CITY OF MANILA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GERARDO GARCIA—CAMIENCITA VILLANUEV,A, MODESTA PAEAYNO— NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ÁSPERAS, MARÍA TABIA— SIMION DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS—…

City of Manila versus Garcia

The Case

This is an action for recovery of possession of real property brought by the City of Manila against twenty-three defendants who occupied city land in Malate, Manila, built houses of second class materials without building permits, and refused to leave when ordered to vacate. The City sued to eject them, to collect the nominal rentals due, and to clear the area for the expansion of a public elementary school. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's leading statement on squatting on public property: that a mayor cannot legalize forcible entry into city land by the simple expedient of issuing permits or leases, and that structures which obstruct a badly needed school building are a public nuisance that may be abated.

Procedural History

The City of Manila filed suit for recovery of possession in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the premises, to pay the amounts of unpaid rentals indicated against their respective names, to pay their monthly rentals from March 1962 until they vacate, and to pay the costs. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment under review.

Facts

The City of Manila owned parcels of land forming one compact area bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, covered by Torrens titles. Shortly after liberation, from 1945 to 1947, the defendants entered upon these premises without the knowledge and consent of the City. They built houses of second class materials, again without the City's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits. There they lived through the years to the present.

In November 1947, after their presence had been discovered, some of the defendants were given written permits by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso, each labeled a lease contract, to occupy specific areas upon stated conditions. Two other defendants received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente in January and March of 1948. The rest of the twenty-three defendants exhibited none. For their occupancy the defendants were charged nominal rentals, and by February 1962 the total rentals due amounted to seven thousand five hundred eighty pesos and sixty-nine centavos.

The Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School stood close, though not contiguous, to the property, and the need for its expansion became pressing. On September 14, 1961, the City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each defendant thirty days to vacate and remove his construction. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand in February and March 1962 for payment of the amounts due and for vacation within fifteen days. The defendants refused, and the City brought suit.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court properly found that the City needs the premises for school purposes.
• Whether or not the defendants acquired the legal status of tenants by virtue of the permits issued by the mayors.
• Whether or not the houses and constructions of the defendants constitute a public nuisance.
• Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over the action, or whether it should have been commenced in the municipal court under the one-year limitation for forcible entry.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, on the one-year period for actions of forcible entry, provides:

A person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, shall present his complaint within one year from the date of such unlawful deprivation of possession.

This bears on the fourth issue, because the defendants claimed the suit was filed beyond the one-year period and should have been brought in the municipal court.

Article 694 of the Civil Code, defining a public nuisance, provides:

A nuisance is public when it affects the health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the community.

This bears on the third issue, because the Court held that the defendants' houses, which obstruct the use of the property for a school building, fall within this definition.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court properly found that the City needs the premises for school purposes. The trial judge had initially ruled out the admissibility of the certification of the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, but in his decision he reversed his stand and cited that very document. The Court held that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice, and that the defendants' remedy was to bring the contradiction to the attention of the court, which they did not do. In any event, the trial judge was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566, because the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board, and that ordinance itself confirmed the appropriation of one hundred thousand pesos for the construction of an additional building of the school.

On the second issue, the Court held that the defendants did not acquire the status of tenants. They entered the land and built their houses without the knowledge and consent of the City and without city permits, and so they are squatters. The permits, erroneously labeled lease contracts, did not legalize their entry. The Court ruled that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits or executing leases, and that the permits granted are null and void. The Court said:

Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act.

On the third issue, the Court held that the houses and constructions of the defendants constitute a public nuisance per se, because they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth. They obstruct the performance of the government's constitutional obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education. The Court added that the public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction. The defendants' forcible entry dated back to the period from 1945 to 1947, and that entry was not legalized by the permits, so their possession remained illegal from the beginning. The suit was filed long after the one-year limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70, and so the case properly belonged to the Court of First Instance.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the Mayor of the City of Manila has no authority to legalize forcible entry into public property by issuing permits or executing leases; such permits are null and void, and squatting remains unlawful no matter how much city officials acquiesce in it. Second, structures erected without permits on city land which hinder and impair the use of that property for a badly needed school building are a public nuisance per se under Article 694 of the Civil Code, and may be summarily abated by the city authorities even without the aid of the courts. Third, where forcible entry into public land dates back many years and was never legalized by any valid permit, the possession remains illegal from the beginning, and an action for recovery of possession filed beyond the one-year period of Section 1 of Rule 70 properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not the municipal court. Fourth, a court may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice, and may take judicial notice of city ordinances as required by the Manila Charter.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, ordering the defendants to vacate the premises, to pay the rentals due and the monthly rentals from March 1962 until they vacate, and to pay the costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of city officials will elevate it into a lawful act. Examiners like to use this case on the lack of authority of local executives to legitimize squatting through permits, on public nuisance per se, and on the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over long-standing illegal possession of public land.