ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC AND BRIGIDA ALLONES, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE NELLY L. ROMERO VALDELLON, ETC., RIZAL PROVINCIAL SHERIFF AND …

The basic issue in this case is whether or not Judge Nelly L.
Romero Valdellon of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII,
committed a grave abuse of discretion by declaring petitioners Reynaldo P.
Dimayacyac and Brigida Allones, defendants in Civil Case No. 29061, in default
and rendering judgment against Dimayacyac under the circumstances recited
hereunder.

Brigida Allones and Alfredo Barro were co-owners in equal shares
of a parcel of land situated on P. Guanzon St., Makati, Metro Manila, with an
area of one hundred and fifty (150) square meters.  Allones sold her share to Reynaldo P.
Dimayacyac allegedly for P30,000. 
Subsequently, Barro filed Civil Case No. 29061 against Dimayacyac and
Allones in order to exercise his right of redemption.  The defendants filed their joint answer with
counterclaim within the reglementary period after which the plaintiff filed an
answer to the counterclaim.  Issues
having been joined, Judge Valdellon set the pre-trial conference on July 26,
1978, and directed the parties to file their pre-trial briefs three days before
that date.  Defendants failed to file
their pre-trial brief as ordered but on July 26, 1978, they attended the
pre-trial conference and tendered their pre-trial brief with an explanation for
the delay in its submission.  The tender
was not accepted and upon motion of the plaintiff’s counsel, the defendants
were declared in default and the court allowed the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte.  Even
then defendants filed their pre-trial brief with the Clerk of Court and filed
the next day an urgent motion to set aside the order of default with
supplemental petition for reconsideration. 
The motion was denied.

On August 7, 1978, Judge Valdellon rendered a decision ordering
Dimayacyac to reconvey to Barro for P11,250 the share he had bought from
Allones and to pay Barro P10,000 as nominal damages plus P2, 000 for attorney’s
fees.

Defendants filed an urgent motion for reconsideration and to set
aside the decision but it was denied by the court.  They then went to the Court of Appeals, not
by ordinary appeal, but by means of a special civil action for certiorari
with injunction alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
judge.  The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition on the ground that the petitioners should have appealed the
decision of the lower court; it also observed that the decision had become
final and executory.

Petitioners, not satisfied with the decision of the Court of
Appeals, have elevated the case to us for review.  We required comment on the petition and after
the same had been submitted, we issued the following resolution on September
14, 1979:

“Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and
the arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, as well
as the comment of the respondents, the Court Resolved:  (a) to treat this case as a special civil
action for certiorari; (b) to consider: 
(1) respondents’ comment as answer to the petition; and (2) the case
SUBMITTED for decision.”

That the ordinary remedy which should be availed by a party who
has been declared in default and judgment rendered against him is that of
appeal and not certiorari is a rule too ele­mentary to be discussed
herein.  This rule, however, is not
without exceptions for to insist on its application in all cases may not always
serve the ends of justice.  The object of
procedural law is to facilitate the adjudication of conflicting claims.  Thus, although an appeal is available, certiorari
still lies when such appeal does not prove to be a more speedy and adequate
remedy.  (Martin, Rules of Court, Vol. 3,
p. 172, citing Valdez vs. Querubin, 37 Phil. 774; Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38
Phil. 182; Campos Y Cia vs. Del Rosario, 41 Phil. 45; Sabado vs. Gonzales, Inc.
53 Phil. 770; Westminster Bank vs. Torres and Nassoor, Inc., 57 Phil. 422;
Claudio vs. Zandueta, 64 Phil. 812; and Saludes vs. Pajarillo and Bautista, 78
Phil. 755.  See also Fernando vs.
Vasquez, L-26417, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 288.)

In the instant case, we agree with the petitioners that the more
appropriate and adequate remedy is not ordinary appeal but the special civil
action of certiorari.  For as they
have stated:

“How could petitioners
appeal when there is nothing to be appealed? 
They were not given an opportunity by the Respondent Judge to present
their evidence and therefore, nothing can be reviewed on appeal except the
self-serving evi­dences adduced by the private respondent during the ex parte
presentation of evidence.

Besides, the leading case of Association of Beverage Employees vs.
Figueras, L-4813, May 28, 1952, and the provisions of Rule 65, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court provide a remedy for an aggrieved party litigant like herein
petitioners, when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions
acted with grave abuse of dis­cretion.

To appeal the decision of the respondent judge would as contended
by the respondents, amount to a recognition of the judgment itself, but the
present petition is seeking for the annul­ment of the said decision on grounds
therein outlined.”

In the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
Rules of Court, no time frame, except that it be filed within a reasonable
time, is required.  Hence, it is
unnecessary to discuss whether or not the decision of the lower court of August
7, 1978, had become final and executory.

We come now to the main question, i.e., whether or not the trial
court committed a grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioners in default
and rendering judgment against them. 
Under the circumstances as narrated, the answer must necessarily be in
the affirmative.

Grave abuse of discretion means capricious and whim­sical
exercise of judgment; it is the exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner.

Rule 20, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court stipulates that “A
party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or
considered as in default.” But the petitioners in the instant case did not
fail to appear at the pre-trial conference on July 26, 1978, as ordered by the
trial court.  They were there.  What they failed to do was to submit a
pre-trial brief three days before the date which the Rules of Court do not
require.  In fact, the Court of Appeals
correctly observed: “There is some merit to the claim that the petitioner
was declared as in default somewhat hurriedly, just because he had failed to submit a pre-trial brief, three days
before the scheduled date.  Trial courts
should use sparingly the power to declare a party as in default, because party
thereby loses the right to offer evidence.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted; the decision
of the lower court dated August 7, 1978, is hereby vacated; and Civil Case No.
29061 is ordered to be re-tried after a pre-trial conference shall have
been conducted.  No special pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., and De
Castro, JJ., concur.

Barredo, (Chairman), and
Aquino, JJ., concur with the observation that
the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed.