G.R. No. L-20991. August 30, 1967
RUFINO CIELOS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. BACOLOD MURCIA MILLING CO., INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in its
Civil Case No. 6453, dismissing the complaint filed by plaintiffs for the
collection of their termination pay, under Republic Act 1052, upon the ground
that their action had already
prescribed.
The facts of this case are not disputed. The herein plaintiffs and appellants, seven
in number, were former employees or laborers of defendant-appellee
Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc., hereinafter
referred to as company. The employment
of the plaintiffs was without a definite
period. The plaintiffs were members of
the Allied Workers Association (AWA), the labor union which had a closed shop agreement with the company, by virtue of
the collective bargaining contract entered into between them. Sometime in 1953, the plaintiffs and many of
their co-employees who were still members of the AWA, and while the closed shop
agreement was then subsisting, affiliated themselves with another labor union
known as the National Employees Workers Security Union (NEWSUN). Because of their affiliation with another
union, the plaintiffs, along with others, were expelled from the AWA; and upon
demand by the AWA from the company for their dismissal from employment pursuant
to the closed shop agreement, the company dismissed them from the service.
Some of the dismissed laborers filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice against the company before the Court of
Industrial Relations, while others simply received their termination pay and
did not join in the case against the company.
The plaintiffs also did not join the unfair labor practice case; and
neither did they receive the separation pay offered to them by the company, for
fear that their acceptance of the separation pay might prejudice their right
for reinstatement in the event that the unfair labor practice case filed by
their co-employees would be decided in their favor. It turned out, however, that the case was
decided against the complainants. In the
decision rendered on December 21,
1956, in G.R. No. L-9003, entitled Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., et al. v. National Employees Workers’s
Union, this Court held that the dismissal by the company, of those laborers who
were former members of the AWA but who affiliated with the NEWSUN during the
existence of the closed shop agreement, was justified and legal.
Having lost their hope of being
reinstated to their former employment, on January 25, 1961, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the
company, before the city court of Bacolod City, to
recover their separation or termination pay, pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act 1052, equivalent to one month’s pay for each, aggregating P863.00, as
follows:
Rufino
Cielos
——————————————————– P124.00
Carlos Zamora
—————————————————— 124.00
Pedro de los Reyes
———————————————— 133.50
Solomon Baylon
—————————————————- 120.00
Timoteo
Perez —————————————————— 120.00
Antonio Zamora
—————————————————- 121.50
Aquilino Palmes
—————————————————- 120.00
The
complaint further prays for the payment of legal interest on their claims from
the date of the filing of the complaint, for attorney’s fees in the sum of
P200.00, and for costs.
The city court of Bacolod
City dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint.
On appeal to the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, plaintiffs’ complaint was likewise
dismissed upon the ground that the action was already barred by the statute of
limitations. The trial court found that
the plaintiffs had been working for the company for a period of about five
years until June 16, 1954, when they were dismissed from the service; that the
plaintiffs were not given by the company thirty days notice of dismissal
before they were actually dismissed from the service, and that the company had
not paid the plaintiffs their separation pay equivalent to one month salary or
wages. The trial court, however,
declared that the action of the plaintiffs was barred, it appearing that the
plaintiffs were dismissed on June 16,
1954 and they filed their complaint on January 25, 1961, or after the lapse of six years
and seven months. The trial court held
that the action of the plaintiffs was barred under Article 1146, paragraph (1),
of the Civil Code, which provides that actions “upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs”
must be instituted within four years from the time the right of action
accrues. In other words, the trial court
held that the failure of the company to pay plaintiffs their separation pay
constitutes “an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs.”
The
plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court on a question of law.
The plaintiffs contend that their action
had not prescribed because the law applicable to their case is paragraph (2) of
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, which provides that actions “upon an
obligation created by law” must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action
accrues. In other words, plaintiffs contend that the obligation of the company to
pay them their separation pay, under Republic Act 1052, is an obligation
created by law.
We
find merit in the contention of the plaintiffs.
Republic Act 1052 provides as
follows:
“Section 1. In cases of employment, without a definite period,
in a commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishment or enterprise,
neither the employer nor the employee shall terminate the employment without
serving notice on the other at least one month in advance.
“The employee, upon whom no such notice was served, shall be
entitled to one month’s compensation from the date of termination of his
employment.
“Sec. 2. Any contract or agreement contrary to the provisions
of section one of this Act shall be null and void.
“Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.”‘[1]
Under
the provisions of Republic Act 1052, above-cited, the employer, in terminating
the employment of his/its employee, must perform one of two things: (1) serve
notice upon the employee at least one month in advance of the termination date
of the employment, or (2) if no notice of termination is served, to pay the employee one month’s compensation
from the date of termination of employment.
It is clear that this
obligation of the employer is one that is specially created by law. This obligation does not have to be
stipulated in the contract of employment.
It is the law that imposes this
obligation, whether the parties to the contract of employment like it or
not. Any agreement in the contract of
employment which would eliminate this obligation is contrary to law.
We hold, therefore, that the obligation
of the employer to pay one month’s compensation to his/its employee under
Republic Act 1052 is an obligation created by law, and the action of the
employee to enforce compliance by the employer of that obligation may be
instituted any time within the period of ten years from the time the right of
action accrues. We sustain the
contention of the plaintiffs that the law applicable to their case is Article
1144(2) of the Civil Code and not Article 1146(1) as held by the lower court.
The defendant, in contending that the action
of the plaintiffs is barred under paragraph 1 of Article 1146 of the Civil
Code, cites the decision in the case of Felix V. Valencia v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., et al., G. R. No. L-13715,
December 23, 1959, wherein this Court held that the cause of action of the
plaintiff which arose upon plaintiff’s separation from the service was barred
because the complaint was not filed within four years from the date that the plaintiff
was separated from the service – the date when the cause of action accrued. That decision is not applicable to the case
now before Us. In the Valencia case the
plaintiff, who was separated from the service but who was later reinstated
because the court declared his separation illegal, sued the employer for actual
or compensatory damages, nominal or temperate damages, attorney’s fees and
contingent fees – amounting to P229,509.00 — alleging that his dismissal was
the result of the malicious, illegal, unjust, oppressive and high-handed acts
of persons in the management of the employer corporation, so that the
plaintiff and his family had been terribly humiliated and had suffered an
irreparable injury to their good name, reputation, honor, social dealings and
prestige. The plaintiff in that
case did not sue for separation pay under Republic Act 1052. This
Court held in that case that the action of the plaintiff was one for injury to
the rights of the plaintiff, and because the action was instituted after four
years from the time that plaintiff was separated from the service the action was already barred.
The defendant also invokes the decision
in the case of Felix Abe, et al. v. Foster Wheeler Corporation and Caltex (Phil.) Inc., G. R. No. L-14785, November
29, 1960, where this
Court made an observation of the provision of Republic Act 1052, as follows:
“It is clear therefrom that this provision
on payment may only be availed of in case of failure to comply with the regulation
on the giving of the 30-day advance notice; that it partakes more of a penalty
for violation of the requirement, which is within the power of the legislature
to impose.”
and contends that Republic Act 1052 did not create any right in favor
of the plaintiffs. The stand of the
defendant cannot be sustained. Precisely
Republic Act 1052 has extended a protection to the employee in the sense that
if he is not served with notice of his dismissal one month in advance of the
day of his actual dismissal the employee “shall be entitled to one
month’s compensation from the date of termination of his employment.” Even
if the provision of the law on the payment of the one month’s compensation
partakes of a penalty for failure on the part of the employer to comply with
the requirement regarding notice, it cannot be disputed that the law has
created an obligation on the part of the employer in favor of the employee. This Court has ruled that compensation under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act is an obligation created by law and, unless the
claim for compensation is timely controverted by the
employer, the action for compensation may be filed within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues.[2] Similarly, We rule that the obligation of
the employer to pay separation pay under Republic Act 1052 is an obligation
created by law and the action for separation pay may be filed within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues.
IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
decision appealed from is reversed and another one entered, ordering the
defendant-appellee to pay the plaintiffs-appellants their
separation pay, with interest and attorney’s fees, as prayed for in the
complaint; and with costs in all instances.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
Republic Act 1052 was approved on June
12, 1954.
[2]
Pan-Philippine Corporation v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 101
Phil., 66; Luzon Stevedoring Co. v.
De Leon, G. R. No. L-9521, November
29, 1959; Manila Railroad Co. v. Perez and Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, G. R. No. L-21071, June 29, 1965.