JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

The main issue in this appeal is the validity of Ordinance No. 3,
Series of 1964, enacted on March 13, 1964 by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which was
declared null and void by the Court of First Instance of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in its decision dated June 29, 1966, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, this Court renders decision declaring Ordinance
No. 3, Series of 1964, to be null and void; making the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued against the defen­dant, Felix D. Soriano, definite and permanent; and further restraining
the defendants, Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., Lorenzo G. Suyat and Estanislao Andrada, from enforcing the said ordinance all throughout Urdaneta; and ordering the said defendants to return to the
plaintiff his drivers (sic) license CPN 017644, a copy of which is Exhibit D-1,
and to pay the costs of suit.”^[1]

From the aforecited decision,
defendants appealed to this Court.  The
antecedent facts of this case are as follows:^[2]

On February 8, 1965,
Juan Augusto B. Primicias,
plaintiff-appellee, was driving his car within the
juris­diction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta’s Muni­cipal Police asked him to stop.  He was told, upon stopping, that he had
violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “and more
particularly, for over­taking a truck.” The policeman then asked for plain­tiff’s
license which he surrendered, and a temporary operator’s permit was issued to
him.  This incident took place about 200
meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran,
Urdaneta.

Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court
of Urdaneta against Primicias
for viola­tion of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964.  Due to the institution of the criminal case,
plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for the
annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants
Municipality of Urdaneta,
Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada
from enforcing the ordinance.  The writ
was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from
further proceeding in the criminal case.

After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered the questioned
decision holding that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by
Republic Act No. 4136, other­wise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code.  Now, defendants, appellants
herein, allege that the lower court erred in:^[3]

“1.  declaring that
Municipal Ordinance No. 3 (Series of 1964) of Urdaneta
is null and void;

“2.  requiring the
municipal council of Urdaneta in the enactment of
said ordinance to give maximum allowable speed and to make classi­fication of
highways;

“3.  holding that said
ordinance is in conflict with section 35 par. b(4) of Republic Act 4136;

“4.  requiring that
said ordinance be approved by the Land Transportation Commissioner;

“5.  holding that said
ordinance is not clear and definite in its terms;

“6.  issuing ex-parte a writ of injunction to restrain the proceedings in
criminal case no. 3140.”

The Ordinance in question provides:^[4]

“SECTION 1 – That the following speed
limits for vehicular traffic along the National Highway and the Provincial
Roads within the territorial limits of Urdaneta shall
be as follows:

a.     Thru crowded streets, approaching intersections
at ‘blind corners, passing school zones or thickly populated areas, duly marked
with sign posts, the maximum speed limit allowable shall be 20 kph.

“SECTION 2 – That any person or
persons caught driving any motor vehicle violating the provisions of this
ordinance shall be fined P10.00 for the first offense; P20.00 for the second
offense; and P30.00 for the third and succeeding offenses, the Municipal Judge
shall recommend the cancellation of the license of the offender to the Motor
Vehicle’s Office (MVO); or failure to pay the fine imposed, he shall suffer a
subsidiary impri­sonment in accordance with law.”

Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being
“patterned after and based on Section 53,^[5]
par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law).” In so
arguing, appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by
Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transpor­tation and Traffic Code, which became
effective on June 20, 1964,
about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta’s Municipal Council.  The explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is
embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, to wit:

“Act Numbered thirty-nine hundred ninety-two (3992) as
amended, and all laws, executive orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations,
or parts thereof in conflict with the provisions of this Act are
repealed.”

By this express repeal, and the general
rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law,^[6]
appellants are in error in contending that “a later enactment of the law
relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law.” Pursuant to
Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, the ordinance at bar is thus placed within
the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not Act No. 3992.  The validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of
1964, must therefore be determined vis-a-vis Republic
Act No. 4136, the “mother statute” so to speak, which was in force at
the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias
for the violation of the said ordinance.

An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others,
that it “must not contravene… the statute,”^[7]
for it is a “fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior
in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.”^[8]
Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance
and a statute, the ordinance “must give way.”^[9]

Since the Ordinance is aimed at regulating traffic, Chapter IV
(Traffic Rules), Article I (Speed Limits and Keeping to the Right), consisting
of sections 35, to 38 of Republic Act No. 4136, particularly Sections 35, 36,
38 contain the provisions material to its validity.  Section 35, (b), Republic Act No. 4136, which
took the place of Section 53, par. (4), Act No. 3992, provides restrictions as
to speed thus:

A look at the aforecited section and
Section 1, par. (a) of the Ordinance shows that the latter is more or less a
restatement only of number (4), par. (b), Section 35.  As observed by the trial court, the Ordinance
“refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph
(b), Section 35,”^[10]
limiting the rates of speed for

“vehicular traffic along the national
highway and the provincial roads within the territorial limits of Urdaneta to 20 kilometers per hour without regard to
whether the road is an open country roads (sic), or through streets or
boulevards, or city or municipal streets with light traffic.”^[11]

As also found correctly by the lower court, the Municipal Council
of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its
thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38,
Republic Act No. 4136, which provides:

“Classification of highways. 
– Public high­ways shall be properly classified for traffic purposes by
the provincial board or city council having jurisdiction over them, and said
provincial board, municipal board or city council shall provide appropriate
signs therefore, subject to the approval of the Commissioner.  It shall be the duty of every provincial,
city and municipal secretary to certify to the Commissioner the names,
locations, and limits of all “through streets” designated as such by
the provincial board, municipal board or council.”

Under this section, a local legislative
body intending to control traffic in public highways^[12]
is supposed to classify first, and then mark them with proper signs, all to be
approved by the Land Transportation Commissioner.  To hold that the provisions of Section 38 are
mandatory is sanctioned by a ruling^[13]
that

“statutes which confer upon a public
body or officer…power to perform acts which concern the public interests or
rights of individuals, are generally regarded as mandatory although the
language is permissive only since they are construed as imposing duties rather
than conferring privileges.”

The classifications which must be based
on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that “no
provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or
resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in
this Act.” In this case, however, there is no showing that the marking of
the streets and areas falling under Section 1, par. (a), Ordinance No. 3,
Series of 1964, was done with the approval of the Land Transportation
Commissioner.  Thus, on this very ground
alone, the Ordinance becomes invalid. 
Since it lacks the requirement imposed by Section 38, the provincial,
city, or municipal board or council is enjoined under Section 62 of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code from “enacting or enforcing any ordinance
or resolution in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

Regarding the contention that the lower court erred in holding
that said “Ordinance is not clear and definite in its terms,” We
agree with the Court a quo that when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase “vehicular traffic”
(Section 1, Ordinance) it “did not distinguish be­tween passenger cars and
motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses.”^[14]
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that nowhere in the Ordinance is
“vehicular traffic” defined. 
Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness,
definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that “an average
man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain
whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of
conduct.”^[15]
In comparison, Section 35(b), Republic Act No. 4136 on which Section 1 of the
Ordinance must be based, stated that the rates of speed enumerated therein
refer to motor vehicle,^[16]
specifying the speed for each kind of vehicle. 
At the same time, to avoid vagueness, Art. II, Section 3 defines what a
motor vehicle is and passenger automobiles are.

On the issue of whether a writ of injunction can restrain the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3140, the general rule is that
“ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition
or injunction.”^[17]
Exceptions however are allowed in the following instances:

“1.  for the orderly
administration of justice;

“2.  to prevent the use
of the strong arm of the law in an appressive and
vindictive manner;

“3.  to avoid
multiplicity of actions;

“4.  to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights;

“5.  in proper cases,
because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid.”^[18]

The local statute or ordinance at bar
being invalid, the exception just cited obtains in this case.  Hence, the lower court did not err in issuing
the writ of injunction against defendants. 
Moreover, considering that “our law on municipal corporations is in
principle patterned after that of the United
States,”^[19]
it would not be amiss for Us to adopt in this instance the ruling that to
enjoin the enforcement of a void ordinance, “injunction has frequently
been sustained in order to prevent a multiplicity of prosecutions under it.”^[20]

In view of the foregoing, the
appealed decision is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Actg. C.J.), Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., santos,
Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., on leave.

Aquino, J., did not take part.

Abad Santos, J., concur. The ordinance in question was in effect a
speed trap for unwary motorists for which Urdaneta
had become notorious.

^[1]
Record on Appeal, pp. 50-51.

^[2] Ibid,
pp. 36-38.

^[3] Rollo, pp. 76-77.

^[4] Rollo, pp. 39-40.

^[5]
Section 53 enumerated the rates of speed of motor vehicles for the roads
classified in the said section.

^[6] Enrile vs. Vinuya, 37 SCRA
381, 382 (1976).

^[7]
Martin, Ruperto G. Public Corporations, 1977
ed., p. 140, Citing Cooley’s Municipal Corporations, p. 170, 171, and
U.S. v. Abendan, 24 Phil. 165; U.S. v.
Chan Tienco, 25 Phil. 89, 91.

^[8]
56 Am. Jur. 2d Sec. 374, p. 406.

^[9]
City of Basilan
v. Hechanova, L-23841, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 711.

^[10]
Record on Appeal, p. 45.

^[11] Ibid.,
p. 42.

^[12]
Art. II, Sec. 3(j), R.A. No. 4136 states that highways “shall mean every
public thoroughfare, public boulevard, driveway, avenue, park, alley and callejon, but shall not include roadway upon grounds owned
by private persons, colleges, universities, or other similar
institutions.”

^[13] Vda. de Mesa, et. al. v. Mencias,
etc., et. al., L-24583, October 29,
1966, 18 SCRA 533, 542.

^[14]
Record on Appeal, p. 46.

^[15]
56 Am. Jur. 2d Sec. 367, p. 394.

^[16]
Section 35(b) starts with “(s)ubject to the
provisions of the preceding paragraph, the rates of speed of any motor vehicle
shall not exceed the following…”

^[17] Gorospe v. Peñaflorida,
101 Phil. 892, citing 43 C.J.S. 768, 770; Lava v. Gonzales, L-23048, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 650, 651;
Ramos v. Torres, L-23454, October
25, 1968, 25 SCRA 557, 563.

^[18]
Ramos v. Torres, L-23454, October
25, 1968, 25 SCRA 557, 564; Hernandez v. Albano, L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95, 96.

^[19]
Homeowners Association of the Phil., Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City
of Manila, 24 SCRA 856, 858 (1968).

^[20]
6 MCQUILLIN 70, (3rd ed.), citing among others, Chicago v. Collins, 175
Ill. 445, 51 N.E. 907, 67 Am. St. Rep.
224; Holland v. Baltimore,
11 Md. 186.