DIOGENES TUASON, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ISABEL ESTEVEZ DE TUANQUI, RESPONDENTS.

Tuason versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review by certiorari brought by Diogenes Tuason and the Director of Lands against the Court of Appeals and Isabel Estevez de Tuanqui, the judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Juan Estevez. The action below was one to remove clouds over real property, with damages and a prayer for preliminary injunction, concerning a parcel of land in Legaspi, Albay, known as Lot 109 of the Cadastral Survey of Legaspi. The estate claimed the lot as its own by right of accretion, as an addition to its adjoining registered land along the former Kapantawan River. The case matters because it is the classic illustration of the riparian owner's right of accretion under the Civil Code, and of the rule that land so formed is private land over which the Director of Lands has no authority to issue a patent.

Procedural History

The estate of Juan Estevez, represented by Isabel Estevez de Tuanqui, filed a complaint for removal of clouds over real property with damages and preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch Two, sitting at Legaspi City. The trial court granted a writ of preliminary injunction. After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. The plaintiff, through new counsel, moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The trial court granted the motion and received the new evidence. In the interim, while the case was pending, the Director of Lands issued a miscellaneous sales patent to Diogenes Tuason, and an original certificate of title was issued in his name; Tuason also mortgaged the property to secure a loan. On May twenty nine, nineteen hundred sixty eight, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the estate the owner of Lot 109, ordering Tuason to reconvey the lot and to purge the title of the mortgage lien, and ordering him to pay annual rentals. That decision became final and executory, and a writ of execution issued, but the writ was suspended when Tuason filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court denied the petition, and Tuason appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in its entirety, and denied the separate motions for reconsideration of Tuason and the Director of Lands. Hence the separate petitions for review by certiorari, which the Supreme Court consolidated.

Facts

The estate of Juan Estevez owned a parcel of land in Legaspi, Albay, registered under the Torrens system since nineteen hundred sixteen, and bounded on the west by the Kapantawan River. Over the years, the current of the river gradually deposited alluvial material along the western side of the estate's land, and a new parcel, Lot 109, was formed. The estate and its heirs took possession of the formed land and improved it, constructing a residential house with cement footings, which was later destroyed by a typhoon, although the footings and a toilet used by the estate's lessee remained.

Diogenes Tuason later claimed rights over a portion of the formed land. He had purchased a house constructed partly on the estate's titled lot and partly on the formed land, and he sought to construct an annex that would occupy the site of the estate's old building and toilet. He also applied with the Director of Lands to purchase or lease the formed land, on the mistaken belief that it formed part of the public domain, and he secured a building permit. The estate protested and filed the action to remove the cloud on its title.

While the case was pending, the Director of Lands issued a miscellaneous sales patent to Tuason over the land in question, and an original certificate of title was issued in Tuason's name. Tuason then mortgaged the property to secure a loan of four thousand nine hundred pesos. The trial court, after receiving newly discovered evidence establishing that the western boundary of the estate's land had indeed been the Kapantawan River, found that Lot 109 was formed by alluvial deposit through the action of the current of the river, and ruled for the estate.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there was accretion, and consequently in not declaring Lot 109 part of the public domain subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not granting Tuason's petition for relief from judgment.

Applicable Provisions

Article 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

Article 457. To the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

This is the provision the Court applies: it vests ownership of the gradual alluvial deposit in the riparian owner, which is the estate of Juan Estevez, and not in the Director of Lands.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found no reason to reverse the findings of fact and conclusions of the lower courts. The records indubitably showed the existence of a river west of the estate's titled property, as confirmed by the cadastral plans and by the testimony of a government official who plotted the development plan of Legaspi and of adjoining property owners. The Court held that the trial court's ocular inspection could not be given too much probative value, because physical changes may occur through the passage of years in ways an inspection cannot determine. The evidence showed that gradual accumulation of deposits by the current of the Kapantawan River had taken place after nineteen hundred sixteen. The Court therefore held that Lot 109 was formed by accretion and belongs to the riparian owner under Article 457. Consequently, the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction over it, and any conveyance he made of private land is null and void.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the lower courts that several notices regarding the submission of the case for decision had been duly sent by registered mail to the attorneys involved. The alleged excusable negligence for failure to claim the mail, because of a change of address without notifying the court and the parties, was not a valid excuse, considering the certification that no less than three notices were sent and that the addressee failed to claim them. The Court also noted that Tuazon did not state in his petition what evidence he would present that would probably change the decision, as the Rules require, so the petition was pro forma and served only to delay the case. The Court further observed that the denial of the petition for relief was no longer pressed, since Tuazon was subsequently allowed to appeal from the decision itself.

Doctrine

To the owner of land adjoining the bank of a river belongs the accretion which the land gradually receives from the effects of the current of the waters, by force of Article 457 of the Civil Code. Land formed by such gradual alluvial deposit is private land, and the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over it; any patent or conveyance the Director makes over such private land is null and void. A riparian owner's right of accretion does not depend on a title issued by the government, but on the operation of law upon the natural action of the river. And a petition for relief from judgment cannot rest on counsel's own negligence in failing to notify the court of a change of address, nor will it prosper where the petitioner does not state the evidence that would probably change the result.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in its entirety, with costs against the petitioners, thereby sustaining the estate's ownership of Lot 109 by accretion and the order for Tuason to reconvey the lot and purge its title of the mortgage lien.

Remember This

Memorize the rule of Article 457: the accretion gradually received from the current of the waters belongs to the owner of the land adjoining the bank, and land so formed is private land beyond the Director of Lands' power to patent. Examiners use this case to test the right of accretion and the nullity of a sales patent issued over private land.