THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BENITO DE LA CRUZ AND CIPRING DE LA CRUZ, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

People versus De la Cruz

The Case

This is People versus De la Cruz, an automatic review of a conviction for robbery in band with double homicide arising from a night of terror on a small island lighthouse in Samar. The People prosecuted Benito de la Cruz and Cipring de la Cruz for conspiring with three unidentified companions to tie up the lighthouse keeper, rob his home, and kill his wife and another man. The case matters for two reasons a bar candidate must hold: it shows how circumstantial evidence, when the chain is complete, can prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt even without an eyewitness to the killing; and it restates the strict test for alibi.

Procedural History

The Information for robbery in band with double homicide was filed in February 1969 before the Court of First Instance of Western Samar. After trial, the court convicted both accused as principals of the consummated crime of robbery with double homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Finding the aggravating circumstances of band and use of a motor vehicle, with no mitigating circumstance to offset them, it sentenced each accused to death, to pay the costs, and to indemnify the heirs of each victim. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case went to the Supreme Court on automatic review, and the Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty.

Facts

Melchor Bago, sixty-four years old, was the lighthouse keeper at Hinamok Island in Salvacion, Basey, Western Samar. At about five o'clock in the afternoon of October 29, 1968, on his way to light the lamp, he was told by a fisherman that some persons had disembarked from a motorized banca, which Melchor saw anchored offshore, painted green and yellow with a roof that hid anyone who entered. At the base of the lighthouse, a man crouching in the cogon grass stood up, followed by four others, all armed. They encircled him. Benito de la Cruz, holding a revolver, ordered the others to hogtie him and warned him not to shout or resist; Cipring de la Cruz took his bolo. Benito demanded the government-issued firearms. Melchor was then taken to a nearby cemetery, his arms tied to a tomb post and his feet to the fence, his mouth stuffed with cloth and a handkerchief. Before leaving, Benito asked which part of his house was open and told him they would kill his wife and return to kill him.

At about nine o'clock that evening, Camilo Saborrido, a fisherman whose house was near Melchor's, saw a motorized banca coming from the direction of the lighthouse anchor in front of Melchor's house. In the moonlight he saw seven men disembark and go uphill toward the house. The next day he saw the dead body of Edilberto Estriber on the beach, and the body of Melchor's wife, hands and legs tied to a piece of wood, a strip of rattan tight around her neck. Melchor was untied at ten o'clock the next morning and found his house in disarray, with a radio, cash, a flashlight, rice, canned goods, earrings, necklaces, suitcases, and a trunk of clothes missing, all valued at 1,313 pesos. The autopsy showed Adriana Bago died of asphyxia due to strangulation with a fracture of the hyoid bone, and Edilberto Estriber died of shock from wounds to the heart and lungs.

In December 1968, Melchor, accompanied by police, traced the boat along the shore to San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte, and identified it as the same boat, repainted blue. When the two appellants appeared and faced him, he recognized them and secretly told the police. They were arrested the next day. Cipring de la Cruz later gave a statement to the Chief of Police admitting he had been with the group, had tied an old man, and had left with loot, but claiming he and his brother acted under duress; he refused to sign it before the Municipal Judge. At trial both appellants set up alibi, claiming they were at a merrymaking in Tanauan, Leyte, on the night in question.

Issues

• Whether or not the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not Melchor Bago's identification of the appellants, forty-three days after the incident, was reliable.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in crediting the testimony of the Chief of Police and in admitting the unsigned statement of Cipring de la Cruz.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi should prosper.
• Whether or not the penalty of death was properly imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as applied by the trial court, provides:

Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

This is the provision under which the appellants were convicted, since homicide was committed on the occasion of the robbery.

Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, on circumstantial evidence, provides:

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

This is the test the Court applied to uphold the conviction without direct evidence of the killings.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that although there was no direct evidence that the appellants killed the two victims, the combination of circumstances produced conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Melchor testified that Benito asked where the firearms were kept, asked which part of the house was open, and warned that they would kill his wife. Saborrido saw the boat come from the lighthouse, anchor before Melchor's house, and seven men disembark and go uphill. The house was found in disarray, and Adriana was bound hand and foot in the same manner Melchor had been bound. Pieced together in point of time and sequence, these circumstances pointed to one conclusion: the appellants and their companions tied Melchor, went to his house, robbed it, and killed the two victims.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the attack on Melchor's identification. His failure to remember the names of the policemen did not mean he could not recognize the faces of the men who had maltreated him and killed his wife; the passage of forty-three days would not dim a memory shaped by such a harrowing and traumatic experience. The Court also noted that at that hour in October, objects and people are still readily discernible at short distances, and the appellants came close enough and stayed long enough to be seen and remembered. Minor inconsistencies, such as the time of release from the cemetery, enhanced rather than impaired his credibility, for they belied a rehearsed story.

On the third issue, the Court found no error in crediting the Chief of Police, who acted in the performance of official duty, with the presumption that official duty was regularly performed. The unsigned statement of Cipring was admissible as part of the officer's testimony; its general tenor was exculpatory, it named people from Tanauan unknown to the officer, and it was not the sole basis of conviction.

On the fourth issue, the Court held the alibi bereft of merit. It takes only about two hours to travel from the house in Tanauan, Leyte, to Hinamok Island, so it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene. The Court restated the rule that alibi must show it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the situs of the crime.

On the fifth issue, the Court found the conviction for robbery with double homicide warranted, with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and of having been committed by a band, and no mitigating circumstance to offset them. But because there was no proof of the value of the property taken or of the use of unlicensed firearms, the Court reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

Doctrine

Circumstantial evidence suffices for conviction when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are drawn are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove the accused was elsewhere; it must be shown that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the situs of the crime at the time. Official duty is presumed regularly performed, and an unsigned statement may be admitted as part of the officer's testimony where it is not the sole basis of conviction. Finally, the aggravating circumstances that raise the penalty must themselves be proven; absent proof of the value of the loot or of unlicensed firearms, the penalty cannot be raised to death.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of both appellants for robbery with double homicide but modified the penalty, reducing it from death to reclusion perpetua, with the indemnity to the heirs of each victim sustained.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: circumstantial evidence convicts when the chain is complete and produces moral certainty, and alibi fails unless physical impossibility is shown. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of circumstantial evidence under Rule 133, Section 4, and the strict standard for alibi.