JUSTINO LUCERO, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE LEON P. DACAYO OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH I, LUCENA CITY, LORETO UMALI, VICTORINO UMALI, SERGIO U…

Original petition for certiorari against the order of the Judge
presiding over Branch I, Eighth Judicial
District, Court of Agrarian Relations, maintaining the dismissal of Case
No. 700 of said Court, allegedly issued in grave abuse of discretion.

Justino Lucero, claiming to be the
tenant of one-half (eastern portion) of four parcels of coconut land owned by
Loreto, Victorino, Sergio and Felimon,
all surnamed Umali, petitioned the Court of Agra­rian
Relations (Branch I, in Lucena City) for a judgment
ordering, among others, therein respondents landowners to desist from ejecting
him (petitioner) from the landholding in question; to deliver to him his
alleged lawful share in the harvests from December, 1963 and there­after; to
make a reliquidation and accounting of previous
harvests, from 1949 to January, 1964; to deliver to petitioner whatever share
he may still be entitled under the law; and to reimburse him attorney’s fees
and costs.

In due time, respondents filed their answer traversing the aver­ments
of the petition.  Thereafter, the case
was set for pre-trial conference.

On August 6, 1964,
when the case was called for pre-trial meeting at 9:30
in the morning, petitioner was not present, al­though his counsel as well as
the other parties were there.  In view of
the assurance of his counsel that petitioner would come, the court declared a
recess.  However, as petitioner was still
not around when the session was resumed at 10
o’clock, the judge granted respondents’ verbal motion and ordered
the dismissal of the case with prejudice.

Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, with prayer that the pre-trial conference be set for
another date, alleging that petitioner’s failure to arrive in court on time was
for reasons beyond the latter’s control. 
This motion was accompanied by a sworn statement of petitioner to the
effect that he left his house for the court on August 6, 1964 at about 6:00 in
the morning; that as resident of barrio Quipot,
he had to walk a distance of about three kilometers to reach the town-proper of
Tiaong; that his trip through this stretch of road
was delayed because he was a sick man^[1]
and the road was under water caused by the rain of the previous night; that he
arrived in Tiaong at about 9 in the morning; that he
happened to board a baby-bus that made frequent stops to pick up and unload
passengers, and he reached the court in Lucena City
after 10 o’clock.

By resolution of October 1, 1964, the motion for reconsidera­tion
was denied, the court ruling that while petitioner’s late arrival for the
pre-trial meeting may be excusable, the affidavit of merits attached to the
motion failed to state the valid cause of action which petitioner intended to prove,
as required by Section 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.  The tenant, consequently, instituted the
present proceeding, charging the respondent Judge of having gravely abused his
discretion in refusing to reconsider the order of dis­missal of Case No. 700.

This petition is meritorious. 
The denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, allegedly for
non-compliance with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37, was
erroneous.  In the first place, there was
no sense in requiring that the affidavit of merits should state the plaintiff’s
cause of action, because that was already pleaded in the complaint filed in the
same Court.  Secondly, the provisions of
Rule 37, on New Trial, do not govern all motions for reconsideration based on
fraud, accident, excusable negligence or mistake; they are appli­cable only
when a party, adversely affected by a judgment already rendered in a case,
seeks to have it set aside and a new trial held, in the hope that the aforesaid
judgment may be reversed or modified on account of the evidence that is to be
produced.  For, if a new trial is indeed
granted, the original decision shall be vacated and the action is to stand for
trial de novo.^[2]  The procedure contem­plated under this Rule,
therefore, involves a reopening of the case for hearing, after it was already
submitted for decision and a judgment thereon was actually reached.  Since the reopening would necessarily affect
the party in whose favor the disputed judgment was rendered, the Rule requires
the movant to show the valid cause of action or
defense which he intends to prove at the new trial, to prevent this remedy from
being utilized merely to delay termination of the proceedings.

But in the case at bar, the proceeding below had not gone beyond
the pre-trial stage; the parties had not as yet adduced any evidence.  A postponement of the pre-trial to another
date would not have caused the respondents landowners irreparable damage or
prejudice.  The dismissal is the more
unjustified, because according to the lower court itself, the failure of
petitioner to arrive on time for the pre-trial conference was excusable.  In short, this is not an occasion for the
enforcement of the precautionary measure prescribed in Rule 37.  The motion filed in this case, being nothing
but a simple pleading for reconsideration of the order of non suit, need not be
accompanied by an affidavit of merits except to show the true cause of the
failure to appear at the pre-trial.

Considering that the granting or denial of a motion for re­consideration
involves an exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the strictures of
Article 24 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,^[3]
it cannot be gainsaid that there had been a patent abuse of discretion when
petitioner’s motion, which is meritorious and in due form, was denied.  The action of the court may be properly
questioned in an action for certiorari. 
The delays of an ordinary appeal render it an inadequate remedy in the
circumstances obtaining in this case.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted; the order of
dismissal, of August 6, 1964,
as well as the resolution of October
1, 1964, issued by the lower court are hereby set aside, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings. 
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Attached to the affidavit was the certification of a chest physician that
petitioner Lucero was suffering from a reactiva­tion of PTB at the apex of his
right lung.

^[2]
Section 5, Rule 37, Rules of Court.

^[3]
Art. 24. — In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvan­tage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be
vigilant for his pro­tection.