G.R. No. L-17152. November 30, 1962
MINDANAO REALTY CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FILOMENO KINTANAR, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
BARRERA, J.:
L-12028 (Mindanao Realty Corp., et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines,
promulgated on November 25, 1958) upholding the right of the Republic of the
Philippines to immediate possession of the properties described in TCT Nos.
6350, 6351 and 6352,[1] the Mindanao
Realty Corporation on February 4, 1959, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Davao an action to quiet its title to the same parcels of land, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code and/or the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Named
defendants were the Republic of the Philippines (with claim ownership of the
same properties), Filomeno Kintanar, Eladio Enriquez and Bartolome Fernandez,
sued “personally and in their capacities as Chairman and members of the Board of
Liquidators, respectively”, the Register of Deeds’and Provincial Sheriff of the
province of Davao, for “their official actuations” in connection with the
alleged illegal deprivation of plaintiff’s properties. Essentially, the
complaint was predicated on the alleged illegal and improper seizure and
vesting, by the Alien Property Custodian pursuant to Vesting Order No. P-2, as
amended, of the 3 parcels of land as part of the assets of the Furukawa
Plantation Company, although the same were actually owned by Tadao Nambu, an
American citizen, and under the Trading with the Enemy Act were not subject to
seizure.
On February 28, 1959, the Solicitor General made a special entry of
appearance “in behalf of the members of the Board of Liquidators and the
Republic of the Philippines, without waiving the State’s right of immunity from
suit, and only to contest the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for by plaintiff.”
Thereafter, or on March 13, 1959, the Republic of the Philippines and the
Chairman and members of the Board of Liquidators, represented by the Solicitor
General, moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the person of defendants—the Republic of the Philippines not
having waived its immunity from suit and the Board of Liquidators not having
capacity to sue and be sued; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter—the action, being one for recovery of seized property under the
Philippine Property Act of 1946, should properly be filed in the United States;
(3) prescription—an action under the Trading with the Enemy Act should be filed
within 2 years from the date of seizure of the property; (4) pendency of another
action—plaintiff filed an action for recovery of same properties in the District
of Columbia, U.S.A., against the U.S. Attorney General, which was then still
pending; (5) bar by former judgment—the order to place the Republic of the
Philippines in possession of the lots in controversy, as a result of the
annotation of the Vesting Order No. P-2, as amended, on TCT Nos. 6350, 6351 and
6352, having been affirmed by the Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-12028, and became
final.
On March 14, 1959, defendants Kintanar, Enriquez and Fernandez filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint against them in their private and personal capacities
for lack of cause of action against them in such capacities.
By order of August 31, 1959, the court, overruling plaintiff’s opposition
that said motion was filed out of time, sustained their, contention and
dismissed the complaint against defendants Kintanar, Enriquez and Fernandez in
their private and personal capacities, for the reason that under the allegations
of the complaint, no judgment could be rendered to hold any or all of them
liable. From said order, plaintiff interposed the present appeal.
Insofar as pertinent to the herein incident, the complaint alleges:
“2. Defendants Filomeno Kintanar, Eladio Enriquez, and Bartolome Fernandez
are Filipinos, of legal age, and are being sued hereunder, personally and in
their capacities as Chairman and members of the Board of Liquidators, as
instrumentality created by Executive Order No. 372 for the purpose of assuming
the duties, functions and obligations of, among others, the National Abaca and
Other Fibers Corporation, a private corporation wholly owned and controlled by
the Philippine Government, which had the capacity to sue and be sued. Said
defendants may be served with summons at their offices at 220 Tanduay Street,
Manila.* * * * * * *
“4. Defendant Republic of the Philippines is a political government entity,
and has been included as defendant, by reason and as a result of the illegal,
unwarranted and unjustified claim which it had filed as alleged owner of
properties already duly registered in the name of and absolutely owned by
plaintiff and acquired by the latter under the transactions more specifically
described hereinbelow. Said defendant may be served with summons in care of the
Solicitor General, Manila.“5. Plaintiff’s present action is based on its right, as the absolute
registered owner and present possessor of real properties, to remove all clouds
on and to quiet its title to said properties, and to otherwise prevent any
interference with plaintiff’s ownership and possession thereof; and is
sanctioned by the new Civil Code and/or the Philippine Property Act of 1946, the
latter as applied and interpreted by the Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-12028
entitled ‘Mindanao Realty Corporation et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines et
al.’ in which said decision, said Court, expressly acknowledged plaintiff’s
right, as a registered owner, to commence the action or actions necessary to
protect its right as such owner.“6. On the basis of the claim that plaintiff’s properties are subject to
seizure as alleged former enemy-owned properties, which claim is false,
unjustified and illegal for the reasons hereinafter set forth, the herein
defendants have taken steps and threatened or are now taking steps and
threatening to arbitrarily diaposses plaintiff of its said properties, without
affording to plaintiff the opportunity to establish its right, as absolute
owner, to prove its ownership and its right to continue in possession of said
properties, as hereunder more particularly alleged.* * * * * * *
“22. The said orders of July 19, 1956 and January 28, 1957 issued by this
Honorable Court as a land registration court at the instance of defendants
constitute the only basis for the possession and control which defendants
Filomeno Kintanar, Eladio Enriquez and Bartolome Fernandez, as Chairman and
members of the Board of Liquidators, may assume and threaten to assume, over the
said properties of plaintiff; notwithstanding the fact that said defendants are
empowered to administer, control and otherwise take possession of, only
properties which are formerly enemy-owned.“23. As a consequence of the said orders of this Honorable Court dated July
19, 1956, afore-cited, issued in G.L.R.O. No. 317, directing the re-annotation
of Amended Vesting Order P-2, and its subsequent order of January 28, 1957,
defendants have unlawfully caused to be placed a cloud on the titles of the
plaintiff to the aforementioned three parcels of land by reason of a record,
claim, encumbrance and/or proceeding all of which, in truth and in fact, are
invalid, ineffective and void, and therefore prejudicial to the said titles and
to the property rights of plaintiff therein, as here-under shown.* * * * * * *
Plaintiff, through this action, seeks the following relief:
“(a) That this Honorable Court immediately issue a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction or restraining order enjoining the defendants from taking possession
of or in anyway interferring with the rights of the plaintiff to their
properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 6350, 6351 and 6352,
of the Register of Deeds of Davao, and particularly plaintiff’s right to
continue in possession thereof, upon plaintiff’s filing the requisite bond.“(b) That after due hearing, the said writ or restraining order be made
permanent.“(c) That the amendment to Vesting Order P-2 dated July 30, 1953 be declared
null and void, in so far as it purports to seize and vest the properties of the
plaintiff.“(d) That the Register of Deeds of Davao be ordered to cancel from
plaintiff’s titles to the above-mentioned properties, the annotation of the said
amendment to Vesting Order P-2.“(e) That the Register of Deeds of Davao be likewise ordered to cancel the
adverse claim filed by the defendants based on the said Vesting Order.“(f) That on the assumption that the above-mentioned properties were actually
vested and seized, that the defendants be ordered to make a formal return of the
same to the plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy
Act.“(g) That this Honorable Court declare plaintiff’s titles purged and cleared
of any adverse claim, lien, encumbrance, particularly of the said amendment to
Vesting Order P-2.”
The rule is well-settled that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of
action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged on the complaint must be
considered. Even admitting then the truthfulness of the averments of the
complaint aforequoted, defendants could not thereunder be held personally liable
for the above relief being sought by plaintiff. It may be observed therefrom
that the specific act or acts of defendants allegedly in violation of
plaintiff’s right consists of the assumption or threat to assume possession and
control of the properties being claimed by the latter (par. 22, of the
complaint). In that same paragraph, however, defendants were referred to as
“Chairman and members of the Board of Liquidators”. This clearly conveys no
other meaning than that the supposed wrongful act was committed or will be
committed by defendants in their capacities as Chairman and members of the Board
of Liquidators. As a matter of fact, nowhere in the complaint is there an
allegation of the perpetration or threat of perpetration of any act by the
defendants Kintanar, Enriquez and Fernandez in a capacity other than as such
officials of the Board of Liquidators.
The authorities cited by appellant, upon which reliance is made, merely
declare that a suit against the individual public officials is not a suit
against the government, so as to require the latter’s consent for the
prosecution of the action. Note that the cases cited refer to the officials not
only as individuals, but also in their official capacities. As such, it is clear
that they are proper parties to the action, as the government can only act
through individual persons. But their liability, if any, is only in their
official capacity, such that no judgment can be rendered to make them personally
liable in their private capacity, unless there is allegation in the
complaint that such officials have maliciously and in bad faith acted outside
the scope of their official authority. It is only in the latter case that public
officials may be held responsible in their individual personal private
capacities.
Such is not the case before us. The complaint herein has been ordered
dismissed as against appellees Kintanar, Enriquez, and Fernandez, only in their
private capacities because of lack of allegation to make them so liable in favor
of appellant. This is supported by the lack of relief asked for in the prayer of
the complaint as against these appellees in their private capacities.
Note that the other motion to dismiss (p. 33, Record on Appeal) filed by the
defendants Republic of the Philippines and these appellees in their official
capacity as Chairman and Members of the Board of Liquidators, upon the alleged
ground, among others, that the court has no jurisdiction over the said
defendants who were acting in their official capacity and as such, the suit was
against the Government which gave no consent therefor, was denied by the
lower court in its order of the same date August 31, 1959 (p. 117, Record on
Appeal). It is therefore clear that herein appellees Kintanar, Enriquez and
Fernandez continue to be individual parties—defendant in this case but in their
official capacity.
Wherefore, the order of the court dismissing the complaint against defendants
Kintanar, Enriquez and Fernandez in their personal private capacities, is hereby
affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
[1] By virtue of the amended Vesting Order P-2, dated
July 30, 1953, these properties, originally registered in the name of one Tadao
Nambu and later acquired by Mindanao Realty Corporation, were seized and vested
by the Alien Property Custodian as part of the assets of the Furukawa Plantation
Company, an enemy corporation.