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the aforequoted dispositive portion.^[6]
Thereafter, respondent Company reimbursed petitioner from time to time his
subsequent medical expenses, in accordance
with paragraph 2 above quoted.

On 8 June 1977, petitioner Gonzaga filed a Motion^[7]
with the WCU claiming the amount of P886.00 which respondent Company had
refused to refund, and which represented the value of certain medicines
purchased by him for his continued
medical treatment.  He also alleged that
respondent Company had manifested it would no longer reimburse him any of his
additional medical expenses beginning 1 June 1977.

Reacting to the motion, respondent Company, in an Opposition^[8]
dated 14 June 1977, contended that the medicines for which petitioner Gonzaga sought reimbursement were for the treatment of
rheumatoid arthritis, an ailment which, respondent claimed, was “not
service-connected or service-aggravated and which did not cause [petitioner’s]
retirement from respondent [Company].” It was also contended that, under
the provisions of a then existing collective bargaining agreement between
respondent Company
and the labor union with which petitioner Gonzaga
was affiliated, petitioner’s right to
reimbursement for such medical expenses had already expired as of 31 May 1977.

The Regional Director of Sub-Regional Office No. 6 (Bacolod City) of the Department of Labor denied petitioner Gonzaga’s claim for P886.00,^[9]
citing the “finding” of Dr.
Eduardo Garcia, the Lovsted company physician, that the amount claimed by petitioner “represents
expenses for medicines which are not applicable to the illness of
the claimant such as cirrhosis of the liver and diabetes but are medicines for rheumatic arthritis.”

On 5 July 1977, petitioner Gonzaga
filed a Petition for Review,^[10]
with the Office of the Secretary of Labor. 
Acting on the petition, the Secretary of Labor, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Compensation Appeals and Review Staff, issued the following
Order on 29 August 1977:^[11]

“It appearing that claimant’s disability was as early
as October 23, 1975 declared by the Compensation Rating Medical Officer to
be permanent in nature to the extent of 50% – which means that the same
(disability) has already reached such point or stage
where no further medication or
treatment is clinically necessary.

WHEREFORE, his petition for reconsideration of the order of Bacolod City Sub-regional Office denying his claim for
additional medical reim­bursement should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.”
(Underlining supplied)

A
Petition for Review was, accordingly, filed with this Court on 16
November 1977, and given due course.  The
parties were required to submit their respective Memoranda.^[12]

That petitioner Gonzaga’s claims for compensation benefits up to June 1977 under the
provisions of Act No. 3428, as amended, had been granted in this case is not
disputed.  The present controversy has
arisen, however, due to respondent Company’s disclaimer of liability under
Section 13 of the Act, for petitioner’s further or subsequent (after June 1977)
medical expenses.  Respondent company
contended, firstly, that rheumatoid arthritis was not among the ailments of
petitioner Gonzaga which were considered compensable
by the Acting Referee of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit and, hence, that
respondent need not refund the amount of P886.00 claimed by petitioner for
medicines for his arthritis.  Respondent
Company contended, secondly, that whatever liability it had to petitioner under
Section 13 had already been terminated.

We are unable to accept respondent’s first contention.  The evidence of record clearly shows that
petitioner Gonzaga anchored his claim for compensation
and medical benefits in WCU Case No. 1480 on all three (3) ailments of hepatic
cirrhosis, diabetes mellitus and rheumatoid arthritis.  The first paragraph of the decision dated 27
October 1975 stated:

“This is a claim for compensation
benefits for an illness of ‘Hepathic Cirrhosis,
Diabetes Mellitus and Rheumatoid Arthritis‘ which claimant allegedly
contracted in the course of this employment
and [which] was found aggravated by it.” (Underscoring supplied)

In its second contention, respondent Company argued that its
liability for petitioner Gonzaga’s medical expenses
under Section 13 of Act No. 3428, as amended, ceased on 1 June 1977 or two (2)
years after respondent Company had commenced payment thereof, a two (2) year
limit having been agreed upon and stipulated in a collective bargaining
agreement between the Lovsted Company management and
rank-and-file.  In response, petitioner Gonzaga invoked Section 7 of the same Act which prohibits “[a]ny
contract, regulation or device of any sort intended to exempt the employer
from all or part of the liability created by [Act No. 3428, as amended].”
There is here, therefore, a fundamental question on the extent
and duration of the employer’s liability for a disabled employee’s medical
expenses, under Section 13 of the Act which in pertinent part reads:

“Sec.
13.  Services,
appliances and supplies.  — Immediately
after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted sickness and during the
subsequent period of disability, the
employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such
services, appliances and supplies
as the nature of his
disability and the process of his recovery may require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of
his physical capacity.

The word ‘services’ used herein shall include medical, surgical,
dental, hospital and nursing attendance and treatment as well as the proper fitting and training in the use of
appliances and the necessary training for purposes of rehabilitation; ‘appliances’ shall include crutches, artificial
members and other devices of the same kind, and the replacement or repairs of
such artificial members or such devices unless the replacement or repair is
made necessary by the lack of proper care by the employee;
and ‘supplies’ shall include medicines, as well as medical, surgical and
dental supplies.

In case the employer or insurance carrier cannot furnish the
aforementioned services, appliances and supplies promptly, the injured or sick employee
may acquire the same at the expense of the employer or insurance carrier.

x x x              x x x                 x x x.”

(Underscoring supplied)

In support of his claim for reimbursement in this case, petitioner Gonzaga
principally relies upon this Court’s ruling in Biscarra v. Repiblic,^[13] decided in 1980.  In that
case, Julio Biscarra, a former Assistant District
Forester of the Bureau of Forestry, was forced to retire in 1970 at the age of 58
years, due to diabetes mellitus, hypertensive
cardiovascular disease, arteriosclerosis, and chronic pyonephritis.  Upon
examination, the Regional Office of the Department of Labor declared Biscarra to be totally and permanently disabled for work and, in 1972, awarded him the amount of P6,000.00 as disability compensation.  Soon after, Biscarra
filed a claim for reimbursement of the amount of P7,183.14,
representing his medical expenses for the treatment of his ailments, which
claim was granted by the Regional Office.

Three years later or in 1975, Biscarra
filed a second
claim for reimbursement of medical expenses, this time in the amount of P4,965.41.  The Regional
Office once again approved the claim.  An
appeal, however, was interposed by the Republic before the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, which reversed the Regional Office and denied the claim
for reimbursement.

On Petition for Certiorari, this Court, by a split
vote,^[14]
reversed the Commission holding that the decision of the Regional Office (granting Biscarra’s
second claim for reimbursement) had already become final and executory, the appeal to the Commission not having been
filed seasonably.  The majority opinion
stated, inter alia, speaking through
then Justice later Chief Justice Makasiar:

“As will be seen from this law [i.e., Act No. 3428, as
amended], it imposes upon the employer the obligation ‘to provide the employee
with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery
may require; and that will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity.’ This law does not provide a maximum either as to the amount to be paid or the
time within which such rights may be availed of.  To sustain, therefore, the proposition that petitioner’s disability being
total and permanent, respondent’s liability to furnish him with further medical
and hospital expenses is terminated, would, in effect, qualify Section 13,
supra, by adding what is not provided in the law or subtracting what is therein
embodied which is legally impermissible.  This would constitute ‘judicial fiat.’ 
This Court, therefore, shall limit itself to the clear intendment of the
law.”^[15] (Underscoring supplied)

In other words, the majority in Biscarra held that the employer’s liability
for medical expenses under Section 13 of Act No. 3428, as amended, is without
any limit as to time or amount:  i.e.,
that such liability “subsists during the period of disability or ‘lasts as
long as the employee is sick.’”^[16]

The Court believes it is necessary to re-examine the doctrine in Biscarra, even though that doctrine relates to
Section 13 of the old Workmen’s Compensation Act, now superseded by the Labor Code.  There may well be a substantial number of
claimants or potential claimants of medical expense benefits under the old Act.

The benefits for disability granted under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No.
3428, as amended) are of two (2) general
types.  As correctly pointed out by the ponencia in
Biscarra, they are:

“x
x x (1) Indemnity
benefits in the form of cash payments which [are] designed to compensate
the worker for the loss of wages due to his disability
sustained or for his death; and (2) medical benefits in the form of medical
services, hospitalization, medicine and other matters related to the treatment
of the compensable injury or disease x x x.”^[17]

These two (2) types of benefits are
separate and distinct from each other in the sense that payment of one, where appropriate, neither includes nor dispenses
with payment of the other.

The first type of benefit represents compensation for income
foregone by the employee as a result of supervening death, injury or
disability.  Death benefits are provided under Sections 8 and 12,
while disability compensation benefits are
provided under Sections 14 (on total disability), 15 (on permanent and
total disability), 16 (on partial disability), 17 (on permanent and partial
disability), and 18 (on
amputation and non-scheduled disability) of the Act.  Under these provisions, the maximum amount of
the income benefit payable by an
employer for the death or physical
disability — whether permanent or temporary, total or partial — of an
employee, is fixed at P6,000.00.

Upon the other hand, the second type of benefit (for medical
services) — the subject matter of this petition — is covered by Section 13 of
the Act.  Under that provision’s first
paragraph (quoted, supra), an “employer or insurance carrier”
is made liable to a disabled
employee for the latter’s hospital and other medical expenses, i.e., for the
value of “such services, appliances and supplies” necessary for the
treatment of the injury occasioned at or as a result of work.  Liability under Section 13 attaches
“immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted
sickness” and continues “during the subsequent period of
disability.” Furthermore, the medical services, appliances and
supplies afforded the employee must conform to requirements dictated by
“the nature of his disability” and “the process of his
recovery;” they must likewise be capable of “promot[ing] his early restoration to the maximum level of his
physical capacity.” We read the latter requirements of the law as
intended for the rehabilitation of the employee as well as for his restoration
to his former state of health (i.e., prior to his injury or disability) in
such manner as would allow him to continue or once more to undertake gainful
work or employment.

The majority opinion in Biscarra
cited the cases of La Mallorca Pambusco
v. Isip,^[18] Itogon-Suyoc, Inc. v. Dulay,^[19]
and Cebu Portland Cement Company v.
Workmen’s Compensation
Commission,^[20] which held that the employer’s liability for medical expenses under Section
13 continues to subsist for as long as the injury or disability of the
employee remains uncured or unarrested.  We must
note, however, that the employees-claimants in those cases had each been found to be suffering from a temporary
disability (pulmonary tuberculosis), sustained medical treatment of which may
be expected to restore them eventually to the maximum level of their physical
capacities and render them once more
capable of and fit for gainful employment. 
Thus, there was no difficulty in applying Section 13 of the Act to the
three (3) cases cited above.

In Biscarra, however, as in the instant case of Gonzaga, the central issue is whether or not, or to what
extent, Section 13 of the Act may be held applicable in respect of a claimant already declared to be
disabled permanently whether totally (in the case of Biscarra) or partially, in the instant case
of Gonzaga.  In
Biscarra, Julio Biscarra’s
second claim for reimbursement of medical expenses was filed three (3) years
after a similar claim of his had already been granted by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission and five (5) years
after Biscarra had retired from his job in the
Bureau of Forestry, having been
clinically diagnosed as disabled permanently and totally.  Biscarra’s
disability being permanent and total, no amount of medical treatment could have
restored him to the maximum level of his pre-disability physical
capacity and could have made him again sufficiently fit for the work he had
previously engaged in.  In fact, Biscarra
never sought re-employment with the Bureau after retiring therefrom.  Thus, to impose upon the Bureau of Forestry liability for Biscarra’s medical expenses during his permanent disability was
in fact to impose unlimited
liability for Biscarra’s lifelong medical expenses.

Addressing the core issue, then Mr. Justice Teehankee,
in his dissenting opinion in Biscarra,
wrote:

“Upon the other
hand, where the disability is total and permanent, the employee’s total and permanent disability or incapacity to perform
gainful work is so declared.  (Cf. Fernandez & Quiazon, Labor &
Social Legislation in the Philippines, p. 595.) Thus, the employer’s
liability for the employee’s medical services and expenses in connection with
the injury or sickness that caused such permanent and total disability is ended upon payment of the P6.000. -maximum lump sum compensation therefor and of the medical expenses incurred in connection
therewith.  Section 13 of the Act can no longer be
invoked for the payment or reimbursement of subsequent medical expenses of the
employee after his retirement from
work as a result of his total and permanent disability because it is obvious that
such expenses are no longer curative and no amount of medical treatment can
restore him to his lost physical capacity for work or labor.

2.       It will thus be seen that an employee who
has been declared to be totally and permanently disabled and who has received
the maximum P6,000. -disability compensation therefor and has been reimbursed the medical expenses
attendant to the injury or illness
which rendered him so incapacitated
is not entitled under the Act
and more particularly under Section 13 to any further payment or reimbursement
for subsequent medical
expenses. 
The Act has never
burdened the employer, be it the government itself,
(and this has always been the official construction and implementation of the
Act as heretofore stated) with
the obligation of making unlimited payments for subsequent medical services and
expenses for as long as the
permanently and totally disabled employee lives.  Not
even in the case of the State as employer has such a limitless burden been
imposed, for the cost thereof would be staggering, if not altogether prohibitive, not to
mention that no provision for such an open-ended and endless obligation has
ever been provided in the budget for the half-century that the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission has been in force.  The employer’s obligation ceases upon payment
of the maximum and fixed P6,000. -disability
compensation for total and permanent disability and the medical expenses attendant  thereto
(which generally have amounted to about the same sum fixed as maximum compensation).”^[21]

(Underscoring supplied)

In a separate dissent in the same case, Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera opined:

“Moreover, ‘period of disability,’ as used in the OLD ACT
[Act No 3428, as amended], inclusion
of its use in
SECTION 13, must be coupled with employment.  If a person is no longer employed, he cannot have a
‘period of disability.’ Under the majority Opinion upholding the employer’s
liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, the employer’s payments will no longer
be during ‘period of disability.’ It should be clear, therefore, that
SECTION 13, according to the legislative purpose, is not [intended] to make
medical expenses payable after an employment has terminated.  If that is so, then LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES
should be held as not within the legislative purpose in SECTION 13.

(c)     Singularity of
‘period.’ In the term ‘period of disability,’ the word ‘period’ is in the
singular.  This is further proof that the
legislative intendment was that medical expenses will be paid for a single
‘period.’ Hence, several ‘periods’ of disability for LIFELONG MEDICAL
EXPENSES cannot be deemed within the intendment of the legislator in SECTION 13.”^[22]
(Underscoring supplied)

We believe that the above-quoted dissenting views in Biscarra are more consistent with the language
itself and the intent of Section 13.

We likewise note with approval the following statements of Mr.
Justice Teehankee where he pointed out that the new law, i.e., the state insurance
scheme in the Labor Code, which superseded the Workmen’s Compensation Act, itself eschewed the notion of unlimited liability for
subsequent medical expenses:

“4.     It must be borne
in mind that under the Workmen’s Compensation Act the employer is not the
insurer of the employee’s needs.  This is
not to say that the State thereby consigns the permanently disabled to the ‘scrap heap or to the garbage dump of human
derelicts.’

It is generally recognized that it is a prime concern of the State
to provide for the medical needs and services of the sick and for the
rehabilitation of the disabled and the
handicapped.  Precisely in pursuance thereof, the State has
established Medicare which provides for the medical needs and services of the
citizenry.  The New Labor Code has now
done away with the Workmen’s Compensation Act whereby the limited
responsibility to provide disability compensation and medical expenses devolved
upon the employer,
private and public, and in its place has adopted the concept of State insurance
of the employees’ health and medical needs and provided for an Employees’
Compensation Program administered by the Government Service Insurance System
for public employees and by the Social Security System for private employees,
by means of a compulsory coverage in the State Insurance Fund for all  employers (with even one employee) and their employees not over 60 years of age.  x x
x.

Under Section 185 [of the New Labor Code] which is the counterpart
of section 13 of the old Workmen’s Compensation Act, it is provided that
‘Immediately after an employee contracts sickness or sustains an injury he
shall be provided by the System [i.e., the GSIS or SSS] during the subsequent
period of his disability with such medical services and appliances as the
nature of his sickness or injury and progress of his recovery may require, subject to the expense
limitation prescribed by the Commission.’

Two (2) things stand out in this new provision of the New Labor
Code compared to the old counterpart provision, to wit:

(a)     The phrase in the old
provision (section 13 of the old Workmen’s Compensation Act) providing that the
employer will provide for the medical services ‘which will promote [the
employee’s] early restoration to the maximum level of his physical
capacity’ has been eliminated, meaning to say that the classification between
the different kinds of disability (total or partial, temporary or permanent)
for purposes
of medical services and expenses has been cast aside.  Hence, the former limitation that totally and
permanently disabled employees were not entitled to payment of their subsequent
medical expenses since they could no longer be restored to the maximum level of
their physical capacity for work has been eliminated with the result that the
totally and permanently disabled are now entitled to payment of such subsequent
medical expenses; and

(b)     Presumably by virtue
of the inclusion now in the new program
of such totally and permanently disabled employees and the uncertain expenses
that may possibly be incurred for their medical needs, it is now expressly
provided that such medical services and expenses shall be subject to the
expense limitation prescribed by the [Employees’ Compensation]
Commission.”^[23]
(Underscoring supplied)

We are not unmindful of the protection to labor and social
justice mandates of the Constitution rightfully and so eloquently espoused by
the majority in Biscarra; neither are we
unaware of the policy enjoining a more liberal construction of our labor and
welfare statutes, as would effectively protect the legal and just rights and interests of workers.  This Court and all other courts in the land
are of course bound to seek to realize these mandates to the fullest extent
possible.  In the performance of this duty,
however, courts are limited by the legislative will and intent, as expressed
in the law itself.  It is in this light and in view of the foregoing
discussions that we expressly adopt here the dissenting views in Biscarra, as the controlling basis for
resolving the controversy at hand.  ln so doing, the Court has not become less compassionate to
the disabled members of our working force or less sensitive to their plight; we
have simply opted to go back to what we believe to be the correct
interpretation and application of the law — i.e., Section 13 of Act No. 3428,
as amended.  We believe we have here
reached the limits of “judicial legislation” by interpretation and
must leave the task of enlarging the scope of benefits to the legislative
authority where it properly belongs and, which must be assumed to be just as
capable of compassionate consideration as courts are thought to be.  That the legislative authority, as noted
earlier, itself chose to re-enact in the Labor Code the principle of limited liability for medical expenses^[24]
which Section 13 of the old law embodied, confirms, to our mind, the correctness of the
interpretation we now adopt and suggests that the demands of compassion are not
always economically feasible.

Recapitulating:  we hold
that the liability of an employer for medical expenses under Section 13 of Act
No. 3428, as
amended, is not a liability for lifelong medical
expenses.  As a general rule, the “employer or
insurance carrier” remains liable for a disabled employee’s medical
expenses for as long as the work-connected injury or disability subsists.  Where disability is permanent in nature or is
incurable such that the disabled employee can no longer be restored to his maximum (pre–disability) level
of physical capacity for work or gainful
employment and the employment relation has been permanently terminated by reason
of the disabled employee’s retirement or resignation, the liability of the employer for medical expenses is limited to the medical expenses incurred during the illness which immediately or proximately resulted in the permanent
disability (whether total or partial) of
the employee.  Since such disability
might not emerge at one precise moment in time, but rather over a period of time during which the physical
condition of the disabled employee is clarified
and stabilized, the medical expenses incurred during that period must be regarded as compensable.  The actual
duration of that period of time must be reasonably related to the nature and effects
of the disabling injury or illness — a relationship best determined by the
physicians of the administrative agency concerned.

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we note that
petitioner Gonzaga, as early as 1975, had been
declared by physicians to be permanently
disabled up to 50% — i.e., a permanent and
partial disability, such that petitioner
could no longer have been
restored to the “maximum level of his physical capacity,”
as required by Section 13 of Act No. 3428,
as amended.  Petitioner of course could possibly have continued
his employment with respondent Company
as his disability, though permanent,
was nevertheless only partial. 
In fact, however, the disability of petitioner Gonzaga had forced him
into an early retirement at the relatively young age of 46 years; he had
in fact been unable to return to
work despite
having received continuous medical treatment for not less than two (2) years. 
Moreover, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission had already ordered the payment to petitioner in lump sum
— as opposed to payment in weekly installments — of the maximum disability benefit of P6,000.00, indicating that the realistic prospects of petitioner’s continued
employment, or re-employment with respondent Company were very slight
indeed, if not altogether nil. 
Respondent Company, therefore,
is deemed to have satisfied in full its monetary obligations to petitioner Gonzaga under Act No. 3428, as amended:  (a) upon payment to the latter of the P6,000.00 maximum disability benefit provided under the Act; and (b) upon
reimbursement of all his medical
expenses incurred within the two
(2)-year period — i.e., from 31 May 1975
to 31 May 1977 — stipulated in the collective
bargaining agreement then in force between the Lovsted company management and rank-and-file.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED and the Order of the Secretary of Labor
dated 29 August 1977 is hereby AFFIRMED.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., dissents.

Sarmiento, J., dissents,
see separate opinion.

Griño-Aquino, J., dissents on the basis of J. Sarmiento’s
views in “Jimenez vs. ECC”, G.R. No. 79193.

---

^[1] Original WCC Records, p. 2-b.

^[2] Id.,
p. 21.

^[3] Id.,
p. 54.

^[4] Id.,
pp. 9-10.

^[5] Id.,
pp. 66-70.

^[6] Id.,
p. 96.

^[7] Id.,
pp. 93-95.

^[8] Id.,
pp. 101-103.

^[9] ld., pp. 125-126.

^[10] Id.,
pp. 152-156.

^[11] Rollo, p. 11, Annex “A” of Petition.

^[12] Id.,
p. 49.

^[13] 95 SCRA 248 (1980).

^[14] Nine (including one agreeing in the result only) to three.

^[15] Id., at 258.

^[16] Id., at 259.

^[17] Id.,
at 267; citation omitted.

^[18] 3 SCRA 241 (1961).

^[19] 9 SCRA 199 (1963).

^[20] 10 SCRA 420 (1964).

^[21] 95 SCRA 248, at 284-285.

^[22] Id., at 301.

^[23] Id. at 287, 289.

^[24]
The limitation now simply consists of a fixed, expense limitation prescribed by the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission under Article 185 of the Labor Code, thereby
avoiding all further controversy on this matter under the new law, i.e., the
Labor Code.

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