CHUG SIU AND TERESITA B. HADLOC, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from an order of dismissal of the lower court of a complaint
wherein plaintiffs, now appellants, sued
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila “to cause the birth certificates of the children of the plaintiffs
corrected or changed in the manner explained and prayed for * * *.”

The complaint was filed on
May 29, 1962, plaintiffs Chug Siu and Teresita B Hadloc alleging that
they “are of legal age,
common-law spouses, Chinese and Filipino respectively by nationality, and they
reside at 1560 Zurbaran, Sta. Cruz, Manila; and the
defendant Local Civil Registrar of Manila, a duly appointed public officer, is sued in his official
capacity * * *.”

Then came the allegation that plaintiffs are the parents of five
(5) children all born in the City of Manila,
with their respective names, Guia, Corazon, Matilde, Manuel and Leticia, dates of birth, and birth
registry numbers being stated (par. 2). 
The alleged errors contained in the birth certificates were set forth in
the next paragraph, to the effect that
being children and brothers of full-blood born of the same parents, Guia was registered as
legitimate, but not the other four, who are registered as illegitimate;
that while as appears from the birth certificates of all five (5) children the
nationality of their mother was correctly
given as Filipino, the birth certificates of Corazon and Matilde
described them as of Chinese nationality; that the plaintiffs not being legally
married, the civil status of the mother in the birth certificate of Guia should be corrected to read “single”; that there are
errors in spelling of the family name or surname “Chug” in all five
(5) birth certificates likewise calling for corrections.  (par. 3).

The
complaint further stated that the above mistakes “must have been
inadvertently committed when the mother, the herein plaintiff Teresita Hadloc, was weak and in
con­finement due to childbirth or when the members of her house­hold, from whom
the physician or midwife got the data con­cerning said
children, were in a state of excitement or worry or were deeply engrossed in
attending to the mother’s weakened condition at the time.”  (par. 4).

Then
came the claim that “such mistakes or errors were explained to defendant
Local Civil Registrar of Manila, but notwithstanding repeated demands made on
him to change the names, he refused on the plea that he could not do so without
a judicial order and, hence, the instant civil action.” (par.
5).

The Deputy Local Civil
Registrar on May 31, 1962 answered with an admission as to the circumstances of the parties, the assertion of lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the veracity of the averments made in the other paragraphs
of the complaint and the allegation of lack of “power or authority to make
the corrections or changes desired by the Plaintiffs in the documents mentioned
in the Complaint in the absence of a judicial order to that effect.”

The Solicitor General on July 10,
1962 filed an
opposition and after referring to judicial decisions to the effect that the
summary proceeding for correction contemplated in Art. 412 of the New Civil
Code is limited to matters “that are not substantial in nature which do
not affect the status and citizenship of the persons involved,”
asserted:  “The foregoing changes as
sought in the instant complaint are no doubt substantial and controversial in
nature and, as such, they could only be threshed out in an appropriate action
specially instituted for the purpose, and not in a proceeding to correct
mistakes or clerical errors under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.”

After a rejoinder to the
opposition was filed by plaintiffs on July 9, 1962, the lower court in the order appealed from
granted the plea for dismissal made by the Solicitor-General.

The
lower court acted correctly.  It was the
settled law as of October 23, 1962 when the above
order was promulgated that a summary petition as authorized by Article 412 of
the New Civil Code does not lie where the matter “concerns the citizenship
not only of petitioner but of his children.”  There is need for its being “threshed
out in an appropriate action.”  So it
was held in the leading case of Ty Kong Tin v.
Republic.^[1]  The above doctrine was followed in Ansaldo v. Republic,^[2] Black v. Republic,^[3] Tan Su v.
Republic,^[4] Bantoto Coo v. Republic,^[5] and Barillo v. Republic,^[6]

That is still the settled law today, as is clear from the
subsequent decisions, the last one of which was rendered in April of 1966.  The decisions follow:  San Luis de Castro v. Republic,^[7] Liu Lin v.
Republic,^[8] Obeso Beduya v. Republic,^[9] Reyes v. Republic^[10]
David v.
Republic,^[11] Calicdan Baybayan v. Republic,^[12]
and Tan v. Republic,^[13]
As the Baybayan decision so aptly puts it:  “The decision must be reversed.  It has been the uniform jurisprudence
of this Court, since Ty Kong Tin v. Republic (1954)
94 Phil. 321, that substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and
citizenship of a person in the Civil Registry Records, can not be
ordered by the court unless first threshed out in an ‘appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented’ (see
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court), and that the summary
proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code only justify an order to
correct innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors
that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding.”

If all that is sought by plaintiffs in this case is the correction of a
clearly misspelled name, then the order of dismissal by the lower court might
be subject to appropriate challenge.  As
noted in the opposition of the Solicitor General however, what is “sought
in the instant complaint of authorities will involve not only a change of names, but it likewise
affects the status and citizenships not only of the minors whose birth
certificates are
herein sought to be corrected, but also of their respective parents.“

One of the most emphatic affirmations against the utilization of
this mode of procedure to obtain a judicial declaration of citizenship comes
from the pen of former Chief Justice Bengzon in the
above cited 1964 decision of Reyes v. Republic. 
Thus:  “The case before us is
not of first impression.  We have repeatedly declared that in
this jurisdiction, the remedy sought in the instant petition cannot be granted
in the manner desired.  While ostensibly,
the action seeks a mere correction
of an entry in the Civil Registry, in effect, it requests the judicial
declaration of Philippine citizenship. 
Many such cases this Court has dismissed.  We have clearly stated time and again, that
declaratory relief is not available for the purpose of obtaining a judicial
declaration of citizenship.”

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal by the lower court is
affirmed.  With costs.

Reyes, JBL, Acting C.J., Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

^[1]
94 Phil. 321, February 5, 1954

^[2]
L-10226, February 14, 1958

^[3]L-10869,
November 28, 1958

^[4]
L-12140, April 29, 1959

^[5]
L-14978, May 23, 1961

^[6]
L-14823, December 28, 1961

^[7]
L-17431, April 30, 1963

^[8]
L-18213, December 24, 1963

^[9]
L-17639, May 29, 1964

^[10]
L-17642, November 27, 1964

^[11]
L-21316, November 29, 1965

^[12]
L-20717, March 18, 1966

^[13]
L-19847, April 29, 1966