JAIME MANLAPAZ, PETITIONER, THE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

For having allegedly extorted four packs of “Philip Morris”
cigarettes from Wilfredo Oliveros, petitioner Manlapaz, a
police officer in Malabon, was charged with robbery
under an information reading as follows:

“** That on or about the 13^th day of October, 1974, in the
municipality of Malabon, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a member of the Malabon Police Force then in uniform and taking advantage of
his position, with intent of gain, and by means of threats and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and extort from one
Wilfredo Oliveros four (4)
packages of Philip Morris cigarettes valued at P10.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Wilfredo Oliveros in the aforementioned amount of P10.00.

Contrary to law.”^[1]

After Manlapaz pleaded not guilty on
arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complainant (Oliveros) had executed an affidavit of
desistance substantially to the effect that the evidence at his disposal was not
sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.^[2] The motion was denied.  Trial
ensued, after which the Lower
Court rendered judgment finding Manlapaz guilty of the crime of light coercion, sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment of eleven (11) days of arresto menor.

Manlapaz appealed to the Court of
Appeals.  In that Court, the case had to be referred to a Special
Division of Five Justices because the members of the Fourth Division, to which
the appeal was initially assigned, could not agree on a verdict. 
The Special Division eventually promulgated judgment, its
conclusions having been reached by a vote of 3
to 2.  Justice Cuevas, with whom concurred Justices Griño-Aquino and Zosa, adjudged
Manlapaz guilty of robbery, not merely of light
coercion.  On the other hand, Justices Pascual and Villasor, in separate
dissenting opinions, voted to acquit Manlapaz. 
The dispositive portion of the majority
decision reads:

“*** IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, accused-appellant’s
conviction is affirmed but for the Crime of ROBBERY (not for Unjust Vexation) as
charged in the information, defined and penalized under Art. 294, par. 5
of the Revised Penal Code and there being no mitigating nor any
aggravating circumstance affecting his criminal liability thus subjecting him to
the imposition of the penalty in its medium period, he is,
therefore, hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day as the maximum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as the maximum; to
return to the offended party the four (4) packs of Philip Morris Cigarettes he
extorted from the latter and in case of inability to do so to indemnify
appellant in the amount of Ten Pesos (P10.00) representing the value thereof;
and to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.”^[3]

The case is now before this Court on Manlapaz’ petition for review on certiorari, to which
due course has been given, and in which the following issues are raised, viz:

“1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in considering the uncorroborated testimony of the lone prosecution
witness as basis for the conviction of petitioner when such evidence is
insufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and imposed on petitioner the
correct and proper penalty; and

3. Whether or not the instant appeal by
certiorari was filed on time.”

Basically, the petitioner would have this Court review and reverse
the conclusions of fact of the majority decision of the Special Division of the
Court of Appeals.  This is a function that this Court does not as a
rule undertake.  The established principle is that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on appeal to
this Court.^[4] There are, however,
certain exceptions to the rule, which the Court has recognized and accepted at
one time or another,^[5] these
being:  (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
Court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings of the Appellate Court are
contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based.

It is petitioner’s submittal that his case falls within one of the
recognized exceptions to the rule, more particularly, that the respondent
Court’s findings are manifestly mistaken or absurd.

The Cuevas (majority) Opinion considered as a “decisive” factor
against the appellant the fact that the complainant had signed and submitted to
the Trial Court an affidavit of desistance which the former had himself
personally or through another drawn up.^[6] It is difficult to perceive the logic of
such a conclusion.  The fact is that there is no indication
whatever in the record that the affidavit of desistance was other than a
voluntary and intelligent act of the complainant.  Indeed, its
submission to the Court by the fiscal himself, indicates that in the latter’s
view the affidavit was not in any way flawed.  And whether it was
prepared by the appellant himself or by another at his instance, as is the
admitted fact, is in the premises a circumstance of no moment, and cannot
detract from what appears on the record to be an essentially voluntary act on
the complainant’s part of signing the same and consenting to its presentation to
the Court.

The case turns upon the testimony of a single witness (the
complainant himself).  There is, to be sure, nothing extraordinary
about a judgment of conviction being made to rest solely on the sworn
declarations of one witness, so long as those declarations are otherwise
credible and convincing.  Except in treason cases, no requirement exists that corroboration of the
testimony of a single witness is necessary for conviction.  But in
this case the complainant’s testimony cannot, upon analysis, in any sense be
deemed credible and convincing.  His testimony is not only
contradicted by the evidence of the defense, it is also tainted by
unlikely and unusual contradictions.

Whereas his memory was avowedly quite strong at the time of giving
his sworn statement on October 15, 1974 specifically as regards the
individual identities of the three other police officers whom he implicated in
the offense,^[7] it was surprisingly
faulty only ten months later, when he testified before the Lower Court on August
8, 1975, at which time he declared that he could remember only the
name of Manlapaz, but not those of the other
three.^[8]

In his sworn statement of October 15, 1974, he declared
that it was Pat. Tadeo who had approached him to inquire as to who had granted him a
permit for beer to be drunk in his store.  However, when he
took the witness stand, he stated that it was Pat. Umali (not Tadeo), who had
approached him to make the inquiry.^[9]

Again, in his sworn statement of October 15, 1974, he declared
that Pat. Tadeo had called three (3) policemen to his
(complainant’s) store.  But on the witness stand on August 8, 1975,
he said that Pat. Tadeo had called only the
accused Manlapaz, and the two (2) other uniformed
patrolmen had joined them later.^[10]

In the same sworn statement he said that when called by Pat. Tadeo, the three (3) uniformed police officers were in the
restaurant drinking beer, but his testimony in Court on August 8, 1975
was that Pat. Manlapaz (the accused) was in the
market when he was called by Pat. Umali (not Tadeo), and that the two (2) other policemen were not with
Manlapaz, but were just strolling around the
vicinity.^[11]

Why there should be these many inconsistencies with respect to
what are otherwise non-controversial, prosaic details of the complainant’s
narrative not unreasonably engenders doubt as to the narrative’s
veracity.  Taken singly, these inconsistencies may not justify
rejection of the complainant’s testimony as undeserving of credit. 
Considered conjointly, however, they cogently conduce towards eschewal of
credence to his declarations.

Apart from these unaccountable contradictions, the record
discloses the complainant’s obvious bias against the accused?appellant. 
His testimony was that he would know Manlapaz
anywhere, even if “you turn out his skin”, because Manlapaz was arrogant and was “making (the cause of) many
cases.”^[12] In fact, his animus
against Manlapaz did not escape the notice of
defense counsel who at one point remarked that he was “*** trying to avoid
mentioning ***” (the other) policemen whom he had implicated in his
complaint.^[13]

On the other hand, no such infirmities are discernible in the
testimonial proofs of the defense.  Appellant Manlapaz’ assertion on the witness stand, that the four
(4) packs of cigarettes subject of the case had not been extorted
from the complainant, but had in truth been freely given to him and his
companions by a certain Efren Gatchalian,^[14] is
adequately corroborated by the testimony of Pat. Sergio Cruz.^[15] It is also in measure confirmed by the
complainant himself, who deposed that Efren Gatchalian, his compadre, had indeed been drinking
beer with appellant Manlapaz and his companions on
that occasion.^[16] The same Efren Gatchalian was mentioned by
complainant as an alleged witness to the robbery-extortion incident. 
However, it does not appear that any serious effort was made by
complainant to procure Gatchalian’s appearance to
corroborate said claim or to rebut Manlapaz’ assertion
that it was he (Gatchalian) who gave the
cigarettes.

As it now turns out, the complainant and the fiscal were correct
in moving for the dismissal of the case shortly after arraignment on the basis
of their assessment that the evidence at their disposal was not sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused.^[17]
The state of the evidence impels concurrence with that assessment, and a
pronouncement that the findings of fact in the decision appealed from are
manifestly mistaken.  The conclusion here reached and declared
makes unnecessary consideration and resolution of the other errors imputed by
the petitioner to the Appellate Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
petitioner, Jaime Manlapaz, is, on reasonable doubt,
acquitted of the crime charged.  No costs.

SO
ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano, JJ.,
concur.

^[2] Record, p. 33.

^[3] Rollo, p.
54

^[4] Sec. 2, second paragraph, Rule 45;
Baniqued vs.
C.A., 127 SCRA 50; Moran, Jr. vs. CA,
133 SCRA 88; Collector of Customs vs. Intermediate Court of
Appeals, 137 SCRA 3; Espiritu vs.
C.A., 137 SCRA 50; Premier Insurance & Surety Corp.
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 141 SCRA 423;
Director of Lands vs. Funtillar, 142 SCRA 57.

^[5] Collated from Tolentino vs. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 167;
Carolina Industries Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. et
al., 97 SCRA 734; Manero vs. CA, 102 SCRA 817;
Moran, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Sacay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593, citing numerous cases;
Director of Lands vs. Funtillar, et al., supra.

^[6] Rollo, p.
54

^[7] Exhibit “A”

^[8] pp. 4–5, TSN
August 8,
1975

^[9] p. 5, Id.

^[10] Id.

^[11] Id.

^[12] p. 4, Id.

^[13] p. 5, Id.

^[14] pp. 2-3, TSN September 10, 1975

^[15] pp. 9-11, TSN January 21, 1976

^[16] p. 7, TSN August 8, 1975

^[17] Record, p.
33