G.R. No. L-25407. August 29, 1969
PILAR M. NORMANDY, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, AS WELL AS OF THE WORLD WAR II VETERANS ENTERPRISES, INC., & LORENZO B. CAMINS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS…
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch I), dated March 5,
1965, denying the motion of Ramon E. Saura, former First Receiver of the World
War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter referred to merely as WARVETS),
asking for reimbursement of the sum of P5, 236.00, representing the amount
which he allegedly paid in advance as compensation to a clerk whose services
he availed of while he was still a receiver.
On September 6,
1960, appellant was appointed receiver
of the WARVETS by the lower court in Civil Case No. 34998[1]
“generally to do and perform such
acts respecting the property, assets and transactions” of the
organization “as the court may authorize”. Upon filing a bond in the sum of fifty thousand
(P50, 000.00) pesos, he entered upon the discharge of his functions.
During his term,
appellant went to Japan by authority of the lower court’s order dated October
12, 1960 for the purpose of checking on the reported undervaluation of goods
shipped to the WARVETS and of preparing the shipment of the goods which had not
yet been committed. For expenses incurred
by him during this trip, which amounted to P9, 431.48, he was ordered
reimbursed by the lower court on June 5, 1963.[2] The
order authorizing reimbursement stated thus:
“x x x The order
permits the claim for reimbursement as part of the receiver’s compensation as
such receiver. It does not prohibit the
reimbursement of the expenses before the payment of the receiver’s compensation,
and it is only fair and just
that at least the expenses which the receiver advanced, if found reasonable and necessary, be reimbursed as soon as the
funds of the WARVETS permit.”
Except for this
reimbursed amount, appellant received no other fee or compensation from the
WARVETS. In fact, for a continuous
period of three (3) years, he performed his duties as receiver without
receiving any compensation as such.
Hence, on October 9, 1963, he filed a motion in the lower court to fix not only his compensation
but also that of his co-receiver, Macario Ofilada.[3] In his motion, he prayed further for such
amounts as attorney’s fees and stenographer’s fees as the court may allow. After an opposition thereto had been duly
interposed, the lower court issued an “Omnibus Order” on January 22,
1964, the second paragraph of which denied the motion of appellant. A reconsideration of the order of denial was
immediately sought by appellant.
Without awaiting action
on his motion for reconsideration, appellant filed another motion, on May 28,
1964, resigning from his post as receiver
and praying that the lower court accept it and at the same time fix the amount
of his fees and compensation as receiver.
On June 5, 1964,
appellant was discharged as receiver and his compensation was fixed at
P10,000.00. The order of the lower court
approving his discharge reads as follows:
“Ramon E. Saura, first receiver, filed in his own behalf on
May 28, 1964, his motion to withdraw as first receiver and for fixing of his
compensation. There being no objection
to this withdrawal, the same is hereby
granted. Respecting his compensation, neither is there objection
thereto. In fact, per joint motion
filed on May 28, by defendants, except Filipinas Merchandising, which has been
granted, they asked the withdrawal of their joint motion dated March 31, 1961,
for the removal of Saura as receiver; and per manifestation of said defendants
except Filipinas Merchandising dated May 28, they recommend P10, 000.00 as
Saura’s fee, which Jose and Susana Cochingyan are willing to advance for the
account of WARVETS.
“WHEREFORE, Ramon E. Saura’s
withdrawal as receiver in this case is hereby approved, and his fee as such is
hereby fixed at Pl0, 000.00, which Jose and Susana Cochingyan shall advance
for the account of WARVETS.”
Subsequently, one Atty.
Anacleto Magno, on his own behalf, presented before the lower court a motion
dated August 18, 1964, for the payment of attorney’s fees to him in the amount
of P10, 000.00 for his alleged services as legal counsel for the appellant when
he was still a receiver. Appellant,
himself, filed another motion for the payment and cancellation of his
receiver’s bond and for the reimbursement to him of the sum of P2, 030.00 which
he paid out of his personal funds as premium for said bond from September 9,
1960 to September 9, 1964. On September
24, 1964, the lower court disposed of both motions in one order by allowing
compensation to Atty. Magno in the reduced amount of P1, 000.00 and granting reimbursement
to appellant in the whole sum
prayed for by him as premium on his bond.
In granting fee to the counsel of appellant, the lower court: said:
“The motion, to the mind of the Court, is not well taken,
because Ramon E. Saura is himself a lawyer and he did not have to retain legal
counsel. If he did, the matter should be
for his own account, particularly because it was a unilateral act on Saura’s
part to get Magno as his lawyer in the receivership.
“Nevertheless, the Court is not unaware that Atty. Magno did
in fact work for Saura, for the former appeared in Court and signed pleadings
for Saura as receiver.
“Wherefore, in fairness to Atty. Magno, it is hereby ordered
that he be paid ‘1,000.00 from the funds under receivership. If he is not satisfied with this amount, he
can go after Saura.”
Barely two months after the issuance of the last-mentioned order,
or on November 18, 1964, appellant filed another motion for reimbursement, this
time for the amount he allegedly paid as compensation of a clerk whom he employed
when he was still a receiver for the period September 9, 1960 to May 28, 1964,
inclusive, at the rate of P120.00 a month, or the total sum of P5, 236.00. Appellant alleged that in view of the
voluminous paper and legal work which he had to attend to as receiver, it was
necessary for him to engage the service of a typist-stenographer, one Melchor
C. Ordoño, who doubled as messenger, filing clerk, utility clerk and records
clerk.
On March 5, 1965, although no party registered any objection to
appellant’s last motion for reimbursement, the lower court denied it in the
appealed order, reasoning thus:
“The record shows that the Court had previously ordered the
payment of P10, 000.00 as compensation for Ramon E. Saura for his services as
first receiver in this case. Therefore,
whatever amount he now seeks in addition thereto would be improper. Moreover, he is now estopped from claiming
any further amount as compensation for alleged clerical services employed by
him as such receiver without prior approval or authority of this Court.”
The lone contention of appellant in this appeal is that the lower
court committed an error in holding that he is not entitled to reimbursement of
the salaries paid by him to his clerk as receiver of the WARVETS. None of the other parties filed any brief.
A receiver is a representative of the court appointed for the
purpose of preserving and conserving the property
in litigation and prevent its possible destruction or dissipation, if it were
left, in the possession of any of the parties.
The receiver is not the representative of any of the parties but of all
of them to the end that their interests may be equally protected with the
least possible inconvenience and expense.
It is inherent in the office of a receiver not only that he should act at all times with the diligence and prudence of a good
father of a family but should also not incur any obligation or expenditure
without leave of the court and it is the responsibility of the court to
supervise the receiver and see to it that he adheres to the above standard of
his trust and limits the expenses of the receivership to the minimum. For these reasons, it is generally the
receivership court that is in a better position to determine whether a
particular expenditure is reasonable and justified or not and its ruling
thereon may not be disturbed by this Court.
It is true that in the case at bar, the motion in question of the
receiver was not opposed by any of the parties.
It is to be observed, however, that the records show that the court a
quo had previously allowed or approved reimbursements to the receiver
of expenditures made by him in connection with the performance of his duties,
more particularly, for a trip made to Japan and for the fees of a lawyer who
had allegedly assisted him, notwithstanding, he is a lawyer himself. Besides, the court a quo fixed
the total compensation to the appellant receiver at P10, 000.00 for his
services as such and said amount, from all appearances, is agreeable to
everyone, including appellant.
The receivership court’s reasons for withholding approval of the
reimbursement in question are precisely because “whatever amount he (the
receiver) now seeks in addition thereto (P10, 000) would be improper. Moreover, he is now estopped from claiming
any further amount as compensation for alleged clerical services employed
by-him as such receiver without prior approval or authority of this
Court.” We find these reasons to be cogent enough in the premises,
specially because appellant’s alleged employment of a clerk was made without
prior leave of court. In these
circumstances, it cannot be said that the court a quo abused its
discretion, much less gravely.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., did not take
part.
Teehanke, J., took no part.
[1]
This is a case filed on January 23, 1958 by Pilar Normandy, in her own behalf and
of others similarly situated as well as of the WARVETS against the defendants
Calixto Duque, Claro P. Lizardo, Florencio Selga, Alberto Ramos, Manuel
Buenafe and the Filipinas Merchandising Corporation, to set aside the
contracts of October 22 and November 25, 1957 entered into between the latter
corporation and the WARVETS. Allowed as
intervenors were the spouses Susana and Jose Cochingyan, Sr. Lorenzo B.
Camins, who was later joined in as party-plaintiff, petitioned for the
appointment of a receiver, which petition was granted by the lower court after
finding facts sufficient to warrant said appointment, to wit:
“From an examination of the
records, it appears that at its meeting on August 1957, the Cabinet approved
the proposal of the World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. to undertake the
procurement and sale of specific items of reparation goods from Japan, valued
at $8,000,000.00, in order to generate trust funds for the benefit of
veterans, war widows and orphans as contemplated in the Reparations Agreement
between the Philippines and Japan and as provided for in Republic Act No.
1789. Thus, on November 4, 1957, the
World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. entered into a Joint Account Agreement
(Annex D) with the spouses Susana and Jose Cochingyan, Sr., doing business
under the name and style of the Catholic Church Mart, where by the latter was given the right to dispose of the reparation goods
aforementioned of the total value of $8,000,000.00, with marginal profits of
40% on non-unclassified goods and 60% on unclassified items in favor of the
former.
“Likewise, and at almost the
same time, that is, on October 22, and November 25, 1957, the aforementioned
World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. entered into the two contracts in
question (Annexes E and F) with the Filipinas Merchandising Corporation whereby the latter was allowed to
negotiate the sale and distribution of the same reparation goods valued at
$2,000,000.00 and $6,000,000.00 with
marginal profits of 15% and 20%
respectively, in favor of the former.
“By reason of these
overlapping contracts, Susana and Jose Cochingyan, Sr. filed a specific
performance suit against the World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. being
Civil Case No. 34392 of this Court, with damages. However, this case was subsequently
dismissed after the World War II Veterans
Enterprises, Inc., the Filipinas Merchandising Corporation, and Susana and Jose
Cochingyan, Sr. executed on February 2, 1959, a Memorandum of Settlement and
Deed of Assignment whereby the Filipinas Merchandising Corporation, for a
consideration, assigned to and relinquished in favor of the Cochingyans all
its rights and privileges under its two contracts aforestated (Annexes E and
F), and whereby the World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. agreed to receive
greatly reduced marginal profits, from the Cochingyans, of 20% and 25% on
non-unclassified and unclassified items respectively. Thus, as a result of the confusion that
resulted in the execution of these various contracts, the ultimate beneficiaries,
namely, the veterans, war widows and orphans, would suffer losses equivalent to
a decrease or reduction in expected profits, from 40% and 60% assigned under
the contract with the Cochingyans of November 4, 1957 (Annex D) to 20% and 25%
under the Memorandum of Settlement dated February 2, 1959, or roughly
P3,400,000.00 to P6,600,000.00.
“It cannot be said that the
original profits of 40% and 60% assigned under the contract with the
Cochingyans of November 4, 1957 (Annex D), would be hard to realize, for it is
common knowledge that imported goods command very high prices much above their
procurement costs, and because the Cochingyans would not have sacrificed time,
energy and expenses in filing their performance suit, Civil Case No. 34392 of
this Court, against the World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. had they not
been sure that they could easily obtain those percentage gains and at the same
time make a safe margin of profits for themselves. As things now stand, the interest of the
beneficiaries cannot be amply protected by the World War II Veterans
Enterprises, Inc. which naturally feels bound to support its commitment under
the Memorandum of Settlement aforementioned.
“For the above reasons, the
Court considers the petition for the appointment of a receiver to be well
founded, and the same is, therefore, hereby granted.”
[2] The order authorizing appellant’s trip provides:
“If the receiver shall
undertake the said trip, it shall be at his own expense without prejudice to
his claiming reimbursement of such expenses as may be found necessary and
reasonable by the Court as part of his compensation as such receiver.” (See p.
10, Record on Appeal.)
[3] Macario Ofilada was appointed as Second Receiver of the
WARVETS by this Court on April 29, 1961, in G. R. No. L-18359 entitled
“Calixto Duque, et al. vs. Court of First Instance, et al.”;
See p. 8, Record on Appeal.