FELIX MEDENILLA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE UNION C. KAYANAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, NINTH JUDICIAL DIS­TRICT BRANCH IV, LUCENA CITY, ANACLETO C. ALCALA,…

Petitioner Felix Medenilla instituted
on December 23, 1967 this certiorari proceeding praying for the nullification
of the order dated November 2, 1967 of the respondent Judge dismissing his two
petitions for exclusion of voters and condemning the petitioner herein to
reimburse private respondents the sum of P4,000.00 as attorney’s fees as well
as to pay the costs, and for an order directing the respondent Judge to receive
evidence with respect  to the petitions
for exclusion of voters, with costs.

On October 21, 1967, herein petitioner filed two petitions for
the exclusion of some 137 persons from the permanent list of voters in Precincts
Nos. 10 and 11 of barrio Villa Reyes, San Narciso, Quezon, on the ground that said persons lack the required
residence in the municipality, have not attained the legal age to vote and
cannot read and write, the same grounds he invoked when he challenged the right
of the said persons to register before the registration board, which rejected
the challenge.  Said petitions also
allege that notice thereof was served on the election registra­tion board and
on the voters concerned setting the petition for hear­ing on November 2, 1967,
accompanied by a sworn proof of notice of hearing to the effect that petitioner
personally sent by registered mail copies of said petitions and notice of
hearing to the respondents and that beginning October 22, 1967, he shall cause
the posting of at least three copies of the petition in three conspicuous
places in the municipality (Annexes A & B , pp. 7-12, rec.).  Said
two petitions were docketed as Election Cases Nos. C-03 and C-04 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV, presided over by the re­spondent Judge, Honorable
Union C. Kayanan.

On October 31, 1967, herein private respondents Anacleto C. Alcala, Amparo S. Lavides, Godofredo Tan, Proceso de Cala, Dante Diamante and Aguinaldo
Fontanilla, who were candidates in the No­vember 14,
1967 election respectively for governor, vice-governor, provincial board
members of Quezon province, and mayor of San Narciso, Quezon, as intervenors under paragraph (e) of section 123 of the
Revised Election Code as amended, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground (1)
that the petitions were not accompanied by the required proof of notice to the
registration board and the challenged voters as the registry receipts and
registry return cards were not attached to the petitions; (2) that the
petitions failed to allege the jurisdictional facts, for omitting to specify
which applications of voters were validated or approved on or before September 15, 1967, the petition for
exclusion of such voters being required by Republic Act No. 5178 to be filed
not later than September 30, 1967, and which applications were validated after
September 15, 1967, the petition for exclusion of such voters being required by
the said Republic Act No. 5178 to be filed not more than ten (10) days from the
date of the publication of such validation in the bulletin board but not later
than October 30, 1967; (3) that the petitions failed to specify the grounds
raised against each of the respondents; and (4) that the petitions violate the
provision of Republic Act No. 5178 requiring that such petitions should be
decided within seven (7) days counted from the date of the filing of such
petition under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 3588 (pp. 13-19, rec.).  The motion to dismiss likewise prays that the
petitioner should be condemned to pay treble costs and other incidental
expenses in connection with the proceedings.

On the scheduled date of hearing on November 2, 1967, herein
private respondents filed a “rejoinder” (should be supple­ment) to
their motion to dismiss, claiming that they were con­strained by the petitions
for exclusion filed by herein petitioner to pay P4,000.00 for the services of
their counsel to protect their interest as well as the right of suffrage of the
challenged voters who are poor tenants and farmers in barrio Villa Reyes, San Nar­ciso, Quezon, considering
that said petitions for exclusion imperilled the
right of said voters to vote and the victory of the herein private respondents
in the 1967 local elections; and that paragraph (d) of section 123 of the
Revised Election Code authorizes the respondent Judge to condemn the culpable
party to pay the costs and incidental expenses should it appear that the
petitions were filed for the purpose of molesting the adverse party and causing
him to incur expenses; and praying that the herein petitioner be directed to
pay to herein private respondents as intervenors in
the lower court the sum of P4,000.00 as indemnity for damages (Annex I, pp.
20-22, rec.).

At the hearing on November 2, 1967, counsel for petitioner, upon
his motion, was given twenty-four (24) hours within which to file his
opposition to the motion to dismiss and the “rejoinder” thereto
(Annex I, p. 61, rec.); but a few hours later, said peti­tioner’s counsel
entered the respondent Judge’s chamber and manifested that he chose not to file
any opposition any more and submitted the cases for resolution without further
argument (see Annex E, p. 24, rec.).

In an order dated November
2, 1967, respondent Judge sustained the position of herein private
respondents as inter­venors, dismissed the two
petitions and directed herein petitioner to reimburse the intervenors
the amount of P4,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Herein petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration dated
November 29, 1967, which as he himself admitted, was twelve (12) days after he
received the questioned order of November 2, 1967 dismissing the two petitions
and directing him to reimburse the herein intervenors
the amount of P4,000.00, on the ground that said order of November 2, 1967 was
issued without the intervenors adducing evidence to
support their claim and that adverse party referred
to in paragraph (d) of section 123 of the Revised Election Code as entitled to
reimbursement for incidental expenses are the challenged voters, and not the private
respondents who are merely intervenors by reason of
their being candidates in the 1967 local elections; and that the claim for
P4,000.00 as indemnity for damages is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
municipal court and not within the jurisdiction of the respondent District
Judge of the Court of First Instance (Annex F, pp. 27-29, rec.).

Intervenors through counsel filed their
opposition dated December 1, 1967
to the aforementioned motion for reconsideration of herein petitioner,
contending that:

(1)     Section 123(e) of the
Revised Election Code as amended allows a candidate who may be affected by the
proceeding to intervene and present his evidence;

(2)     the term “adverse
party”, as a consequence, in paragraph (d) of Section 123 of the Revised
Election Code comprehends the intervenors, who had to
intervene to protect their interests as candidates and those of the challenged
voters, who actually voted for them in the election of 1967;

(3)     the respondent court,
as an incident of its jurisdiction over an exclusion case, has wide discretion
to grant damages pursuant to the expressed statutory authority therefor under paragraph (d) of section 123 of the Revised
Election Code as amended, regardless of the amount actually claimed; and

(4)     more than fifteen (15)
days had already lapsed from the time herein petitioner was furnished copies of
the decision of the respondent Judge dated November 2, 1967 and therefore said
order of November 2, 1967 had already become final and executory
(see Annex C, pp. 30-33, rec.).

Herein petitioner filed a supplemental petition for reconsid­eration
dated December 4, 1967 stating among others that the seven-day period for
decision of exclusion cases is directed to the court; that the seven-day period
for decision should be counted from the submission of the case for decision as
the law does not require that the period should be reckoned from the filing of
the petition; that notice to the election registration board and the challenged
voters of the hearing may be made by registered mail or if the same is not
practicable, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place in the municipal building
and in two other conspicuous places within the municipality at least ten (10)
days prior to the date of hearing under paragraph (b) of Section 123 of the Revised
Election Code as amended, which period of ten (10) days had not been repealed
or reduced by Congress; that petitioner in making his notice of publication and
certification under oath as to his having complied with the required notice
merely followed paragraph (b) of Section 123 of the Revised Election Code as
amended; that when the challenged voters failed to appear on the first day set
for hearing the judge may postpone the hearing and may direct that notice
thereof be effected in such manner and within such period of time as he may
desire under paragraph (b) of Section 123 of the Revised Election Code as
amended; that the right of any registered voter to challenge the qualifica­tions
of a prospective voter should not be discouraged; that attorney’s fees are not
included in the term “costs and incidental expenses”; that costs are
not awarded in these cases; that there is no proof that petition was filed for
the purpose of molesting the respondent voters sought to be excluded as
evidence has never been taken by the respondent court in the proceeding; that
attorney’s fees under costs cannot exceed twenty pesos (P20.00) citing section
10 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; and that the order dismissing his
exclusion petitions without hearing is a violation of his civil rights and his
right of due process; and praying that the order dated November 2, 1967 be
reconsidered and that the case be set for hearing for the reception of the
evidence (Annex H, pp. 34-39, rec.).

In an order dated December 11, 1967, respondent Judge denied the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and on the ground that the order
of November 2, 1967 was already final and executory
before the filing of the said motion for reconsideration (Annex III-3, p. 27,
rec.) dated November 29, 1967, which was filed as admitted by petitioner twelve
(12) days after his receipt of the order of November 2, 1967 (see par. 10 of
instant petition, p. 5, rec.).

It likewise appears that in the local elections held on November 14, 1967, herein private respondent
Pelagio Aguinaldo Fontanilla was proclaimed mayor-elect and his opponent
Jesus Cortez, who lost by a margin of ninety-four (94) votes, filed an election
protest against him docketed as Election Case No. C-09 before the Lucena City Court of First Instance on the ground, among
others, that the protestee Pelagio
Aguinaldo Fontanilla
succeeded in registering approximately 356 persons, who are not residents of
San Narciso, Quezon as
voters in Precincts 10 and 11 of barrio Villa Reyes, San Narciso,
Quezon (Annex IV, pp. 78-86, rec.).

I

Because 137
challenged voters were not excluded, they actually voted in the 1967 local
elections for herein respondents Alcala, Lavides, Tan, de Gala, Diamante as well as for Aguinaldo Fontanilla, who were
candidates respectively for provincial gover­nor, vice-governor and provincial
board members of Quezon prov­ince as well as for
municipal mayor of San Narciso, Quezon.  As aforestated,
Jesus Cortez, the losing candidate for municipal mayor, filed a protest against
the election of respondent Aguinaldo Fontanilla claiming among others that three hundred
fifty-six (356) disqualified voters illegally voted in Precincts 10 and 11 of
barrio Villa Reyes, San Narciso, which number of
voters ostensibly includes the one hundred thirty-seven (137) voters sought to
be excluded from the permanent list of voters for said Precincts 10 and 11 in
the two petitions for exclusion filed by herein petitioner before the
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance, who dismissed such petitions
which dismissal is now questioned by herein petitioner before Us.  Consequently, the issue as to whether said
one hundred thirty-seven (137) voters should be excluded from the permanent
list of voters of Precincts 10 and 11 of barrio Villa Reyes, San Narciso, Quezon, has become moot
and academic, as maintained by herein private respondents.

It has been held that the proclamation of a winning candidate
renders moot and academic a mandamus suit filed by a candidate to compel the
provincial board of canvassers to recount the votes in certain precincts on the
ground that the election returns therefrom were
prepared at gun-point, for his remedy is to file an election protest.^[1]
By analogy, the same principle should apply to the instant petition, by reason
of the election and proclamation of respondent Aguinaldo
Fontanilla as mayor of San Narciso,
against whom an election protest was actually filed by the losing candidate.

Moreover, once a candidate is proclaimed elected, the law regards
the permanent list of voters as conclusive with respect to the question as to
who had the right to vote in said election (section 176(f), Revised Election
Code as amended), without pre­judice to the criminal liability of the persons
who voted despite their alleged lack of qualifications.  Criminal prosecution of the one hundred
thirty-seven (137) challenged voters was then available to herein petitioner
within two years from the date of the commission of the offense (section 188,
Revised Election Code, as amended).

II

As found by the respondent Judge, herein petitioner failed to
prove that he actually sent by registered mail copies of the petitions and
notices of hearing to the local registration boards and to each of the one
hundred thirty-seven (137) challenged voters in Precincts 10 and 11 of barrio
Villa Reyes, San Narciso, on October 21, 1967 when he
filed the petitions or that he caused to be posted such petitions and such
notices of hearing in the municipal building and in two other conspicuous
places in the municipality of San Narciso; because he
did not attach the corresponding registry receipts to the petitions he filed on
October 21, 1967.  Neither did he submit
such registry receipts and the registry return cards or the affidavit of
posting of the copies of the petitions and notices at the hearing on November
2, 1967, twelve (12) days after he filed the two petitions on October 21, 1967,
to refute the absence of actual notice which was one of the grounds invoked by
the intervenors in their motion to dismiss.  Instead of submitting such registry receipts
and registry return cards of affidavit of posting, petitioner submitted his
petitions and the motions to dismiss for resolutions without argument, after
abandoning his right to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss within
twenty-four (24) hours from November 2, 1967 granted to him by the respondent
Judge upon his own motion; nor did he submit evidences of actual receipt by the
challenged voters of the copies of the petition and notice or of such posting
when he filed on November 29, 1967 his motion for reconsideration of the order
dated November 2, 1967- after the lapse of about thirty-seven (37) days from
the filing of the two petitions for exclusion on October 21, 1967, which period
is more than sufficient for the registry return cards to reach the hands of
petitioner if he really sent on October 21, 1967 by registered mail copies of
the petitions and notice of hearing.

Again petitioner failed to submit documentary proof of such
receipt or posting, when he filed his supplemental petition for reconsideration
dated December 4, 1967,
about forty-two (42) days from October
21, 1967 when he filed his petitions for exclusion.

It is significant to note that petitioner’s motion for reconsid­eration
and supplemental motion for reconsideration respectively dated November 29 and December 4, 1967 did not allege that
the challenged voters actually received the copies of the petitions and notice
of hearing or that the posting of such copies and notice was actually effected.

Petitioner was not even able to submit such documentary evidence
at the oral argument on March 11, 1969
before US.  It was only on March 15, 1969
— over one year and four months from the filing of the petition on October 21,
1967 — that herein petitioner submitted to this Court registry receipts on
which appears stamped the date October 21, 1967 (see pp. 89-102, rec.).  But until this very late date, herein
petitioner has not submitted the best evidence of actual receipt by the
challenged voters, namely the registry return cards, and not even evidence or
affidavit of actual posting of the petition and notice of hearing.  And the genuineness of the registry receipts
is extremely doubtful; because if he had said receipts on October 21, 1967, he should have attached them
to the petitions he filed or submitted them at the hear­ing on November 2, 1967.

All these requirements of due process for the Court to acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petitions and over the persons of
the challenged electors as well as the registration board, were not complied
with by the petitioner, which non-compliance justified the finding of the
respondent Judge that the petitioner filed the petitions solely to harass or
molest the challenged voters and their candidates, the herein intervenors, which malicious intent became more manifest
upon a consideration of certain geographical and physical facts.

Barrio Villa Reyes is about fifteen (15) kilometers from the poblacion of San Narciso which is
about one hundred (100) kilometers from Lucena City
where the respondent Judge holds court. 
There is no road connecting San Narciso and Lucena City.  To reach Lucena
City from San Narciso, one has to take a boat to the
town of Tagkawayan which is about four hours by boat
in fair weather from San Narciso, and then from Tagkawayan to Lucena City another
five hours by express train or about seven hours by the regular train (p. 9 of
Answer and p. 13 of Annex 2, pp. 53, 94, rec.). 
Mails from Lucena
City to San Narciso
are transported by boat.  One can
visualize the great difficulty of actually serving copies of the petitions and
notice of hearing on the one hundred thirty-seven (137) challenged electors in
barrio Villa Reyes, San Narciso, or even posting just
three copies of such petitions and notice at least ten (10) days from October 21, 1967 to the hearing on November 2, 1967.  It would be harder still and most expensive
for the challenged electors, who are poor farmers and tenants, to be able to
attend the hearing.

Without passing upon the question whether Republic Act No. 5178
requires that petitions for exclusion should be initially filed only in the
municipal court, under section 11 of Republic Act No. 4730 amending Section 15
of Republic Act No. 3588, pe­titions for exclusions may be filed before the
justice of the peace court or the court of first instance.  Hence, as a matter of fair­ness to the one
hundred thirty-seven (137) challenged voters, herein petitioner could have
filed the two petitions for exclusion in the mu­nicipal court of San Narciso.  Instead, he
filed said petitions in the Court of First Instance in Lucena City
which is remote and not easily accessible from barrio Villa Reyes, San Narciso, the residence of the challenged electors.

III

Respondent Judge had likewise cogent reasons in holding that the
two petitions for exclusion failed to allege jurisdictional facts; because both
petitions omitted to specify the challenged voters whose applications were
validated or approved on or before September 15, 1967, and the date of the
publication in the bulletin board of the challenged voters whose applications
were validated after September 15, 1967, to enable the court to determine
whether the petitions were filed on time, as the law enjoins that a petition
for exclusion should be filed not later than September 30, 1967 against voters
whose applications were approved on or before September 15, 1967, and within
ten (10) days from the publication of such approval in the bulletin board but
not later than October 30, 1967 against voters whose applications were approved
after Septem­ber 15, 1967 (sec. 1, R.A. No. 5178).

Had the petitioner specified in his two petitions for exclusion
the dates of the approval and publication of such approval of the applications
for registration by the challenged voters, the court could have determined with
facility whether the petitions were filed on time, so that the electors whose
registration is being challenged beyond the period fixed by the law, will not
be unduly harassed and exposed to the necessity of incurring expenses
considering that, as alleged by herein private respondents, which is not denied
by herein petitioner, the challenged voters are poor tenants and farmers in the
distant barrio of Villa Reyes, San Narciso, about one
hundred fifteen (115) kilometers from Lucena City,
where re­spondent Judge sits.  Such
omission aggravates the malevolence of petitioner.

The respondent Judge, also had grounds in ruling that the
petitions were defective for omitting to particularize the corresponding
disqualifications raised against which specific voters.  The petitions, shotgun-like, raised the same
three grounds — ­lack of residence, non-age, and illiteracy — against all the
one hundred thirty-seven (137) challenged voters.  This circum­stance likewise accentuates the
mischievous intent of petitioner to unduly molest the challenged voters and
their candidates, herein private respondents.

IV

Then, too, the respondent Judge was not without reason in
concluding that the petitions violated Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5178,
which directs that such petition for exclusion shall be decided within seven
days from filing; because petitioner set the petitions for hearing on November
2, 1967, or twelve (12) days after they were filed.  If a petitioner is allowed to fix any date of
hearing, as argued by intervenors, petitioner could
set the petition for hearing on the eve of or on Election Day, thus affording
the Judge practically no time to hear and decide the petitions before the polls
close.

Contrary to the contention of herein petitioner, para­graph (f)
of Section 123 of the Revised Election Code as amended, provides that
non-appearance of a challenged elector at the hear­ing is prima facie
evidence only that the registered voter is fictitious, not that he is a
non-resident or below age or illiterate, which are the three grounds of the two
exclusion petitions filed by herein petitioner against the one hundred
thirty-seven (137) challenged voters.

That the seven-day period for decision should be counted from the
date of the filing of the petition, is supported by the pre­vious statutory
provisions on the matter, in view of the urgent character of such petitions for
exclusion, so that the challenged elector, who is qualified, may not be disenfranchized. 
Thus, under paragraph (g) of Section 123 of the Revised Election Code as
amended, such petitions shall be decided by the Judge of the Court of First
Instance “within six hours after the hearing and within ten (10) days
after the receipt at the office of the clerk of court.” Under Section 15
of Republic Act No. 3588, such petitions “shall be decided within fifteen
days after filing.” The right of appeal as provided for in existing
laws shall be available to any interested party.  Section 11 of Republic Act No. 4730 amending
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 3588 reiterates the same provision.

As above intimated, the primary reason why the period of decision
has been shortened is precisely because of the exigent nature of petitions for
exclusion to preserve the right of suffrage of the challenged but qualified
elector who is merely being harassed by the petition for exclusion.

V

Because paragraph (3) of Section 123 of the Revised Election Code
as amended authorizes any candidate “who may be affected by the
proceedings” to intervene and present his evidence in exclusion cases,
herein private respondents as candidates for provincial governor,
vice-governor, members of the provincial board of Quezon
province as well as mayor of San Narciso, should be
comprehended within the purview of the term “adverse party” in
paragraph (d) of said Section 123, who are entitled to an award of “costs
and incidental expenses,” when the Judge is satisfied that the application
for exclusion has been filed solely for the purpose of molesting the
“adverse party” and causing him to incur expenses.  Because of such authorization in paragraph
(e) of Section 123, the petitioner herein expected such intervention from the
candidates to protect the right of suffrage of the challenged voters, who are
their sympathizers and who actually voted for herein private respondents as
candidates in the 1967 local elections, and consequently to protect their own
candidacies.

By reason of such intervention, herein petitioner also anti­cipated
that the intervenors will inevitably incur expenses
consisting of attorney’s fees for their counsel, transportation, and food and
lodging for the challenged voters, who are poor tenants and farmers, had they
been duly notified of the petition in accordance with the pro­cedure prescribed
by paragraph (e) of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5178 in relation to Section
123 of the Revised Election Code.  It
should be noted that the challenged voters number one hundred thirty-seven
(137) and one could imagine the expenses for their transportation, board and
lodging should all of them appear at the hearing by reason of the two petitions
for their exclusion, since they will have to come all the way from their barrio
Villa Reyes, San Narciso, about four hours by boat
and about five or seven hours by express or regular train via Tagkawayan to Lucena City where
the respondent Judge holds court. 
Fortunately for herein petitioner, because of his failure to actually
serve copies of the pe­tition and notice of hearing on the said one hundred
thirty-seven (137) challenged electors or to cause the required posting
thereof, the expenses of herein intervenors were
minimized.

VI

Generally, attorney’s fees are not recoverable as costs unless
expressly provided by the law or imposed by the Judge as costs.^[2]

Section 6 of Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
“no attorney’s fees shall be passed as costs against the adverse party,
except as provided by the Rules of Civil Law. 
xx xx.”

Before the
adoption of the new Civil Code, the uniform jurisprudence was to the effect
that attorney’s fees are not proper elements of damages and it was not a sound
policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate, unless there is an
expressed stipulation to that effect.^[3]

Article 2208 of the new Civil Code authorizes attorney’s fees in
eleven (11) exceptional cases, among which are (1) in a case of clearly
unfounded civil action or proceeding and (2) when the court deems it just and
equitable to award attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.^[4]

As above demonstrated, the respondent Judge found, from the
failure of herein petitioner to submit proof of actual service of copies of the
petitions and notice of hearing on the challenged voters and the registration
board of San Narciso, that herein peti­tioner
instituted the two exclusion petitions for the sole purpose of molesting the
challenged voters and herein intervenors and causing
them to incur expenses, considering that the challenged electors come from a
remote and not easily accessible barrio about one hundred fifteen (115)
kilometers from Lucena City.

However, it is required that there is need of proof as to the
amount of damages for attorney’s fees.^[5]
And Article 2208 of the Civil Code enjoins that in “all cases, the
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.”

To determine the amount of attorney’s fees, the following factors
should be considered:  (1) amount and
character of the services rendered; (2) labor, time and trouble involved; (3)
nature and importance of the litigation or business for which services are
rendered; (4) responsibility imposed; (5) amount of money or value of property
affected by the controversy; (6) skill and experience called for in the
performance of the services; (7) professional character and social standing of
the attorney; (8) results secured; and (9) whether or not the fee is absolute
or contingent^[6]
­always subject to the principle that the award of attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation rest with the discretion of the court,^[7]
which may decree the same whenever it deems it just and equitable.  This discretion may be exercised by the
appellate court even when the trial court did not provide for attorney’s fees
and no appeal was interposed on this score before the appellate tribunal.^[8]

While it is true that there was no proof of the amount of
attorney’s fees actually paid or to be paid by herein private re­spondents as intervenors in these two exclusion cases involving one
hundred thirty-seven (137) registered electors, the fact that herein private
respondents prayed for attorney’s fees in their “rejoinder” to their
motion to dismiss shows that the services of counsel of herein private
respondents were rendered not gratis et amore.  Considering the aforementioned factors
enumerated in the case of Umipig, supra, we believe
that herein private respond­ents have the right to recover attorney’s fees in
the reasonable amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) as well as costs.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner is hereby directed to pay herein
private respondents attorney’s fees in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00).  Thus modified, the order
dated November 2, 1967 of
the respondent Judge is hereby affirmed in all other respects.   With costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., in the result.

Dizon and
Ruiz Castro, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
Castillo vs. Prov. Board of Canvassers,
L-22765 &
L-24038, Jan. 30, 1965.

^[2]
Belamino, et.
al. vs. Alihan, 56 O.G. 6935; Montero vs.
Guerrero, L-12579, June 30, 1960.

^[3]
Reyes, et. al. vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 964; Koster,
Inc. vs. Zulueta, 99 Phil. 945; Barreto vs. Arevalo, et.
al., 99 Phil. 771.

^[4]
Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo,
L-16396, Jan. 31, 1963;
Reyes, et.al. vs. Yatco,
supra; Koster, Inc. vs. Zulueta, supra; Barreto vs.
Arevalo, et. al., supra; Firestone, etc. vs.
Chavez & Co., Ltd., et, al., 64 O.G. 1758; Castueras
vs. Bayona, L-13657, Oct. 16, 1959; Eastboard vs. Ysmael &
Co., Inc., 102 Phil. 102; Chuy vs. Phil. Am.
Life, 95 Phil. 282.

^[5]
Warner, Barnes, & Co., Ltd. vs. Luzon Surety,
95 Phil. 924.

^[6]
Umipig, et. al. vs. Degala,
et. al., 96 Phil. 77.

^[7]
Guitarte vs. Sabato,
et. al., 107 Phil. 437.

^[8]
Fores vs. Miranda, 105 Phil. 266.