REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SATURNINO R. ARICHETA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Republic versus Aricheta

The Case

This is an action by the Republic of the Philippines against Saturnino R. Aricheta to eject him from a parcel of land he is occupying, or squatting on, within the East Triangle of the Quezon Memorial Park in Diliman, Quezon City. The Republic claims ownership of the park, which was established by presidential proclamation, and the defendant resists on the strength of a Spanish grant supposedly issued to a remote predecessor and a deed of sale in his favor. The case matters because it settles, in a few clean strokes, the relationship between a Torrens certificate of title held by a government entity and a presidential proclamation converting the covered land into a public park, and because it teaches what a buyer who is himself a lawyer is presumed to know about titled land in and around the capital.

Procedural History

The Republic filed the complaint for ejectment in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After a pre-trial at which both sides presented documentary evidence without objection, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the Republic the registered owner of the land under its certificate of title, finding that the portion in question had been converted into the Quezon Memorial Park by presidential proclamation, that the park is administered by the National Parks and Wildlife Office, that the defendant had been occupying the premises for more than one year after the filing of the action, and that the proclamation is constitutional. The defendant moved for reconsideration and for a new trial; both were denied. He then perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court, assigning five errors.

Facts

The Republic established the Quezon Memorial Park by Proclamation Number 42, dated July 5, 1954, as amended by Proclamation Number 373, dated December 21, 1956, both issued by the President of the Philippines. The whole land constituting the park is covered by a certificate of title in the name of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. The Republic sent the defendant letters of demand to vacate in July and September 1955, and when he refused, it brought this action.

The defendant answered that the land formerly belonged to Marcelino Tiburcio, who was granted a Spanish grant on March 25, 1877; that he purchased the property in good faith from a vendor whose deed of sale was registered under Act Number 3344; that the Republic had no valid title and acquired one merely by presidential proclamation; and that an action between Tiburcio and the Republic, through the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, over the same parcel was pending.

At the pre-trial the defendant presented, among others, a copy of the deed of sale in his favor, his petition for registration under Act Number 3344, and the agreement between Tiburcio and his predecessor. To rebut this, the Republic showed that the Commissioner of Parks and Wildlife had opposed Tiburcio's application for registration under Act Number 496, and that the court had denied that application in a resolution dated October 17, 1955, which had already become final. The defendant, it bears noting, is an attorney at law.

Issues

• Whether or not the complaint is defective for lack of verification under Section 1 of Rule 72, and whether that defect may be raised for the first time on appeal.
• Whether or not there is a pending action between the parties for the same cause, amounting to litis pendentia.
• Whether or not the certificate of title held by the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was anomalously and fraudulently obtained.
• Whether or not the defendant may be considered a possessor in good faith.
• Whether or not the presidential proclamation converting the land into a park is valid.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, on the verification of complaints in actions for the recovery of possession of real property, provides:

The complaint shall be verified by an affidavit that the plaintiff has good faith in the claim of the possession of the premises.

The Court treats the action as one for recovery of title and possession rather than a bare forcible entry case, and holds that any defect in verification was waived because it was not raised in the trial court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the action is one for the recovery of title and possession of property, as the evidence shows, and that in any event the supposed defect in the complaint cannot be raised on appeal, not having been raised at the opportune time in the trial court.

On the second issue, the Court found that while a civil case between Tiburcio and the Republic had indeed been filed, the trial showed that it had already been decided, as proved by the order denying registration, which had become final. There was therefore no pending action to speak of.

On the third issue, the Court dismissed the claim that the certificate of title was anomalously and fraudulently obtained as a mere allegation without evidence to support it.

On the fourth issue, the Court refused to find the defendant a possessor in good faith. It stressed that the defendant is an attorney at law, who should have known that no property around the City of Manila or in Quezon City is as yet not covered by Torrens title. It added that his vendor had no Torrens title and that the deed of sale itself stated that the vendor bound himself to issue a clear title to the land, which shows that the vendee must have doubted the validity of his vendor's title.

On the fifth issue, the Court upheld the proclamation, reasoning that since the whole land constituting the park is covered by a certificate of title in the name of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and is therefore property of the Government of the Philippines, the authority of the President to convert the same into a park cannot be questioned.

Doctrine

A Torrens certificate of title in the name of a government entity is conclusive evidence of the Government's ownership, and the President may validly convert land so covered into a public park by proclamation; the authority to do so cannot be questioned. An allegation that a Torrens title was fraudulently obtained is worthless without evidence to support it. A buyer of untitled land in or around the capital cannot be a possessor in good faith where he is an attorney at law, is chargeable with knowledge that such land is already under Torrens title, and accepts a deed in which his vendor undertakes to issue a clear title later, for that undertaking betrays doubt about the vendor's own title. Finally, a defect in the verification of a complaint is waived if not raised in the trial court, and a claim of a pending action fails once the supposed prior case has already been decided by a final order.

Disposition

The Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal, which it called frivolous, affirmed the decision of the trial court, and imposed treble costs against the defendant-appellant.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a Torrens title in the name of a government entity makes the land government property, so the President's proclamation converting it into a park cannot be questioned. Examiners like to use this case on the good faith of a buyer of untitled land, especially a lawyer-buyer, and on the waiver of a defective verification raised only on appeal.