CAPITOL MOTORS CORPORATIONS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NEMESIO I. YABUT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal on a question of law from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-9869.

On March 1, 1966,
Capitol Motors Corporations filed a complaint against Nemesio
I. Yabut.  It
was therein averred that on April 24, 1965, the defendant executed in favor of
the plaintiff a promissory note (copy of which was attached to the complaint)
for the sum of P30,134.25, payable in eighteen (18) equal monthly installments
with interest at 12% per annum the first installment to become due on June 10,
1965; that it was stipulated in the promissory note that should the defendant
fail to pair two (2) successive installments, the principal sum remaining
unpaid would immediately become due and demandable and the defendant would, by
way of attorney’s fees and costs of collection, be obligated to the plaintiff
for an additional sum equivalent to 25% of 
the principal and interest due; that as of February 23, 1966, the sum
remaining unpaid on the promissory note was P30,754.79, including accrued
interest; that the defendant defaulted in the payment of two (2) successive
installments, and likewise failed to pay the interest due on the promissory
note; and that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, the defendant failed and
refused to pay the said principal sum and interest due. Prayer was made that
the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30,754.79,
as well as the interest due thereon from February 23, 1966, and an additional sum equivalent to 25%
of the amount due, plus costs.

On April 27, 1966,
and within the reglementary period, the defendant,
through his counsel, filed an answer which reads:

“DEFENDANT through counsel alleges:

“1.  Paragraph
1 of the complaint is admitted.

“2.  Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the
complaint are specifically denied for lack of know­ledge sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth thereof.

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Complaint be
dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.”

On June 16, 1966,
the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that
the defend­ant, not having set forth in his answer the substance of the matters
relied upon by him to support his denial, had failed to deny specifically the
material allegations of the complaint, hence, must be deemed to have admitted
them.  The defendant did not file an
opposition to the motion.  On September 13, 1966, after hearing on
the motion, the court issued an order granting the said motion and considering
the case submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings; and on January 9, 1967, the court rendered
judgment granting in toto the
plaintiff’s prayer in its complaint.

In this appeal, defendant-appellant contends that the court a
quo erred in considering him as having failed to deny specifically the
material allegations of the complaint, and, consequently, in deciding the case
on the basis of the pleadings.  Citing
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I 1963 Ed., p. 281, he argues that
since Section 10 Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court, recognizes three (3)
modes of specific denial, namely: (1) by specifying each material allegation of
fact in the complaint the truth of which the defendant does not admit and,
whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will
rely upon to support his denial or (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the
complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder or (3) by
stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which
has the effect of a denial, and he has adopted the third mode of specific
denial, his answer tendered an issue, and, consequently, the court a quo
could not render a valid judgment on the pleadings.

This appeal is without merit.

We agree with defendant-appellant that one of the modes of
specific denial contemplated in Section 10, Rule 8, is a denial by stating
that, the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint.  The question, however, is whether paragraph 2
of defendant-appellant’s answer constitutes a specific denial under the said
rule.  We do not think so.  In Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes,
et al., G.R.No.L-9531, May 140 1958 (103 Phil., 662), this Court said that the
rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and
giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to
which want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the
defendant’s knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably
untrue.  In said case the suit was one
for foreclosure of mortgage; and a copy of the deed of mortgage was attached to
the complaint; thus, according to this Court, it would have been easy for the
defendants to specifically allege in their answer whether or not they had
executed the alleged mortgage.  The same
thing can be said in the present case, where a copy of the promissory note sued
upon was attached to the complaint.  The
doctrine in Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. was reiterated in J.P. Juan &
Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc., G.R.No. L-25137, July 28, 1969 (28 SCRA 807).  And in Sy-quia vs. Marsman,
G.R. No. L-23426, March 1, 1968
(22 SCRA 927), this Court said:

“With regard to the plea of lack of knowledge or information
set up in paragraph 3 of the answer, this Court’s decision in Warner Barnes vs.
Reyes, 103 Phil. 662, 6650 is authority for the proposition that this form of
denial must be availed of with sincerity and good faith, not for the purpose of
confusing the other party, nor for purposes of delay.  Yet, so lacking in sincerity and good faith
is this part of the answer that defendants-appellants go to the limit of denying
knowledge or information as to whether they (defendants) were in the premises (Marsman Bldg.) on January
4, 1961, as averred, in paragraph 4 of the complaint.  Yet whether such a fact was or was not true
could not be unknown to these defendants.”

In National Marketing Corporation vs. De
Castro, 106 Phil., 803 (1959), this Court held:

“Furthermore, in his answer to the appellee’s
complaint, he merely alleged that ‘he has no knowledge of information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters contained in paragraphs
3, 4, 5 and 6 so much so that he denies specifically said allegations.’ A
denial is not spe­cific simply because it is so qualified. (Sections 6 and 7,
Rule 9; El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments,
Inc. 74 Phil., 79; Baetamo vs. Amador, 74 Phil., 735;
Dacanay vs. Lucero, 76 Phil., 139; Lagrimas vs. Lagrimas, 95 Phil.,
113.) Material averments in a complaint, other than those as to the amount of
damage, are deemed admitted when not specifically denied. (Section 8, Rule 9.)
The court may render judgment upon the pleadings if material averments in the
complaint are admitted.  (Section 10, Rule 35; Baetamo vs. Amador,
supra Lichauco vs. Guash,
76 Phil., 5; Lati vs. Valmores,
G.R.No. L-6877, 30 March 1954.)”

It becomes evident from all the above
doctrines that a mere allegation of ignorance of the facts alleged in the complaint, is insufficient to raise an issue; the defendant
must aver positively or state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts so
alleged. (Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines,
Vol. I, p. 417, citing Wood vs. Staniels
3 Code Rep. 152 and Vassalt vs. Austin, 32 Cal.
597.)

Thus, in at least two (2) cases where this Court ruled that
judgment on the pleadings was not proper, it will be seen that the reason was
that in each case the defendants did something more than merely alleging lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief.  In Arrojo
vs. Caldoza, et al., G.R.No.
L-17454, July 31, 1963 (8 SCRA 547), the defendants, in their answer to the
complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land, did not merely allege
that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the material allegations in the complaint, but added the
following:  “The truth of the mat­ter
is that the defendants have not occupied or taken any property belonging to the
plaintiff.  They took possession and
ownership only of the land belonging to them, which properties were possessed
and owned originally by their predecessors-in-interest, who were the parents of
the defendants * * *.” In Benavides vs. Alabastro,
G.R.No.L-19762, December 23, 1964 (12 SCRA 553), the defendant’s answer did not
only deny the material allegations of the complaint but also set up certain
special and affirmative defenses the nature of which called for presentation of
evidence.

There are two other reasons why the present appeal must
fail.  First.  The present action is founded upon a written
instrument attached to the complaint, but defendant-appellant failed to deny
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the instrument; hence, the same
are deemed admitted.  (Section 8, Rule 8
of the Revised Rules of Court; Songco vs. Sellner, 37 Phil. 254; Philippine Commercial &
Industrial Bank vs. ELRO Phil., Corporation et al., G.R. No. L-30830,
August 22,
1969 [29 SCRA 38]; J.P. Juan & Sons,
Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc., supra.)
Second.  Defendant-appellant did
not oppose the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by plaintiff-appellee; neither has he filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order of September 13, 1966,
which deemed the case submitted for decision on the pleadings, or of the
decision rendered on January 9, 1967.  In Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963 (9 SCRA 349), this
Court said:

“It appears that when the plaintiff moved to have the case decided
on the pleadings, the defendant interposed no objection and has practically
assented thereto.  The defendant,
therefore, is deemed to have admitted the allegations of the complaint, so that
there was no necessity for the plaintiff to submit evidence of his claim.”

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.